@ultimat3/ai 2.0.0 → 3.0.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CLAUDE.md CHANGED
@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ Tier 4. May import tier 0–3: `core schema i18n money time cache seo entity pol
4
4
  query jobs realtime`. **Never** `mcp manifest render pwa ui admin testing cli`.
5
5
 
6
6
  Declared today: `action` (the primitive `llm()` returns), `cache` (semantic cache), `core`,
7
- `db` (pgvector), `money`, `policy`, `schema`, `time`.
7
+ `db` (pgvector), `jobs` (`agentJob()`), `money`, `policy`, `schema`, `time`.
8
+
9
+ **`jobs` was declared 2026-08, for `agentJob()`.** `packages/action/src/job-handle.ts`'s header
10
+ already named this package as the home: `isJobHandle` needs `kind === 'job'` plus membership of a
11
+ WeakMap only `job()` writes, and `action` and `jobs` are both tier 3, so the bridge has to live at
12
+ tier 4+. Downward edge, nothing new in the tier table.
8
13
 
9
14
  `mcp` is the same tier, so the LLM-tool projection is restated structurally in `tools.ts`
10
15
  rather than imported. Same contract, two wire formats — and the same *decision*: `toLlmTools` and
@@ -44,10 +49,16 @@ until 2026-08, naming a tool no catalog contained (`llm.test.ts`, `agent.test.ts
44
49
  | `pg-vector-sql.ts` | every pgvector statement: DDL, upsert, cosine, FTS, RRF fusion |
45
50
  | `pg-vector.ts` | `PgVectorStore` — the production store |
46
51
  | `rag.ts` | chunker, retriever, reranker, budgeted context assembler |
47
- | `tools.ts` | action → LLM tool definition; `runLlmToolCall` |
52
+ | `tools.ts` | action → LLM tool definition; the `AgentTool` union and `asProjectableAction`; `runLlmToolCall` |
48
53
  | `llm.ts` | `llm()` — the model call, declared as an `action`; and what a streamed answer must satisfy |
49
54
  | `llm-stream.ts` | `.stream()`'s plumbing: the sink, the ambient mark, the one-turn drive |
50
55
  | `agent.ts` | `agent()` — the tool loop, declared as an `action` |
56
+ | `agent-transcript.ts` | what one turn leaves in the transcript: the assistant replay, the tool results, the correction |
57
+ | `agent-facts.ts` | `describeAgents()` — the agent registry and the row a manifest publishes |
58
+ | `agent-job.ts` | `agentJob()` — an agent as a real `JobHandle`, composed from `job()` |
59
+ | `hive.ts` | `hive()` — one action fanned out over many inputs, declared as an `action` |
60
+ | `hive-result.ts` | `HiveMember` / `HiveResult`, and the SCHEMA built from the member's own `output` |
61
+ | `hive-errors.ts` | the `X_HIVE_*` class; its code and title stay in `errors.ts` |
51
62
  | `redaction.ts` | the one gate between `vars()` and the provider: a `Secret` never reaches a prompt |
52
63
  | `eval-errors.ts` | the five `X_EVAL_*` classes; their codes and titles stay in `errors.ts` |
53
64
  | `runtime.ts` | the ambient gateway / embedder / semantic caches an `llm()` reaches |
@@ -92,6 +103,12 @@ until 2026-08, naming a tool no catalog contained (`llm.test.ts`, `agent.test.ts
92
103
  zero leaks the ceiling upward on every release.
93
104
  - Cost is `Money` (integer minor units), rounded **up**. Never a float, never a division
94
105
  that loses a fraction.
106
+ - **The gateway's two reads of a provider's throw are total.** A `Provider` is the APP's object, so
107
+ the value it rejects with is one the framework did not build: `isRetryable` indexes it (a getter,
108
+ or a `Proxy` trap) and fails closed if the read raises, and the failure line goes through core's
109
+ `renderThrowable` rather than `error.message` / `String(error)` — a renderer that throws replaces
110
+ `X_AI_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE` with a bare `TypeError` nothing catches by code, and it bounds a
111
+ provider's 1MB body out of the `cause`.
95
112
  - Every non-2xx and every in-band `error` frame becomes `AiTransportError`, which carries a real
96
113
  `status` field — that field IS the gateway's retry rule. A body parsed as a message would read
97
114
  as an empty, successful answer, which is the one outcome nothing downstream can detect.
@@ -261,15 +278,156 @@ until 2026-08, naming a tool no catalog contained (`llm.test.ts`, `agent.test.ts
261
278
  (`X_AGENT_MAX_TURNS`, never a partial answer), by `budget.tokensPerRun` (the ledger's `request`
262
279
  scope, which accumulates across turns) and by `maxToolResultChars` — the transcript IS the
263
280
  request, so an untruncated tool result is re-billed once per remaining turn.
