@twinsearth/w2m-dsh-plugin 2.0.3 → 2.0.5

package/src/relay/tofuture-whitelist.mjs

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Relay-side ToFuture whitelist (S2): rows are HMACs only, never identifiers.
- *
- * The admin provisions `<stateDir>/tofuture-whitelist.json` offline:
- *   { "v": 1, "rows": [ { "kind": "mac", "hmac": "<64hex>", "salt_id": "<16hex>" }, ... ] }
- *
- * `compare(entries)` is intentionally silent: it returns only whether ANY entry matched, never
- * which row, which kind, or how many; callers must not send that boolean to the client.
- */
-import { existsSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-
-const HEX64 = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
-const HEX16 = /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/;
-
-export function loadWhitelist(stateDir) {
-  if (typeof stateDir !== 'string' || stateDir === '') return { ok: true, rows: [], empty: true };
-  const path = join(stateDir, 'tofuture-whitelist.json');
-  if (!existsSync(path)) return { ok: true, rows: [], empty: true, path };
-  let parsed;
-  try { parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, 'utf8')); } catch { return { ok: false, code: 'TOFUTURE_WHITELIST_INVALID', path }; }
-  const rows = Array.isArray(parsed?.rows) ? parsed.rows : [];
-  const clean = [];
-  for (const row of rows) {
-    if (row === null || typeof row !== 'object') continue;
-    if (!HEX64.test(String(row.hmac ?? ''))) continue;
-    if (!HEX16.test(String(row.salt_id ?? ''))) continue;
-    // Only the HMAC and its salt id are kept; any extra field (a leaked identifier) is dropped.
-    clean.push({ kind: typeof row.kind === 'string' ? row.kind.slice(0, 8) : 'any', hmac: String(row.hmac), salt_id: String(row.salt_id) });
-  }
-  return { ok: true, rows: clean, empty: clean.length === 0, path };
-}
-
-/** @returns {boolean} true when at least one entry matches a whitelisted HMAC. */
-export function whitelistMatches(whitelist, entries) {
-  if (whitelist === null || whitelist.ok !== true || Array.isArray(whitelist.rows) !== true) return false;
-  if (!Array.isArray(entries) || entries.length === 0) return false;
-  const byHmac = new Set(whitelist.rows.map((row) => row.hmac + '|' + row.salt_id));
-  for (const entry of entries) {
-    if (entry === null || typeof entry !== 'object') continue;
-    if (!HEX64.test(String(entry.hmac ?? ''))) continue;
-    if (!HEX16.test(String(entry.salt_id ?? ''))) continue;
-    if (byHmac.has(String(entry.hmac) + '|' + String(entry.salt_id))) return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}

package/src/util/data-plane.mjs

@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * S0 — 数据面端口（DataPlaneSink）。P0 止血的地基。
- *
- * 红线（2026-10-27 冻结）：
- *  · 用户数据只允许去用户自己选择的第三方（GitHub / 局域网 Git / SSH 云盘等）；
- *  · 我们的 Relay 只承载类型化元数据（指令/状态/hash/size/count/Ref ≤4KiB）；
- *  · 任何 push/fetch 目标解析后指向 relay → 一律拒绝；
- *  · 无 sink 时统一返回 ARTIFACT_NOT_DELIVERED，绝不回退 relay。
- *
- * 本模块无 I/O：只做 Ref 校验、sink 目标判定与端口分发。真实适配器（git/ssh/dir）
- * 与 NullSink 由调用方注入，这样单测不碰网络与磁盘。
- */
-
-export const REF_MAX_BYTES = 4096;
-export const REF_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
-  'v', 'sink', 'locator', 'kind', 'task_id', 'machine_id',
-  'plain', 'cipher', 'enc', 'zip', 'sig',
-]);
-export const REF_KINDS = Object.freeze(['stdout', 'stderr', 'patch', 'memory', 'artifact', 'reduce-input']);
-export const SINK_KINDS = Object.freeze(['github', 'lan-git', 'ssh', 'dir']);
-export const REF_HEX = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
-
-const DATA_FIELDS = new Set([
-  'data', 'content', 'contents', 'patch', 'patch_text', 'stdout', 'stderr',
