@ultimat3/action 1.1.0 → 2.0.0

package/CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+# @ultimat3/action
+
+Owns the `action` + `mutator` primitives and their six projections. Tier 3.
+
+## Boundary
+
+- May import: `core`, `schema` (t0), `cache`, `i18n`, `time` (t1), `entity`, `policy`, `http` (t2).
+- Never import: `query`, `jobs`, `realtime` (sideways), or any tier 4-5 package.
+- Never re-implement authz, validation or caching — call `policy`, `schema`, `cache`.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Job |
+|---|---|
+| `action.ts` | the primitive: `action()`, `describeAction`, the registry-facing name stamp |
+| `invoke.ts` | **the one execution path** + the private declaration store `handle` lives in |
+| `facade.ts` | the fluent surface — binds each projection to the action, re-implements none |
+| `mutator.ts` | action + optimistic `.local` twin + authoritative `.server` + `.conflict` |
+| `registry.ts` | export-name registration, collisions, `describeActions()` |
+| `define-api.ts` | `defineApi({ actions, mutators, queries, llm, jobs, tasks })` — the app's one boot call |
+| `http.ts` | route projection (`enforcedBy: 'handler'`) + OpenAPI operation |
+| `openapi.ts` | deterministic OpenAPI 3.1 document |
+| `client.ts` | typed RPC client (browser-safe: no server imports) |
+| `mcp-tool.ts` | MCP descriptor, same `invoke` |
+| `job-handle.ts` | the `.job()` projection: an action as a queueable payload. **Not** consumed by `@ultimat3/jobs` — see Invariants |
+| `contract-test.ts` | assertions `x g action` emits |
+| `sample-input.ts` | a value `input:` accepts, from its own IR — what makes the policy assertion reach a policy |
+| `idempotency.ts` | the store SEAM: types, the installed-store slot, the scope declaration + `assertIdempotencyScope`, and `withIdempotency` — the replay-or-run gate |
+| `idempotency-key.ts` | the namespaced key — action + actor + the caller's key, as one JSON tuple — and the refusal of one that names no request |
+| `idempotency-memory.ts` | the process default: bounded, swept, `scope: 'process'` |
+| `idempotency-postgres.ts` | the SHARED store — one table, one `insert … on conflict` |
+| `deprecation.ts` | `Deprecation` + the RFC 9745/8594 render + the `deprecated_calls_total` counter |
+| `policy-gate.ts` | **the only** runtime edge to `@ultimat3/policy` (`errors.ts` takes `SurfaceDenial` as a type, which erases) |
+| `cache-gate.ts` | the post-commit bust — **the only** file that calls `invalidateTags` |
+| `audit.ts` | the audit seam: `AuditRecord`, `AuditSink`, the memory sink, the installed-sink store |
+| `audit-gate.ts` | **the only** file that calls a sink, and where the two failure policies live |
+| `type-pins.ts` | compile-time assertions `tsc` checks — what the erased view projects, and why `client()` is not part of it |
+| `naming.ts`, `validate.ts`, `json-schema.ts`, `stable.ts` | pure helpers |
+
+## Invariants
+
+- Every surface goes through `invoke`: parse input, evaluate policy, handle, parse
+  output. Adding a second execution path is the one unforgivable change here.
+- **An explicit `ctx` is INSTALLED, never merely passed** (`As of 2026-08`). `invoke` entered
+  `runWithContext` only when `options.actor` was supplied; given `options.ctx` alone it called
+  `core(target, raw, options.ctx, options)` directly. So `guard()` decided about that actor while
+  everything reading the AMBIENT context — above all `@ultimat3/entity`'s tenant guard, which
+  derives from `tryUseContext()` and not from the ctx it is handed — saw a different identity, or
+  none: `writeAnywhere.job().invoke(input, ctxAsOrgA)` wrote a row naming org B while the identical
+  call under an ambient context was `X_TENANCY_ACTOR_MISMATCH`. Absent a `ctx` this reinstalls the
+  ambient one, a no-op on every path that already worked. The twin fix is `@ultimat3/query`'s
+  `asActor`, and `invoke-context.test.ts` asserts an EQUALITY between the three spellings of one
+  caller — ambient, `options.actor`, `options.ctx` — because three independent expectations are
+  exactly what let this ship.