281
+ - **`tools` takes the real `action()`, adapted at this package's edge — decided 2026-08 (issue
282
+ #124).** It took `ProjectableAction` alone, which no `action()` structurally satisfies (an
283
+ action is `as`/`tool`/`openapi`/`job`/`contract` and the callable, never `run`), so the shape
284
+ the README documents was a `TS2741` and every test here hand-built a stand-in — which is why
285
+ the suite was green over an API that did not compile. `AgentTool = AnyAction |
286
+ ProjectableAction` and `asProjectableAction` are the fix, the same union `@ultimat3/mcp`'s
287
+ `ListedPrimitive` already accepted. **Not** a `run` member on the action facade, which was the
288
+ obvious alternative and is wrong three times over: it duplicates `.as()` (axiom 1), it would
289
+ offer a tool named `''` for an action `registerActions` has not named yet, and it would NOT
290
+ collapse `mcp`'s adapter, whose `toWireSchema` narrows to the subset that server's arg
291
+ validator can enforce while this one publishes the Messages API's (`packages/mcp/src/
292
+ from-action.ts` header). Two wire formats, two projections, one `invoke`.
293
+ - Projection happens on the FIRST RUN, memoised — never at declaration. `agent()` is evaluated at
294
+ module scope and `registerAction` stamps a name at boot, so `actionName()` at declaration would
295
+ make the ordinary `export const publishPost = action(...)` beside it `X_ACTION_UNREGISTERED`.
296
+ - **An `agent()` is a tool of another `agent()`** — it returns an action, and an action is what a
297
+ tool is. That is the supervisor/sub-agent shape, with no `hive()` and no ninth primitive; the
298
+ sub-agent runs under the same actor, through its own policy.
264
299
  - A tool listed in `agent({ tools })` that is not `mcp: { expose: true }` is
265
300
  `X_AGENT_TOOL_UNEXPOSED` **at declaration**, not filtered at the call: a silently dropped tool
266
301
  reads as offered and is not. `isMcpExposed` is the one predicate, so an in-app agent and an
267
- external MCP client see the same catalogue.
302
+ external MCP client see the same catalogue. Asked of the DECLARATION, not of the projection,
303
+ because exposure needs no name and the name does not exist yet.
304
+ - **`ctx.signal` is read, at three points.** `throwIfAborted` at the top of every turn and before
305
+ every tool batch, and `GenerateRequest.signal` forwarded into `fetch` by both providers. The
306
+ transcript IS the request, so a loop that keeps going after the caller disconnects re-sends it
307
+ once per remaining turn, runs every remaining tool's side effect and discards the answer —
308
+ eight provider calls for an answer nothing reads. `X_ABORTED` is core's, already shipped; no
309
+ new code. `signal` is deliberately absent from `cacheKeyFor` and from every estimate: it says
310
+ whether a call was ABANDONED, never what it asked for.
311
+ - **The tools of ONE turn run concurrently**, unbounded within the turn, results paired by index
312
+ so a fast tool cannot be matched to a slow tool's `tool_use` id. Serial cost 5x wall clock for a
313
+ turn that asked for five tools and nothing in the types or the docs said so. No second ceiling
314
+ here: the batch is what one model turn asked for, each entry is an action with its own `policy`
315
+ and `rateLimit`, and a tool that calls a model still queues on the ledger's root turnstile.
316
+ Guarantee is "no tool STARTS after the abort" — a tool already in flight unwinds through its
317
+ own handler's reading of `ctx.signal`, which is the action's to make.
318
+ - **`onTurn` is the per-turn observation, and `.stream()` on `agent()` is deliberately not shipped
319
+ yet.** A 90-second multi-turn run emitted nothing until it returned. `onTurn` reports facts
320
+ only — turn, model, tool names, stop reason, usage, that turn's cost — never the transcript and
321
+ never the actor, and the same facts land on the span as an `agent.turn` event so a run
322
+ declaring no hook is still readable in a trace. A throw from it FAILS the run: an observer that
323
+ quietly stopped working reads exactly like one that is fine. Tokens on a screen is a different
324
+ contract from turns in a loop, and half-shipping it would be the second path axiom 1 refuses.
268
325
  - **No semantic cache on `agent()`.** Similar prompts do not have similar answers once the answer
269
326
  depends on what `lookupOrder` returned this second.
327
+ - **Every `tool_use` block the transcript replays is answered by a `tool_result` in the very next
328
+ message** — the Messages API's own rule, and `agent-transcript.ts` owns both halves of it for
329
+ that reason. Two paths broke it, both through `respond`, which is filtered out of the calls
330
+ that RUN and replayed like any other block: a turn emitting a tool call AND `respond` together
331
+ (ordinary parallel tool use), and a `respond` whose input failed the output schema, followed by
332
+ a plain user message. Both were a 400 (`tool_use ids were found without tool_result blocks`),
333
+ i.e. `X_AI_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE` in place of a completed run, and `agent.test.ts` never mixed
334
+ the two so neither shipped visible. An unaccepted `respond` now comes back as its own
335
+ `tool_result`, `is_error`, saying why — the answer is SUPERSEDED, not wrong: it was written
336
+ before the results of the tools the same turn asked for existed, so the loop continues and the
337
+ model answers again with them in hand. Discarding the block instead would have been the other
338
+ legal fix and loses the record; USING the speculative answer would skip the tool results the
339
+ model itself asked for, after those tools already ran.