-  'text', 'blob', 'base64', 'body', 'raw',
-]);
-
-function utf8Bytes(value) {
-  return Buffer.byteLength(typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value), 'utf8');
-}
-
-function parseHost(endpoint) {
-  if (typeof endpoint !== 'string' || endpoint.trim() === '') return null;
-  const scpLike = /^[^@\s]+@([^:\s]+):/.exec(endpoint.trim());
-  if (scpLike !== null) return { host: scpLike[1].toLowerCase(), port: '', href: endpoint, scheme: 'ssh' };
-  try {
-    const url = new URL(endpoint);
-    return { host: url.hostname.toLowerCase(), port: url.port, href: url.href, scheme: url.protocol.replace(':', '') };
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-function isPrivateOrLocal(host) {
-  return /^10\./.test(host)
-    || /^192\.168\./.test(host)
-    || /^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./.test(host)
-    || host === 'localhost'
-    || host.endsWith('.local')
-    || /^\[fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/i.test(host)
-    || /^\[fe80:/i.test(host);
-}
-
-/**
- * 判断一个数据面目标是否获准（只做字符串/URL 级判定；DNS 解析后校验由适配器负责）。
- * @returns {{ok: true, sink: string} | {ok: false, code: string, detail: object}}
- */
-export function assertDataPlaneTarget({ endpoint, relayBase }) {
-  const target = parseHost(endpoint);
-  if (target === null) return { ok: false, code: 'DATA_PLANE_ENDPOINT_INVALID', detail: {} };
-  if (typeof relayBase === 'string' && relayBase !== '') {
-    const relay = parseHost(relayBase);
-    if (relay !== null && target.host === relay.host) {
-      return { ok: false, code: 'DATA_PLANE_POINTS_AT_RELAY', detail: { endpoint, relay: relay.host } };
-    }
-  }
-  if (target.host === 'github.com' || target.host.endsWith('.github.com')) {
-    return { ok: true, sink: 'github' };
-  }
-  if (target.scheme === 'ssh' || target.scheme === 'git') {
-    return { ok: true, sink: isPrivateOrLocal(target.host) ? 'lan-git' : 'ssh' };
-  }
-  if (target.scheme === 'http' || target.scheme === 'https') {
-    if (isPrivateOrLocal(target.host)) return { ok: true, sink: 'lan-git' };
-    return { ok: false, code: 'DATA_PLANE_SCHEME_FORBIDDEN', detail: { scheme: target.scheme, host: target.host } };
-  }
-  return { ok: false, code: 'DATA_PLANE_SCHEME_FORBIDDEN', detail: { scheme: target.scheme } };
-}
-
-function scanForContent(value, path, hits) {
-  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return;
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-    value.forEach((entry, index) => scanForContent(entry, path + '[' + index + ']', hits));
-    return;
-  }
-  for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
-    const keyPath = path === '' ? key : path + '.' + key;
-    if (DATA_FIELDS.has(key.toLowerCase())) hits.push(keyPath);
-    scanForContent(child, keyPath, hits);
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * 校验进入控制面的 Ref：纯元数据、≤4KiB、无内容字段、哈希形状正确。
- * @returns {{ok: true} | {ok: false, code: string, detail: object}}
- */
-export function inspectRef(ref) {
-  if (ref === null || typeof ref !== 'object' || Array.isArray(ref)) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_NOT_OBJECT', detail: {} };
-  }
-  const bytes = utf8Bytes(ref);
-  if (bytes > REF_MAX_BYTES) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_TOO_LARGE', detail: { bytes, limit_bytes: REF_MAX_BYTES } };
-  }
-  const hits = [];
-  scanForContent(ref, '', hits);
-  if (hits.length > 0) return { ok: false, code: 'DATA_PLANE_FORBIDDEN', detail: { paths: hits.slice(0, 8) } };
-  const unknown = Object.keys(ref).filter((key) => !REF_FIELDS.includes(key));
