@udibo/oauth2 0.36.0 → 0.38.0

package/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # @udibo/oauth2
 
-[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2) [![JSR version](https://jsr.io/badges/@udibo/oauth2)](https://jsr.io/@udibo/oauth2) [![JSR score](https://jsr.io/badges/@udibo/oauth2/score)](https://jsr.io/@udibo/oauth2/score) [![CI](https://github.com/udibo/oauth2/actions/workflows/ci-cd.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://github.com/udibo/oauth2/actions/workflows/ci-cd.yml?query=branch%3Amain) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/npm/l/@udibo/oauth2)](LICENSE) [![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dw/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2) [![Node.js version](https://img.shields.io/node/v/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2)
+[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2) [![JSR version](https://jsr.io/badges/@udibo/oauth2)](https://jsr.io/@udibo/oauth2) [![CI](https://github.com/udibo/oauth2/actions/workflows/ci-cd.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://github.com/udibo/oauth2/actions/workflows/ci-cd.yml?query=branch%3Amain) [![Coverage](https://codecov.io/gh/udibo/oauth2/branch/main/graph/badge.svg)](https://codecov.io/gh/udibo/oauth2) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/npm/l/@udibo/oauth2)](LICENSE) [![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dw/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2) [![Node.js version](https://img.shields.io/node/v/@udibo/oauth2)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@udibo/oauth2)
 
 OAuth2 and OpenID Connect tools for TypeScript applications: clients,
 authorization and resource servers, Hono middleware, React bindings, and

package/dist/identity/events.d.ts

@@ -118,18 +118,39 @@ export type IdentityEvent = {
 } | {
     type: "password_reset.completed";
     userId: string;
+    /**
+     * Sessions the reset revoked: the sum of what
+     * `IdentityUserStore.resetCredential` and the `sessions` service
+     * reported. Absent when neither ran.
+     */
+    sessionsRevoked?: number;
 } | {
     type: "password_reset.failed";
     /**
      * `"invalid_token"` — the reset link was unknown, expired, or already used.
-     * `"session_revocation_failed"` — the new password was set but the
-     * configured {@link RevocableSessionService} threw before the user's other
-     * sessions could be revoked, so the reset is reported failed (and rethrown)
-     * rather than trusted. The reset token is already spent, so clear the
-     * still-live sessions by calling `revokeAllByUser` again from this event,
-     * or have the user complete a fresh reset link.
+     * Nothing changed.
+     *
+     * The other reasons fire after the link was spent, and the error is
+     * rethrown:
+     *
+     * - `"credential_write_failed"` — hashing or storing the new password
+     *   threw. The old password still works and no session was revoked; the
+     *   user requests a fresh link.
+     * - `"session_revocation_failed"` — the new password was set but the
+     *   configured `RevocableSessionService` threw before the user's other
+     *   sessions could be revoked. Call `revokeAllByUser(userId)` again.
+     * - `"lockout_reset_failed"` — the password changed and the sessions were
+     *   revoked, but clearing the failed-attempt lockout threw. Call
+     *   `reset(userId)` on the lockout, or let the lock lapse.
+     *
+     * A store that implements `IdentityUserStore.resetCredential` writes the
+     * password and revokes the sessions it holds together. A
+     * `"session_revocation_failed"` after that means the stored sessions
+     * were revoked and only the `sessions` service's own state was not.
      */
-    reason: "invalid_token" | "session_revocation_failed";
+    reason: "invalid_token" | "credential_write_failed" | "session_revocation_failed" | "lockout_reset_failed";
+    /** The account the spent link belonged to; absent for `"invalid_token"`. */
+    userId?: string;
 } | {
     type: "credential_mint.failed";
     /**

package/dist/identity/mfa/service.d.ts

@@ -189,7 +189,9 @@ export type MfaVerification = {
     method: "recovery";
     /**
      * How many unused recovery codes remain — surface it so the UI can
-     * prompt regeneration when low.
+     * prompt regeneration when low. Counted from the set read just before
+     * this code was burned, so a code burned concurrently is not yet
+     * subtracted.
      */
     remainingRecoveryCodes: number;
 };
@@ -285,7 +287,9 @@ export declare class MfaService {
      * accepted TOTP code advances the stored last step through
      * {@link MfaStore.advanceLastStep}, so the same code is rejected on replay;
      * an accepted recovery code is burned through
-     * {@link MfaStore.consumeRecoveryHash}, so it is single-use. Both hold under
+     * {@link MfaStore.consumeRecoveryHash}, so it is single-use. The remaining
+     * codes are read before the burn, so a store failure never spends a code
+     * without signing the user in. Both hold under
      * concurrent submission only if the store implements those methods
      * atomically. Without an
      * active credential every code is rejected — recovery codes are a fallback

package/dist/identity/mfa/service.js

@@ -153,7 +153,9 @@ export class MfaService {
      * accepted TOTP code advances the stored last step through
      * {@link MfaStore.advanceLastStep}, so the same code is rejected on replay;
      * an accepted recovery code is burned through
-     * {@link MfaStore.consumeRecoveryHash}, so it is single-use. Both hold under
+     * {@link MfaStore.consumeRecoveryHash}, so it is single-use. The remaining
+     * codes are read before the burn, so a store failure never spends a code
+     * without signing the user in. Both hold under
      * concurrent submission only if the store implements those methods
      * atomically. Without an
      * active credential every code is rejected — recovery codes are a fallback
@@ -255,11 +257,12 @@ export class MfaService {
         if (normalizeRecoveryCode(code).length !== RECOVERY_CODE_LENGTH) {
             return undefined;
         }
-        const consumed = await this.#store.consumeRecoveryHash(userId, await hashRecoveryCode(code));
-        if (!consumed)
+        const hash = await hashRecoveryCode(code);
+        const stored = await this.#store.getRecoveryHashes(userId);
+        if (!(await this.#store.consumeRecoveryHash(userId, hash))) {
             return undefined;
-        const remainingRecoveryCodes = (await this.#store.getRecoveryHashes(userId))
-            .length;
+        }
+        const remainingRecoveryCodes = stored.filter((candidate) => candidate !== hash).length;
         await this.#resetThrottle(userId);
         await this.#emit({
             type: "mfa.verify.succeeded",