340
+ - **A tool result is rendered totally.** `runLlmToolCall` returns `content: string` and the loop
341
+ TRUNCATES it, so `JSON.stringify`'s other two answers both have to be handled: `undefined` for
342
+ an action that returns nothing (`'null'`), and a throw on a bigint, a cycle or a `toJSON` of
343
+ the value's own — reported as "the tool ran and its result is not JSON", never as a failure,
344
+ because a model told the tool failed calls it again and buys its side effects twice. The throw
345
+ it catches is read with `stringField`, never `typeof error.code === 'string'`: the value is an
346
+ app's, so the probe is a getter call or a `Proxy` trap inside the catch block.
270
347
  - `AiMessage.content` widened to `string | readonly AiContentBlock[]` for this: a `tool_result`
271
348
  has to name the `tool_use` it answers and a string has nowhere to put the id. The block field
272
349
  names are the Messages API's, so `body()` passes them through untouched.
350
+ - **`hive()` is a fan-out, and the FOURTH instance of the factory rule** (after `llm()`,
351
+ `backfill()` and `agent()`) — it returns an `action`, never a ninth primitive. It exists because
352
+ the alternative is a hand-rolled `Promise.all` over `agent()` calls, and that loop gets four
353
+ things wrong every time: the actor, the order, the difference between ran-and-failed and
354
+ never-ran, and the ceiling.
355
+ - **`HiveResult` is a SCHEMA, not an interface**, built from the member action's own `output` and
356
+ embedded in the `ok` arm. That is what makes a hive project to OpenAPI, the typed client, the
357
+ MCP `outputSchema` and the manifest like any other action; a hand-written interface would have
358
+ given the type and none of the six projections, which is the whole reason it is a factory.
359
+ - **Three arms — `ok` / `failed` / `skipped` — never two.** A member that ran and threw and a
360
+ member that never ran are different facts, and an aborted sibling is the second. Two arms make
361
+ "the hive stopped early" indistinguishable from "every remaining item is bad data", which is
362
+ the difference between retrying the tail and fixing the source. `skipped` gets its own counter
363
+ beside `ok` and `failed` for the same reason: three arms and two counters means every caller
364
+ writes `members.length - ok - failed` once, and writes it wrong once.
365
+ - **`members` is in SPLIT order, always**, filled by index rather than pushed on settle, with
366
+ `index` on every arm so a caller can join a result back to its row without depending on array
367
+ position surviving a filter.
368
+ - **The hive never names an actor.** `split` derives member inputs from `input` and `ctx` and
369
+ from nothing a model emitted; each member runs through its own callable, so `invoke` applies
370
+ the member's own `policy` with `ctx.actor` untouched. There is no `as(actor)` in the factory —
371
+ the same boundary `agent()` holds, and the reason both belong in the framework.
372
+ - **No hive-specific budget code, deliberately.** One derived ledger for the run, `withBudget`
373
+ around the pool, each member's `agent()` deriving again — and the ceiling holds under
374
+ parallelism because `reserve` DEBITS on the root's turnstile before the call. Three members
375
+ against a ceiling only one fits leave exactly one `ok`; that is asserted through the hive
376
+ rather than asserted about the ledger, because the ledger already promised it.
377
+ - **A member's throw is RECORDED, whatever it is.** `failureOf` reads it with `isThrownError` and
378
+ `stringField` from core, never `error instanceof Error` and `.message`: a member is an app's
379
+ action, so a `Proxy` makes `instanceof` run a `getPrototypeOf` trap, and a throw there takes
380
+ down the whole hive — the one outcome the three arms exist to prevent. `skipped` has two
381
+ reasons, because they are two facts: `SKIPPED_ABORTED` (a sibling failed under `'abort'`) and
382
+ `SKIPPED_NO_INPUT` (the split produced nothing at that index). One string for both sent a
383
+ caller to retry a tail that was never cut.
384
+ - **`onMemberError` is required.** `'abort'` stops and leaves the rest `skipped`; `'collect'`
385
+ harvests. Both are right for somebody, so neither may be inherited silently.
386
+ - `concurrency` defaults to 4 and `minMembers` to 2, and neither number is measured off any run —
387
+ the framework cannot know a provider's concurrency allowance. A below-floor split still runs
388
+ every input it produced, serially: dropping one would be silent data loss.
389
+ - An empty split is `X_HIVE_EMPTY`, never a successful run of zero members — "0 ok, 0 failed"
390
+ cannot be told apart from a query that returned no rows and nobody noticed.
391
+ - An aborted `ctx` unwinds the whole hive with `X_ABORTED`, which is a DIFFERENT event from
392
+ `onMemberError: 'abort'`: the latter is a completed run with a partial harvest worth returning,
393
+ the former has nobody left to hand it to.
394
+ - **`describeAgents()` publishes what an `ActionDescriptor` cannot.** An agent projects to the same
395
+ descriptor as any other action, and that descriptor knows nothing about turns, tools, models or
396
+ prompt hashes — so "how far can this loop and what may it call" had no answer outside the source.
397
+ Same shape as `describePrompts()` / `describeEvals()`, and deliberately NOT a new
398
+ `ActionDescriptor` field: `@ultimat3/action` is tier 3 and knows nothing about models.