-  if (unknown.length > 0) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_FIELD_UNKNOWN', detail: { unknown, allowed: REF_FIELDS.slice() } };
-  }
-  if (ref.v !== 1) return { ok: false, code: 'REF_VERSION', detail: { expected: 1, got: ref.v ?? null } };
-  if (!SINK_KINDS.includes(ref.sink)) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_SINK_UNKNOWN', detail: { allowed: SINK_KINDS.slice(), got: ref.sink ?? null } };
-  }
-  if (!REF_KINDS.includes(ref.kind)) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_KIND_UNKNOWN', detail: { allowed: REF_KINDS.slice(), got: ref.kind ?? null } };
-  }
-  if (typeof ref.locator !== 'string' || ref.locator.trim() === '' || ref.locator.length > 512) {
-    return { ok: false, code: 'REF_LOCATOR_INVALID', detail: {} };
-  }
-  if (ref.plain !== undefined) {
-    if (typeof ref.plain !== 'object' || !REF_HEX.test(String(ref.plain.sha256 ?? ''))) {
-      return { ok: false, code: 'REF_PLAIN_INVALID', detail: {} };
-    }
-  }
-  if (ref.cipher !== undefined) {
-    if (typeof ref.cipher !== 'object' || !REF_HEX.test(String(ref.cipher.sha256 ?? ''))) {
-      return { ok: false, code: 'REF_CIPHER_INVALID', detail: {} };
-    }
-  }
-  return { ok: true };
-}
-
-/**
- * NullSink：永不上传，统一降级码。用于"无数据面"的合规默认值。
- */
-export function createNullSink() {
-  return {
-    kind: 'null',
-    async pushObject() {
-      return { ok: false, code: 'ARTIFACT_NOT_DELIVERED', detail: { reason: 'no data plane sink configured' } };
-    },
-    async fetchObject() {
-      return { ok: false, code: 'ARTIFACT_NOT_DELIVERED', detail: { reason: 'no data plane sink configured' } };
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * 端口分发：调用方注入 sinks（github/lan-git/ssh/dir），未命中一律 NullSink。
- * @param {{sinks?: Record<string, object>, relayBase?: string}} [options]
- */
-export function createDataPlane(options = {}) {
-  const sinks = options.sinks ?? {};
-  const relayBase = options.relayBase ?? '';
-  function pick(endpoint) {
-    const target = assertDataPlaneTarget({ endpoint, relayBase });
-    if (target.ok !== true) return { ok: false, result: target };
-    const sink = sinks[target.sink];
-    if (sink === undefined) return { ok: true, sink: createNullSink() };
-    return { ok: true, sink };
-  }
-  return {
-    async pushObject({ endpoint, ref, ...rest }) {
-      const refCheck = inspectRef(ref);
-      if (refCheck.ok !== true) return refCheck;
-      const chosen = pick(endpoint);
-      if (chosen.ok !== true) return chosen.result;
-      return chosen.sink.pushObject({ ref, ...rest });
-    },
-    async fetchObject({ endpoint, ref, ...rest }) {
-      const refCheck = inspectRef(ref);
-      if (refCheck.ok !== true) return refCheck;
-      const chosen = pick(endpoint);
-      if (chosen.ok !== true) return chosen.result;
-      return chosen.sink.fetchObject({ ref, ...rest });
-    },
-  };
-}

package/src/util/sealed-object.mjs

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * 数据面密封对象：压缩 → AES-256-GCM → X25519 封装内容密钥 → Ed25519 签名。
- * 顺序固定：compress → encrypt → sign；校验顺序固定：验签 → 解密 → 解压 → sha。
- * relay 永不接触明文、内容密钥或私钥。
- */
-import {
-  createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, diffieHellman,
-  generateKeyPairSync, hkdfSync, randomBytes, sign as edSign, verify as edVerify,
-} from 'node:crypto';
-import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
-import { gzipSync, gunzipSync } from 'node:zlib';
-
-// zstd landed in Node 22.15/23.8 while engines allow Node 20: feature-detect instead of importing
-// the name, because a named ESM import of a missing export fails at link time on the older runtime.