package/dist/identity/service.d.ts

@@ -60,6 +60,22 @@ export interface IdentityUserStore<User extends IdentityUser> {
     getCredential(userId: string): Promise<PasswordCredential | undefined>;
     /** Replace the user's password credential (reset / change). */
     setCredential(userId: string, credential: PasswordCredential): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Complete a password reset in one transaction: replace the credential,
+     * drop any imported hash, and revoke **every** session of the user. Return
+     * the number of sessions revoked. On a throw, none of the three may have
+     * happened.
+     *
+     * Optional. Implement it when the credential and the sessions share a
+     * database, so a session-store outage cannot leave a reset with the new
+     * password set and the old sessions live. When present,
+     * {@link IdentityService.resetPassword} calls it instead of
+     * {@link setCredential} and {@link clearLegacyCredential}. The reset link is
+     * still spent first. A configured `sessions` service is still called after
+     * this commits, for session state outside the transaction, such as a cache.
+     * Its `revokeAllByUser` then finds nothing left in the shared database.
+     */
+    resetCredential?(userId: string, credential: PasswordCredential): Promise<number>;
     /**
      * Atomically replace the credential only if it still equals `expected`.
      * `undefined` expects no native credential, for an imported-password upgrade.
@@ -188,7 +204,13 @@ export interface IdentityServiceOptions<User extends IdentityUser> {
      * Successful sign-ins are never delayed.
      */
     failedSignInFloorMs?: number;
-    /** Session revocation, called on a successful password reset. Optional. */
+    /**
+     * Session revocation, called on a successful password reset. Optional. When
+     * the user store implements {@link IdentityUserStore.resetCredential}, the
+     * reset still calls `revokeAllByUser` after that transaction commits, so
+     * session state the transaction cannot reach is revoked too. Omit it when
+     * the store's transaction already covers every place a session lives.
+     */
     sessions?: RevocableSessionService;
     /** Delivery transports for the emailed links and sign-in codes. Optional. */
     delivery?: DeliveryHooks;
@@ -468,19 +490,27 @@ export declare class IdentityService<User extends IdentityUser> {
      * redeemable until they expire) and, when an `otp` service is configured, the
      * pending sign-in code. Neither can fail the reset: a store that throws is
      * logged and the reset still completes, since the password has already
-     * changed by then.
+     * changed by then. Each is voided independently, so one store failing does
+     * not keep the other credential alive.
      *
      * The token is consumed **first**, before the password is written, so two
      * concurrent submissions of one link resolve to exactly one `{ userId }` and
      * only that call's password is set — the loser gets `null` and writes
-     * nothing. Sessions are revoked **after** the password is changed. If that
-     * revocation throws, the reset is reported failed — a `password_reset.failed`
-     * (`session_revocation_failed`) event fires, no `password_reset.completed`
-     * fires, and the error rethrows — rather than silently returning success
-     * with the user's old sessions still live. The token is already spent and
-     * the new password already set by then, so the operator clears the still-live
-     * sessions by calling `revokeAllByUser` again (subscribe to the event), or
-     * the user completes a fresh reset link.
+     * nothing. Any failure after that point is reported, never swallowed: a
+     * `password_reset.failed` event carrying the `userId` and a reason
+     * (`credential_write_failed`, `session_revocation_failed` or
+     * `lockout_reset_failed`) fires, no `password_reset.completed` fires, and the
+     * error rethrows. Each reason names what already changed and how to finish
+     * the reset; see the event's documentation.
+     *
+     * Without {@link IdentityUserStore.resetCredential}, sessions are revoked
+     * **after** the password is changed, in a separate call, so a session-store
+     * outage leaves the new password set and the old sessions live. A store
+     * that implements it makes the password write and the revocation one
+     * transaction; a configured `sessions` service then runs after the commit
+     * and can still report `session_revocation_failed` for the state outside
+     * it. `password_reset.completed` carries `sessionsRevoked`, the sum of the
+     * counts the store and the `sessions` service reported.
      *
      * @throws {IdentityError} `weak_password` when `password` fails the password
      * policy — including the 8–256 character defaults that apply when
@@ -602,7 +632,9 @@ export declare class IdentityService<User extends IdentityUser> {
      * the `signin_code.failed` event carries `locked`. Success consumes the code
      * (single-use), resets the flow's throttle window, and carries the `userId`
      * to sign in — session creation and your MFA gate stay your app's job, as
-     * does treating a since-deleted/disabled user as a failed sign-in.
+     * does treating a since-deleted/disabled user as a failed sign-in. A
+     * throttle reset that throws is logged and the result is still `success`,
+     * since the code is already spent.
      */
     verifySignInCode(input: {
         email: string;

