@ultimat3/auth 9.0.0 → 11.0.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -24,8 +24,20 @@ import type { AuthLimiter, AuthRateLimitPolicy } from './rate-limit';
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  export type AuthLimiterFactory = (policy: AuthRateLimitPolicy) => AuthLimiter;
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  let factory: AuthLimiterFactory | undefined;
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- /** Every limiter this process built through the factory above, so a purge can reach them. */
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- let built: AuthLimiter[] = [];
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+ /**
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+ * The limiters a purge can still reach, ONE per distinct window.
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+ *
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+ * A list appended to per call is a leak with no ceiling: `installedAuthLimiter` runs twice per
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+ * `defineAuth` — the account/IP bucket and the tenant bucket — and nothing trimmed it, so a
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+ * process that redefines auth (`x dev`'s reload, a test file, a host building one `Auth` per app)
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+ * held every limiter it ever built, and the store behind each, for its whole life.
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+ *
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+ * Keyed by `windowMs` because that is the only thing `purgeAuthLimits` reads: every limiter here
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+ * writes the same two tables, so one per window is all a sweep can distinguish. The FIRST of a
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+ * window is kept, which is the limiter the old list already swept — a second install clears the
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+ * map, so nothing here outlives the pool it was built on either way.
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+ */
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+ let built = new Map<number, AuthLimiter>();
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  /**
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  * The ONE install point, the same shape as `configureKdfGate` beside it: a host that owns the
@@ -37,13 +49,13 @@ let built: AuthLimiter[] = [];
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  */
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  export function configureAuthLimiters(next: AuthLimiterFactory): void {
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  factory = next;
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- built = [];
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+ built = new Map();
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  }
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  /** Back to `createAuthLimiter`, the per-process default. A host that installs one calls this on stop. */
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  export function resetAuthLimiters(): void {
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  factory = undefined;
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- built = [];
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+ built = new Map();
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  }
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  /**
@@ -55,10 +67,20 @@ export function resetAuthLimiters(): void {
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  export function installedAuthLimiter(policy: AuthRateLimitPolicy): AuthLimiter | undefined {
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  if (factory === undefined) return undefined;
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  const limiter = factory(policy);
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- built.push(limiter);
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+ if (!built.has(policy.windowMs)) built.set(policy.windowMs, limiter);
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  return limiter;
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  }
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73
 
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+ /**
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+ * How many limiters a purge can still reach. Deliberately NOT exported from `src/index.ts`: it
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+ * exists because unbounded retention has no other observation — `purgeAuthLimits` sweeps exactly
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+ * one limiter however many were held, so no assertion about behaviour could see the growth. The
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+ * same shape as `@ultimat3/realtime`'s `droppedChannelFrames`.
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+ */
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+ export function installedLimiterCount(): number {
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+ return built.size;
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+ }
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+
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  /** A limiter that keeps rows somebody else has to delete. The memory limiter sweeps itself. */
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  type PurgingAuthLimiter = AuthLimiter & { purgeExpired(): Promise<number> };
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@@ -82,7 +104,7 @@ const canPurge = (limiter: AuthLimiter): limiter is PurgingAuthLimiter =>
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  */
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  export async function purgeAuthLimits(): Promise<number> {
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  let widest: PurgingAuthLimiter | undefined;
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- for (const limiter of built) {
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+ for (const limiter of built.values()) {
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  if (!canPurge(limiter)) continue;
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  if (widest === undefined || limiter.policy.windowMs > widest.policy.windowMs) widest = limiter;
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  }
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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  // database exists and the one every test in this package runs against — the same interface
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  // Postgres and Better Auth implement, so a flow that works here works there or the seam is wrong.
