@twinsearth/w2m-dsh-plugin 0.20.0 → 0.22.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,107 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format follows
 [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this project
 adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [0.22.0] — 2026-10-15
+
+**The gate now grades a real dispatch, and connects to the approval queue.**
+
+0.21.0 built the gate and admitted it had no caller. This release gives it one: `gateDispatch()` reads a
+dispatch's **own** facts — `write` and a non-empty `write_scope`, both already in the payload — and grades it,
+rather than asking the caller to name a capability. That distinction is the whole design: **a caller who must
+name their own capability is a caller who can name the cheap one.**
+
+### The unset level, which is the honest part
+
+`tools.mjs` states plainly that **no parameter of any tool can widen what a machine will run**, and that there
+is no way for a caller to set anything authority-shaped. So a plugin with no configured actor level has no
+actor to judge. Two answers were available:
+
+* treat an unset level as `0` — which would **refuse every writing dispatch on every machine that has not opted
+  in**, breaking a working fleet to enforce a policy nobody asked for;
+* treat it as **unenforced, and say so**.
+
+This does the second, and `enforced` is the whole point: **a gate that reports `ALLOW` and a gate that reports
+"not checked" must never look alike, because the first is a decision and the second is the absence of one.**
+A test asserts exactly that — same verdict, different `enforced`, different `reason_code`.
+
+### The escalation reaches the queue it was built for
+
+`approvalRequestFor()` returns `null` for anything that is not `NEEDS_APPROVAL`, and otherwise produces a
+request shaped for the cross-session approval index built in 0.10.0 — **the two features finally meet**, which
+is the point: a permission gate and an approval queue that do not connect are two things that each look
+finished and jointly do nothing.
+
+The request carries the **subject level recorded now**, not left to be re-derived later, for the reason
+0.10.0's index already states: an approver who could supply the subject level could lower it. A destructive
+request is marked `auto_settleable: false` explicitly, rather than leaving the queue to infer it from a
+capability name.
+
+### A `write` with no scope is graded as the dearer capability
+
+The dispatch path refuses that combination separately. Grading it cheap here would mean that if that check
+ever moved, a request intending to write would be handed the read-only permission.
+
+### A test of mine was wrong, again in the same direction
+
+`gateDispatch({write: true}, 0)` was asserted to be `deny`; it is `needs_approval`, **because an ordinary
+actor is exactly one band below captain and that is the documented behaviour.** The implementation was right.
+This is the fourth time in this project that a failing test was the test's fault — and it is the argument for
+testing refusals rather than only the happy path, because a wrong refusal fails loudly enough to be told apart
+from a wrong acceptance.
+
+**11 new tests, 0 failures.**
+
+## [0.21.0] — 2026-10-15
+
+**The capability table has a gate now, so it is a policy rather than a description of one.**
+
+`scripts/layer-model.mjs` has declared since 0.12.0 what each operational capability costs in authority —
+`read_fleet_state` at ordinary, `dispatch_writing` at captain, `publish_release` at org admin,
+`write_config` at system admin — and **nothing consulted it**. A table nothing reads is true on the day it is
+written and unenforced afterwards; that is the same failure this project already paid for with the layering,
+where a prose description was quietly violated while nothing failed.
+
+`src/agent/permission.mjs` compares the table against `authority.mjs`'s bands and returns one of three
+verdicts. The interesting part is not `ALLOW`:
+
+### The escalation window is exactly one band
+
+`NEEDS_APPROVAL` is granted to an actor **one band below** the requirement and to nobody further down.
+`DENY` covers everything else.
+
+**Two bands below is refused rather than escalated**, and that is a security decision rather than a
+convenience one: if any shortfall could be forwarded, an ordinary actor could request a system-admin action
+and **the request itself would be the attack** — one inattentive approver away from a write to
+`allowedCommands`. One band means an actor can ask for the next thing up and no more, which is what
+"escalate to your supervisor" actually means.
+
+### An undeclared capability is DENIED
+
+Not `ALLOW`, which would make the table grant whatever is added next; not `NEEDS_APPROVAL`, which would make
+it requestable. Either would turn an **omission** into a permission. `decide('teleport', 100)` refuses, because
+authority answers *how much may this actor do*, not *is this a thing that exists*.
+
+### A level nobody defined is refused rather than rounded
+
+`50.5`, `-1`, `101`, `NaN` and `'50'` are all denied with the requirement still reported. Treating them as `0`
+would silently downgrade an actor; treating them as high would silently promote one. Neither is a decision
+this module is entitled to make.