package/dist/identity/service.js

@@ -258,19 +258,27 @@ export class IdentityService {
      * redeemable until they expire) and, when an `otp` service is configured, the
      * pending sign-in code. Neither can fail the reset: a store that throws is
      * logged and the reset still completes, since the password has already
-     * changed by then.
+     * changed by then. Each is voided independently, so one store failing does
+     * not keep the other credential alive.
      *
      * The token is consumed **first**, before the password is written, so two
      * concurrent submissions of one link resolve to exactly one `{ userId }` and
      * only that call's password is set — the loser gets `null` and writes
-     * nothing. Sessions are revoked **after** the password is changed. If that
-     * revocation throws, the reset is reported failed — a `password_reset.failed`
-     * (`session_revocation_failed`) event fires, no `password_reset.completed`
-     * fires, and the error rethrows — rather than silently returning success
-     * with the user's old sessions still live. The token is already spent and
-     * the new password already set by then, so the operator clears the still-live
-     * sessions by calling `revokeAllByUser` again (subscribe to the event), or
-     * the user completes a fresh reset link.
+     * nothing. Any failure after that point is reported, never swallowed: a
+     * `password_reset.failed` event carrying the `userId` and a reason
+     * (`credential_write_failed`, `session_revocation_failed` or
+     * `lockout_reset_failed`) fires, no `password_reset.completed` fires, and the
+     * error rethrows. Each reason names what already changed and how to finish
+     * the reset; see the event's documentation.
+     *
+     * Without {@link IdentityUserStore.resetCredential}, sessions are revoked
+     * **after** the password is changed, in a separate call, so a session-store
+     * outage leaves the new password set and the old sessions live. A store
+     * that implements it makes the password write and the revocation one
+     * transaction; a configured `sessions` service then runs after the commit
+     * and can still report `session_revocation_failed` for the state outside
+     * it. `password_reset.completed` carries `sessionsRevoked`, the sum of the
+     * counts the store and the `sessions` service reported.
      *
      * @throws {IdentityError} `weak_password` when `password` fails the password
      * policy — including the 8–256 character defaults that apply when
@@ -293,33 +301,55 @@ export class IdentityService {
         });
         if (consumed.status !== "success")
             return null;
-        const { resolved } = consumed;
-        await this.#users.setCredential(resolved.subject, await this.#passwords.hash(input.password));
-        try {
-            await this.#users.clearLegacyCredential?.(resolved.subject);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            console.error("[@udibo/oauth2] resetPassword legacy-credential clear failed:", error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
-        }
-        await this.#voidPasswordlessCredentials(tokens, resolved.subject, emailFromData(resolved.data));
-        if (this.#sessions) {
-            try {
-                await this.#sessions.revokeAllByUser(resolved.subject);
+        const userId = consumed.resolved.subject;
+        const resetCredential = this.#users.resetCredential;
+        let sessionsRevoked;
+        await this.#failResetOnThrow(userId, "credential_write_failed", async () => {
+            const credential = await this.#passwords.hash(input.password);
+            if (resetCredential) {
+                sessionsRevoked = await resetCredential.call(this.#users, userId, credential);
             }
-            catch (error) {
-                await this.#emit({
-                    type: "password_reset.failed",
-                    reason: "session_revocation_failed",
-                });
-                throw error;
+            else {
+                await this.#users.setCredential(userId, credential);
             }
+        });
+        if (!resetCredential)
+            await this.#clearLegacyAfterReset(userId);
+        await this.#voidPasswordlessCredentials(tokens, userId, emailFromData(consumed.resolved.data));
+        const sessions = this.#sessions;
+        if (sessions) {
+            await this.#failResetOnThrow(userId, "session_revocation_failed", async () => {
+                sessionsRevoked =
+                    (sessionsRevoked ?? 0) + (await sessions.revokeAllByUser(userId));
+            });
+        }
+        const lockout = this.#lockout;
+        if (lockout) {
+            await this.#failResetOnThrow(userId, "lockout_reset_failed", () => lockout.reset(userId));
         }
-        await this.#lockout?.reset(resolved.subject);
         await this.#emit({
             type: "password_reset.completed",
-            userId: resolved.subject,
+            userId,
+            ...(sessionsRevoked === undefined ? {} : { sessionsRevoked }),
         });
-        return { userId: resolved.subject };
+        return { userId };
+    }
+    async #failResetOnThrow(userId, reason, step) {
+        try {
+            await step();
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            await this.#emit({ type: "password_reset.failed", reason, userId });
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    async #clearLegacyAfterReset(userId) {
+        try {
+            await this.#users.clearLegacyCredential?.(userId);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            console.error("[@udibo/oauth2] resetPassword legacy-credential clear failed:", error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+        }
     }
     /**
      * Mint + deliver an email-verification link for a user. Typically called
@@ -565,7 +595,9 @@ export class IdentityService {
      * the `signin_code.failed` event carries `locked`. Success consumes the code
      * (single-use), resets the flow's throttle window, and carries the `userId`
      * to sign in — session creation and your MFA gate stay your app's job, as
-     * does treating a since-deleted/disabled user as a failed sign-in.
+     * does treating a since-deleted/disabled user as a failed sign-in. A
+     * throttle reset that throws is logged and the result is still `success`,
+     * since the code is already spent.
      */
     async verifySignInCode(input) {
         const otp = this.#requireOtp("verifySignInCode");
@@ -593,7 +625,12 @@ export class IdentityService {
             });
             return { status: "invalid" };
         }
-        await this.#resetThrottle("signInCode", email);
+        try {
+            await this.#resetThrottle("signInCode", email);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.#logPersistFailure("sign-in code throttle reset", error);
+        }
         await this.#emit({ type: "signin_code.verified", userId: user.id });
         return { status: "success", userId: user.id };
     }
@@ -719,14 +756,10 @@ export class IdentityService {
         });
     }
     async #voidPasswordlessCredentials(tokens, subject, email) {
-        try {
-            await tokens.invalidate(TokenPurpose.SignIn, subject);
-            if (email)
-                await this.#otp?.invalidate(email, TokenPurpose.SignIn);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            console.error("[@udibo/oauth2] resetPassword could not void the outstanding " +
-                "passwordless credentials; they stay usable until they expire:", error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+        await logVoidFailure("sign-in links", () => tokens.invalidate(TokenPurpose.SignIn, subject));
+        const otp = this.#otp;
+        if (email && otp) {
+            await logVoidFailure("sign-in code", () => otp.invalidate(email, TokenPurpose.SignIn));
         }
     }
     async #trapMintFailure(flow, mint) {
@@ -854,6 +887,15 @@ const DELIVERY_PURPOSES = {
     sendEmailVerification: TokenPurpose.EmailVerification,
     sendSignInLink: TokenPurpose.SignIn,
 };
+async function logVoidFailure(credential, invalidate) {
+    try {
+        await invalidate();
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        console.error(`[@udibo/oauth2] resetPassword could not void the outstanding ` +
+            `${credential}, usable until expiry:`, error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
+    }
+}
 function emailFromData(data) {
     const email = data?.email;
     return typeof email === "string" ? email : undefined;

package/dist/models/token.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,14 @@ export interface Token<Client extends ClientInterface, User, Scope extends Abstr
     claims?: Record<string, unknown>;
     /** The authorization code used to generate this token, for replay detection per RFC 6819. */
     code?: string;
+    /**
+     * The SHA-256 digest, as lowercase hex, of the PKCE `code_verifier` that
+     * redeemed {@linkcode Token.code}. The authorization code grant sets it on a
+     * code redeemed with PKCE. A token service persists it with the code, so
+     * `revokeCode` can tell a replay that presents that verifier from one that
+     * only names the client.
+     */
+    codeVerifierHash?: string;
     /**
      * OIDC nonce carried transiently from the authorization code so the token
      * endpoint can echo it in the id_token. Not persisted by token stores.

