@udibo/oauth2 0.33.0 → 0.34.0

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/_cookie-keys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * The AES-256-GCM keys the BFF's encrypted-cookie stores seal under.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/** HKDF `info` label for `EncryptedCookieSessionStore`'s key. */
+export declare const SESSION_COOKIE_KEY_INFO = "udibo:oauth2:bff:session-cookie:v1";
+/** HKDF `info` label for `EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage`'s key. */
+export declare const AUTH_REQUEST_COOKIE_KEY_INFO = "udibo:oauth2:bff:auth-request-cookie:v1";
+/**
+ * Derives a cookie store's key from its configured secret with HKDF-SHA-256
+ * under the store's own `info` label, so one secret given to two stores yields
+ * independent keys.
+ *
+ * @throws {Error} When the secret is shorter than 16 bytes.
+ */
+export declare function deriveCookieKey(secret: string | Uint8Array, info: string): Promise<CryptoKey>;

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/_cookie-keys.js

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/**
+ * The AES-256-GCM keys the BFF's encrypted-cookie stores seal under.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+import { deriveSealKey } from "../../../utils/crypto.js";
+/** HKDF `info` label for `EncryptedCookieSessionStore`'s key. */
+export const SESSION_COOKIE_KEY_INFO = "udibo:oauth2:bff:session-cookie:v1";
+/** HKDF `info` label for `EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage`'s key. */
+export const AUTH_REQUEST_COOKIE_KEY_INFO = "udibo:oauth2:bff:auth-request-cookie:v1";
+const MIN_SECRET_BYTES = 16;
+/**
+ * Derives a cookie store's key from its configured secret with HKDF-SHA-256
+ * under the store's own `info` label, so one secret given to two stores yields
+ * independent keys.
+ *
+ * @throws {Error} When the secret is shorter than 16 bytes.
+ */
+export async function deriveCookieKey(secret, info) {
+    const bytes = typeof secret === "string" ? new TextEncoder().encode(secret) : secret;
+    if (bytes.byteLength < MIN_SECRET_BYTES) {
+        throw new Error("secret must be at least 16 bytes; 32+ bytes of entropy is recommended.");
+    }
+    return await deriveSealKey(bytes, info);
+}