399
+ The facts are a THUNK, resolved when asked: `agent()` runs at module scope beside the actions it
400
+ lists, and every name in a row is stamped by `registerAction` at boot. An agent still carrying no
401
+ name has no row — not a silent drop, but the absence of a capability: an action with no name
402
+ reaches no route, no tool catalogue and no queue. `named()` builds a TWIN where registration
403
+ names in place, so an agent renamed that way is absent for the same reason; register it instead.
404
+ - **`agentJob()` closes #125 for the agent case, by COMPOSING `job()`** — the returned value is one
405
+ `job()` seated in that package's own registry, so `.enqueue()`, the outbox, the worker's
406
+ cancellation, the dead-letter path, `x jobs show` and its manifest row arrive without a line here.
407
+ Never an imitation handle: `isJobHandle` needs `kind === 'job'` plus membership of a WeakMap only
408
+ `job()` writes, which is exactly what stops a second execution path existing.
409
+ - `name`, `tenant` and `retry` are REQUIRED, no defaults. `name` because a job name is the durable
410
+ queue key that queued, retrying and dead-lettered rows already carry — deriving it from the
411
+ export name would move delivery when somebody renames a variable. `tenant` and `retry` because
412
+ `jobs` states that every candidate default for `tenant` is a cross-tenant read waiting for the
413
+ first job that takes an org id in its input. Both are `TS2741` when omitted AND have runtime
414
+ backstops (`X_JOB_TENANT_REQUIRED`, the `retry.attempts` assert), for generated and JS callers.
415
+ - **Both reads of `target.job()` are LAZY**, and that is load-bearing: `actionName()` throws
416
+ `X_ACTION_UNREGISTERED` until boot stamps the export name, and `agentJob()` is evaluated at
417
+ module scope right beside the `agent()` it wraps. Same rule as `agent()`'s tool projection and
418
+ `describeAgents()`' thunk — third instance in this package.
419
+ - **The at-least-once trap is DOCUMENTED, not enforced, and that is a decision with evidence.**
420
+ `idempotencyKey` dedupes the ENQUEUE, never the ATTEMPT: a lost lease re-runs the agent from the
421
+ top, as does every page `backfill()` replays. So every tool an `agentJob()`'d agent may call has
422
+ to be idempotent. The framework cannot check it: `mutates` is not a fact an `action()` declares
423
+ — it exists only in `@ultimat3/mcp`, whose `projectable.ts` sets it to `true` for EVERY action —
424
+ so a read-only `lookupOrder` and a destructive `issueRefund` are indistinguishable, and
425
+ `ActionFacade`'s `Pick<>` carries no `idempotent` either (only `describe()` does, and that needs
426
+ a name). `isMutator` IS legible without a name, but `mutator()` is the local-first write
427
+ primitive: refusing only those would catch almost none of the risk while reading as if it caught
428
+ all of it. A wrong refusal is worse than a stated obligation, so the obligation is stated — in
429
+ `AgentJobOptions.idempotencyKey`'s doc comment and in the README, both naming the second refund.
430
+
273
431
  - **`configureAi({ redact })` is the one seam between `vars()` and the provider.** `vars()` is the
274
432
  one declared place a model call loads data, so it is the one place a redactor can see the row
275
433
  before it leaves the process; the redactor sees the whole RENDERED prompt and the system prompt,
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -300,23 +300,161 @@ export const support = agent({
300
300
  output: t.object({ answer: t.string }),
301
301
  prompt: supportPrompt,
302
302
  vars: ({ input }) => ({ orderId: input.orderId }),
303
- tools: [lookupOrder, issueRefund], // actions, each mcp.expose
303
+ tools: [lookupOrder, issueRefund], // real actions, each mcp.expose
304
304
  maxTurns: 6,
305
305
  maxToolResultChars: 4_000,
306
306
  budget: { tokensPerRun: 200_000, costPerCall: { minor: 50, currency: 'USD' } },
307
307
  policy: can('order:support'),
308
+ onTurn: ({ turn, toolCalls, cost }) => progress.push({ turn, toolCalls, cost }),
308
309
  });
309
310
  ```
310
311
 
312
+ `tools` takes the `action()` an app already wrote — `[lookupOrder, issueRefund]`, the imports
313
+ themselves. `As of 2026-08`: it took a hand-shaped `ProjectableAction` until then, so the line
314
+ above was a `TS2741` against every real action (issue #124) and the only thing that satisfied it
315
+ was a stand-in written for a test.
316
+
317
+ An `agent()` returns an action, so **an agent is a tool of another agent** — a supervisor lists a
318
+ sub-agent in its own `tools` and the sub-agent runs under the same actor, through the same policy.
319
+ No `hive()`, no supervisor primitive: it falls out of the factory rule.