package/dist/server/grants/authorization-code.d.ts

@@ -33,8 +33,10 @@ export interface CodeReuseEvent<Client extends ClientInterface> {
      * The client that presented the code. It is the code's own client only when
      * the token service's `revokeCode` honors its `client` argument. A public
      * client, or any client the grant looks up by id because
-     * `requireClientAuthentication` is `false`, is named by `client_id` alone,
-     * so whoever holds the spent code can present it as that client.
+     * `requireClientAuthentication` is `false`, is named by `client_id` alone;
+     * its replay revokes, and so reaches this event, only when it presented the
+     * `code_verifier` that redeemed the code and `revokeCode` honors its
+     * `codeVerifierHash` argument.
      */
     client: Client;
 }
@@ -90,7 +92,9 @@ export interface AuthorizationCodeGrantOptions<Client extends ClientInterface, U
      * token service's `revokeCode` revoked those tokens — record it as a
      * security event. A `revokeCode` that honors its `client` argument revokes
      * nothing, and so does not fire this, for a client other than the code's
-     * own; {@linkcode CodeReuseEvent.client} says who that excludes.
+     * own; {@linkcode CodeReuseEvent.client} says who that excludes. A client
+     * that did not authenticate with its secret fires it only by presenting the
+     * `code_verifier` that redeemed the code.
      *
      * Trigger point `code-reuse` (see `docs/trigger-points.md`).
      * Fire-and-forget: it is awaited, but a throw is caught and logged, never
@@ -225,7 +229,14 @@ export declare class AuthorizationCodeGrant<Client extends ClientInterface, User
      * then fails its checks, asks
      * `tokenService.revokeCode` to revoke the tokens issued from it on behalf of
      * the presenting client, fires `onCodeReuse` when it did, and fails with
-     * `invalid_grant` (RFC 6819 §4.4.1.1).
+     * `invalid_grant` (RFC 6819 §4.4.1.1). The replay must prove it could have
+     * redeemed the code: a client that authenticated with a `client_secret` in
+     * `request` asks with the client alone, and any other client asks with the
+     * SHA-256 hex digest of the `code_verifier` it presented, which `revokeCode`
+     * matches against {@linkcode Token.codeVerifierHash}. Without a verifier,
+     * such a client's replay revokes nothing. Pass the `client` that
+     * {@linkcode getAuthenticatedClient} resolved from this same `request`.
+     * A code redeemed with PKCE issues its token with `codeVerifierHash` set.
      *
      * @throws {InvalidRequestError} When `code` is missing, a required `code_verifier` is absent, or the verifier is malformed.
      * @throws {InvalidGrantError} When the code is unknown, expired, already claimed, or its verifier or `redirect_uri` does not match.

package/dist/server/grants/authorization-code.js

@@ -188,7 +188,14 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
      * then fails its checks, asks
      * `tokenService.revokeCode` to revoke the tokens issued from it on behalf of
      * the presenting client, fires `onCodeReuse` when it did, and fails with
-     * `invalid_grant` (RFC 6819 §4.4.1.1).
+     * `invalid_grant` (RFC 6819 §4.4.1.1). The replay must prove it could have
+     * redeemed the code: a client that authenticated with a `client_secret` in
+     * `request` asks with the client alone, and any other client asks with the
+     * SHA-256 hex digest of the `code_verifier` it presented, which `revokeCode`
+     * matches against {@linkcode Token.codeVerifierHash}. Without a verifier,
+     * such a client's replay revokes nothing. Pass the `client` that
+     * {@linkcode getAuthenticatedClient} resolved from this same `request`.
+     * A code redeemed with PKCE issues its token with `codeVerifierHash` set.
      *
      * @throws {InvalidRequestError} When `code` is missing, a required `code_verifier` is absent, or the verifier is malformed.
      * @throws {InvalidGrantError} When the code is unknown, expired, already claimed, or its verifier or `redirect_uri` does not match.
@@ -202,9 +209,10 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
         if (typeof code !== "string") {
             throw new InvalidRequestError("code parameter required");
         }
+        const replay = { code, client, request, body };
         const authorizationCode = await authorizationCodeService.get(code);
         if (!authorizationCode) {
-            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, code, client, "invalid code");
+            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, replay, "invalid code");
         }
         if (authorizationCode.expiresAt < new Date()) {
             throw new InvalidGrantError("invalid code");
@@ -212,7 +220,7 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
         const exchangeCode = tokenService.exchangeCode?.bind(tokenService);
         if (!exchangeCode &&
             !(await authorizationCodeService.revoke(authorizationCode))) {
-            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, code, client);
+            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, replay);
         }
         let token;
         try {
@@ -221,11 +229,15 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
         }
         catch (error) {
             if (exchangeCode) {
-                await this.#consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, client);
+                await this.#consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, replay);
             }
             throw error;
         }
         token.code = code;
+        const codeVerifier = body.get("code_verifier");
+        if (typeof codeVerifier === "string") {
+            token.codeVerifierHash = await sha256Hash(codeVerifier);
+        }
         let saved;
         if (exchangeCode) {
             try {
@@ -233,7 +245,7 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
             }
             catch (error) {
                 if (isOAuth2Error(error)) {
-                    await this.#consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, client);
+                    await this.#consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, replay);
                 }
                 throw error;
             }
@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
             saved = await tokenService.save(token);
         }
         if (!saved) {
-            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, code, client);
+            throw await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, replay);
         }
         if (authorizationCode.nonce)
             saved.nonce = authorizationCode.nonce;
@@ -281,23 +293,38 @@ export class AuthorizationCodeGrant extends AbstractGrant {
             throw new InvalidGrantError("did not expect redirect_uri parameter");
         }
     }
-    async #consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, client) {
+    async #consumeFailedExchange(authorizationCodeService, tokenService, authorizationCode, replay) {
         try {
             if (!(await authorizationCodeService.revoke(authorizationCode))) {
-                await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, authorizationCode.code, client);
+                await this.#refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, replay);
             }
         }
         catch (error) {
             console.error("[@udibo/oauth2] could not consume the code of a failed exchange:", error instanceof Error ? error.message : error);
         }
     }
-    async #refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, code, client, unrevokedMessage = "code already used") {
-        if (!(await tokenService.revokeCode(code, client))) {
-            return new InvalidGrantError(unrevokedMessage);
+    async #refuseClaimedCode(tokenService, { code, client, request, body }, unrevokedMessage = "code already used") {
+        const codeVerifier = body.get("code_verifier");
+        let revoked = false;
+        if (this.#authenticatedBySecret(request, body)) {
+            revoked = await tokenService.revokeCode(code, client);
+        }
+        else if (typeof codeVerifier === "string") {
+            revoked = await tokenService.revokeCode(code, client, await sha256Hash(codeVerifier));
         }
+        if (!revoked)
+            return new InvalidGrantError(unrevokedMessage);
         await this.#notifyCodeReuse({ codeHash: await sha256Hash(code), client });
         return new InvalidGrantError("code already used");
     }
+    #authenticatedBySecret(request, body) {
+        try {
+            return !!this.getClientCredentials(request, body).clientSecret;
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
     async #notifyCodeReuse(event) {
         if (!this.#onCodeReuse)
             return;