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/auth-request-store.d.ts

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
  * caller chooses.
  *
  * {@link EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage} carries the record in an encrypted
- * cookie instead (AES-GCM under a server-held secret, the same construction
- * {@link EncryptedCookieSessionStore} uses), so no server-side storage is
- * involved and any instance can complete the flow. Apps that already have a
- * database can implement {@link AuthRequestStorage} against it instead.
+ * cookie instead (AES-GCM under a key derived from a server-held secret), so no
+ * server-side storage is involved and any instance can complete the flow. Apps
+ * that already have a database can implement {@link AuthRequestStorage} against
+ * it instead.
  *
  * **Which storage you pick is a reliability decision, not a security one.**
  * Server-side storage on its own says a `state` is pending somewhere — never
@@ -84,6 +84,13 @@ export interface EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorageOptions {
     /**
      * Secret the AES-256 key is derived from; at least 32 bytes. Reuse the
      * secret across instances so any of them can unseal a cookie another sealed.
+     *
+     * Give each store instance and each app a secret of its own. Nothing in a
+     * sealed cookie binds it to the app or store instance that sealed it, so two
+     * apps that share a secret can open each other's pending sign-ins. Sharing
+     * one with {@link EncryptedCookieSessionStore} does not let either store open
+     * the other's cookies: each derives its key with HKDF-SHA-256 under its own
+     * label.
      */
     secret: string;
     /** Cookie attribute overrides. */
@@ -138,8 +145,12 @@ export interface AuthRequestStorageFactory {
  * ```ts
  * const bff = new HonoBff({
  *   client,
- *   sessionStore: new EncryptedCookieSessionStore({ secret }),
- *   authRequestStorage: new EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({ secret }),
+ *   sessionStore: new EncryptedCookieSessionStore({
+ *     secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
+ *   }),
+ *   authRequestStorage: new EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({
+ *     secret: process.env.AUTH_REQUEST_SECRET!,
+ *   }),
  * });
  * ```
  */
@@ -171,7 +182,7 @@ export declare class EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage implements AuthRequestSto
  * import { encryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage } from "@udibo/oauth2/hono/bff";
  *
  * const authRequestStorage = encryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({
- *   secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
+ *   secret: process.env.AUTH_REQUEST_SECRET!,
  * });
  * ```
  */

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/auth-request-store.js

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@
  * caller chooses.
  *
  * {@link EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage} carries the record in an encrypted
- * cookie instead (AES-GCM under a server-held secret, the same construction
- * {@link EncryptedCookieSessionStore} uses), so no server-side storage is
- * involved and any instance can complete the flow. Apps that already have a
- * database can implement {@link AuthRequestStorage} against it instead.
+ * cookie instead (AES-GCM under a key derived from a server-held secret), so no
+ * server-side storage is involved and any instance can complete the flow. Apps
+ * that already have a database can implement {@link AuthRequestStorage} against
+ * it instead.
  *
  * **Which storage you pick is a reliability decision, not a security one.**
  * Server-side storage on its own says a `state` is pending somewhere — never
@@ -29,13 +29,17 @@
  */
 import { deleteCookie, getCookie, setCookie } from "hono/cookie";
 import { MemoryAuthRequestStorage, } from "../../../client/mod.js";
-import { deriveAesKey, sealJson, unsealJson } from "../../../utils/crypto.js";
+import { sealJson, unsealJson } from "../../../utils/crypto.js";
+import { AUTH_REQUEST_COOKIE_KEY_INFO, deriveCookieKey, } from "./_cookie-keys.js";
 import { resolveCookieName, resolvePrefixConstrainedAttributes, } from "./cookie-prefix.js";
 const BASE_NAME = "oauth2_auth_request";
 const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
 const DEFAULT_MAX_PENDING = 3;
 // RFC 6265 §6.1 only guarantees 4096 bytes per cookie, attributes included.
 const MAX_COOKIE_NAME_VALUE_BYTES = 3900;
+function isObject(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
 function cookieAttributes(options, maxAgeSeconds) {
     const { secure, path, domain } = resolvePrefixConstrainedAttributes(options);
     return {
@@ -65,8 +69,12 @@ function cookieAttributes(options, maxAgeSeconds) {
  * ```ts
  * const bff = new HonoBff({
  *   client,
- *   sessionStore: new EncryptedCookieSessionStore({ secret }),
- *   authRequestStorage: new EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({ secret }),
+ *   sessionStore: new EncryptedCookieSessionStore({
+ *     secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
+ *   }),
+ *   authRequestStorage: new EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({
+ *     secret: process.env.AUTH_REQUEST_SECRET!,
+ *   }),
  * });
  * ```
  */
@@ -107,17 +115,19 @@ export class EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage {
         }
     }
     #key() {
-        return (this.#keyPromise ??= deriveAesKey(this.#secret));
+        return (this.#keyPromise ??= deriveCookieKey(this.#secret, AUTH_REQUEST_COOKIE_KEY_INFO));
     }
     async #read(c) {
         const cookieValue = getCookie(c, this.#name);
         if (!cookieValue)
             return {};
         const pending = await unsealJson(await this.#key(), cookieValue);
-        if (!pending)
+        if (!isObject(pending))
             return {};
         const cutoff = Date.now() - this.#ttlMs;
-        return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(pending).filter(([, record]) => record.createdAt > cutoff));
+        return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(pending).filter((entry) => isObject(entry[1]) &&
+            typeof entry[1].createdAt === "number" &&
+            entry[1].createdAt > cutoff));
     }
     async #write(c, pending, keep) {
         const entries = Object.entries(pending)
@@ -143,7 +153,10 @@ export class EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage {
     /** Returns the storage bound to `c`, for the duration of that request. */
     forRequest(c) {
         return {
-            get: async (state) => (await this.#read(c))[state] ?? null,
+            get: async (state) => {
+                const pending = await this.#read(c);
+                return Object.hasOwn(pending, state) ? pending[state] : null;
+            },
             set: async (state, value) => {
                 const pending = await this.#read(c);
                 pending[state] = value;
@@ -168,7 +181,7 @@ export class EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage {
  * import { encryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage } from "@udibo/oauth2/hono/bff";
  *
  * const authRequestStorage = encryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage({
- *   secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
+ *   secret: process.env.AUTH_REQUEST_SECRET!,
  * });
  * ```
  */