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+ import { type Clock, systemClock } from '@ultimat3/core';
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  import type {
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  AuthAccount,
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  AuthAdapter,
@@ -14,18 +15,29 @@ import type {
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  UserPatch,
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  UserQuery,
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  } from './adapter';
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+ import { authUniqueViolation } from './errors';
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  import { timingSafeEqual } from './tokens';
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  const verificationKey = (purpose: string, identifier: string): string => `${purpose}:${identifier}`;
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  export class MemoryAdapter implements AuthAdapter {
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  readonly name = 'memory';
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+ readonly #clock: Clock;
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  readonly #users = new Map<string, AuthUser>();
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  readonly #sessions = new Map<string, AuthSession>();
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  readonly #accounts = new Map<string, AuthAccount>();
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  readonly #verifications = new Map<string, AuthVerification>();
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  readonly #apiKeys = new Map<string, AuthApiKeyRecord>();
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+ /**
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+ * The clock every instant this adapter stamps comes from — one argument, because a stamp is a
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+ * fact about WHEN a call happened and a test that cannot move it can only assert a range.
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+ * Defaults to `systemClock`, so `new MemoryAdapter()` is what it always was.
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+ */
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+ constructor(clock: Clock = systemClock) {
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+ this.#clock = clock;
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+ }
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+
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  /**
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  * Exact match, because `BuiltinAdapter` issues `where email = $1` against a plain `text ...
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  * unique` column and nothing folds case there. Normalising here instead made this the ONE
@@ -43,7 +55,35 @@ export class MemoryAdapter implements AuthAdapter {
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  return this.#users.get(id) ?? null;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * The two UNIQUE constraints `x_users` declares, enforced here because `BuiltinAdapter` LEANS on
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+ * them: `email text not null unique` and `external_id text unique` (`tables.ts`). Without them
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+ * this adapter — the one `x new` scaffolds and every test runs against — accepted two rows at one
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+ * address, and the second was unreachable forever, since `findUserByEmail` returns the first.
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+ *
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+ * Over the STORED string, exactly as Postgres compares it. No case folding: that is the
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+ * divergence `adapter-parity.test.ts`'s first case pins, and `normaliseEmail` above the seam is
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+ * what makes two spellings one address.
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+ */
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  async createUser(input: CreateUserInput): Promise<AuthUser> {
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+ for (const existing of this.#users.values()) {
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+ if (existing.email === input.email) {
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+ throw authUniqueViolation('createUser', 'x_users', 'email');
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+ }
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+ // `!= null` in one predicate, spelled out: a Postgres unique index is NULLS DISTINCT, so
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+ // `external_id text unique` constrains only the rows that CARRY a value and admits
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+ // unlimited NULLs. `!== undefined` alone made a second account with no external id collide
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+ // with the first — and `oauth-login.ts` hands over `grants.externalId ?? null` for every
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+ // first-time OAuth user, so the second such signup failed against a constraint production
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+ // does not have.
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+ if (
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+ input.externalId !== undefined &&
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+ input.externalId !== null &&
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+ existing.externalId === input.externalId
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+ ) {
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+ throw authUniqueViolation('createUser', 'x_users', 'external_id');
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+ }
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+ }
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  const user: AuthUser = {
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  id: input.id,
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  // Stored as handed over, exactly as the `insert into x_users` binds it.
@@ -197,7 +237,10 @@ export class MemoryAdapter implements AuthAdapter {
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  // Before the write, never after: a wrong guess that consumed the row would be an
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  // unauthenticated way to kill the victim's live link, which is the Postgres adapter's rule too.
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  if (!timingSafeEqual(tokenHash, record.tokenHash)) return null;
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- const consumed: AuthVerification = { ...record, consumedAt: new Date(record.createdAt) };
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+ // The moment it was REDEEMED, which is what `consumed_at = now()` writes on the Postgres
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+ // side. This was `new Date(record.createdAt)` — the moment it was ISSUED — so every window
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+ // measured from the stamp read a redemption as having happened at issue time.
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+ const consumed: AuthVerification = { ...record, consumedAt: this.#clock.now() };
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  this.#verifications.set(key, consumed);
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  return consumed;
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  }
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
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  import type { Clock } from '@ultimat3/core';
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  import { EnvMissingError, systemClock } from '@ultimat3/core';
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- import { oauthStateInvalid } from './errors';
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  import type { OAuthHandshake, OAuthProviderId } from './oauth';
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+ import { oauthStateInvalid } from './oauth-errors';
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  import { hasOAuthProvider } from './oauth-registry';
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  import { type RequestLike, readCookie } from './session';
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  import { base64Url, timingSafeEqual } from './tokens';
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
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  // four endpoints that nobody re-checks when the vendor moves one.