+- The declaration never leaves `invoke.ts`. `defOf`/`stashDef` are internal and must
+  never be re-exported from `src/index.ts` — that absence is the enforcement, and
+  `index.test.ts` is what makes it one.
+- **`toRoute` sets `enforcedBy: 'handler'`, so the HTTP pipeline's authz stage stands down.**
+  `invoke` is the route's single evaluation and the only one holding the row `def.row` loaded;
+  a stage deciding first would decide the same policy from `row: null`, deny the row's own
+  author, and never reach the evaluation that had the row. `meta.policy` stays set — dropping
+  it would read as "this action is unguarded" in `x routes` and the manifest. `http.test.ts`
+  drives a row-level action over the real pipeline and counts the evaluations: exactly one.
+- **`stable.ts` holds TWO serializers, and they are not one function.** `stableStringify` is the
+  DOCUMENT form: `serializeOpenApi` publishes it as `openapi.json` and `json-schema.ts` re-reads it
+  with `JSON.parse`, so a non-finite number has to be `null` — the bare token `NaN` would make a
+  published spec unparseable. `canonicalJson` is the HASH form `fingerprint` is taken over, and it
+  must be INJECTIVE: `NaN`, `±Infinity` and JSON `null` all encoded as `'null'` and `String(-0)` is
+  `"0"`, so four distinct inputs shared one `requestHash` — one caller handed another's stored
+  response on replay — and one job dedupe key. That is why the fix `@ultimat3/query` made in its own
+  `stable.ts` could not simply be copied here; it needed the split first. Ordinary payloads are
+  byte-identical between the two, so no idempotency record and no enqueued job moved.
+  `stable.test.ts` pins both duties, including a `JSON.parse` of the document form.
+- **`tagKeys` is `@ultimat3/cache`'s, not this package's — moved 2026-08.** `packages/action/src/tags.ts`
+  and `packages/query/src/tags.ts` were byte-identical, and both packages are tier 3, so neither can
+  import the other and a copy in either is a second answer for the other. `tagKey` went with it: it
+  was `serializeTag` under a second name with zero call sites. Same shape as `toBucket`. Never
+  restore a local one, and never reach for `@ultimat3/render`'s same-named `tagKeys` — that one
+  preserves declaration order and is a different function.
+- **`toBucket` is `@ultimat3/http`'s, not this package's — moved 2026-08.** http owns `Bucket` and
+  the limiter maths, and `@ultimat3/query` needs the identical conversion while being the same
+  tier as this package, so a copy in either is a second answer to "what does this limit mean" for
+  the other. It is re-exported from `src/index.ts` so an action file still reaches it through one
+  import, and it raises http's `X_RATE_LIMIT_INVALID`; `X_ACTION_RATE_LIMIT_INVALID` is gone with
+  the copy. Never restore a local one.
+- **`rateLimit:` reaches the limiter, not only the spec.** `toRoute` sets `meta.rateLimit` (the
+  bucket name) **and** `meta.rateLimitBucket` (`toBucket(name, def.rateLimit)`), and
+  `@ultimat3/http`'s `withRouteBuckets` registers the second under the first. Until 2026-08 only
+  the name was set, so `bucketFor` fell through to `default` — 120 burst / 2 per second for an
+  action that declared 5, with the declared numbers published in `x-ultimate.rateLimit` all the
+  same: looser in practice than what the author wrote, which is the dangerous direction. `toBucket`
+  is the **only** conversion between `{ limit, windowMs }` and `{ capacity, refillPerSecond }`, and
+  both projections that read the declaration call it, so the spec cannot publish a pair the limiter
+  refuses. http's `X_RATE_LIMIT_INVALID` covers all three checks, and the third is the one that is
+  easy to miss: the **computed** rate, not just the two declared halves. `windowMs: 0` is an
+  infinite refill, and so is `{ limit: Number.MAX_VALUE, windowMs: 1 }` — two finite positive
+  numbers whose division enforces nothing. `limit` must also be at least one whole token, or the
+  first caller is already refused and the endpoint is closed rather than limited.