+
+### Nothing destructive settles itself
+
+`mayAutoSettle()` returns false for any destructive capability **even on an `ALLOW` at maximum authority** —
+the level answers "may this actor", not "should this happen now". A release published on a machine's own
+judgement is a release nobody reviewed.
+
+### The table is audited, not trusted
+
+`auditCapabilities()` reports any entry **no band can reach**, because an unreachable capability reads as
+policy while doing nothing — worse than an absent one, since it looks like a control.
+
+**18 tests, 0 failures.** One property is asserted across the whole table rather than by example: for every
+declared capability and every level from 0 to 100, a `NEEDS_APPROVAL` verdict implies the actor is exactly one
+band below.
+
 ## [0.20.0] — 2026-10-15
 
 **Version skew is refuted too, and the direct-path failure is now counted instead of read one at a time.**

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@twinsearth/w2m-dsh-plugin",
-  "version": "0.20.0",
+  "version": "0.22.0",
   "description": "DSH: Windows2MacOS — drive the same project on online Windows and macOS machines from one DeepSeek account, across networks and regions. P2P hole punching is the default path (relay + shared server as rendezvous, ledger and fallback), with a bundled STUN responder, Tailscale/public-VPS/tunnel shapes, Rabbit relay + per-machine Localside + eight DSH tools (replicate / split), nine aggregate verdicts and signed requests.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@
     }
   },
   "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test --test-force-exit test/relay.test.mjs test/broadcast.test.mjs test/agent.test.mjs test/authority.test.mjs test/blocks.test.mjs test/approval-index.test.mjs test/fleet-sync.test.mjs test/health.test.mjs test/storage.test.mjs test/exit-channel.test.mjs test/council.test.mjs test/log-bounds.test.mjs test/test-report.test.mjs test/fleet-scale.test.mjs test/fleet-state.test.mjs test/crypto-blake2s.test.mjs test/installed-version.test.mjs test/layer-model.test.mjs test/memory.test.mjs test/tools.test.mjs  test/claims.test.mjs test/fleet-target.test.mjs test/client-bundle.test.mjs test/schedule.test.mjs test/auto-update.test.mjs test/update-source.test.mjs test/update-install.test.mjs test/update-wiring.test.mjs test/signing.test.mjs test/stress.test.mjs test/shared-config.test.mjs test/metrics.test.mjs test/metrics-route.test.mjs test/tool-cards.test.mjs test/p2p-stun.test.mjs test/p2p-transport.test.mjs test/p2p-signaling.test.mjs test/p2p-node.test.mjs test/p2p-transport-fields.test.mjs test/p2p-plugin.test.mjs test/p2p-crypto.test.mjs test/stun-server.test.mjs test/loader-entry.test.mjs test/mdns-wire.test.mjs test/mdns-discover.test.mjs test/chatops-approval.test.mjs test/chatops-policy.test.mjs test/chatops-file-safety.test.mjs test/chatops-outbound-queue.test.mjs test/chatops-commands.test.mjs test/chatops-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-config-route.test.mjs test/chatops-apply.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-contract.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet.test.mjs test/chatops-account.test.mjs test/chatops-auth.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-scope.test.mjs test/chatops-handoff.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-wiring.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-live.test.mjs test/chatops-takeover.test.mjs test/chatops-device-signing.test.mjs test/chatops-relay-verify.test.mjs test/chatops-durability.test.mjs test/chatops-run-command.test.mjs test/secrets-guard.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-fleet-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-join.test.mjs",
+    "test": "node --test --test-force-exit test/relay.test.mjs test/broadcast.test.mjs test/agent.test.mjs test/authority.test.mjs test/blocks.test.mjs test/approval-index.test.mjs test/fleet-sync.test.mjs test/health.test.mjs test/storage.test.mjs test/exit-channel.test.mjs test/council.test.mjs test/log-bounds.test.mjs test/test-report.test.mjs test/fleet-scale.test.mjs test/fleet-state.test.mjs test/crypto-blake2s.test.mjs test/installed-version.test.mjs test/permission.test.mjs test/layer-model.test.mjs test/memory.test.mjs test/tools.test.mjs  test/claims.test.mjs test/fleet-target.test.mjs test/client-bundle.test.mjs test/schedule.test.mjs test/auto-update.test.mjs test/update-source.test.mjs test/update-install.test.mjs test/update-wiring.test.mjs test/signing.test.mjs test/stress.test.mjs test/shared-config.test.mjs test/metrics.test.mjs test/metrics-route.test.mjs test/tool-cards.test.mjs test/p2p-stun.test.mjs test/p2p-transport.test.mjs test/p2p-signaling.test.mjs test/p2p-node.test.mjs test/p2p-transport-fields.test.mjs test/p2p-plugin.test.mjs test/p2p-crypto.test.mjs test/stun-server.test.mjs test/loader-entry.test.mjs test/mdns-wire.test.mjs test/mdns-discover.test.mjs test/chatops-approval.test.mjs test/chatops-policy.test.mjs test/chatops-file-safety.test.mjs test/chatops-outbound-queue.test.mjs test/chatops-commands.test.mjs test/chatops-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-config-route.test.mjs test/chatops-apply.