@typedstandards/verify-core 0.3.1 → 0.5.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@ export * from './lifecycle.ts';
 export * from './rekor.ts';
 export * from './rekor-inclusion.ts';
 export * from './asn1.ts';
+export * from './x509.ts';
 export * from './rfc3161.ts';
 export * from './verify.ts';

package/dist/index.js

@@ -25,5 +25,6 @@ export * from "./lifecycle.js";
 export * from "./rekor.js";
 export * from "./rekor-inclusion.js";
 export * from "./asn1.js";
+export * from "./x509.js";
 export * from "./rfc3161.js";
 export * from "./verify.js";

package/dist/lifecycle.d.ts

@@ -81,3 +81,40 @@ export declare function resolveLifecycleFromLegacyColumns(columns: {
     reinstatedAt?: string | null;
     reinstatedReason?: string | null;
 }): LifecycleResolution;
+/** A signed lifecycle attestation, carried in the bundle so the chain resolves with
+ *  NO reference-implementation dependency (civic-ai-tools-website#119 P3). The server
+ *  fetches these from the DB + blob; an offline verifier reads them from the bundle. */
+export interface CarriedLifecycleNode {
+    /** The signed attestation node JSON (the envelope) — recomputed + signature-checked. */
+    node: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** The stored nodeId (envelope hash) the recomputed hash must match. */
+    nodeId: string;
+    /** The signature envelope over the node (`{signature, publicKey, algorithm}`). */
+    signature?: {
+        signature?: string;
+        publicKey?: string;
+        algorithm?: string;
+    } | null;
+    /** Presence flags (surfaced; per-attestation TSA/Rekor depth is a follow-up). */
+    hasTimestamp?: boolean;
+    hasRekor?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve lifecycle (#10) INDEPENDENTLY from carried signed attestation nodes —
+ * the browser/offline path that reaches `source: 'attestation-chain'` with no
+ * reference-implementation dependency (civic-ai-tools-website#119 P3).
+ *
+ * Unlike the server (whose DB query guarantees the rows target this node and whose
+ * rows are platform-signed), an independent verifier must NOT trust the carrier, so
+ * each node is gated before it can affect status:
+ *   - REACHABILITY (§9.2 #13): `node.targetNodeId` MUST equal the content node's id;
+ *     an attestation about a different node is not part of this lifecycle.
+ *   - INTEGRITY: the recomputed envelope hash MUST equal the stored `nodeId`.
+ *   - SIGNATURE: the Ed25519(ph) signature MUST verify over that hash.
+ * A node failing any of these is EXCLUDED (a forged/tampered/misdirected transition
+ * cannot move the status). Surviving nodes go to `resolveLifecycleFromChain`, which
+ * applies the §8.10.3 retention asymmetry (a valid but non-signer-matched attestation
+ * is surfaced in the chain yet does NOT move the publisher's status). That shared
+ * resolver is unchanged, so the server route's output stays byte-identical.
+ */
+export declare function verifyLifecycleChain(carried: CarriedLifecycleNode[], contentNodeId: string, targetSignerIdentifier: string): LifecycleResolution;

package/dist/lifecycle.js

@@ -111,3 +111,53 @@ export function resolveLifecycleFromLegacyColumns(columns) {
             : {}),
     };
 }
+function pickString(v) {
+    return typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0 ? v : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve lifecycle (#10) INDEPENDENTLY from carried signed attestation nodes —
+ * the browser/offline path that reaches `source: 'attestation-chain'` with no
+ * reference-implementation dependency (civic-ai-tools-website#119 P3).
+ *
+ * Unlike the server (whose DB query guarantees the rows target this node and whose
+ * rows are platform-signed), an independent verifier must NOT trust the carrier, so
+ * each node is gated before it can affect status:
+ *   - REACHABILITY (§9.2 #13): `node.targetNodeId` MUST equal the content node's id;
+ *     an attestation about a different node is not part of this lifecycle.
+ *   - INTEGRITY: the recomputed envelope hash MUST equal the stored `nodeId`.
+ *   - SIGNATURE: the Ed25519(ph) signature MUST verify over that hash.
+ * A node failing any of these is EXCLUDED (a forged/tampered/misdirected transition
+ * cannot move the status). Surviving nodes go to `resolveLifecycleFromChain`, which
+ * applies the §8.10.3 retention asymmetry (a valid but non-signer-matched attestation
+ * is surfaced in the chain yet does NOT move the publisher's status). That shared
+ * resolver is unchanged, so the server route's output stays byte-identical.
+ */
+export function verifyLifecycleChain(carried, contentNodeId, targetSignerIdentifier) {
+    const views = [];
+    for (const entry of carried) {
+        // Reachability: the attestation must reference THIS content node.
+        if (pickString(entry.node['targetNodeId']) !== contentNodeId)
+            continue;
+        const verdict = verifyAttestationNode(entry.node, entry.nodeId, entry.signature ?? null);
+        // Independent crypto gate: integrity + a valid signature, or it cannot count.
+        if (!verdict.nodeIdMatches || verdict.signatureValid !== true)
+            continue;
+        const signer = entry.node['signer'];
+        const metadata = entry.node['metadata'];
+        views.push({
+            nodeId: entry.nodeId,
+            type: pickString(entry.node['type']) ?? '',
+            signer,
+            createdAt: pickString(metadata?.['createdAt']) ?? '',
+            reason: pickString(entry.node['reason']),
+            effectiveAt: pickString(entry.node['effectiveAt']),
+            priorWithdrawalNodeId: pickString(entry.node['priorWithdrawalNodeId']),
+            signatureValid: verdict.signatureValid,
+            nodeIdMatches: verdict.nodeIdMatches,
+            hasTimestamp: !!entry.hasTimestamp,
+            hasRekor: !!entry.hasRekor,
+            signerMatchesTarget: !!signer && signer.identifier === targetSignerIdentifier,
+        });
+    }
+    return resolveLifecycleFromChain(views);
+}