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/session-store.d.ts

@@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ export interface EncryptedCookieSessionStoreOptions {
      * Server-held secret(s) used to derive the AES-256 key(s). Each must have at
      * least 32 bytes of entropy; pass a base64 / hex string or raw bytes.
      *
+     * Give each store instance and each app a secret of its own. Nothing in a
+     * sealed cookie binds it to the app or store instance that sealed it, so two
+     * apps that share a secret can open each other's session cookies. Sharing one
+     * with `EncryptedCookieAuthRequestStorage` does not let either store open the
+     * other's cookies: each derives its key with HKDF-SHA-256 under its own
+     * label.
+     *
      * Pass an **ordered list** to rotate the secret without signing everyone out:
      * the **first** entry is current — every cookie is sealed under it — and
      * `read` tries each entry in turn, so a cookie sealed under a still-listed
@@ -308,10 +315,6 @@ export interface EncryptedCookieSessionStoreOptions {
      * `update` re-seals with a fresh stamp, so this is an **inactivity** window
      * for a session the BFF keeps refreshing. Must be a positive number of
      * milliseconds.
-     *
-     * The store stamps each cookie with a seal time at `create`/`update`; a
-     * cookie without that stamp is aged from its `updatedAt` instead, so it is
-     * bounded too.
      */
     maxAgeMs?: number;
 }
@@ -322,6 +325,11 @@ export interface EncryptedCookieSessionStoreOptions {
  * Security notes:
  * - Each secret must have at least 256 bits of entropy. A weak secret defeats
  *   the confidentiality of the cookie.
+ * - The key is derived from the secret with HKDF-SHA-256 under a label of this
+ *   store's own, so a cookie sealed by another store under the same secret
+ *   does not open here.
+ * - `read` accepts only what `create` sealed: a cookie that is malformed,
+ *   foreign, or the wrong shape reads as `null`.
  * - AES-GCM provides authenticated encryption; tampered cookies fail `read`
  *   (returns `null`).
  * - `destroy` is a no-op on the server — the cookie must be cleared in the
@@ -366,8 +374,8 @@ export declare class EncryptedCookieSessionStore implements SessionStore, Bounde
     create(data: SessionData): Promise<string>;
     /**
      * Decrypts the cookie value, trying each configured secret in turn. Returns
-     * `null` if it is tampered, malformed, sealed with an unknown secret, or
-     * sealed longer ago than
+     * `null` if it is tampered, malformed, sealed with an unknown secret or by
+     * another store, not in the shape `create` seals, or sealed longer ago than
      * {@linkcode EncryptedCookieSessionStoreOptions.maxAgeMs}.
      */
     read(cookieValue: string): Promise<SessionData | null>;