-const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
-let zstdCompressSync = null;
-let zstdDecompressSync = null;
-try {
-  const zlib = require('node:zlib');
-  if (typeof zlib.zstdCompressSync === 'function') {
-    zstdCompressSync = zlib.zstdCompressSync;
-    zstdDecompressSync = zlib.zstdDecompressSync;
-  }
-} catch { /* older Node: gzip only */ }
-
-export const MAX_OBJECT_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
-export const COMPRESS_THRESHOLD = 4 * 1024;
-export const MAX_RATIO = 100;
-
-const sha256 = (buf) => createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('hex');
-const aadOf = ({ taskId, plainSha256, sink }) => Buffer.from(taskId + '|' + plainSha256 + '|' + sink, 'utf8');
-
-function compress(bytes) {
-  if (bytes.length <= COMPRESS_THRESHOLD) return { alg: 'none', body: bytes };
-  const zstd = typeof zstdCompressSync === 'function';
-  try {
-    const body = zstd ? zstdCompressSync(bytes) : gzipSync(bytes, { level: 6 });
-    if (body.length >= bytes.length * 0.95) return { alg: 'none', body: bytes };
-    return { alg: zstd ? 'zstd' : 'gzip', body };
-  } catch {
-    return { alg: 'none', body: bytes };
-  }
-}
-
-function decompress(alg, body, declaredBytes) {
-  if (alg === 'none') return body;
-  const out = alg === 'zstd' ? zstdDecompressSync(body) : gunzipSync(body);
-  if (out.length > declaredBytes) throw new Error('DECOMPRESSION_LIMIT');
-  return out;
-}
-
-/** 生成接收方 X25519 密钥对（PEM）。 */
-export function createRecipientKeys() {
-  const pair = generateKeyPairSync('x25519');
-  return {
-    publicKeyPem: pair.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-    privateKeyPem: pair.privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-  };
-}
-
-/** 生成签名密钥对（Ed25519 PEM）。 */
-export function createSigningKeys() {
-  const pair = generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
-  return {
-    publicKeyPem: pair.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-    privateKeyPem: pair.privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * @param {{bytes: Buffer, taskId: string, sink: string, recipientPublicKeyPem: string, signerPrivateKeyPem: string, maxBytes?: number}} input
- */
-export function sealObject(input) {
-  const { bytes, taskId, sink, recipientPublicKeyPem, signerPrivateKeyPem } = input;
-  const maxBytes = Number.isInteger(input.maxBytes) ? input.maxBytes : MAX_OBJECT_BYTES;
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(bytes)) throw new Error('OBJECT_NOT_BYTES');
-  if (bytes.length > maxBytes) throw new Error('OBJECT_TOO_LARGE');
-  if (typeof taskId !== 'string' || taskId === '' || typeof sink !== 'string' || sink === '') throw new Error('OBJECT_META_INVALID');
-
-  const plainSha256 = sha256(bytes);
-  const zip = compress(bytes);
-  const cek = randomBytes(32);
-  const iv = randomBytes(12);
-  const aad = aadOf({ taskId, plainSha256, sink });
-  const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', cek, iv);
-  cipher.setAAD(aad);
-  const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(zip.body), cipher.final()]);
-  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
-
-  const eph = generateKeyPairSync('x25519');
-  const shared = diffieHellman({ privateKey: eph.privateKey, publicKey: createPublicKey(recipientPublicKeyPem) });
-  const kek = Buffer.from(hkdfSync('sha256', shared, Buffer.from(plainSha256.slice(0, 32), 'hex'), Buffer.from('w2m-sealed-v1', 'utf8'), 32));
-  const wrapIv = randomBytes(12);
-  const wrapCipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', kek, wrapIv);
-  const wrapped = Buffer.concat([wrapCipher.update(cek), wrapCipher.final()]);
-  const wrapTag = wrapCipher.getAuthTag();
-
-  const signature = edSign(null, Buffer.from(plainSha256 + '|' + bytes.length + '|' + sink + '|' + taskId, 'utf8'), signerPrivateKeyPem);
-  return {
-    v: 1,
-    alg: 'x25519-hkdf-sha256-aes-256-gcm-v1',
-    comp: zip.alg,
-    sink,
-    task_id: taskId,
-    plain: { sha256: plainSha256, bytes: bytes.length },