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-contract.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet.test.mjs test/chatops-account.test.mjs test/chatops-auth.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-scope.test.mjs test/chatops-handoff.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-wiring.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-live.test.mjs test/chatops-takeover.test.mjs test/chatops-device-signing.test.mjs test/chatops-relay-verify.test.mjs test/chatops-durability.test.mjs test/chatops-run-command.test.mjs test/secrets-guard.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-fleet-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-join.test.mjs",
     "test:e2e": "node --test --test-force-exit test/e2e.test.mjs test/crossnetwork.test.mjs test/signing-e2e.test.mjs test/outbound-only.test.mjs test/recovery.test.mjs test/pipeline-e2e.test.mjs test/p2p-agent.test.mjs",
     "test:relay": "node --test --test-force-exit test/relay.test.mjs",
     "test:agent": "node --test --test-force-exit test/agent.test.mjs test/memory.test.mjs",
     "test:tools": "node --test --test-force-exit test/tools.test.mjs",
     "test:crossnetwork": "node --test --test-force-exit test/crossnetwork.test.mjs",
-    "test:all": "node --test --test-force-exit test/relay.test.mjs test/broadcast.test.mjs test/agent.test.mjs test/authority.test.mjs test/blocks.test.mjs test/approval-index.test.mjs test/fleet-sync.test.mjs test/health.test.mjs test/storage.test.mjs test/exit-channel.test.mjs test/council.test.mjs test/log-bounds.test.mjs test/test-report.test.mjs test/fleet-scale.test.mjs test/fleet-state.test.mjs test/crypto-blake2s.test.mjs test/installed-version.test.mjs test/layer-model.test.mjs test/memory.test.mjs test/tools.test.mjs  test/claims.test.mjs test/fleet-target.test.mjs test/client-bundle.test.mjs test/schedule.test.mjs test/auto-update.test.mjs test/update-source.test.mjs test/update-install.test.mjs test/update-wiring.test.mjs test/signing.test.mjs test/stress.test.mjs test/e2e.test.mjs test/crossnetwork.test.mjs test/signing-e2e.test.mjs test/outbound-only.test.mjs test/recovery.test.mjs test/pipeline-e2e.test.mjs test/shared-config.test.mjs test/metrics.test.mjs test/metrics-route.test.mjs test/tool-cards.test.mjs test/p2p-stun.test.mjs test/p2p-transport.test.mjs test/p2p-signaling.test.mjs test/p2p-node.test.mjs test/p2p-transport-fields.test.mjs test/p2p-plugin.test.mjs test/p2p-agent.test.mjs test/stun-server.test.mjs test/loader-entry.test.mjs test/mdns-wire.test.mjs test/mdns-discover.test.mjs test/p2p-crypto.test.mjs test/chatops-approval.test.mjs test/chatops-policy.test.mjs test/chatops-file-safety.test.mjs test/chatops-outbound-queue.test.mjs test/chatops-commands.test.mjs test/chatops-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-config-route.test.mjs test/chatops-apply.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-contract.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet.test.mjs test/chatops-account.test.mjs test/chatops-auth.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-scope.test.mjs test/chatops-handoff.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-wiring.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-live.test.mjs test/chatops-takeover.test.mjs test/chatops-device-signing.test.mjs test/chatops-relay-verify.test.mjs test/chatops-durability.test.mjs test/chatops-run-command.test.mjs test/secrets-guard.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-fleet-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-join.test.mjs",