package/dist/server/services/token.d.ts

@@ -173,13 +173,17 @@ export interface TokenServiceInterface<Client extends ClientInterface, User, Sco
      * client the code's tokens were issued to; for any other client revoke
      * nothing and resolve `false`. A different confidential client could never
      * have redeemed the code, since that needs the code's own client's
-     * credentials, so its replay says nothing about theft. The gate names a
-     * public client, or any client when the grant's
-     * `requireClientAuthentication` is `false`, by `client_id` alone, so anyone
-     * holding such a client's spent code can still present it as that client
-     * and revoke. A store that ignores `client` revokes on any client's replay,
-     * which lets a client that sees a leaked, spent code end the session it
-     * started.
+     * credentials, so its replay says nothing about theft. A store that ignores
+     * `client` revokes on any client's replay, which lets a client that sees a
+     * leaked, spent code end the session it started.
+     *
+     * `codeVerifierHash`, the SHA-256 hex digest of the `code_verifier` the
+     * replay presented, is passed for a client that did not authenticate with a
+     * secret. When it is given, also revoke only when it equals the
+     * {@linkcode Token.codeVerifierHash} persisted with the code's tokens;
+     * tokens saved without one never match. Omitted, the client check alone
+     * applies. A store that ignores it lets anyone holding a public client's
+     * spent code end the session it started.
      *
      * With {@linkcode exchangeCode}, make the two linearizable: a call that
      * begins once `exchangeCode` has claimed the code must find and revoke the
@@ -188,7 +192,7 @@ export interface TokenServiceInterface<Client extends ClientInterface, User, Sco
      *
      * @see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6819#section-4.4.1.1
      */
-    revokeCode(code: string, client?: Client): Promise<boolean>;
+    revokeCode(code: string, client?: Client, codeVerifierHash?: string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
      * Exchanges an authorization code in one atomic step: claims
      * `authorizationCode` as `AuthorizationCodeServiceInterface.revoke`
@@ -207,8 +211,9 @@ export interface TokenServiceInterface<Client extends ClientInterface, User, Sco
      *
      * After a successful call the code service's `get` must resolve `undefined`
      * for the code, as after `revoke`. A failed insert must leave the code
-     * claimable. Store the token so `revokeCode` finds it by the code, and make
-     * the two linearizable, as `revokeCode` requires.
+     * claimable. Store the token so `revokeCode` finds it by the code, with its
+     * {@linkcode Token.codeVerifierHash}, and make the two linearizable, as
+     * `revokeCode` requires.
      * `runCodeExchangeContractTests` checks it under concurrent callers, with
      * the store's barrier wired between its claim and its insert.
      */
@@ -372,8 +377,9 @@ export declare abstract class AbstractTokenService<Client extends ClientInterfac
     /**
      * Revokes every token issued from the given authorization code, returning
      * true if any were revoked (signaling code replay per RFC 6819 §4.4.1.1).
-     * Revoke nothing when `client` is not the client the tokens were issued to
-     * ({@linkcode TokenServiceInterface.revokeCode} explains why).
+     * Revoke nothing when `client` is not the client the tokens were issued to,
+     * or when `codeVerifierHash` is given and is not the one they were saved
+     * with ({@linkcode TokenServiceInterface.revokeCode} explains why).
      */
-    abstract revokeCode(code: string, client?: Client): Promise<boolean>;
+    abstract revokeCode(code: string, client?: Client, codeVerifierHash?: string): Promise<boolean>;
 }

package/dist/testing/contract/code-exchange.d.ts

@@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ export interface CodeExchangeContractOptions<C extends ClientInterface, U extend
      * longer to reach the lock they wait on.
      */
     blockedAfterMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * Set to `false` when the service's `revokeCode` deliberately ignores its
+     * `codeVerifierHash` argument, as `runTokenServiceContractTests` allows. The
+     * suite still checks that a token `exchangeCode` saved revokes for its own
+     * verifier, and registers an ignored case naming what is not covered — a
+     * replay that names a public client, with any verifier, revokes the token
+     * `exchangeCode` saved. Defaults to `true`.
+     */
+    revokeCodeChecksVerifier?: boolean;
     /** Overrides the name passed to the outer `describe` block. */
     describeName?: string;
 }