+- **Everything `withIdempotency`'s `run` throws is treated as possibly-committed.** `guard()` and
+  `validateInput` both run before the gate (`invoke.ts`), so by the time `run` is called the only
+  things left are the handler and `validateOutput` — and the second throws *after* the first has
+  committed. The reservation is therefore SETTLED as a failure and the retry replays it under the
+  first attempt's own code; `release()` is reserved for a pre-handler failure, of which this gate
+  has none. Releasing there is what turned a rounding change in an `output:` schema into a second
+  charge: `X_OUTPUT_INVALID` dropped the record and the client's automatic retry re-ran a handler
+  that had already taken the money. A `settle` that itself refuses leaves the record **in flight**
+  for the same reason — a 409 the caller can act on beats a silent re-run. A store with no `fail`
+  slot gets the same fail-closed treatment. `idempotency-failure.test.ts` drives the
+  post-commit-throw path first, because that is the one that shipped.
+- **An idempotency record belongs to ONE CALLER, and a key that names no request is refused**
+  (`As of 2026-08`). The namespace was the action name alone, so `idempotencyKeyFor` filed every
+  caller's `k1` under one record: alice POSTed `charge`, bob POSTed `charge` with the same header
+  and was handed alice's stored response — and with a *differing* payload bob got
+  `X_IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT` instead, so any key he guessed was a key he could deny her. The key is
+  now `JSON.stringify([action, actor.kind, actor.id, actor.orgId ?? null, key])`, and the encoding
+  is a **JSON tuple, never a joined string**, for `readAuthority`'s reason: an actor id is app data,
+  so under `a:b:c` an id of `alice:x` with key `y` is the same record as `alice` with key `x:y`.
+  Separately, `req.header()` is `Headers.get()`, which answers `''` for `Idempotency-Key:` and
+  never `null` — so a blank header was itself a shared key. It is `X_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_INVALID`, a
+  4xx raised before the handler, and **not** read as "no key": the quiet reading loses the retry
+  protection exactly when a client's key interpolation broke, and the double charge lands on the
+  client's own automatic retry. `@ultimat3/jobs` refuses an empty key at the enqueue for the same
+  reason and uses `assert` because *its* empty key is the app's declaration, not a caller's header.
+  What this does NOT close: an anonymous actor is one identity, so anonymous callers of a public
+  idempotent action still share a key space — nothing at this tier can tell two apart, and keying
+  on an IP or a cookie would break the retry the header exists to serve.
+- **Both stores FENCE a settlement on `in-flight`**, as `@ultimat3/jobs`' `SQL_ACK` fences on
+  `state = 'running'`. A reservation whose window lapsed is reclaimed by the next caller
+  (`on conflict … do update`), so a straggler from the first one used to overwrite a record it no
+  longer owned and the next replay answered a retry with a value produced for a different request.
+  Postgres fences in SQL and returns `key`, so the no-op is observable and logged; memory checks
+  the status it holds. It is logged and never thrown — a settlement is post-commit, so raising
+  there would turn a durable write into the caller's error. The fence is on the STATUS only: the
+  reservation's own `id` would close the last case (a straggler landing while the replacement is
+  still in flight) and cannot be checked, because `IdempotencyStore.settle(key, value)` is public
+  API and does not carry it.
+- **Where the idempotency records live is DECLARED, and refused at registration.**
+  `IdempotencyStore.scope` says what a driver provides; `configureIdempotency({ scope })` says what
+  the deployment requires; `assertIdempotencyScope` compares them inside `registerAction` — the
+  funnel every registration path shares, and one that necessarily runs before a route is mounted.
+  `'shared'` over a per-process store, or over a store declaring **no** scope, is
+  `X_IDEMPOTENCY_NOT_SHARED` before the socket opens. The exact shape of `assertRateLimitScope`
+  and `assertRouteBuckets`, and for the same reason: what cannot be shown to hold is not assumed
+  to hold. The default is `'process'`, because one process is the only thing a framework can
+  promise without being told — nothing here reads an environment to guess a replica count.