package/dist/rfc3161.d.ts

@@ -1,41 +1,39 @@
 /**
- * A pinned TSA signing key — the OFFLINE trust anchor for check #7 (spec §10.3).
- * Pinning the SIGNING key (not the long-lived root) is the P2a "acceptable v1":
- * it must be re-pinned if FreeTSA rotates the signing cert. P2b anchors to the RSA
- * root via the token's embedded chain, which removes the re-pin.
+ * A pinned TSA ROOT — the OFFLINE trust anchor for check #7 (spec §10.3). Pinning the
+ * long-lived ROOT (not the signing cert) means a verifier trusts ANY signing cert the
+ * root issues: the token's embedded chain is validated up to this anchor, so FreeTSA
+ * rotating its signing cert needs no re-pin (the P2a fragility, now removed).
  */
-export interface TsaAnchor {
+export interface TsaRootAnchor {
     name: string;
-    /** EC P-384 signing public key, base64 SPKI DER. */
-    signingKeyDer: string;
-    /** Signing cert validity window (ISO 8601, UTC). genTime must fall inside it. */
-    notBefore: string;
-    notAfter: string;
+    /** Root public key, base64 SPKI DER. */
+    rootKeyDer: string;
 }
-export declare const FREETSA_TSA_ANCHORS: readonly TsaAnchor[];
-export type Rfc3161FailReason = 'parse_error' | 'not_granted' | 'unexpected_content_type' | 'unexpected_algorithm' | 'no_message_digest' | 'content_not_bound' | 'no_anchor' | 'signature_invalid' | 'imprint_mismatch' | 'genTime_outside_validity';
+export declare const FREETSA_ROOT_ANCHORS: readonly TsaRootAnchor[];
+export type Rfc3161FailReason = 'parse_error' | 'unexpected_algorithm' | 'no_message_digest' | 'content_not_bound' | 'imprint_mismatch' | 'no_signing_cert' | 'eku_not_timestamping' | 'genTime_outside_validity' | 'chain_incomplete' | 'chain_signature_invalid' | 'untrusted_root' | 'signature_invalid';
 export interface Rfc3161VerifyResult {
-    /** All checks passed: a pinned TSA's signature binds this package hash to genTime. */
+    /** All checks passed: a chain-trusted TSA signed this package hash at genTime. */
     verified: boolean;
-    /** messageImprint.hashedMessage == the expected package hash (sha256). */
     imprintMatches: boolean | null;
-    /** The TSA ECDSA-P384 signature over SHA-512(signedAttrs) verifies vs the anchor. */
-    signatureValid: boolean | null;
-    /** signedAttrs.messageDigest == SHA-512(TSTInfo) — the sig is bound to the TSTInfo. */
     contentBound: boolean | null;
-    /** genTime within the pinned signing cert's validity window. */
+    /** The embedded signing cert chains to the pinned root (each link verified). */
+    chainVerified: boolean | null;
+    /** The signing cert carries EKU id-kp-timeStamping. */
+    ekuTimestamping: boolean | null;
+    /** genTime within the signing cert's validity window. */
     withinValidity: boolean | null;
-    /** RFC 3161 genTime, epoch ms. */
+    /** The TSA ECDSA-P384 signature verifies under the chain-validated leaf key. */
+    signatureValid: boolean | null;
     genTime?: number;
-    /** The matched anchor name (when the signature verified). */
+    /** The matched root anchor name. */
     tsa?: string;
     reason?: Rfc3161FailReason;
 }
 /**
- * Verify an RFC 3161 timestamp token (base64) attests `expectedHashHex` (the package
- * SHA-256), against the pinned TSA anchors. Returns a graded verdict; a parse failure
- * or unknown anchor is reported (not thrown) so the caller can render it calmly,
- * while a real cryptographic failure (`signature_invalid` / `imprint_mismatch` /
- * `content_not_bound`) is the alarm signal.
+ * Verify an RFC 3161 token (base64) attests `expectedHashHex` (the package SHA-256),
+ * chaining the token's embedded signing cert to a pinned TSA root. Async (the cert
+ * chain uses WebCrypto RSA). A parse failure / untrusted chain is reported, not
+ * thrown; `imprint_mismatch` / `content_not_bound` / `chain_signature_invalid` /
+ * `signature_invalid` are the alarm signals.
  */
-export declare function verifyRfc3161Timestamp(tokenB64: string, expectedHashHex: string, anchors?: readonly TsaAnchor[]): Rfc3161VerifyResult;
+export declare function verifyRfc3161Timestamp(tokenB64: string, expectedHashHex: string, anchors?: readonly TsaRootAnchor[]): Promise<Rfc3161VerifyResult>;