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5
 
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  import { renderThrowable } from '@ultimat3/core';
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- import { oauthExchangeFailed } from './errors';
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  import { isRecord } from './json';
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  import type { OAuthProvider } from './oauth';
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+ import { oauthExchangeFailed } from './oauth-errors';
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  import type { OAuthFetch } from './oauth-exchange';
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11
 
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  const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
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+ // Single responsibility: the OAuth half of this package's error factories — every refusal a
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+ // provider handshake can produce, and the one phrase their fixes are built from.
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+ // Split from `errors.ts` at the 500-line ceiling; the codes, the titles and the single
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+ // `registerErrorCodes()` call stay there, so this file adds no code and registers nothing.
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+
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+ import { renderCauseValue, renderFixLiteral } from '@ultimat3/core';
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+ import { AuthError } from './errors';
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+ import { oauthStartPath } from './oauth-paths';
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+
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+ /**
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+ * The `fix:` quotes `oauthStartPath` rather than a hand-written path. That is not tidiness: this
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+ * line shipped naming `GET /auth/oauth/<provider>` while `@ultimat3/auth` mounted no route at all,
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+ * so every caller who followed it hit a 404. One declaration, read by the mount and by the fix,
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+ * is what stops that recurring — `oauthLogin()` cannot move without moving this sentence.
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+ */
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+ export const oauthStateInvalid = (provider: string, part: string): AuthError =>
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+ new AuthError({
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+ code: 'X_OAUTH_STATE_INVALID',
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+ cause: `${provider} callback rejected: ${part}`,
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+ fix: `${restartAt(provider)} — a callback URL is single-use`,
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+ meta: { provider },
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+ });
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+
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+ /** The one phrase every "start over" fix is built from, so none of them can name a dead route. */
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+ export const restartAt = (provider: string): string =>
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+ `restart the flow at GET ${oauthStartPath(provider)}`;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * The provider came back with `error=` and no code — almost always the user pressing Cancel.
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+ * A separate code from `X_OAUTH_EXCHANGE_FAILED` on purpose: nothing was exchanged, nothing is
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+ * misconfigured, and folding the single commonest non-success outcome of a login into the code
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+ * that means "the client secret is wrong" makes both unreadable in a log and pages the wrong person.
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+ */
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+ export const oauthDenied = (
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+ provider: string,
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+ reason: string,
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+ description: string | null,
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+ ): AuthError =>
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+ new AuthError({
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+ code: 'X_OAUTH_DENIED',
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+ // `reason` and `description` are query parameters off the callback URL — whatever the browser
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+ // was redirected with, newlines and quotes included. `renderCauseValue` renders them as JSON
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+ // string literals, so a forged `error_description` cannot forge a second log line or break the
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+ // sentence around it. Both are already `string` by type: this is escaping, not throw-safety.
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+ cause: `${provider} declined the authorization: ${renderCauseValue(reason)}${
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+ description === null ? '' : ` (${renderCauseValue(description)})`
47
+ }`,
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+ fix: `${restartAt(provider)} and approve the ${provider} consent screen`,
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+ meta: { provider, reason },
50
+ });
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+
52
+ /**
53
+ * A URL segment naming a provider no `registerOAuthProvider` call has claimed, or one that is but
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+ * was left out of `defineAuth({ providers })`. One refusal for both: which of the two it is
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+ * describes the app's configuration to an unauthenticated caller, and the fix is the same sentence
56
+ * either way.
57
+ *
58
+ * **`supported` is the CALLER's to scope, because the two callers have two audiences.**
59
+ * `oauth-route.ts` passes `BUILTIN_OAUTH_PROVIDER_IDS` — its reader is an anonymous stranger who
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+ * typed a URL, and the three built-ins are a framework constant already in the public docs, while
61
+ * the live registry holds whatever internal OP this deployment registered. `providerFor()` passes
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+ * `oauthProviderIds()` — its reader is a developer holding a stack trace, and there the full list
63
+ * is exactly what makes the fix runnable. Neither ever passes `defineAuth({ providers })`: naming
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+ * what this deployment turned on is the disclosure the shared refusal exists to prevent.