320
+
311
321
  | Rule | Why |
312
322
  |---|---|
313
323
  | the actor is **`ctx.actor`**, read once, never from the model | this is the mistake a hand-rolled loop ships, and the reason the loop belongs in the framework |
324
+ | an aborted `ctx` unwinds the run — at the top of every turn, before every tool batch, and on the socket | the transcript IS the request, so a loop that keeps going after the caller disconnects re-sends it once per remaining turn, runs every remaining side effect and discards the answer. `ctx.signal` rides on `GenerateRequest` too, so a call already in flight is cut rather than paid for |
325
+ | the tools of **one turn** run concurrently, results paired by `tool_use` id | a turn asking for five tools cost 5x wall clock and nothing said so. Order is positional, never by completion; the batch is bounded by what one turn asked for, and each tool is an action with its own `policy` and `rateLimit`, so a second ceiling here would be a throttle competing with those |
326
+ | `onTurn` reports each completed turn as it happens (and an `agent.turn` span event, always) | a 90-second run emitted nothing until it returned. Observation only — it cannot steer the loop, see the transcript or reach the actor — and a throw from it fails the run rather than being swallowed |
314
327
  | a tool that is not `mcp: { expose: true }` is `X_AGENT_TOOL_UNEXPOSED` **at declaration** | a silently dropped tool reads as offered and is not; `isMcpExposed` is the one predicate, so an in-app agent and an external MCP client see the same catalogue |
315
328
  | running out of turns is `X_AGENT_MAX_TURNS`, never a partial answer | a half-finished transcript returned as a result is working notes presented as a decision |
316
329
  | `budget.tokensPerRun` caps the **whole run** | a single call is bounded by `maxTokens`; a loop is bounded by nothing until this is set |
317
330
  | a tool result is truncated, and says so | the transcript IS the request, so an untruncated result is re-billed once per remaining turn |
318
331
  | **no semantic cache** | similar prompts do not have similar answers once the answer depends on what `lookupOrder` returned this second |
319
332
 
333
+ ## `hive()` — many members, one action
334
+
335
+ Fan an action out over many inputs. The fourth factory over a primitive, after `llm()`,
336
+ `backfill()` and `agent()`: a fan-out is still one server-authoritative operation with an input
337
+ schema, an output schema and a policy.
338
+
339
+ ```ts
340
+ import { action, t } from '@ultimat3/action';
341
+ import { hive } from '@ultimat3/ai';
342
+ import { allow } from '@ultimat3/policy';
343
+
344
+ const summarisePost = action({
345
+ input: t.object({ postId: t.uuid }),
346
+ output: t.object({ summary: t.string }),
347
+ policy: allow(),
348
+ mcp: { expose: true },
349
+ handle: ({ input }) => ({ summary: input.postId }),
350
+ });
351
+
352
+ export const summariseBacklog = hive({
353
+ input: t.object({ postIds: t.array(t.uuid) }),
354
+ member: summarisePost,
355
+ split: ({ input }) => input.postIds.map((postId) => ({ postId })),
356
+ concurrency: 8,
357
+ minMembers: 2,
358
+ onMemberError: 'collect',
359
+ budget: { tokensPerRun: 500_000 },
360
+ policy: allow(),
361
+ });
362
+ ```
363
+
364
+ `member` is any action — most usefully an `agent()`, which makes a hive a **supervisor over
365
+ sub-agents** with no supervisor primitive anywhere.
366
+
367
+ | Rule | Why |
368
+ |---|---|
369
+ | `members` comes back in **split order**, with `index` on every arm | a hand-rolled `Promise.all` reports in completion order, so joining a result back to the row it came from silently depends on nothing having failed |
370
+ | three arms — `ok`, `failed`, `skipped` — never two | *ran and threw* and *never ran* are different facts, and an aborted sibling is the second. Collapsing them makes "the hive stopped early" read as "every remaining item is bad data" |
371
+ | `onMemberError` is **required** | `'abort'` stops and leaves the rest `skipped`; `'collect'` harvests the rest. Both are right for somebody, so neither is a default |
372
+ | the hive **never names an actor** | `split` derives member inputs from `input` and `ctx` and from nothing a model emitted; each member runs through its own callable, so `invoke` applies the member's own policy with `ctx.actor` untouched |
373
+ | `concurrency` bounds the fan-out; one derived ledger bounds the spend | the ceiling holds under parallelism because the budget's root turnstile debits before the call, so three members against a ceiling only one fits leave exactly one `ok` — no hive-specific budget code exists |
374
+ | an empty split is `X_HIVE_EMPTY` | "0 ok, 0 failed" cannot be told apart from a query that returned no rows and nobody noticed |
375
+ | `minMembers` (default 2) stops fanning out, and **drops nothing** | a member's fixed cost dominates trivial work; below the floor every input still runs, serially |
376
+ | an aborted `ctx` unwinds the whole hive with `X_ABORTED` | distinct from `onMemberError: 'abort'`, which is a completed run with a partial harvest worth returning — here there is nobody left to hand it to |
377
+
378
+ ## `agentJob()` — an agent as durable background work
379
+
380
+ Run an agent over a million rows as resumable, retried, budgeted queue work. `As of 2026-08` this
381
+ is the only way an agent reaches a queue at all: `.job()` hands back `kind: 'action-job'`, and
382
+ `isJobHandle` needs `kind === 'job'` plus membership of a `WeakMap` only `job()` writes, so nothing
383
+ externally shaped has ever reached the registry, the worker or the dead-letter path (issue #125).