package/dist/adapters/hono/bff/session-store.js

@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
  * @module
  */
 import { InvalidGrantError } from "../../../errors.js";
-import { deriveAesKey, sealJson, unsealJson } from "../../../utils/crypto.js";
+import { sealJson, unsealJson } from "../../../utils/crypto.js";
+import { deriveCookieKey, SESSION_COOKIE_KEY_INFO } from "./_cookie-keys.js";
 /** Whether a store implements the {@link BackchannelLogoutStore} capability. */
 export function supportsBackchannelLogout(store) {
     return (typeof store.destroyByLogout ===
@@ -233,6 +234,11 @@ function isSealedSession(value) {
  * Security notes:
  * - Each secret must have at least 256 bits of entropy. A weak secret defeats
  *   the confidentiality of the cookie.
+ * - The key is derived from the secret with HKDF-SHA-256 under a label of this
+ *   store's own, so a cookie sealed by another store under the same secret
+ *   does not open here.
+ * - `read` accepts only what `create` sealed: a cookie that is malformed,
+ *   foreign, or the wrong shape reads as `null`.
  * - AES-GCM provides authenticated encryption; tampered cookies fail `read`
  *   (returns `null`).
  * - `destroy` is a no-op on the server — the cookie must be cleared in the
@@ -294,7 +300,7 @@ export class EncryptedCookieSessionStore {
         return this.#maxAgeMs;
     }
     #key(index) {
-        return (this.#keyPromises[index] ??= deriveAesKey(this.#secrets[index]));
+        return (this.#keyPromises[index] ??= deriveCookieKey(this.#secrets[index], SESSION_COOKIE_KEY_INFO));
     }
     /** Encrypts the session into the cookie value under the current secret; there is no server-side record. */
     async create(data) {
@@ -303,8 +309,8 @@ export class EncryptedCookieSessionStore {
     }
     /**
      * Decrypts the cookie value, trying each configured secret in turn. Returns
-     * `null` if it is tampered, malformed, sealed with an unknown secret, or
-     * sealed longer ago than
+     * `null` if it is tampered, malformed, sealed with an unknown secret or by
+     * another store, not in the shape `create` seals, or sealed longer ago than
      * {@linkcode EncryptedCookieSessionStoreOptions.maxAgeMs}.
      */
     async read(cookieValue) {
@@ -312,13 +318,9 @@ export class EncryptedCookieSessionStore {
             const unsealed = await unsealJson(await this.#key(index), cookieValue);
             if (unsealed === null)
                 continue;
-            if (isSealedSession(unsealed)) {
-                return this.#isExpired(unsealed.issuedAt) ? null : unsealed.data;
-            }
-            const legacy = unsealed;
-            return this.#isExpired(legacy.updatedAt ?? legacy.createdAt)
-                ? null
-                : legacy;
+            if (!isSealedSession(unsealed))
+                return null;
+            return this.#isExpired(unsealed.issuedAt) ? null : unsealed.data;
         }
         return null;
     }