65
+ *
66
+ * The fix names `registerOAuthProvider` first so it stays executable for the branch the narrowed
67
+ * list cannot cover — a segment nothing registered cannot be added to `providers` at all, so
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+ * "add it" alone was an instruction that could not be followed.
69
+ *
70
+ * The segment itself is a URL path the caller typed, so it goes through `renderCauseValue` in the
71
+ * sentence and `renderFixLiteral` in the command — a fix has to parse after a hostile value lands
72
+ * in it.
73
+ */
74
+ export const oauthProviderUnknown = (provider: string, supported: readonly string[]): AuthError =>
75
+ new AuthError({
76
+ code: 'X_OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN',
77
+ cause: `no oauth provider is mounted at ${renderCauseValue(oauthStartPath(provider))}`,
78
+ fix: `registerOAuthProvider({ id: ${renderFixLiteral(provider, '<id>')} }) if it is not built in, then add that id to defineAuth({ providers: [...] }) — known here: ${supported.map((id) => `'${id}'`).join(', ')}`,
79
+ meta: { provider },
80
+ });
81
+
82
+ /**
83
+ * Two `registerOAuthProvider` calls claiming one id. A silent replacement would let whichever
84
+ * module imported second decide where every login for that id goes — including which `issuers`
85
+ * an id token may claim — so the second registration refuses at boot instead.
86
+ */
87
+ export const oauthProviderDuplicate = (provider: string): AuthError =>
88
+ new AuthError({
89
+ code: 'X_OAUTH_PROVIDER_DUPLICATE',
90
+ cause: `an oauth provider is already registered as ${renderCauseValue(provider)}, so the second registration would silently replace the first`,
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+ fix: `give one of them a different id, or delete the duplicate registerOAuthProvider({ id: ${renderFixLiteral(provider, '<id>')} }) call`,
92
+ meta: { provider },
93
+ });
94
+
95
+ export interface OAuthExchangeFailure {
96
+ readonly provider: string;
97
+ /**
98
+ * Which leg of the server-to-server conversation failed. `discovery` and `jwks` are the two
99
+ * boot/verification legs an enterprise OP adds: reading `/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
100
+ * and reading the key set an id token's signature is checked against.
101
+ */
102
+ readonly stage: 'token' | 'userinfo' | 'discovery' | 'jwks';
103
+ readonly detail: string;
104
+ readonly status?: number | undefined;
105
+ readonly fix: string;
106
+ }
107
+
108
+ /**
109
+ * Deliberately specific, unlike every credential error above it. This one describes a
110
+ * conversation between two servers — naming the stage, the provider and its own status
111
+ * discloses nothing about any user, and is the difference between a fixable misconfiguration
112
+ * and a shrug.
113
+ */
114
+ export const oauthExchangeFailed = (failure: OAuthExchangeFailure): AuthError =>
115
+ new AuthError({
116
+ code: 'X_OAUTH_EXCHANGE_FAILED',
117
+ cause:
118
+ `${failure.provider} ${failure.stage} request failed` +
119
+ `${failure.status === undefined ? '' : ` with HTTP ${failure.status}`}: ${failure.detail}`,
120
+ fix: failure.fix,
121
+ meta: {
122
+ provider: failure.provider,
123
+ stage: failure.stage,
124
+ ...(failure.status === undefined ? {} : { status: failure.status }),
125
+ },
126
+ });
127
+
128
+ /**
129
+ * The address is proven to the provider, and an account that never proved it already holds it.
130
+ * Naming that is not account enumeration — this caller just demonstrated they own the address —
131
+ * and staying silent would leave them with a login that fails forever and no way out.
132
+ *
133
+ * The address itself rides in `meta`, never in `cause`: a log pipeline can redact a field by
134
+ * key, and cannot redact an address that was already interpolated into a sentence.