package/dist/rfc3161.js

@@ -1,164 +1,164 @@
 // RFC 3161 timestamp verification (spec §9.2 check #7, deep) — browser-safe.
 //
-// `verifyEvidence` today does PRESENCE for #7 (`!!rfc3161Timestamp`). This closes
-// the cryptographic gap for the FreeTSA profile our producer uses (#119 P2a): it
-// parses the RFC 3161 token (a PKCS#7/CMS SignedData over a TSTInfo) and verifies,
-// OFFLINE, that a trusted TSA attested the package hash at a point in time:
-//   1. messageImprint.hashedMessage == the package hash (sha256), so the token is
+// `verifyEvidence` did PRESENCE for #7. P2a added cryptographic TSA-signature
+// verification; P2b (this) closes it to a FULL chain to a pinned trust anchor:
+//   1. messageImprint.hashedMessage == the package hash (sha256) — the token is
 //      ABOUT this package;
-//   2. signedAttrs.messageDigest == SHA-512(TSTInfo), so the signature is BOUND to
-//      that TSTInfo;
-//   3. the TSA's ECDSA-P384 signature over SHA-512(signedAttrs) verifies against the
-//      PINNED FreeTSA signing key (the trust anchor);
-//   4. genTime falls within that signing cert's validity window.
+//   2. signedAttrs.messageDigest == SHA-512(TSTInfo) — the signature is BOUND to it;
+//   3. the token's EMBEDDED signing cert chains to the PINNED FreeTSA RSA-4096 root
+//      (each link's signature verified; CA + validity-vs-genTime checked) — so the
+//      signer is trusted WITHOUT pinning the (rotatable) signing key;
+//   4. the signing cert carries EKU id-kp-timeStamping and its validity covers
+//      genTime;
+//   5. the TSA's ECDSA-P384 signature over SHA-512(signedAttrs) verifies under THAT
+//      chain-validated leaf key.
 //
-// SCOPE (P2a): FreeTSA uses an EC P-384 signing cert and `ecdsa-with-SHA512`, so the
-// TSA-signature check is pure `@noble` ECDSA — no WebCrypto/RSA. The anchor is the
-// PINNED signing-cert public key (re-pin on rotation — documented below). P2b adds
-// full embedded-cert chain validation to FreeTSA's RSA root (which removes the
-// re-pin), and generalizes EKU/validity from the certs themselves. The recipe here
-// was validated byte-for-byte against a real freetsa.org token (cross-checked with
-// OpenSSL `ts -verify`) before shipping; `__fixtures__/rfc3161-token.json` is that
-// token and the tests reproduce it offline.
+// Crypto: the leaf TSA signature is `@noble` ECDSA-P384 (the cert key); the cert
+// chain is RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5/SHA-512 via WebCrypto (`globalThis.crypto.subtle`, a
+// global — verify-core stays browser-safe). lowS:false on the ECDSA verify (a TSA
+// emits high-S; see the #119 lowS fix). Validated byte-for-byte against real
+// freetsa.org tokens (low-S + high-S fixtures) cross-checked with OpenSSL.
 import { p384 } from '@noble/curves/nist.js';
 import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js';
 import { base64ToBytes, bytesToHex } from "./primitives.js";
 import { Asn1Error, readNode, children, content, rawTlv, oidToString, readTime, } from "./asn1.js";
-// --- OIDs ------------------------------------------------------------------
+import { parseCertificate, verifyCertSignatureRsa, bytesEqual, OID_EKU_TIMESTAMPING, } from "./x509.js";
 const OID_SIGNED_DATA = '1.2.840.113549.1.7.2';
 const OID_CT_TSTINFO = '1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.4';
 const OID_SHA256 = '2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1';
 const OID_SHA512 = '2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3';
 const OID_ECDSA_SHA512 = '1.2.840.10045.4.3.4';
 const OID_ATTR_MESSAGE_DIGEST = '1.2.840.113549.1.9.4';
-// PROVENANCE (anchor pinning — spec §10.3). FreeTSA's online TSA (`freetsa.org/tsr`)
-// signs with this EC P-384 key (cert serial C2E986160DA8E9CD, OU=TSA, EKU
-// id-kp-timeStamping, valid 2026-02-15 → 2040-02-02). Captured 2026-06-07 from
-// `https://freetsa.org/files/tsa.crt`; a live token verified against it with both
-// `@noble` (here) and OpenSSL `ts -verify` against FreeTSA's published CA. The cert
-// chains to FreeTSA's self-signed RSA-4096 root (OU=Root CA) — pinning that root and
-// validating the embedded chain is P2b.
-export const FREETSA_TSA_ANCHORS = [
+// PROVENANCE (anchor pinning — spec §10.3). FreeTSA's self-signed root CA
+// (O=Free TSA/OU=Root CA, RSA-4096, SHA-256 fingerprint
+// A6:37:9E:7C:EC:C0:5F:AA:3C:BF:07:60:13:D7:45:E3:27:BB:BA:A3:8C:0B:9A:F2:24:69:D4:70:1D:18:AA:BC).
+// Captured 2026-06-07 from `https://freetsa.org/files/cacert.pem`; real tokens'
+// embedded signing certs chain to it (verified with `@noble`/WebCrypto here and
+// OpenSSL `ts -verify`). Adopters changing TSAs document their root here (§10.3).
+export const FREETSA_ROOT_ANCHORS = [
     {
         name: 'freetsa.org',
-        signingKeyDer: 'MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEohXhobLWy4cYsdKOFALpjUsB1FJTntwwb7PH2LOfNMAA1ufaKhkgsdeW6etU0pl5MC5tSVuPF52yy4sz+mbY3L7IVdx/bs9m0ud7IA14YNcC2yIQLa2gvnxwsrR3rlWr',