+- **The memory store is bounded, and the eviction order is part of the guarantee.** A key is
+  caller-supplied, so its cardinality is the write rate: unbounded, 500 idempotent writes a second
+  is 43M immortal entries a day. Expired records go for free (past the window a record answers as
+  a missing one); past the cap, **`in-flight` records are the last to go** — one of those is the
+  reservation that stops a concurrent duplicate from running the handler twice. That is the mirror
+  of `memoryRateLimitStore` evicting the fullest bucket first; never swap either for an LRU.
+- **`postgresIdempotencyStore` is the shipped shared store, and it must be CALLED.** A mechanism
+  built and never wired is the defect this package has shipped twice. It takes a structural
+  `PgExecutor` — the same shape `@ultimat3/jobs`' pg driver declares, satisfied by `Bun.sql` and by
+  a Tx — so there is no `action -> db` package edge and the app wires it:
+  `setIdempotencyStore(postgresIdempotencyStore({ executor: Bun.sql }))` then
+  `configureIdempotency({ scope: 'shared' })`, at boot, before `registerActions()`.
+  `SQL_IDEMPOTENCY_TABLE` is applied the way `SQL_JOBS_TABLE` is. The reservation is ONE statement:
+  a returned row always means this caller owns it, because the `do update` fires only for a row
+  already outside the window.
+- **`deprecated:` is a compat WINDOW and versioning is deliberately not here.** One declaration,
+  four projections: `Deprecation`/`Sunset` headers on every response *including the failures* the
+  handler raises, a `rel="successor-version"` link derived through `derivePath` (never a second URL
+  derivation), `deprecated: true` in the OpenAPI operation, and `deprecated_calls_total`. The
+  headers are rendered ONCE at projection, so a date that cannot become one is
+  `X_ACTION_DEPRECATION_INVALID` at mount rather than on the first request — the rule `toBucket`
+  follows. Running two versions side by side is two deployments behind one ingress (axiom 7); a
+  path prefix, a second registry or a version router would all be a ninth thing to maintain.
+  `deprecation.ts` is TWINNED in `@ultimat3/query`, because both are tier 3 and the shared home is
+  `@ultimat3/http` if it ever grows one — the same compromise `naming.ts` is ported under.
+- **The span wraps `execute` whole, and carries attributes.** It used to wrap `def.handle` alone
+  and set nothing, so `def.row()` — the loader a row-level policy needs — ran inside no span at
+  all: a 2s p99 reported 40ms and the missing 1.96s read as framework overhead. Attributes are
+  chosen for bounded cardinality (surface, actor KIND, outcome, booleans) with one exception, the
+  namespaced idempotency key, which is the single fact that joins a retry to the call it retries —
+  and is never a metric label. `telemetry.test.ts` asserts the EXTENT structurally, by reading
+  `currentSpan()` from inside `row:` and the policy predicate, not by timing: the test clock is
+  frozen.
+- **`policyCapability` is a display label and `policyPermissions` is what a report matches on.**
+  A composite renders as `and(post:publish, org:administer)`, which equals no permission string,
+  so `x policy list` matching on `capability` reported every non-trivially-guarded action's
+  permissions as *unenforced* — real grants shown as dead. `ActionDescriptor.permissions` is the
+  flattened list from `@ultimat3/policy`'s `policyPermissions`, published beside `capability` and
+  never instead of it. A `not()` clause contributes its inner permissions: the grant still
+  participates in the decision, so omitting it would be the false statement.
+- **Both clients inject `traceparent`.** `@ultimat3/core`'s `traceparent()` existed with no caller
+  in the repo, so every Ultimate-to-Ultimate hop began a fresh root trace on the far side. It is
+  set BEFORE the caller's own headers so an explicit one still wins, and an incomplete span context
+  (`spanId: ''`, which `currentSpanContext()` answers when a request context exists but no span
+  does) sends nothing rather than `00-<trace>--01`. In a browser there is no ambient context, so
+  a cross-origin call acquires no CORS preflight it did not already have.