384
+
385
+ ```ts
386
+ import { t } from '@ultimat3/action';
387
+ import { agent, agentJob, definePrompt } from '@ultimat3/ai';
388
+ import { allow } from '@ultimat3/policy';
389
+
390
+ const summarisePost = agent({
391
+ input: t.object({ postId: t.uuid, orgId: t.uuid }),
392
+ output: t.object({ summary: t.string }),
393
+ prompt: definePrompt<{ postId: string }>({
394
+ id: 'summarise-post',
395
+ version: '1.0.0',
396
+ template: 'Summarise post {{postId}}.',
397
+ }),
398
+ vars: ({ input }) => ({ postId: input.postId }),
399
+ tools: [],
400
+ policy: allow(),
401
+ });
402
+
403
+ export const summariseBacklog = agentJob(summarisePost, {
404
+ name: 'summarise-backlog',
405
+ tenant: (input) => input.orgId,
406
+ retry: { attempts: 3, backoff: 'exponential' },
407
+ });
408
+ ```
409
+
410
+ It composes `job()` rather than imitating a handle, so `.enqueue()`, the outbox, the worker's
411
+ cancellation, `x jobs show` and its manifest row all arrive for free. Pair it with `backfill()` for
412
+ the sweep and `hive()` for the fan-out inside one page.
413
+
414
+ | Rule | Why |
415
+ |---|---|
416
+ | `name` is required, and is the queue key | a job name is what queued, retrying and dead-lettered rows already carry, so renaming an export must not move where they are delivered |
417
+ | `tenant` and `retry` are required, no default | `jobs` states it: every candidate default for `tenant` is a cross-tenant read waiting for the first job that takes an org id in its input. `tenant: 'none'` is the explicit statement that it touches no scoped table |
418
+ | the action projection is read **lazily** | `agentJob()` runs at module scope beside the `agent()` it wraps, and names are stamped by `registerAction` at boot — reading `.job()` eagerly makes that ordinary file `X_ACTION_UNREGISTERED` |
419
+ | one execution path, and it is the action's | `run` is `invoke(agent, input, { surface: 'job', ctx })`, so the agent's policy, input parse, budget scope and span all apply — and the `ctx` is the worker's, so an attempt timing out aborts the agent's turn loop |
420
+ | the actor is the worker context's, never the model's | the job body runs with system authority and the org comes from the job's declared `tenant`; nothing a model emits can reach either |
421
+
422
+ ### The at-least-once trap, said plainly
423
+
424
+ **`idempotencyKey` dedupes the ENQUEUE, never the ATTEMPT.** Two enqueues with the same payload are
425
+ one row. One row that a worker claims, half-runs and loses the lease on is claimed again, and **the
426
+ agent runs a second time from the top** — as does every page a `backfill()` replays, since its
427
+ `handle` is at-least-once by construction.
428
+
429
+ So every tool the agent may call has to be idempotent: an `upsertAll`, an `updateWhere`, a statement
430
+ whose second run changes nothing. Otherwise a replayed attempt issues a second refund.
431
+
432
+ **The framework does not check this, and the reason is worth knowing.** `mutates` is not a fact an
433
+ `action()` declares — it exists only in `@ultimat3/mcp`, which sets it to `true` for *every* action
434
+ it projects — so a read-only `lookupOrder` and a destructive `issueRefund` are indistinguishable
435
+ here. A rule refusing every tool that has not declared `idempotent: true` would refuse the reads
436
+ too, and a wrong refusal is worse than a stated obligation. `isMutator` is legible, but `mutator()`
437
+ is the local-first write primitive and catches almost none of the risk while reading as if it
438
+ caught all of it. This is a contract you keep, not one the compiler keeps for you.
439
+
440
+ ## `describeAgents()` — what the manifest can say
441
+
442
+ ```ts
443
+ import { describeAgents } from '@ultimat3/ai';
444
+
445
+ describeAgents();
446
+ // [{ name: 'supportAgent', prompt: 'support@1.0.0', promptHash: '…', model: 'claude-opus-5',
447
+ // maxTurns: 6, maxToolResultChars: 4000, tools: ['issueRefund', 'lookupOrder'],
448
+ // budget: { tokensIn: null, tokensPerRun: 200000, costPerCall: { minor: 50, currency: 'USD' } },
449
+ // mcp: true }]
450
+ ```
451
+
452
+ An agent projects to an `ActionDescriptor` like any other action, and that descriptor knows nothing
453
+ about turns or tools — so "how far can this loop, and what may it call" had no answer outside the
454
+ source. Names are read when you ask, not when the agent was declared: `registerAction` stamps them
455
+ at boot, long after `agent()` ran at module scope. An agent nothing registered has no row, because
456
+ an action with no name reaches no route, no tool catalogue and no queue.