-        notBefore: '2026-02-15T19:44:22Z',
-        notAfter: '2040-02-02T19:44:22Z',
+        rootKeyDer: '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',
     },
 ];
-// EC P-384 SPKI DER is a fixed 120-byte structure: a 23-byte prefix (SEQUENCE →
-// AlgorithmIdentifier{ id-ecPublicKey, secp384r1 } → BIT STRING) then the 97-byte
-// uncompressed point (0x04 ‖ X ‖ Y).
+// EC P-384 SPKI DER: 23-byte prefix + 97-byte uncompressed point (0x04 ‖ X ‖ Y).
 const EC_P384_SPKI_PREFIX = Uint8Array.from([
     0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01,
     0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00,
 ]);
 const EC_P384_SPKI_LENGTH = 120;
-function extractP384Point(publicKeyB64Der) {
-    const der = base64ToBytes(publicKeyB64Der);
-    if (der.length !== EC_P384_SPKI_LENGTH) {
-        throw new Asn1Error(`Unexpected P-384 SPKI length ${der.length}`);
-    }
+function extractP384Point(spkiDer) {
+    if (spkiDer.length !== EC_P384_SPKI_LENGTH)
+        throw new Asn1Error('not a P-384 SPKI');
     for (let i = 0; i < EC_P384_SPKI_PREFIX.length; i++) {
-        if (der[i] !== EC_P384_SPKI_PREFIX[i])
-            throw new Asn1Error('Unexpected P-384 SPKI prefix');
+        if (spkiDer[i] !== EC_P384_SPKI_PREFIX[i])
+            throw new Asn1Error('unexpected P-384 SPKI prefix');
     }
-    return der.slice(EC_P384_SPKI_LENGTH - 97);
+    return spkiDer.slice(EC_P384_SPKI_LENGTH - 97);
 }
-/** The AlgorithmIdentifier's OID (its first child). */
 function algorithmOid(buf, alg) {
     return oidToString(buf, children(buf, alg)[0]);
 }
-/** Navigate TimeStampResp → ContentInfo → SignedData → { TSTInfo, signerInfo }. */
 function parseToken(buf) {
     const resp = readNode(buf, 0);
     const respKids = children(buf, resp);
-    // PKIStatusInfo.status: 0 granted, 1 grantedWithMods; anything else ⇒ no token.
-    const status = children(buf, respKids[0])[0];
-    const statusVal = content(buf, status);
-    if (statusVal.length !== 1 || statusVal[0] > 1)
+    const status = content(buf, children(buf, respKids[0])[0]);
+    if (status.length !== 1 || status[0] > 1)
         throw new Asn1Error('PKIStatus not granted');
-    const contentInfo = respKids[1];
-    if (!contentInfo)
-        throw new Asn1Error('no timeStampToken');
-    const ciKids = children(buf, contentInfo);
+    const ciKids = children(buf, respKids[1]);
     if (oidToString(buf, ciKids[0]) !== OID_SIGNED_DATA)
         throw new Asn1Error('not signedData');
-    const signedData = children(buf, ciKids[1])[0]; // [0] EXPLICIT → SignedData
-    const sd = children(buf, signedData);
-    const encap = sd.find((c) => c.tag === 0x30); // first SEQUENCE = encapContentInfo
-    const signerInfos = sd.filter((c) => c.tag === 0x31).pop(); // last SET = signerInfos
+    const sd = children(buf, children(buf, ciKids[1])[0]);
+    const encap = sd.find((c) => c.tag === 0x30);
+    const certsNode = sd.find((c) => c.tag === 0xa0); // certificates [0] IMPLICIT
+    const signerInfos = sd.filter((c) => c.tag === 0x31).pop();
     if (!encap || !signerInfos)
         throw new Asn1Error('malformed SignedData');
     const encapKids = children(buf, encap);
     if (oidToString(buf, encapKids[0]) !== OID_CT_TSTINFO)
         throw new Asn1Error('eContent not TSTInfo');
-    const tstOctet = children(buf, encapKids[1])[0]; // [0] EXPLICIT → OCTET STRING
+    const tstOctet = children(buf, encapKids[1])[0];
     if (tstOctet.tag !== 0x04)
         throw new Asn1Error('TSTInfo not an OCTET STRING');
-    const tstInfo = buf.slice(tstOctet.contentStart, tstOctet.contentEnd);
-    const signerInfo = children(buf, signerInfos)[0];
-    const si = children(buf, signerInfo);
+    const si = children(buf, children(buf, signerInfos)[0]);
     const signedAttrs = si.find((c) => c.tag === 0xa0);
     const signature = si.find((c) => c.tag === 0x04);
     if (!signedAttrs || !signature)
         throw new Asn1Error('signerInfo missing signedAttrs/signature');
-    // SignerInfo has three SEQUENCEs: sid (issuerAndSerialNumber), digestAlgorithm,
-    // signatureAlgorithm. The digest alg is the LAST 0x30 before signedAttrs (the sid
-    // also precedes it); the signature alg is the first 0x30 after.
     const seqs = si.filter((c) => c.tag === 0x30);
     const digestAlg = seqs.filter((c) => c.end <= signedAttrs.start).pop();
     const signatureAlg = seqs.find((c) => c.start >= signedAttrs.end);
     if (!digestAlg || !signatureAlg)
         throw new Asn1Error('signerInfo missing algorithm ids');
+    const certs = certsNode ? children(buf, certsNode).map((n) => parseCertificate(buf, n)) : [];
     return {
-        tstInfo,
+        tstInfo: buf.slice(tstOctet.contentStart, tstOctet.contentEnd),
         signedAttrs,
         digestAlgOid: algorithmOid(buf, digestAlg),
         signatureAlgOid: algorithmOid(buf, signatureAlg),
         signature: content(buf, signature),