package/dist/testing/contract/code-exchange.js

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 import { assert, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import { InvalidGrantError } from "../../errors.js";
 import { AuthorizationCodeGrant, } from "../../server/grants/authorization-code.js";
+import { sha256Hash } from "../../server/utils/hash.js";
+import { generateCodeChallenge, generateCodeVerifier, } from "../../utils/pkce.js";
 import { race } from "./_race.js";
 const defaultMakeUser = (seq) => ({ id: `u${seq}`, username: `user${seq}` });
 const defaultMakeClient = (seq) => ({
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
     const makeClient = options.makeClient ?? defaultMakeClient;
     const pausable = options.exchangeAwaitsBarrier ?? true;
     const blockedAfterMs = options.blockedAfterMs ?? 100;
+    const expectCodeVerifierCheck = options.revokeCodeChecksVerifier ?? true;
     describe(options.describeName ?? "TokenServiceInterface.exchangeCode contract", () => {
         let services;
         let codeService;
@@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
         let user;
         let client;
         let armed;
+        let verifiers;
         const barriers = {
             async afterClaim() {
                 const hold = armed;
@@ -76,6 +80,7 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
         };
         beforeEach(async () => {
             armed = undefined;
+            verifiers = new Map();
             services = await options.makeServices(barriers);
             codeService = services.authorizationCodeService;
             tokenService = services.tokenService;
@@ -88,24 +93,37 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
             assert(typeof tokenService.exchangeCode === "function", "runCodeExchangeContractTests needs a token service that implements exchangeCode");
             return tokenService.exchangeCode(authorizationCode, token);
         }
+        function verifierOf(authorizationCode) {
+            const verifier = verifiers.get(authorizationCode.code);
+            assert(verifier, "the suite saved no verifier for this code");
+            return verifier;
+        }
         async function savedCode() {
+            const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
             const authorizationCode = {
                 code: await codeService.generateCode(client, user),
                 expiresAt: await codeService.expiresAt(client, user),
                 client,
                 user,
+                challenge: await generateCodeChallenge(verifier),
+                challengeMethod: "S256",
             };
+            verifiers.set(authorizationCode.code, verifier);
             await codeService.save(authorizationCode);
             return authorizationCode;
         }
         async function tokenFor(authorizationCode) {
-            return {
+            const token = {
                 accessToken: await tokenService.generateAccessToken(client, user),
                 accessTokenExpiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000),
                 client,
                 user,
                 code: authorizationCode.code,
             };
+            const verifier = verifiers.get(authorizationCode.code);
+            if (verifier)
+                token.codeVerifierHash = await sha256Hash(verifier);
+            return token;
         }
         async function live(tokens) {
             const found = [];
@@ -154,6 +172,8 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
             const body = new FormData();
             body.set("grant_type", "authorization_code");
             body.set("code", authorizationCode.code);
+            body.set("client_id", client.id.toString());
+            body.set("code_verifier", verifierOf(authorizationCode));
             return grant.token(new Request("https://as.test/token", { method: "POST" }), client, body);
         }
         it("implements exchangeCode", () => {
@@ -170,6 +190,30 @@ export function runCodeExchangeContractTests(options) {
             expect(await tokenService.revokeCode(authorizationCode.code, client), "revokeCode must find the token exchangeCode saved by its code").toBe(true);
             expect(await live([token])).toStrictEqual([]);
         });
+        it("revokes the token it saved for the codeVerifierHash it was saved with", async () => {
+            const authorizationCode = await savedCode();
+            const token = await tokenFor(authorizationCode);
+            await exchangeCode(authorizationCode, token);
+            expect(await tokenService.revokeCode(authorizationCode.code, client, token.codeVerifierHash), "exchangeCode must persist codeVerifierHash with the token, or a " +
+                "replay with the redeeming verifier cannot revoke it").toBe(true);
+            expect(await live([token])).toStrictEqual([]);
+        });
+        if (expectCodeVerifierCheck) {
+            it("keeps the token's codeVerifierHash, so revokeCode refuses another verifier and revokes for its own", async () => {
+                const authorizationCode = await savedCode();
+                const token = await tokenFor(authorizationCode);
+                await exchangeCode(authorizationCode, token);
+                expect(await tokenService.revokeCode(authorizationCode.code, client, await sha256Hash(generateCodeVerifier())), "a replay that does not present the redeeming verifier must " +
+                    "revoke nothing").toBe(false);
+                expect(await live([token])).toStrictEqual([token.accessToken]);
+                expect(await tokenService.revokeCode(authorizationCode.code, client, token.codeVerifierHash), "exchangeCode must persist codeVerifierHash with the token, or a " +
+                    "replay with the redeeming verifier cannot revoke it").toBe(true);
+                expect(await live([token])).toStrictEqual([]);
+            });
+        }
+        else {
+            it.skip("revokeCode ignores the presented verifier — a replay that names a public client, with any verifier, revokes the token exchangeCode saved (revokeCodeChecksVerifier: false)", () => { });
+        }
         it("refuses a code that was already claimed or never stored, persisting nothing", async () => {
             const claimed = await savedCode();
             await codeService.revoke(claimed.code);

package/dist/testing/contract/identity-user-store.d.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ export interface IdentityUserStoreContractFixture<User extends IdentityUser> {
     isEmailVerified?(userId: string): Promise<boolean>;
     /** Seed an imported hash. Required for legacyCredentials. */
     setLegacyCredential?(userId: string, hash: string): Promise<void>;
+    /** Start a live session for the user and return its id. Required for resetCredential. */
+    startSession?(userId: string): Promise<string>;
+    /** Whether the application would still accept the session. Required for resetCredential. */
+    isSessionLive?(sessionId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Make the next resetCredential call throw at `step`, after the other
+     * writes have had their chance to run inside the transaction. Required for
+     * resetCredential: the suite calls it once for each step (`"legacy"` only
+     * with legacyCredentials) to prove that no write survives another failing,
+     * whichever order your transaction runs them in.
+     */
+    failNextReset?(step: "credential" | "legacy" | "sessions"): Promise<void> | void;
     /** Release resources and remove this test's records after all calls finish. */
     dispose?(): Promise<void> | void;
 }
@@ -45,6 +57,12 @@ export interface IdentityUserStoreContractOptions<User extends IdentityUser> {
     emailVerification?: boolean;
     /** Require imported credential lookup and clearing, plus its setup helper. */
     legacyCredentials?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Require the transactional password-reset capability and its session and
+     * fault-injection helpers. With legacyCredentials, also checks that the
+     * reset drops the imported hash.
+     */
+    resetCredential?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Register the IdentityUserStore suite in a Vitest test file. Credential fixtures