+    "test:all": "node --test --test-force-exit test/relay.test.mjs test/broadcast.test.mjs test/agent.test.mjs test/authority.test.mjs test/blocks.test.mjs test/approval-index.test.mjs test/fleet-sync.test.mjs test/health.test.mjs test/storage.test.mjs test/exit-channel.test.mjs test/council.test.mjs test/log-bounds.test.mjs test/test-report.test.mjs test/fleet-scale.test.mjs test/fleet-state.test.mjs test/crypto-blake2s.test.mjs test/installed-version.test.mjs test/permission.test.mjs test/layer-model.test.mjs test/memory.test.mjs test/tools.test.mjs  test/claims.test.mjs test/fleet-target.test.mjs test/client-bundle.test.mjs test/schedule.test.mjs test/auto-update.test.mjs test/update-source.test.mjs test/update-install.test.mjs test/update-wiring.test.mjs test/signing.test.mjs test/stress.test.mjs test/e2e.test.mjs test/crossnetwork.test.mjs test/signing-e2e.test.mjs test/outbound-only.test.mjs test/recovery.test.mjs test/pipeline-e2e.test.mjs test/shared-config.test.mjs test/metrics.test.mjs test/metrics-route.test.mjs test/tool-cards.test.mjs test/p2p-stun.test.mjs test/p2p-transport.test.mjs test/p2p-signaling.test.mjs test/p2p-node.test.mjs test/p2p-transport-fields.test.mjs test/p2p-plugin.test.mjs test/p2p-agent.test.mjs test/stun-server.test.mjs test/loader-entry.test.mjs test/mdns-wire.test.mjs test/mdns-discover.test.mjs test/p2p-crypto.test.mjs test/chatops-approval.test.mjs test/chatops-policy.test.mjs test/chatops-file-safety.test.mjs test/chatops-outbound-queue.test.mjs test/chatops-commands.test.mjs test/chatops-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-config-route.test.mjs test/chatops-apply.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-contract.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet.test.mjs test/chatops-account.test.mjs test/chatops-auth.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-scope.test.mjs test/chatops-handoff.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-wiring.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-live.test.mjs test/chatops-takeover.test.mjs test/chatops-device-signing.test.mjs test/chatops-relay-verify.test.mjs test/chatops-durability.test.mjs test/chatops-run-command.test.mjs test/secrets-guard.test.mjs test/chatops-ilink-fleet-bridge.test.mjs test/chatops-fleet-join.test.mjs",
     "pack": "node scripts/pack.mjs",
     "verify:join": "node scripts/verify-join.mjs",
     "lint": "eslint .",
@@ -144,7 +144,8 @@
     "test:fleet-scale": "node --test --test-force-exit test/fleet-scale.test.mjs",
     "test:fleet-state": "node --test --test-force-exit test/fleet-state.test.mjs",
     "test:crypto-blake2s": "node --test --test-force-exit test/crypto-blake2s.test.mjs",
-    "test:installed-version": "node --test --test-force-exit test/installed-version.test.mjs"
+    "test:installed-version": "node --test --test-force-exit test/installed-version.test.mjs",
+    "test:permission": "node --test --test-force-exit test/permission.test.mjs"
   },
   "keywords": [
     "dsh-bundle",

package/src/agent/permission.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+/**
+ * The permission gate: turning a declared capability table into a decision.
+ *
+ * ## Why this exists, and what it is not
+ *
+ * `scripts/layer-model.mjs` declares what each operational capability costs in authority, and **nothing used
+ * it**. A table nothing consults is not a policy; it is a description of a policy that happens to be true on
+ * the day it is written. This module is the thing that consults it.
+ *
+ * What it is **not**: it does not know what a capability *means*. Classification — is this a write, a scope
+ * change, a registration — belongs to whatever knows the action, which is `authority.mjs`'s own stated rule
+ * and the reason that file declines to enumerate actions. So the two files are split by that line:
+ * `layer-model.mjs` says what each capability costs, `authority.mjs` owns the bands, and this module compares
+ * the two and returns a verdict.
+ *
+ * ## The three answers, and why there are exactly three
+ *
+ * `ALLOW` — the actor's level meets the capability's cost.
+ * `NEEDS_APPROVAL` — the actor is **one band below**, so somebody above them may authorise it.
+ * `DENY` — anything else, including a capability nobody declared.
+ *
+ * The `NEEDS_APPROVAL` window is deliberately **one band**, not "anything below". If any shortfall could be
+ * escalated, an ordinary actor could request a system-admin action and a single inattentive approver would
+ * grant it; the request itself would be the attack. One band means an actor can ask for the *next* thing up
+ * and no more, which is what "escalate to your supervisor" actually means.
+ *
+ * ## The refusal that matters most
+ *
+ * **An undeclared capability is DENIED.** Answering `ALLOW` for something the table has not heard of makes the
+ * table grant whatever is added next, and answering `NEEDS_APPROVAL` makes it requestable. Both are worse than
+ * a refusal, because both hide the omission.