+        certs,
     };
 }
-/** The OCTET STRING value of the messageDigest signed attribute. */
 function messageDigestAttr(buf, signedAttrs) {
     for (const attr of children(buf, signedAttrs)) {
         const kids = children(buf, attr);
         if (oidToString(buf, kids[0]) === OID_ATTR_MESSAGE_DIGEST) {
-            const value = children(buf, kids[1])[0]; // SET OF → OCTET STRING
-            return content(buf, value);
+            return content(buf, children(buf, kids[1])[0]);
         }
     }
     return null;
 }
-/** Pull { hashedMessage, hashAlgOid, genTime } out of a TSTInfo. */
 function parseTstInfo(tst) {
-    const root = readNode(tst, 0);
-    const kids = children(tst, root); // version, policy, messageImprint, serial, genTime, …
-    const messageImprint = kids[2];
-    const miKids = children(tst, messageImprint);
-    const hashAlgOid = algorithmOid(tst, miKids[0]);
-    const hashedMessage = content(tst, miKids[1]);
+    const kids = children(tst, readNode(tst, 0));
+    const miKids = children(tst, kids[2]);
     const genTimeNode = kids.find((c) => c.tag === 0x18);
     if (!genTimeNode)
         throw new Asn1Error('TSTInfo missing genTime');
-    return { hashedMessage, hashAlgOid, genTime: readTime(tst, genTimeNode) };
+    return {
+        hashedMessage: content(tst, miKids[1]),
+        hashAlgOid: algorithmOid(tst, miKids[0]),
+        genTime: readTime(tst, genTimeNode),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Validate the embedded chain from `leaf` up to a self-signed cert whose key is a
+ * pinned root anchor, verifying each link's RSA signature, that issuers are CAs, and
+ * that genTime falls within every cert's validity. Returns the matched anchor or a
+ * reason. Bounded against cycles/length.
+ */
+async function validateChainToRoot(certs, leaf, anchors, genTime) {
+    let current = leaf;
+    for (let depth = 0; depth < 8; depth++) {
+        if (genTime < current.notBefore || genTime > current.notAfter) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'genTime_outside_validity' };
+        }
+        if (bytesEqual(current.issuerDer, current.subjectDer)) {
+            // self-signed: trusted iff its key is pinned.
+            const anchor = anchors.find((a) => bytesEqual(base64ToBytes(a.rootKeyDer), current.spkiDer));
+            return anchor ? { ok: true, tsa: anchor.name } : { ok: false, reason: 'untrusted_root' };
+        }
+        const issuer = certs.find((c) => bytesEqual(c.subjectDer, current.issuerDer));
+        if (!issuer || !issuer.isCA)
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'chain_incomplete' };
+        if (!(await verifyCertSignatureRsa(current, issuer.spkiDer))) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'chain_signature_invalid' };
+        }
+        current = issuer;
+    }
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'chain_incomplete' };
 }
-function bytesEqual(a, b) {
-    if (a.length !== b.length)
-        return false;
-    let diff = 0;
-    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
-        diff |= a[i] ^ b[i];
-    return diff === 0;
+function fail(base, reason) {
+    return { ...base, reason };
 }
 /**
- * Verify an RFC 3161 timestamp token (base64) attests `expectedHashHex` (the package
- * SHA-256), against the pinned TSA anchors. Returns a graded verdict; a parse failure
- * or unknown anchor is reported (not thrown) so the caller can render it calmly,
- * while a real cryptographic failure (`signature_invalid` / `imprint_mismatch` /
- * `content_not_bound`) is the alarm signal.
+ * Verify an RFC 3161 token (base64) attests `expectedHashHex` (the package SHA-256),
+ * chaining the token's embedded signing cert to a pinned TSA root. Async (the cert
+ * chain uses WebCrypto RSA). A parse failure / untrusted chain is reported, not
+ * thrown; `imprint_mismatch` / `content_not_bound` / `chain_signature_invalid` /
+ * `signature_invalid` are the alarm signals.
  */
-export function verifyRfc3161Timestamp(tokenB64, expectedHashHex, anchors = FREETSA_TSA_ANCHORS) {
+export async function verifyRfc3161Timestamp(tokenB64, expectedHashHex, anchors = FREETSA_ROOT_ANCHORS) {
     let buf;
     let token;
     let tst;
@@ -173,74 +173,67 @@ export function verifyRfc3161Timestamp(tokenB64, expectedHashHex, anchors = FREE
         return {
             verified: false,
             imprintMatches: null,
-            signatureValid: null,
             contentBound: null,
+            chainVerified: null,
+            ekuTimestamping: null,
             withinValidity: null,
+            signatureValid: null,
             reason: 'parse_error',
         };
     }
     const base = {
         verified: false,
         imprintMatches: null,
-        signatureValid: null,
         contentBound: null,
+        chainVerified: null,
+        ekuTimestamping: null,
         withinValidity: null,
+        signatureValid: null,