+- **`ActionJobHandle` is not consumed by `@ultimat3/jobs`, and the file said it was until
+  2026-08.** The header read "`@ultimat3/jobs` consumes this shape, so enqueueing an existing
+  action costs zero rewriting" — a claim no code supports. `'action-job'` occurs in four places,
+  all inside this package (`job-handle.ts:16,30`, `job-handle.test.ts`, `facade.test.ts`), and
+  `isJobHandle` (`packages/jobs/src/job.ts:256`) requires `kind === 'job'` **and** membership of a
+  module-private `WeakMap` written only inside `job()` — so this is impossible in principle, not
+  merely unwired. `JobHandle` shares two members with it. What the shape actually gives: `.job()`
+  on the façade, `action:<name>` as a durable queue key, a payload-derived idempotency key, and an
+  `invoke` that runs the one execution path under `surface: 'job'` — so an app that owns a queue
+  can drive it by hand and still get the action's parse + policy. **The missing halves are
+  `tenant` and `retry`**, both required on `JobDefinition` with deliberately no default, so "zero
+  rewriting" was never reachable regardless of wiring. The bridge is one `job({ … })` call, and it
+  belongs in the app or at tier 4+: `action` and `jobs` are both tier 3. Not built here — that is
+  code, and this was a comment correction.
+- An action has no `.def`. Inside the package read it with `defOf(target)`; outside,
+  read the lifted `.input`/`.output`/`.policy`/`.mcp` or `describe()`.
+- **`AnyAction` projects every surface, `client()` excepted.** The registry answers in the erased
+  view — `listActions()`, `getAction(name)` — so a member missing from it is a projection the
+  registry cannot reach: `.job()` was absent until 2026-08 and `getAction('publishPost')?.job()`
+  was a type error against an object that has had the method since `facadeFor` bound it. `job()`
+  erases because `ActionJobHandle`'s members are method-syntax (bivariant parameters) and its
+  output erases to `unknown`; `ClientMethod` is a **function type**, so its input is
+  contravariant and `(input: unknown) => …` is a supertype of no concrete action's method. Both
+  halves are build errors in `type-pins.ts`, never a comment — and type claims go there, never in
+  a `.test.ts`, because `tsconfig.json` excludes tests and `tsc` never reads one.
+- **The client keeps the server's error code and marks it remote.** A `problem+json` failure
+  becomes `RemoteActionError` (`errors.ts`), which re-uses the code off the wire the way
+  `ActionDeniedError` re-uses the policy decision's — and then says so, because the browser
+  bundle never registered it: `name` marks it in a stack, `meta.origin: 'remote'` marks it in
+  `--json`, the overlay and the error reporter. **It never synthesizes a docs URL.**
+  `https://ultimate.dev/errors/X_SIGNUP_CLOSED` for an app-declared code is a 404 dressed as
+  documentation; the link is the server's own `docs`/`type` when it sent an `http(s)` one, this
+  build's registered link when `hasErrorCode` knows the code, otherwise `ERROR_DOCS_BASE`. The
+  code must be `X_SCREAMING_SNAKE` to be taken at all — `typeof code === 'string'` accepted `""`
+  from a gateway — and anything else is `RpcFailedError`, which is what that code means.
+  `docs` and `type` travel to `remoteDocs` as an ordered pair, not `docs ?? type`: preference is
+  not selection, and picking the preferred slot on presence alone let one `javascript:` string
+  bury a perfectly good `type` the same response had already offered.
+- **MCP exposure is read through `isMcpExposed` from `@ultimat3/core`, in all three places.**
+  `toMcpTools` builds the tool, `describeAction` publishes the manifest fact and
+  `toOpenApiOperation` publishes `x-ultimate.mcpTool` — the last two fail-opened (`?? true`,
+  `!== false`) until 2026-08, so an action with no `mcp` block was advertised as a tool by both
+  contract artifacts and refused by the only surface that could serve one. A contract that
+  disagrees with the runtime is worse than no contract; never spell the check inline again.