-    cipher: { bytes: ciphertext.length + tag.length },
-    aad_sha256: sha256(aad),
-    epk: eph.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-    iv: iv.toString('base64'),
-    tag: tag.toString('base64'),
-    wrap: { iv: wrapIv.toString('base64'), tag: wrapTag.toString('base64'), value: wrapped.toString('base64') },
-    body: ciphertext.toString('base64'),
-    sig: signature.toString('base64'),
-  };
-}
-
-/** 验签 → 解封装 → 解密 → 解压 → sha 复核。 */
-export function openObject(sealed, { recipientPrivateKeyPem, signerPublicKeyPem, maxBytes }) {
-  const limit = Number.isInteger(maxBytes) ? maxBytes : MAX_OBJECT_BYTES;
-  const expected = sealed?.plain?.sha256;
-  if (typeof expected !== 'string') throw new Error('OBJECT_INVALID');
-  const ok = edVerify(null, Buffer.from(expected + '|' + sealed.plain.bytes + '|' + sealed.sink + '|' + sealed.task_id, 'utf8'), signerPublicKeyPem, Buffer.from(sealed.sig, 'base64'));
-  if (ok !== true) throw new Error('OBJECT_SIGNATURE_INVALID');
-  if (sealed.plain.bytes > limit) throw new Error('OBJECT_TOO_LARGE');
-
-  const aad = aadOf({ taskId: sealed.task_id, plainSha256: expected, sink: sealed.sink });
-  const shared = diffieHellman({ privateKey: createPrivateKey(recipientPrivateKeyPem), publicKey: createPublicKey(sealed.epk) });
-  const kek = Buffer.from(hkdfSync('sha256', shared, Buffer.from(expected.slice(0, 32), 'hex'), Buffer.from('w2m-sealed-v1', 'utf8'), 32));
-  const unwrap = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', kek, Buffer.from(sealed.wrap.iv, 'base64'));
-  unwrap.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(sealed.wrap.tag, 'base64'));
-  const cek = Buffer.concat([unwrap.update(Buffer.from(sealed.wrap.value, 'base64')), unwrap.final()]);
-
-  const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', cek, Buffer.from(sealed.iv, 'base64'));
-  decipher.setAAD(aad);
-  decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(sealed.tag, 'base64'));
-  const zipBody = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(sealed.body, 'base64')), decipher.final()]);
-  const plain = decompress(sealed.comp, zipBody, sealed.plain.bytes);
-  if (plain.length !== sealed.plain.bytes) throw new Error('OBJECT_SIZE_MISMATCH');
-  if (sha256(plain) !== expected) throw new Error('OBJECT_HASH_MISMATCH');
-  return { bytes: plain, sha256: expected };
-}

package/src/util/tofuture-hmac.mjs

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * ToFuture identity HMAC (S2): the only form in which network identifiers leave the machine.
- *
- * One canonical algorithm for client, whitelist provisioning and relay comparison:
- *   salt_id = HMAC(fleet_key, "w2m-ops-salt-v1|" + machine_id) hex[0..16]
- *   hmac    = HMAC(fleet_key, "w2m-ops-id-v1|" + kind + "|" + value + "|" + salt_id) hex
- *
- * Nothing here returns, stores or logs `value`; callers pass it in memory and keep only `hmac`.
- */
-import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
-
-export const ID_KINDS = Object.freeze(['mac', 'ipv4', 'ipv6', 'bssid']);
-
-const hmacHex = (key, text) => createHmac('sha256', key).update(text, 'utf8').digest('hex');
-
-export function saltIdOf(fleetKey, machineId) {
-  return hmacHex(String(fleetKey), 'w2m-ops-salt-v1|' + String(machineId)).slice(0, 16);
-}
-
-export function identityHmac(fleetKey, machineId, kind, value) {
-  const salt = saltIdOf(fleetKey, machineId);
-  return { kind, salt_id: salt, hmac: hmacHex(String(fleetKey), 'w2m-ops-id-v1|' + kind + '|' + String(value) + '|' + salt) };
-}
-
-/** Stable JSON for the request body (keys sorted) — used by tests and future attestation. */
-export function canonicalJson(value) {
-  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value);
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) return '[' + value.map(canonicalJson).join(',') + ']';
-  return '{' + Object.keys(value).sort().map((key) => JSON.stringify(key) + ':' + canonicalJson(value[key])).join(',') + '}';
-}