         genTime: tst.genTime,
     };
-    // FreeTSA profile (P2a): SHA-512 digest + ECDSA-with-SHA-512 signature.
     if (token.digestAlgOid !== OID_SHA512 || token.signatureAlgOid !== OID_ECDSA_SHA512) {
-        return { ...base, reason: 'unexpected_algorithm' };
+        return fail(base, 'unexpected_algorithm');
     }
-    // (1) message imprint is about THIS package (sha256).
-    const imprintMatches = tst.hashAlgOid === OID_SHA256 && bytesToHex(tst.hashedMessage) === expectedHashHex.toLowerCase();
-    base.imprintMatches = imprintMatches;
-    if (!imprintMatches)
-        return { ...base, reason: 'imprint_mismatch' };
-    // (2) the signature is bound to this TSTInfo via the messageDigest attribute.
+    base.imprintMatches =
+        tst.hashAlgOid === OID_SHA256 && bytesToHex(tst.hashedMessage) === expectedHashHex.toLowerCase();
+    if (!base.imprintMatches)
+        return fail(base, 'imprint_mismatch');
     if (!mdAttr)
-        return { ...base, reason: 'no_message_digest' };
-    const contentBound = bytesEqual(mdAttr, sha512(token.tstInfo));
-    base.contentBound = contentBound;
-    if (!contentBound)
-        return { ...base, reason: 'content_not_bound' };
-    // (3) ECDSA-P384 signature over SHA-512(signedAttrs re-tagged [0] → SET) verifies
-    // against a pinned anchor key. (`@noble` prehashes with SHA-384 by default, so we
-    // hash with SHA-512 ourselves and pass `prehash: false`.)
+        return fail(base, 'no_message_digest');
+    base.contentBound = bytesEqual(mdAttr, sha512(token.tstInfo));
+    if (!base.contentBound)
+        return fail(base, 'content_not_bound');
+    // The signing cert is the embedded cert with EKU id-kp-timeStamping.
+    const leaf = token.certs.find((c) => c.ekus.includes(OID_EKU_TIMESTAMPING));
+    if (!leaf) {
+        base.ekuTimestamping = token.certs.length > 0 ? false : null;
+        return fail(base, token.certs.length > 0 ? 'eku_not_timestamping' : 'no_signing_cert');
+    }
+    base.ekuTimestamping = true;
+    base.withinValidity = tst.genTime >= leaf.notBefore && tst.genTime <= leaf.notAfter;
+    const chain = await validateChainToRoot(token.certs, leaf, anchors, tst.genTime);
+    base.chainVerified = chain.ok;
+    if (!chain.ok)
+        return fail(base, chain.reason ?? 'untrusted_root');
+    base.tsa = chain.tsa;
+    if (!base.withinValidity)
+        return fail(base, 'genTime_outside_validity');
+    // The TSA signature: ECDSA-P384 over SHA-512(signedAttrs re-tagged [0]→SET),
+    // under the chain-validated leaf key. lowS:false — a TSA emits high-S (#119 fix).
     const signedBytes = Uint8Array.from(rawTlv(buf, token.signedAttrs));
-    signedBytes[0] = 0x31; // [0] IMPLICIT (0xa0) → SET OF (0x31) for the signature input
-    const digest = sha512(signedBytes);
-    let matched;
-    for (const anchor of anchors) {
-        try {
-            const point = extractP384Point(anchor.signingKeyDer);
-            // `lowS: false` is REQUIRED here: low-S is a signature-malleability convention
-            // for SIGNING, not a validity rule. A TSA (like FreeTSA) legitimately emits
-            // high-S ECDSA signatures (~half of them); `@noble`'s default `lowS: true`
-            // would false-negative those (it rejected the real high-S da9246 token —
-            // regression-tested). Accepting high-S is correct: both S and n−S are valid
-            // signatures by the same key, and we only ask "did this TSA sign this hash".
-            if (p384.verify(token.signature, digest, point, { format: 'der', prehash: false, lowS: false })) {
-                matched = anchor;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        catch {
-            // malformed anchor key ⇒ try the next
-        }
+    signedBytes[0] = 0x31;
+    try {
+        const point = extractP384Point(leaf.spkiDer);
+        base.signatureValid = p384.verify(token.signature, sha512(signedBytes), point, {
+            format: 'der',
+            prehash: false,
+            lowS: false,
+        });
     }
-    base.signatureValid = !!matched;
-    if (!matched) {
-        // Distinguish "no pinned key vouches for this token" (calm — unknown TSA) from a
-        // signature that fails under a known key. Here, none verified ⇒ no_anchor.
-        return { ...base, reason: 'no_anchor' };
+    catch {
+        base.signatureValid = false;
     }
-    base.tsa = matched.name;
-    // (4) genTime within the pinned signing cert's validity window.
-    const notBefore = Date.parse(matched.notBefore);
-    const notAfter = Date.parse(matched.notAfter);
-    const withinValidity = tst.genTime >= notBefore && tst.genTime <= notAfter;
-    base.withinValidity = withinValidity;
-    if (!withinValidity)
-        return { ...base, reason: 'genTime_outside_validity' };
+    if (!base.signatureValid)
+        return fail(base, 'signature_invalid');
     return { ...base, verified: true };
 }