package/dist/testing/contract/identity-user-store.js

@@ -137,6 +137,60 @@ export function runIdentityUserStoreContractTests(options) {
                 expect(await store.getCredential(other.id)).toStrictEqual(ORIGINAL);
             });
         }
+        if (options.resetCredential) {
+            async function resetSetup() {
+                assert.exists(store.resetCredential, "resetCredential capability is required");
+                assert.exists(fixture.startSession, "startSession setup helper is required");
+                assert.exists(fixture.isSessionLive, "isSessionLive setup helper is required");
+                const user = await create();
+                const other = await create(2);
+                if (options.legacyCredentials) {
+                    assert.exists(fixture.setLegacyCredential);
+                    await fixture.setLegacyCredential(user.id, "imported-hash-one");
+                }
+                return {
+                    user,
+                    other,
+                    sessions: [
+                        await fixture.startSession(user.id),
+                        await fixture.startSession(user.id),
+                    ],
+                    otherSession: await fixture.startSession(other.id),
+                };
+            }
+            async function liveness(ids) {
+                return await Promise.all(ids.map((id) => fixture.isSessionLive(id)));
+            }
+            it("resets the credential and revokes every session of the user, and only that user", async () => {
+                const { user, other, sessions, otherSession } = await resetSetup();
+                expect(await store.resetCredential(user.id, structuredClone(REPLACEMENT)), "resetCredential must report the sessions it revoked").toStrictEqual(2);
+                expect(await store.getCredential(user.id)).toStrictEqual(REPLACEMENT);
+                expect(await liveness(sessions), "resetCredential revokes every session of the user").toStrictEqual([false, false]);
+                if (options.legacyCredentials) {
+                    expect(await store.getLegacyCredential(user.id), "resetCredential drops the imported hash").toBe(null);
+                }
+                expect(await store.getCredential(other.id)).toStrictEqual(ORIGINAL);
+                expect(await fixture.isSessionLive(otherSession), "resetCredential must not revoke another user's sessions").toBe(true);
+                expect(await store.resetCredential(user.id, structuredClone(REPLACEMENT))).toStrictEqual(0);
+            });
+            const steps = options.legacyCredentials
+                ? ["credential", "legacy", "sessions"]
+                : ["credential", "sessions"];
+            for (const step of steps) {
+                it(`changes nothing when the reset fails at the ${step} step`, async () => {
+                    const { user, sessions } = await resetSetup();
+                    assert.exists(fixture.failNextReset, "failNextReset fault-injection helper is required");
+                    await fixture.failNextReset(step);
+                    const outcome = await store.resetCredential(user.id, structuredClone(REPLACEMENT)).then(() => "resolved", () => "rejected");
+                    expect(outcome, "resetCredential must reject when failNextReset injected a failure").toStrictEqual("rejected");
+                    expect(await store.getCredential(user.id), "a failed reset must leave the credential unchanged").toStrictEqual(ORIGINAL);
+                    expect(await liveness(sessions), "a failed reset must leave the sessions live").toStrictEqual([true, true]);
+                    if (options.legacyCredentials) {
+                        expect(await store.getLegacyCredential(user.id), "a failed reset must leave the imported hash in place").toStrictEqual("imported-hash-one");
+                    }
+                });
+            }
+        }
         if (options.emailVerification) {
             it("verifies only the issued-for email and is idempotent", async () => {
                 const user = await create();

package/dist/testing/contract/token.d.ts

@@ -86,6 +86,15 @@ export interface TokenServiceContractOptions<C extends ClientInterface, U extend
      * started — instead of passing in silence. Defaults to `true`.
      */
     revokeCodeChecksClient?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Set to `false` when the service's `revokeCode` deliberately ignores its
+     * `codeVerifierHash` argument. The suite then registers an ignored case
+     * naming what is not covered — a replay that names a public client by
+     * `client_id`, with any verifier, revokes the tokens issued from its spent
+     * code, so anyone who holds a leaked code can end the session it started —
+     * instead of passing in silence. Defaults to `true`.
+     */
+    revokeCodeChecksVerifier?: boolean;
     /** Overrides the name passed to the outer `describe` block. */
     describeName?: string;
 }