457
+
320
458
  ## Redaction: one declared seam
321
459
 
322
460
  `vars()` is the one place a model call loads data, so it is the one place anything can sit between
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@ultimat3/ai",
3
- "version": "2.0.0",
3
+ "version": "3.0.0",
4
4
  "description": "LLM gateway, versioned prompts, evals as tests, embeddings, hybrid vector search, RAG",
5
5
  "license": "MIT",
6
6
  "type": "module",
@@ -31,13 +31,14 @@
31
31
  "test": "bun test"
32
32
  },
33
33
  "dependencies": {
34
- "@ultimat3/action": "2.0.0",
35
- "@ultimat3/cache": "2.0.0",
36
- "@ultimat3/core": "2.0.0",
37
- "@ultimat3/db": "2.0.0",
38
- "@ultimat3/money": "2.0.0",
39
- "@ultimat3/policy": "2.0.0",
40
- "@ultimat3/schema": "2.0.0",
41
- "@ultimat3/time": "2.0.0"
34
+ "@ultimat3/action": "3.0.0",
35
+ "@ultimat3/cache": "3.0.0",
36
+ "@ultimat3/core": "3.0.0",
37
+ "@ultimat3/db": "3.0.0",
38
+ "@ultimat3/jobs": "3.0.0",
39
+ "@ultimat3/money": "3.0.0",
40
+ "@ultimat3/policy": "3.0.0",
41
+ "@ultimat3/schema": "3.0.0",
42
+ "@ultimat3/time": "3.0.0"
42
43
  }
43
44
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
1
+ // What an `agent()` IS, published for the manifest — turns, tools, budget, model, prompt hash.
2
+ //
3
+ // Nothing agent-shaped was visible anywhere before this: an agent projects to `ActionDescriptor`
4
+ // like every other action, and that descriptor deliberately knows nothing about turns or tools,
5
+ // so "which agents does this app have, how far can each one loop, and what may it call" had no
6
+ // answer outside reading the source. Same shape as `describePrompts()` / `describeEvals()`, and
7
+ // deliberately NOT a new `ActionDescriptor` field: @ultimat3/action is tier 3 and knows nothing
8
+ // about models.
9
+
10
+ import type { AnyAction } from '@ultimat3/action';
11
+ import type { Money } from '@ultimat3/money';
12
+
13
+ /** The declared ceilings, flattened so a manifest row is plain JSON. `null` is "not declared". */
14
+ export interface AgentBudgetFact {
15
+ readonly tokensIn: number | null;
16
+ readonly tokensPerRun: number | null;
17
+ readonly costPerCall: Money | null;
18
+ }
19
+
20
+ export interface AgentFact {
21
+ /** The export name registration stamped — the same name `.tool()` and `tools/call` answer to. */
22
+ readonly name: string;
23
+ readonly prompt: string;
24
+ readonly promptId: string;
25
+ /**
26
+ * The prompt's content hash. An agent's behaviour is its prompt, so a row without one records
27
+ * which agent ran and not which agent it was — the same reason every eval result carries it.
28
+ */
29
+ readonly promptHash: string;
30
+ readonly model: string;
31
+ readonly maxTurns: number;
32
+ readonly maxToolResultChars: number;
33
+ /** Tool names, sorted — the catalogue this agent may call, which is its blast radius. */
34
+ readonly tools: readonly string[];
35
+ readonly budget: AgentBudgetFact;
36
+ /** Whether the agent itself is offered as a tool, so a supervisor could call it. */
37
+ readonly mcp: boolean;
38
+ }
39
+
40
+ /**
41
+ * Keyed by the action, and the facts are a THUNK: every name in a row — the agent's and its
42
+ * tools' — is stamped by `registerAction` at boot, long after `agent()` ran at module scope.
43
+ * Reading them here rather than at declaration is what makes a row name what an app can call.
44
+ */
45
+ const registry = new Map<AnyAction, () => Omit<AgentFact, 'name'>>();
46
+
47
+ export function registerAgentFact(target: AnyAction, facts: () => Omit<AgentFact, 'name'>): void {
48
+ registry.set(target, facts);
49
+ }
50
+
51
+ /**
52
+ * Every registered agent, by name.
53
+ *
54
+ * An agent still carrying no name is left out, and that is not a silent drop: a name is stamped by
55
+ * `registerAction`, an action without one reaches no route, no tool catalogue and no queue, so
56
+ * there is no capability for a row to describe. `named()` builds a TWIN rather than naming in
57
+ * place — registration names in place — so an agent renamed that way is absent for the same
58
+ * reason. Register it instead: `registerAction('supportAgent', support)`.
59
+ */
60
+ export function describeAgents(): readonly AgentFact[] {
61
+ return [...registry.entries()]
62
+ .filter(([target]) => target.name !== '')
63
+ .map(([target, facts]) => ({ name: target.name, ...facts() }))
64
+ .sort((a, b) => (a.name < b.name ? -1 : a.name > b.name ? 1 : 0));
65
+ }
66
+
67
+ /** Test-only reset. A module-level registry otherwise leaks between test files. */
68
+ export function resetAgents(): void {
69
+ registry.clear();
70
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * `agentJob()` — an agent as durable, resumable, budgeted background work.
3
+ *
4
+ * The bridge `packages/action/src/job-handle.ts` names in its own header and could not build:
5
+ * `isJobHandle` needs `kind === 'job'` PLUS membership of a WeakMap only `job()` writes, so no
6
+ * externally-shaped object reaches the registry, the queue or the worker — and `action` and `jobs`
7
+ * are both tier 3, so neither may import the other. This package is tier 4 and may import both,
8
+ * which is exactly where that header says the adapter belongs.
9
+ *
10
+ * It composes `job()` rather than re-implementing a handle: the returned value IS one `job()`
11
+ * seated, so `.enqueue()`, the outbox, the worker's cancellation, the dead-letter path,
12
+ * `x jobs show` and its manifest row all arrive without a line here.