package/dist/verify.js

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ export async function verifyEvidence(input, deps) {
     // the timestamped hash against the pinned TSA anchor (#119 P2a). Pure/offline.
     let rfc3161 = null;
     if (input.rfc3161Timestamp && packageHash) {
-        rfc3161 = verifyRfc3161Timestamp(input.rfc3161Timestamp, packageHash);
+        rfc3161 = await verifyRfc3161Timestamp(input.rfc3161Timestamp, packageHash);
     }
     // Step 3b — blob references embedded in the package (check #9).
     let blobRefs = [];
@@ -101,10 +101,21 @@ export async function verifyEvidence(input, deps) {
             blobRefsVerified = blobRefs.every((r) => r.ok);
         }
     }
-    // Step 4 — key trust against the registry (check #5).
+    // Step 4 — key trust against the registry (check #5). A VERIFIED RFC 3161 genTime
+    // is a cryptographically attested upper bound on when the package was signed — a
+    // second time source alongside Rekor's `integratedTime` (#119 P2a). Use the
+    // EARLIEST attested time: the signature predates any timestamp over its hash, so
+    // the smallest attested time is the strongest proof a deprecated-key signature was
+    // made before deprecation. Both are in SECONDS for `verifyKeyTrust` (genTime is ms).
+    let signedBeforeTime = rekorIntegratedTime;
+    if (rfc3161?.verified && rfc3161.genTime !== undefined) {
+        const genTimeSec = Math.floor(rfc3161.genTime / 1000);
+        signedBeforeTime =
+            signedBeforeTime === undefined ? genTimeSec : Math.min(signedBeforeTime, genTimeSec);
+    }
     let keyTrust = null;
     if (sigPublicKey && sigKid) {
-        keyTrust = verifyKeyTrust(sigPublicKey, sigKid, rekorIntegratedTime, deps.registry);
+        keyTrust = verifyKeyTrust(sigPublicKey, sigKid, signedBeforeTime, deps.registry);
     }
     else if (sigPublicKey) {
         keyTrust = legacyEmbeddedKeyTrust();

package/dist/x509.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import { type DerNode } from './asn1.ts';
+export declare const OID_EKU_TIMESTAMPING = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8";
+export interface X509Cert {
+    /** The signed TBSCertificate (raw TLV) — exactly what the issuer signed. */
+    tbsBytes: Uint8Array;
+    /** Outer signatureAlgorithm OID. */
+    sigAlgOid: string;
+    /** signatureValue (BIT STRING content, the leading unused-bits octet dropped). */
+    signature: Uint8Array;
+    /** SubjectPublicKeyInfo (raw TLV) — this cert's public key. */
+    spkiDer: Uint8Array;
+    /** serialNumber content octets. */
+    serial: Uint8Array;
+    /** issuer / subject Name (raw TLV) — compared by bytes for chain linking. */
+    issuerDer: Uint8Array;
+    subjectDer: Uint8Array;
+    notBefore: number;
+    notAfter: number;
+    /** Extended Key Usage OIDs (empty if the extension is absent). */
+    ekus: string[];
+    /** basicConstraints cA:TRUE. */
+    isCA: boolean;
+}
+/** Parse a Certificate (SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate, signatureAlgorithm, signature }). */
+export declare function parseCertificate(buf: Uint8Array, node: DerNode): X509Cert;
+export declare function bytesEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean;
+/**
+ * Verify `cert.signature` over `cert.tbsBytes` using `issuerSpkiDer` (RSA), via
+ * WebCrypto (`globalThis.crypto.subtle` — a browser/Node global, not a `node:`
+ * import, so verify-core stays browser-safe). Returns false for an unsupported
+ * algorithm or any verification error.
+ */
+export declare function verifyCertSignatureRsa(cert: X509Cert, issuerSpkiDer: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean>;