135
+ */
136
+ export const oauthAccountNotLinked = (provider: string, email: string): AuthError =>
137
+ new AuthError({
138
+ code: 'X_UNAUTHENTICATED',
139
+ cause: `an account holds this ${provider} address but never verified it, so ${provider} may not claim it`,
140
+ fix: `sign in with that account's password and confirm the email-verify link, then retry ${provider}`,
141
+ meta: { provider, email },
142
+ });
143
+
144
+ /**
145
+ * `link: 'never'` and a local account already holds the address. Same code and same disclosure
146
+ * rule as `oauthAccountNotLinked` — the caller proved to the provider that the address is theirs,
147
+ * so naming the collision is not enumeration — and the address rides in `meta`, never in `cause`.
148
+ */
149
+ export const oauthLinkingDisabled = (provider: string, email: string): AuthError =>
150
+ new AuthError({
151
+ code: 'X_UNAUTHENTICATED',
152
+ cause: `an account already holds this address and defineAuth({ link: 'never' }) forbids ${provider} from claiming it`,
153
+ fix: "sign in with that account's own credentials, or set link: 'verified-email' in defineAuth to let a provider-verified address claim a locally-verified account",
154
+ meta: { provider, email },
155
+ });
156
+
157
+ /**
158
+ * `CreateUserInput` carries no `emailVerifiedAt`, so a provider-verified address takes a second
159
+ * write. Falling back to the unstamped row would mint a session for a user every later login
160
+ * reads as unverified — the exact state `resolveUser` refuses to link a provider to — so the
161
+ * flow fails closed on an adapter that loses the stamp instead of half-succeeding.
162
+ */
163
+ export const emailVerifiedNotStored = (provider: string, userId: string): AuthError =>
164
+ new AuthError({
165
+ code: 'X_NOT_IMPLEMENTED',
166
+ cause: `the adapter returned no row for new user ${userId}, so the ${provider}-verified address was never stamped verified`,
167
+ fix: 'return the updated row from AuthAdapter.updateUser — MemoryAdapter.updateUser is the reference implementation',
168
+ meta: { provider, userId },
169
+ });
170
+
171
+ /** The token arrived, and is not one this handshake can trust: wrong `iss`, `aud`, or expired. */
172
+ export const oauthTokenInvalid = (provider: string, reason: string, fix: string): AuthError =>
173
+ new AuthError({
174
+ code: 'X_OAUTH_TOKEN_INVALID',
175
+ cause: `${provider} id token rejected: ${reason}`,
176
+ fix,
177
+ meta: { provider },
178
+ });
@@ -4,8 +4,13 @@
4
4
  // token is verified here, so no caller downstream can forget to.
5
5
 
6
6
  import type { Clock } from '@ultimat3/core';
7
- import { EnvMissingError, renderCauseValue, renderThrowable, systemClock } from '@ultimat3/core';
8
- import { oauthExchangeFailed, restartAt } from './errors';
7
+ import {
8
+ EnvMissingError,
9
+ logger,
10
+ renderCauseValue,
11
+ renderThrowable,
12
+ systemClock,
13
+ } from '@ultimat3/core';
9
14
  import { type IdTokenClaims, verifyIdToken } from './id-token';
10
15
  import { isRecord } from './json';
11
16
  import type { IdTokenKeys } from './jwks';
@@ -15,6 +20,7 @@ import {
15
20
  type OAuthHandshake,
16
21
  type OAuthProviderId,
17
22
  } from './oauth';
23
+ import { oauthExchangeFailed, restartAt } from './oauth-errors';
18
24
  import { providerFor } from './oauth-registry';
19
25
 
20
26
  /** Just the call. `typeof fetch` also carries `preconnect`, which no test double should have to. */
@@ -91,7 +97,31 @@ export function oauthCredentials(
91
97
  * mostly prose this package authored, and quoting that would make every readable message unread-
92
98
  * able. The rule is "remote text is rendered", and this function is where remote text is made.
93
99
  */
94
- export async function providerDetail(response: Response): Promise<string> {
100
+ /**
101
+ * How much of a body this leg may quote back.
102
+ *
103
+ * `'raw'` — the default and what userinfo, discovery and jwks use: those requests carry a bearer
104
+ * token or nothing, and the raw text is what makes a misconfigured enterprise OP debuggable.