package/dist/utils/crypto.d.ts

@@ -2,20 +2,14 @@
  * Authenticated-encryption (AES-256-GCM) and key-derivation helpers for sealing
  * session and token data at rest or in a cookie.
  *
- * Two key-derivation paths, for two different threat models:
- *
- * - {@link deriveAesKey} hashes a single **server-held** secret (SHA-256) into
- *   an AES-256-GCM key. Use this for a stateless cookie sealed under one
- *   configured secret (see `EncryptedCookieSessionStore`), where the secret is
- *   never persisted.
- *
- * - {@link deriveSealKey} uses **HKDF** with a domain-separating `info` label so
- *   a high-entropy *per-session* secret yields an encryption key that is
- *   independent of any other value derived from the same secret. This is what
- *   makes "the cookie value is both the lookup credential **and** the decryption
- *   key" safe: a database can store `sha256(secret)` as a lookup hash while the
- *   sealing key is `HKDF(secret, info)`, and knowing the stored hash never
- *   reveals the key. Always pass a distinct `info` per purpose.
+ * {@link deriveSealKey} uses **HKDF** with a domain-separating `info` label so a
+ * high-entropy secret yields an encryption key that is independent of any other
+ * value derived from the same secret. This is what makes "the cookie value is
+ * both the lookup credential **and** the decryption key" safe: a database can
+ * store `sha256(secret)` as a lookup hash while the sealing key is
+ * `HKDF(secret, info)`, and knowing the stored hash never reveals the key. It is
+ * also what lets one secret seal two kinds of value without either opening as
+ * the other. Always pass a distinct `info` per purpose.
  *
  * {@link seal}/{@link unseal} use AES-256-GCM (an AEAD), so tampered ciphertext
  * fails to unseal (returns `null`) rather than decrypting to garbage.
@@ -61,18 +55,6 @@ export declare function base64urlDecode(value: string): Uint8Array;
  * ```
  */
 export declare function randomToken(bytes?: number): string;
-/**
- * Derive an AES-256-GCM key from a single server-held secret via SHA-256.
- *
- * Suitable when the secret is a long-lived configuration value that is never
- * stored alongside the ciphertext. Do **not** use this when a hash of the same
- * secret is persisted (e.g. as a lookup key) — use {@link deriveSealKey} so the
- * sealing key is independent of that stored hash.
- *
- * @throws {Error} if the secret is shorter than 16 bytes. Length is all that is
- * checked; supply 32+ bytes of real entropy.
- */
-export declare function deriveAesKey(secret: string | Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey>;
 /**
  * Derive an AES-256-GCM sealing key from a high-entropy secret via HKDF-SHA-256
  * with a domain-separating `info` label.

package/dist/utils/crypto.js

@@ -2,20 +2,14 @@
  * Authenticated-encryption (AES-256-GCM) and key-derivation helpers for sealing
  * session and token data at rest or in a cookie.
  *
- * Two key-derivation paths, for two different threat models:
- *
- * - {@link deriveAesKey} hashes a single **server-held** secret (SHA-256) into
- *   an AES-256-GCM key. Use this for a stateless cookie sealed under one
- *   configured secret (see `EncryptedCookieSessionStore`), where the secret is
- *   never persisted.
- *
- * - {@link deriveSealKey} uses **HKDF** with a domain-separating `info` label so
- *   a high-entropy *per-session* secret yields an encryption key that is
- *   independent of any other value derived from the same secret. This is what
- *   makes "the cookie value is both the lookup credential **and** the decryption
- *   key" safe: a database can store `sha256(secret)` as a lookup hash while the
- *   sealing key is `HKDF(secret, info)`, and knowing the stored hash never
- *   reveals the key. Always pass a distinct `info` per purpose.
+ * {@link deriveSealKey} uses **HKDF** with a domain-separating `info` label so a
+ * high-entropy secret yields an encryption key that is independent of any other
+ * value derived from the same secret. This is what makes "the cookie value is
+ * both the lookup credential **and** the decryption key" safe: a database can
+ * store `sha256(secret)` as a lookup hash while the sealing key is
+ * `HKDF(secret, info)`, and knowing the stored hash never reveals the key. It is
+ * also what lets one secret seal two kinds of value without either opening as
+ * the other. Always pass a distinct `info` per purpose.
  *
  * {@link seal}/{@link unseal} use AES-256-GCM (an AEAD), so tampered ciphertext
  * fails to unseal (returns `null`) rather than decrypting to garbage.
@@ -79,25 +73,6 @@ export function base64urlDecode(value) {
 export function randomToken(bytes = 32) {
     return base64urlEncode(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytes)));
 }
-/**
- * Derive an AES-256-GCM key from a single server-held secret via SHA-256.
- *
- * Suitable when the secret is a long-lived configuration value that is never
- * stored alongside the ciphertext. Do **not** use this when a hash of the same
- * secret is persisted (e.g. as a lookup key) — use {@link deriveSealKey} so the
- * sealing key is independent of that stored hash.
- *
- * @throws {Error} if the secret is shorter than 16 bytes. Length is all that is
- * checked; supply 32+ bytes of real entropy.
- */
-export async function deriveAesKey(secret) {
-    const raw = toBytes(secret);
-    if (raw.byteLength < 16) {
-        throw new Error("secret must be at least 16 bytes; 32+ bytes of entropy is recommended.");
-    }
-    const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", toArrayBuffer(raw));
-    return await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", digest, { name: "AES-GCM" }, false, ["encrypt", "decrypt"]);
-}
 /**
  * Derive an AES-256-GCM sealing key from a high-entropy secret via HKDF-SHA-256
  * with a domain-separating `info` label.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@udibo/oauth2",
-  "version": "0.33.0",
+  "version": "0.34.0",
   "description": "A flexible OAuth2 toolkit: framework-agnostic authorization & resource servers, a typed client, Hono adapters (including a backend-for-frontend), and React bindings.",
   "keywords": [
     "authorization-server",