+- **An MCP tool's NAME is the export name verbatim, in all four places — `toToolName` is gone**
+  (`As of 2026-08`). The same three readers that fail-opened on exposure also *derived* the name:
+  `toToolName` snake_cased it for `toMcpTool`, for `x-ultimate.mcpTool` and for
+  `describeAction().mcp.tool`, while `@ultimat3/mcp` has only ever served
+  `primitive.mcp?.name ?? primitive.name`. So nine of the ten tool names
+  `examples/dummy/openapi.json` published — `publish_post`, `create_post`, … — were names
+  `tools/call` answers not-found for; the tenth, `summarize`, is single-word and so was already
+  its own snake_case form, which is why a count of the wrong names is not a count of the rows. The
+  DESCRIPTOR said the same: `x actions describe --json`, `x actions list --json`, the
+  `actions.describe` dev MCP tool and the `/_x` Routes panel all read `.mcp.tool`. **Not the app
+  manifest** — `ActionFact.mcp` is `{ expose, description? }` and `packages/manifest/src/sources.ts`
+  copies only those two, so `x.manifest.json` has never carried a tool name and `grep '"tool"'` on
+  either committed manifest finds none. Do not describe this defect as a manifest defect; the
+  manifest's stake in the `mcp` block is `expose`, which is the invariant above. `ActionMcp`
+  carries no `name:`, so
+  the verbatim name is the whole rule and there is nothing left to derive; the helper is
+  **deleted** rather than left exported, because a dead name-deriver is a second way to name a
+  tool. `mcp-tool.test.ts`'s "one name per action, on every surface" asserts the three strings are
+  one string AND that it is the verbatim name — the equality alone passes on the old behaviour,
+  where all three agreed on the wrong name. **Neither package derives a tool name any more**:
+  `@ultimat3/query` carried a same-named twin with the identical defect and deleted it in the same
+  change, so `packages/query/src/naming.ts` derives PATHS only and its `src/index.ts` exports no
+  such helper. Both are tier 3, so neither could import the other and each owned its own removal —
+  which is why the rule is restated in both `CLAUDE.md`s rather than shared.
+- **The post-commit bust never fails the write it followed.** `cache.invalidates` fans out once the
+  handler has committed, so `bustAfterCommit` — `cache-gate.ts`, the only caller of
+  `invalidateTags` here — absorbs a fan-out that refuses and answers `undefined`: an undeclared tag
+  (`X_CACHE_TAG_UNKNOWN`) must not turn a durable write into a failed action, and those entries
+  expire by TTL. One dead tier is not that case; `invalidateTags` already reports it in
+  `report.errors`. It logs through core's `logger`, never `ctx.logger` — an HTTP `Ctx` is a cast
+  request context that carries none — and never renders the tags, because reading a malformed
+  `invalidates` entry back is the second throw the guard exists to stop. **A replay skips the bust
+  entirely:** no handler ran, the first call already busted these tags, and re-purging the CDN and
+  re-queueing ISR per retry is work for a write nobody made.
+- **The policy contract test asserts `ActionDeniedError`, and it sends valid input to get there.**
+  It sent `{}` and accepted any `UltimateError` until 2026-08, so every action with a required
+  field failed `input:` before `guard()` ran and the assertion passed on `X_INPUT_INVALID` —
+  including one whose policy was `allow()`. `sampleInput` builds the payload from `input:`'s own
+  IR (required keys only) so the invocation reaches the policy; the class, not `X_FORBIDDEN`, is
+  the assertion, because `ActionDeniedError` re-uses the policy decision's code and `can()`
+  answers a null actor with `X_UNAUTHENTICATED`. **Only `X_INPUT_INVALID` becomes
+  `X_CONTRACT_DRIFT`** — it is the one code `invoke` raises before `guard()` is reached, and
+  `input:` is the one knob that answers it. Everything else keeps its own code and its own fix:
+  saying `X_OUTPUT_INVALID … before its policy decided` named a stage nothing had checked and
+  offered a fix that changes nothing, and it hid the `allow()` whose handler threw — the authz
+  escape this assertion exists to catch. A non-`UltimateError` (a `row:` loader's own
+  `TypeError`) is rethrown untouched too: its stack is the thing worth reading.
+  `contract-test.contract.test.ts` drives all three assertions against actions built to fail them.