13
+ */
14
+
15
+ import type { Action, ActionJobHandle } from '@ultimat3/action';
16
+ import type { JobHandle, JobTenant, RetryPolicy } from '@ultimat3/jobs';
17
+ import { job } from '@ultimat3/jobs';
18
+ import type { InferInput, InferOutput, StandardSchemaV1 } from '@ultimat3/schema';
19
+
20
+ export interface AgentJobOptions<I> {
21
+ /**
22
+ * The durable queue key. REQUIRED and never derived from the agent's export name: a job name is
23
+ * what queued, retrying and dead-lettered rows already carry, so renaming an export must not
24
+ * move where they are delivered.
25
+ */
26
+ readonly name: string;
27
+ /**
28
+ * REQUIRED, no default, and the org this run's body acts under. `jobs` states why: every
29
+ * candidate default is a cross-tenant read waiting for the first job that takes an org id in its
30
+ * input. `tenant: 'none'` is the explicit statement that this agent touches no tenant-scoped
31
+ * table, and then every scoped read inside it fails closed.
32
+ */
33
+ readonly tenant: JobTenant<I>;
34
+ /** REQUIRED, no default. A model call fails transiently; how many times is nobody else's guess. */
35
+ readonly retry: RetryPolicy;
36
+ readonly queue?: string;
37
+ /**
38
+ * Defaults to the action projection's own key — `action:<name>:<fingerprint of input>` — which
39
+ * is stable across retries and derived from the payload alone.
40
+ *
41
+ * **It dedupes the ENQUEUE, never the ATTEMPT.** Two `enqueue` calls with the same payload are
42
+ * one row; one row that a worker claims, half-runs and loses the lease on is claimed again, and
43
+ * the agent runs a second time from the top. Combined with `backfill()`, whose `handle` is at
44
+ * least once by construction, a replayed page re-runs every agent on it.
45
+ *
46
+ * What that means for `tools`: **every tool the agent may call has to be idempotent** — an
47
+ * `upsertAll`, an `updateWhere`, a statement whose second run changes nothing — because a
48
+ * replayed attempt issues a second `issueRefund` otherwise. The framework does NOT check this and
49
+ * cannot: `mutates` is not a fact an `action()` declares (`@ultimat3/mcp` sets it to `true` for
50
+ * every action it projects), so a read-only `lookupOrder` and a destructive `issueRefund` are
51
+ * indistinguishable here, and a rule refusing both would be a wrong refusal. See the README.
52
+ */
53
+ idempotencyKey?(input: I): string;
54
+ }
55
+
56
+ /**
57
+ * Wrap an `agent()` — or any action — as a real job handle.
58
+ *
59
+ * Both reads of the underlying projection are LAZY, and that is load-bearing: `target.job()` calls
60
+ * `actionName()`, which throws `X_ACTION_UNREGISTERED` until `registerAction` stamps the export
61
+ * name at boot — and `agentJob()` is evaluated at module scope, right beside the `agent()` it
62
+ * wraps. The queue key comes from `options.name` for the same reason it is required.
63
+ */
64
+ export function agentJob<TInput extends StandardSchemaV1, TOutput extends StandardSchemaV1>(
65
+ target: Action<TInput, TOutput>,
66
+ options: AgentJobOptions<InferOutput<TInput>>,
67
+ ): JobHandle<InferOutput<TInput>> {
68
+ let projected: ActionJobHandle<TInput, TOutput> | undefined;
69
+ const bridge = (): ActionJobHandle<TInput, TOutput> => {
70
+ if (projected === undefined) projected = target.job();
71
+ return projected;
72
+ };
73
+ return job<InferOutput<TInput>>({
74
+ name: options.name,
75
+ input: target.input as StandardSchemaV1<unknown, InferOutput<TInput>>,
76
+ tenant: options.tenant,
77
+ retry: options.retry,
78
+ ...(options.queue === undefined ? {} : { queue: options.queue }),
79
+ idempotencyKey: (input) =>
80
+ options.idempotencyKey?.(input) ?? bridge().idempotencyKey(asInput<TInput>(input)),
81
+ // ONE execution path, and it is the action's. `ActionJobHandle.invoke` is `invoke(target,
82
+ // input, { surface: 'job', ctx })`, so the agent's policy, its input parse, its budget scope
83
+ // and its span all apply — and `ctx` is the WORKER's, so `ctx.signal` aborting at the attempt
84
+ // timeout reaches the agent's turn loop.
85
+ run: ({ input, ctx }) => bridge().invoke(asInput<TInput>(input), ctx),
86
+ });
87
+ }
88
+
89
+ /**
90
+ * The job parsed with the action's OWN schema, so what it hands back is a value that schema
91
+ * accepts — `invoke` re-parses it regardless, which is what makes this safe rather than merely
92
+ * convenient. The cast exists because `InferOutput` and `InferInput` are different types wherever a
93
+ * field has a default, and nothing at this seam can prove they meet.
94
+ */
95
+ function asInput<TInput extends StandardSchemaV1>(value: InferOutput<TInput>): InferInput<TInput> {
96
+ return value as InferInput<TInput>;
97
+ }