package/dist/testing/contract/token.js

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ const defaultMakeClient = (seq) => ({
 });
 const defaultMakeScope = (value) => new BasicScope(value);
 const defaultMakeFamilyId = () => crypto.randomUUID();
+const randomVerifierHash = () => Array.from(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)), (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
 /** Runs the {@link TokenServiceInterface} contract suite. */
 export function runTokenServiceContractTests(options) {
     const makeUser = options.makeUser ?? defaultMakeUser;
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ export function runTokenServiceContractTests(options) {
     const makeFamilyId = options.makeFamilyId ?? defaultMakeFamilyId;
     const expectReuseDetection = options.refreshTokenReuseDetection ?? true;
     const expectCodeClientCheck = options.revokeCodeChecksClient ?? true;
+    const expectCodeVerifierCheck = options.revokeCodeChecksVerifier ?? true;
     describe(options.describeName ?? "TokenServiceInterface contract", () => {
         let userService;
         let clientService;
@@ -292,6 +294,72 @@ export function runTokenServiceContractTests(options) {
             else {
                 it.skip("revokeCode ignores the presenting client — any client that presents a spent code revokes its tokens (revokeCodeChecksClient: false)", () => { });
             }
+            if (expectCodeVerifierCheck) {
+                async function issueBoundCode(code, codeVerifierHash) {
+                    const accessToken = await tokenService.generateAccessToken(client, user);
+                    await tokenService.save({
+                        accessToken,
+                        code,
+                        codeVerifierHash,
+                        client,
+                        user,
+                    });
+                    return accessToken;
+                }
+                it("revokes nothing for a codeVerifierHash other than the one the code's tokens were saved with", async () => {
+                    const accessToken = await issueBoundCode("bound-code", randomVerifierHash());
+                    expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("bound-code", client, randomVerifierHash()), "a replay without the verifier that redeemed the code proves " +
+                        "nothing, so it must not revoke what the code issued").toBe(false);
+                    expect(await tokenService.getToken(accessToken)).not.toBe(undefined);
+                });
+                it("revokes for the codeVerifierHash the code's tokens were saved with, after another was refused", async () => {
+                    const codeVerifierHash = randomVerifierHash();
+                    const accessToken = await issueBoundCode("bound-code", codeVerifierHash);
+                    await tokenService.revokeCode("bound-code", client, randomVerifierHash());
+                    expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("bound-code", client, codeVerifierHash)).toBe(true);
+                    expect(await tokenService.getToken(accessToken)).toBe(undefined);
+                });
+                if (expectCodeClientCheck) {
+                    it("revokes nothing for another client that presents the codeVerifierHash the code's tokens were saved with", async () => {
+                        const other = makeClient(2);
+                        await options.addClient(clientService, other);
+                        const codeVerifierHash = randomVerifierHash();
+                        const accessToken = await issueBoundCode("bound-code", codeVerifierHash);
+                        expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("bound-code", other, codeVerifierHash), "a matching verifier does not lift the client check").toBe(false);
+                        expect(await tokenService.getToken(accessToken)).not.toBe(undefined);
+                    });
+                }
+                it("revokes nothing for a codeVerifierHash when the code's tokens were saved without one", async () => {
+                    const accessToken = await issueBoundCode("unbound-code");
+                    expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("unbound-code", client, randomVerifierHash()), "a code redeemed without PKCE binds no verifier, so no verifier " +
+                        "a replay presents can match it").toBe(false);
+                    expect(await tokenService.getToken(accessToken)).not.toBe(undefined);
+                });
+                it("revokes a code saved with a codeVerifierHash when none is passed, for a client that authenticated", async () => {
+                    const accessToken = await issueBoundCode("bound-code", randomVerifierHash());
+                    expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("bound-code", client), "the grant omits codeVerifierHash for a client that " +
+                        "authenticated with its secret, where the client check suffices").toBe(true);
+                    expect(await tokenService.getToken(accessToken)).toBe(undefined);
+                });
+                it("revokes nothing in a rotated family for a codeVerifierHash other than the one the code's tokens were saved with", async () => {
+                    const family = makeFamilyId();
+                    const issued = {
+                        ...(await familyMember(family)),
+                        code: "rotated-bound-code",
+                        codeVerifierHash: randomVerifierHash(),
+                    };
+                    await tokenService.save(issued);
+                    const rotated = await familyMember(family);
+                    await rotateTo(issued, rotated);
+                    expect(await tokenService.revokeCode("rotated-bound-code", client, randomVerifierHash())).toBe(false);
+                    expect(await isLive(rotated), "the verifier check comes before any family is revoked — a " +
+                        "replay without the redeeming verifier must not end the " +
+                        "session rotated from the code").toBe(true);
+                });
+            }
+            else {
+                it.skip("revokeCode ignores the presented verifier — a replay that names a public client, with any verifier, revokes its spent code's tokens (revokeCodeChecksVerifier: false)", () => { });
+            }
         });
         if (expectReuseDetection) {
             describe("refresh-token rotation family", () => {

package/dist/testing/services.d.ts

@@ -298,9 +298,10 @@ export declare class MemoryTokenService<C extends ClientInterface, U extends Mem
      * {@linkcode revokeFamily} does, so their rotated successors end with them.
      * Resolves `true` when tokens were issued from the code.
      * Removes nothing and resolves `false` when `client` is given and is not the
-     * client the code's tokens were issued to.
+     * client the code's tokens were issued to, or when `codeVerifierHash` is
+     * given and is not the one they were saved with.
      */
-    revokeCode(code: string, client?: C): Promise<boolean>;
+    revokeCode(code: string, client?: C, codeVerifierHash?: string): Promise<boolean>;
 }
 /** Options for {@link MemoryAuthorizationCodeService}. */
 export interface MemoryAuthorizationCodeServiceOptions<C extends ClientInterface, U extends MemoryUserShape> {

package/dist/testing/services.js

@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ export class MemoryTokenService {
         };
         if (token.code)
             stored.codeHash = await sha256Hash(token.code);
+        if (token.codeVerifierHash) {
+            stored.codeVerifierHash = token.codeVerifierHash;
+        }
         if ("refreshToken" in token) {
             const rt = token;
             stored.refreshTokenHash = await sha256Hash(rt.refreshToken);
@@ -369,6 +372,7 @@ export class MemoryTokenService {
             if (!bucket) {
                 bucket = {
                     clientId: stored.clientId,
+                    codeVerifierHash: stored.codeVerifierHash,
                     accessTokenHashes: new Set(),
                     familyIds: new Set(),
                 };
@@ -516,9 +520,10 @@ export class MemoryTokenService {
      * {@linkcode revokeFamily} does, so their rotated successors end with them.
      * Resolves `true` when tokens were issued from the code.
      * Removes nothing and resolves `false` when `client` is given and is not the
-     * client the code's tokens were issued to.
+     * client the code's tokens were issued to, or when `codeVerifierHash` is
+     * given and is not the one they were saved with.
      */
-    async revokeCode(code, client) {
+    async revokeCode(code, client, codeVerifierHash) {
         const codeHash = await sha256Hash(code);
         const bucket = this.#tokensByCodeHash.get(codeHash);
         if (!bucket || bucket.accessTokenHashes.size === 0)
@@ -526,6 +531,10 @@ export class MemoryTokenService {
         if (client && client.id.toString() !== bucket.clientId.toString()) {
             return false;
         }
+        if (codeVerifierHash !== undefined &&
+            codeVerifierHash !== bucket.codeVerifierHash) {
+            return false;
+        }
         for (const familyId of bucket.familyIds)
             this.#revokeFamily(familyId);
         for (const accessTokenHash of bucket.accessTokenHashes) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@udibo/oauth2",
-  "version": "0.36.0",
+  "version": "0.38.0",
   "description": "A flexible OAuth2 toolkit: framework-agnostic authorization & resource servers, a typed client, Hono adapters (including a backend-for-frontend), and React bindings.",
   "keywords": [
     "authorization-server",