+  **`X_AUDIT_SINK_MISSING` is the one code assertion 1 passes through as well**, for the same
+  reason: `auditSinkFor` runs *before* `validateInput`, so "the schema accepted garbage" is a
+  false statement about it and `tighten input:` is a fix that changes nothing. It is the only
+  refusal that precedes the parse — a second one is a design mistake, not a second entry here.
+- **The audit seam ships the mechanism and none of the row.** `audit: true` on a declaration
+  wraps `execute` — it never forks it — so a **denied** attempt is recorded, which is the whole
+  reason this lives in the framework: `guard` throws before `handle`, so nothing an app writes
+  around its own handler could ever see one. What reaches the sink is what `invoke` already holds
+  (`at` from `ctx.now()`, the name, the mutator brand, the surface, the whole `ctx`, the parsed
+  input, the namespaced idempotency key, `replayed`, the outcome, the failure code). What does
+  **not** ship, ever: an audit entity, a schema, a retention policy, a storage backend, a hash
+  chain, a subject index, or an opinion on what "who" means under impersonation — four apps model
+  those four ways, so by axiom 8's own test they are business convention and shipping one makes
+  three of them wrong. `result` is absent for the same reason and one more: a handler's return is
+  reachable from the handler itself, so shipping it would be this package deciding a row carries
+  an after-image, which is `@ultimat3/admin`'s `diff` convention arriving one tier down.
+- **The audit vocabulary is `@ultimat3/admin`'s, shared by name and not by import.** `AuditOutcome`
+  is the same three words (`allowed | denied | failed`) and `AuditSink` the same noun; `admin` is
+  tier 5 and this is tier 3, so there is no edge to share them over. **Known duplicate**: admin's
+  `AuditSink` writes a fixed `AuditEntry` requiring an `AdminActor` and a `permission`, and it is
+  called only from `admin/crud.ts`, so an action outside `/admin` still produces nothing there.
+  Unifying them means lifting the vocabulary into `@ultimat3/core` — the only tier both reach —
+  and rebuilding `admin/audit.ts` on this seam. Not done here: `admin` is a shipped public API
+  and its `AuditEntry` is a different shape.
+- **A sink may not silently swallow, and the two failure policies are deliberate opposites.**
+  `X_AUDIT_SINK_MISSING` is raised *before* the input parse, so an audited action nothing can
+  record refuses with no committed write behind it — there is deliberately no logger-backed
+  default sink, because a line nobody stores satisfies the declaration while recording nothing.
+  A sink that refuses an **allowed** record fails the invocation (`X_AUDIT_SINK_FAILED`), which
+  is the inverse of `cache-gate.ts`'s absorb-and-log: a dropped cache entry expires by TTL and
+  the stack heals itself, while nothing ever re-derives an audit row that was never written. It
+  is post-commit all the same, so the cause says the handler already committed rather than
+  implying a rollback. **Its `fix:` branches on `record.idempotencyKey !== null` — the
+  INVOCATION's fact, never the declaration's `idempotent`.** A retry replays instead of re-running
+  only when this call reserved a record, and `invoke` reads
+  `def.idempotent === true ? (options.idempotencyKey ?? null) : null`, so a non-idempotent action
+  and an idempotent one whose caller sent no header collapse to the same `null`. The unqualified
+  "retry with the same Idempotency-Key" told a caller to apply a committed write twice — an
+  axiom-4 violation dressed as a fix line. Requiring `idempotent: true` at declaration was the
+  other candidate and was rejected: it would not have made the message true (the header is still
+  the caller's), and it would force the idempotency store on every app that wants only an audit
+  trail — "which writes must be retry-safe" is the app's call, not this package's.
+  `meta.replayable` carries the same fact to `--json`, and `audit.test.ts` pins both branches so
+  the text cannot drift back. A sink that refuses a **denied or failed** record is logged as
+  `audit.sink.failed` and the original error still reaches the caller — `X_AUDIT_SINK_FAILED`
+  there would hide the `X_FORBIDDEN` and would answer a probing client differently depending on
+  whether the audit backend was up, which is an oracle.