105
+ *
106
+ * `'coded-only'` — the `POST /token` leg, and ONLY it. That request carries `client_secret`, and
107
+ * an endpoint that echoes what it was sent (compromised, impersonated, or a misbehaving gateway)
108
+ * put the secret into an `X_OAUTH_EXCHANGE_FAILED` `cause:` that `oauth-route.ts` publishes to an
109
+ * unauthenticated caller. Measured: 38 of 42 characters of the secret reached the response body,
110
+ * and a shorter `redirect_uri` fits all of it inside `MAX_DETAIL_LENGTH`. A coded OAuth error
111
+ * still comes through — `invalid_grant`, `redirect_uri_mismatch` — because that is a field the
112
+ * SPEC defines and the whole reason this string exists.
113
+ */
114
+ export type DetailEcho = 'raw' | 'coded-only';
115
+
116
+ /** What a `coded-only` leg says instead of the body. Names why, so nobody re-adds the echo. */
117
+ const OPAQUE_BODY =
118
+ 'the endpoint answered with a body that is not a coded OAuth error, and this leg does not quote ' +
119
+ 'one back because its request carries the client secret';
120
+
121
+ export async function providerDetail(
122
+ response: Response,
123
+ echo: DetailEcho = 'raw',
124
+ ): Promise<string> {
95
125
  const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');
96
126
  if (text === '') return 'the response body was empty';
97
127
  try {
@@ -105,6 +135,7 @@ export async function providerDetail(response: Response): Promise<string> {
105
135
  } catch {
106
136
  // Not JSON — fall through to the truncated raw text below.
107
137
  }
138
+ if (echo === 'coded-only') return OPAQUE_BODY;
108
139
  return renderCauseValue(
109
140
  text.length > MAX_DETAIL_LENGTH ? `${text.slice(0, MAX_DETAIL_LENGTH)}…` : text,
110
141
  );
@@ -143,16 +174,31 @@ async function postForm(
143
174
  signal: AbortSignal.timeout(options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS),
144
175
  });
145
176
  } catch (error) {
146
- // `renderThrowable`, never `error.message` behind an `instanceof`: the rejection comes from
147
- // an injected `fetch`, and `instanceof` itself throws on a value whose `getPrototypeOf` trap
148
- // does losing the one refusal that tells a caller the code is already spent.
149
- const reason = renderThrowable(error);
177
+ // The rendered value goes to the LOG, never into the `detail:`.
178
+ //
179
+ // `oauth-route.ts` publishes this cause to an unauthenticated caller, and the rejection comes
180
+ // from an injected `OAuthFetch` — an app's own wrapper, a proxy client, an adapter behind it —
181
+ // so its text is a server's internals. Reproduced: a bare
182
+ // `Error('connect ECONNREFUSED 10.4.2.17:5432 (postgres://app:hunter2@db.internal/prod)')`
183
+ // was served as the 502 body of a public callback. `problem()`'s uncoded branch does NOT catch
184
+ // this one: it is coded by the time it gets there.
185
+ //
186
+ // `renderThrowable`, never `error.message` behind an `instanceof`: `instanceof` itself throws
187
+ // on a value whose `getPrototypeOf` trap does, losing the one refusal that tells a caller the
188
+ // code is already spent. What stays in the sentence is `url` and the remedy, both framework
189
+ // constants, so the failure is still fixable without quoting anything this package does not own.
190
+ logger.error('auth.oauth.token_fetch_failed', {
191
+ provider,
192
+ url,
193
+ detail: renderThrowable(error),
194
+ });
150
195
  throw oauthExchangeFailed({
151
196
  provider,
152
197
  stage: 'token',
153
198
  detail:
154
- `${reason} — nothing left this host for ${url} (egress, DNS or TLS); restart the ` +
155
- 'flow once it does, since the code is already spent',
199
+ `nothing left this host for ${url} (egress, DNS or TLS); the reason is in this process ` +
200
+ 'log under auth.oauth.token_fetch_failed. Restart the flow once it does, since the code ' +
201
+ 'is already spent',
156
202
  fix: `curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null ${url}`,
157
203
  });
158
204
  }
@@ -161,7 +207,9 @@ async function postForm(
161
207
  throw oauthExchangeFailed({
162
208
  provider,
163
209
  stage: 'token',
164
- detail: await providerDetail(response),
210
+ // `coded-only`: this request carried `client_secret`, and `oauth-route.ts` publishes this
211
+ // cause to whoever typed the URL.