package/dist/x509.js

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// Minimal X.509 certificate parsing (civic-ai-tools-website#119 P2b) — browser-safe.
+//
+// Just enough of RFC 5280 to validate the RFC 3161 token's embedded cert chain: the
+// signed TBSCertificate bytes, the outer signature + algorithm, the public key, the
+// validity window, issuer/subject (for chain linking), the serial (to match the CMS
+// signer), and the two extensions we gate on (EKU, basicConstraints). Built on the
+// strict-DER `asn1.ts` reader, so malformed certs throw rather than mis-parse.
+import { readNode, children, content, rawTlv, oidToString, readTime, Asn1Error, } from "./asn1.js";
+export const OID_EKU_TIMESTAMPING = '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8';
+const OID_EXT_EKU = '2.5.29.37';
+const OID_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS = '2.5.29.19';
+/** Parse a Certificate (SEQUENCE { tbsCertificate, signatureAlgorithm, signature }). */
+export function parseCertificate(buf, node) {
+    const [tbs, sigAlg, sigBits] = children(buf, node);
+    if (!tbs || !sigAlg || !sigBits)
+        throw new Asn1Error('malformed Certificate');
+    // TBSCertificate: [ version [0] EXPLICIT (optional), serialNumber, signature,
+    //   issuer, validity, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, ... extensions [3] ]
+    const tk = children(buf, tbs);
+    let i = 0;
+    if (tk[i]?.tag === 0xa0)
+        i++; // optional version [0]
+    const serial = content(buf, tk[i++]);
+    i++; // inner signature AlgorithmIdentifier (redundant; skip)
+    const issuer = tk[i++];
+    const validity = tk[i++];
+    const subject = tk[i++];
+    const spki = tk[i++];
+    if (!issuer || !validity || !subject || !spki)
+        throw new Asn1Error('malformed TBSCertificate');
+    const [nb, na] = children(buf, validity);
+    if (!nb || !na)
+        throw new Asn1Error('malformed Validity');
+    const ekus = [];
+    let isCA = false;
+    const extsWrap = tk.slice(i).find((c) => c.tag === 0xa3); // extensions [3] EXPLICIT
+    if (extsWrap) {
+        for (const ext of children(buf, children(buf, extsWrap)[0])) {
+            const ec = children(buf, ext); // Extension { extnID OID, critical BOOL?, extnValue OCTET }
+            const oid = oidToString(buf, ec[0]);
+            const value = content(buf, ec[ec.length - 1]); // extnValue OCTET STRING content (nested DER)
+            if (oid === OID_EXT_EKU) {
+                for (const kp of children(value, readNode(value, 0)))
+                    ekus.push(oidToString(value, kp));
+            }
+            else if (oid === OID_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) {
+                const bc = children(value, readNode(value, 0));
+                if (bc[0]?.tag === 0x01 && content(value, bc[0])[0] === 0xff)
+                    isCA = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        tbsBytes: rawTlv(buf, tbs),
+        sigAlgOid: oidToString(buf, children(buf, sigAlg)[0]),
+        signature: content(buf, sigBits).slice(1),
+        spkiDer: rawTlv(buf, spki),
+        serial,
+        issuerDer: rawTlv(buf, issuer),
+        subjectDer: rawTlv(buf, subject),
+        notBefore: readTime(buf, nb),
+        notAfter: readTime(buf, na),
+        ekus,
+        isCA,
+    };
+}
+export function bytesEqual(a, b) {
+    if (a.length !== b.length)
+        return false;
+    for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
+        if (a[i] !== b[i])
+            return false;
+    return true;
+}
+// RSA signature-algorithm OID → WebCrypto SHA hash name. Only the SHA-2 RSASSA-
+// PKCS1-v1.5 variants a TSA chain uses are accepted.
+const RSA_SIG_HASH = {
+    '1.2.840.113549.1.1.11': 'SHA-256',
+    '1.2.840.113549.1.1.12': 'SHA-384',
+    '1.2.840.113549.1.1.13': 'SHA-512',
+};
+/**
+ * Verify `cert.signature` over `cert.tbsBytes` using `issuerSpkiDer` (RSA), via
+ * WebCrypto (`globalThis.crypto.subtle` — a browser/Node global, not a `node:`
+ * import, so verify-core stays browser-safe). Returns false for an unsupported
+ * algorithm or any verification error.
+ */
+export async function verifyCertSignatureRsa(cert, issuerSpkiDer) {
+    const hash = RSA_SIG_HASH[cert.sigAlgOid];
+    if (!hash)
+        return false;
+    try {
+        // Copy into fresh ArrayBuffer-backed views: subarray slices are
+        // `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>`, which WebCrypto's `BufferSource` rejects.
+        const key = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey('spki', new Uint8Array(issuerSpkiDer), { name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash }, false, ['verify']);
+        return await globalThis.crypto.subtle.verify({ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' }, key, new Uint8Array(cert.signature), new Uint8Array(cert.tbsBytes));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@typedstandards/verify-core",
-  "version": "0.3.1",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "description": "Portable, browser-safe verification core for Typed Standards evidence packages — the §9.2 check suite, single-sourced so it verifies identically on a server and in the browser.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "Nathan Storey",