+- **`auditSettled` sits outside the `catch`, not inside it.** Inside, its own
+  `X_AUDIT_SINK_FAILED` fell into the failure branch and wrote a *second* record saying the
+  action `failed` — for a handler that had committed. An audit trail lying about a write is
+  worse than no audit trail; `audit.test.ts` counts the records a refusing sink was offered.
+- App code reaches a projection through the action (`publishPost.tool()`), never through
+  `.def` and never by importing the projection function. `facade.ts` is where a new method
+  is bound; the projection itself keeps living in its own file.
+- A mutator projects the three names it was authored with — `.local`, `.server`, `.conflict` —
+  plus every action façade member, through `named()` and registration alike. No aliases: the
+  old `.applyLocal` is gone, not deprecated.
+- `mutator.server()` calls the action's own callable, so it lands in `invoke` like every other
+  surface. Reaching the declared `server` from there is the second execution path this package
+  exists to prevent. `.local()` is the one member that skips the core — it never leaves the
+  client, so there is nothing to authorize.
+- Registration names the action the app exported, in place — `import { publishPost }` is
+  projectable after boot. Naming an already-named action is the only case that twins.
+- `src/index.ts` re-exports `t` from `@ultimat3/schema` **verbatim**, so an action file imports
+  one package. Never wrap, spread or re-declare it: `t` delegates to `schemaProvider()` on every
+  access, and a copy would freeze the provider at import time. `index.test.ts` asserts identity.
+- `defineApi` is the app's registration call; `registerActions` is what it composes. It reaches
+  `@ultimat3/query`'s and `@ultimat3/jobs`' registries through core's registrar table
+  (`primitiveRegistrar('query' | 'job' | 'task')`), never a sideways import — and throws
+  `X_REGISTRAR_MISSING` rather than skipping a kind whose registrar is absent, because a silent
+  skip drops every primitive of that kind.
+- **`jobs` and `tasks` belong in the same call, for the same reason `queries` do.** The export
+  name becomes the job's durable queue key; a job module nothing hands over keeps `job()`'s
+  positional `anonymous-job-<n>`, on every queue row and in the manifest. A definition with its
+  own `name:` keeps it — that rule lives in `@ultimat3/jobs`, not here. Jobs register before
+  tasks: a task descriptor lists the jobs it enqueues by name.
+- `defineApi`'s returned maps are built from the **registrar's own results**, never from the
+  modules' exports. A feature module exports helpers next to its primitives; copying every export
+  would seat one in `Api['actions']` as a client method nothing serves, and let two modules'
+  same-named helpers overwrite each other with no `X_ACTION_DUPLICATE` to raise. The type does the
+  same filter, so `rpc<Api['actions']>()` offers only what registered.
+- `rpc` is the only name for the map-wide typed client. There is no `createClient` alias.
+- **`registerAction` guards the derived PATH as well as the name.** `X_ACTION_DUPLICATE` only ever
+  asked about the name, so `archiveOrder` and `archiveOrders` — one route, by `pluralize`'s
+  deliberate "a trailing `s` is already plural" rule — both registered and both projected: the
+  router table seated whichever came last and the other was unreachable over HTTP while its
+  OpenAPI operation and MCP tool still advertised it. `paths` is a second index, cleared by
+  `resetRegistry` with the first, and the refusal is `X_ACTION_PATH_DUPLICATE`.
+- No policy at registration → `X_ACTION_POLICY_MISSING`. No exceptions, no flag.
+- `serializeOpenApi` output must be byte-stable: sorted keys, sorted registry, no clock.
+- `client.ts` stays free of server imports — it is bundled into the browser.
+- Authz goes through `enforce(surface, policy, { input, actor, ctx })` from
+  `@ultimat3/policy`; a returned denial becomes `ActionDeniedError`, which keeps the
+  policy's own code (`X_FORBIDDEN`, `X_UNAUTHENTICATED`) and carries the surface
+  denial. `policy-gate.ts` is the only file with a **runtime** edge to the policy package;
+  `errors.ts` also imports it, `import type { SurfaceDenial }`, which `verbatimModuleSyntax`
+  erases — so there is still exactly one place authz is evaluated.
+
+## Commands
+
+```
+bun test packages/action
+bun run typecheck
+```