212
+ detail: await providerDetail(response, 'coded-only'),
165
213
  status: response.status,
166
214
  fix: fixForStatus(provider, response.status),
167
215
  });
@@ -7,16 +7,15 @@ import { ConfigInvalidError, logger, uuid } from '@ultimat3/core';
7
7
  import type { AuthAccount, AuthUser } from './adapter';
8
8
  import type { Auth, LoginResult } from './auth';
9
9
  import { normaliseEmail } from './email';
10
+ import { authWriteFailed, mfaRequired } from './errors';
11
+ import type { OAuthCallback, OAuthHandshake } from './oauth';
10
12
  import {
11
- authWriteFailed,
12
13
  emailVerifiedNotStored,
13
- mfaRequired,
14
14
  oauthAccountNotLinked,
15
15
  oauthExchangeFailed,
16
16
  oauthLinkingDisabled,
17
17
  restartAt,
18
- } from './errors';
19
- import type { OAuthCallback, OAuthHandshake } from './oauth';
18
+ } from './oauth-errors';
20
19
  import {
21
20
  exchangeOAuthCode,
22
21
  type OAuthClientCredentials,
@@ -200,8 +199,20 @@ function accountFor(auth: Auth, user: AuthUser, input: OAuthSignInInput): AuthAc
200
199
  userId: user.id,
201
200
  provider: input.profile.provider,
202
201
  providerAccountId: input.profile.providerAccountId,
203
- accessToken: input.tokens.accessToken,
204
- refreshToken: input.tokens.refreshToken,
202
+ // `null`, deliberately — this package does not persist a provider credential.
203
+ //
204
+ // `x_accounts.access_token` and `refresh_token` held live provider tokens in the CLEAR, under
205
+ // a `tables.ts` header promising "no column holds a plaintext secret", and NOTHING read either
206
+ // one back: `oauth-profile.ts` uses the token from the exchange, in flight, and
207
+ // `packages/auth/CLAUDE.md` states that refresh is not implemented. Declared and never wired
208
+ // — the same deletion this repo already ran for `jobs.driver`, except this one made a database
209
+ // dump into a set of usable third-party credentials.
210
+ //
211
+ // The TYPE keeps both fields: `AuthAccount` is the documented adapter seam, and an app that
212
+ // deliberately stores tokens implements `linkAccount` itself. What changed is what the
213
+ // framework writes.
214
+ accessToken: null,
215
+ refreshToken: null,
205
216
  expiresAt: input.tokens.expiresAt,
206
217
  createdAt: auth.clock.now(),
207
218
  };
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
4
4
  // decides whether this login may attach itself to an existing account by address.
5
5
 
6
6
  import { logger, renderThrowable } from '@ultimat3/core';
7
- import { oauthExchangeFailed, restartAt } from './errors';
8
7
  import { idTokenEmailVerified, isVerifiedFlag } from './id-token';
9
8
  import { isRecord } from './json';
10
9
  import type { OAuthProviderId } from './oauth';
10
+ import { oauthExchangeFailed, restartAt } from './oauth-errors';
11
11
  import {
12
12
  OAUTH_USER_AGENT,
13
13
  type OAuthFetch,
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
5
5
  // account linking with it. The three built-ins register through the same call an app uses, so the
6
6
  // opening does not create a second path.
7
7
 
8
- import { oauthProviderDuplicate, oauthProviderUnknown } from './errors';
9
8
  import type { OAuthProvider } from './oauth';
10
9
  import { BUILTIN_OAUTH_PROVIDERS } from './oauth-builtins';
10
+ import { oauthProviderDuplicate, oauthProviderUnknown } from './oauth-errors';
11
11
 
12
12
  const registry = new Map<string, OAuthProvider>();
13
13