+ */
+import { CAPABILITIES, permissionFor, isDestructive } from '../../scripts/layer-model.mjs';
+import { AUTHORITY_BANDS, AUTHORITY_MAX, AUTHORITY_VERDICT, bandOf, isAuthorityLevel } from './authority.mjs';
+
+export { AUTHORITY_VERDICT };
+
+/** Why a decision came out the way it did. Codes, so a caller branches on a value rather than on prose. */
+export const GATE_REFUSAL = Object.freeze({
+  UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY: 'GATE_UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY',
+  NOT_A_LEVEL: 'GATE_NOT_A_LEVEL',
+  BELOW_BAND: 'GATE_BELOW_BAND',
+  SUFFICIENT: 'GATE_SUFFICIENT',
+  ONE_BAND_BELOW: 'GATE_ONE_BAND_BELOW',
+});
+
+/**
+ * The band index a level falls in, or `-1` when the level is unusable.
+ *
+ * Uses `bandOf` from `authority.mjs` rather than re-deriving the bands, so a change to the band table cannot
+ * make this module disagree with the one that owns it.
+ */
+function bandIndex(level) {
+  if (!isAuthorityLevel(level)) return -1;
+  const band = bandOf(level);
+  if (band === null || band === undefined) return -1;
+  const index = AUTHORITY_BANDS.findIndex((b) => b.name === (band.name ?? band));
+  return index;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether an actor may exercise a capability.
+ *
+ * @param {string} capability as named in the capability table
+ * @param {number} level the actor's authority level
+ * @returns {{
+ *   verdict: string, capability: string|null, level: number|null,
+ *   required: number|null, shortfall: number|null, destructive: boolean|null,
+ *   reason_code: string, detail: string
+ * }}
+ */
+export function decide(capability, level) {
+  const required = permissionFor(capability);
+
+  if (required === null) {
+    // The most important branch. A capability the table has never heard of is refused, not permitted and not
+    // escalated: either answer would turn an omission into a grant.
+    return {
+      verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.DENY,
+      capability: typeof capability === 'string' ? capability : null,
+      level: isAuthorityLevel(level) ? level : null,
+      required: null,
+      shortfall: null,
+      destructive: null,
+      reason_code: GATE_REFUSAL.UNKNOWN_CAPABILITY,
+      detail: `no capability named ${JSON.stringify(capability)} is declared, so nothing may exercise it; an undeclared capability is refused rather than granted`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (!isAuthorityLevel(level)) {
+    // A level nobody defined cannot be compared, and treating it as 0 would silently downgrade an actor while
+    // treating it as high would silently promote one. Neither is a decision this module is entitled to make.
+    return {
+      verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.DENY,
+      capability,
+      level: null,
+      required,
+      shortfall: null,
+      destructive: isDestructive(capability),
+      reason_code: GATE_REFUSAL.NOT_A_LEVEL,
+      detail: `${JSON.stringify(level)} is not an authority level (an integer in 0..${AUTHORITY_MAX}), so it cannot be compared against the required ${required}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const destructive = isDestructive(capability);
+
+  if (level >= required) {
+    return {
+      verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.ALLOW,
+      capability,
+      level,
+      required,
+      shortfall: 0,
+      destructive,
+      reason_code: GATE_REFUSAL.SUFFICIENT,
+      detail: `level ${level} meets the ${required} required for ${capability}${destructive ? ' (destructive)' : ''}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const actorBand = bandIndex(level);
+  const requiredBand = bandIndex(required);
+  const oneBelow = actorBand >= 0 && requiredBand >= 0 && requiredBand - actorBand === 1;
+
+  if (oneBelow) {
+    return {
+      verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.NEEDS_APPROVAL,
+      capability,
+      level,
+      required,
+      shortfall: required - level,
+      destructive,
+      reason_code: GATE_REFUSAL.ONE_BAND_BELOW,
+      detail: `level ${level} is one band below the ${required} required for ${capability}, so it may be escalated to an approver${destructive ? '; the action is destructive and must not be auto-approved' : ''}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.DENY,
+    capability,
+    level,
+    required,
+    shortfall: required - level,
+    destructive,
+    reason_code: GATE_REFUSAL.BELOW_BAND,
+    detail: `level ${level} is ${required - level} below the ${required} required for ${capability}, which is more than one band; the request itself is refused rather than escalated`,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Which capability a dispatch costs, decided from the dispatch's own facts.
+ *
+ * A dispatch that may write costs more than one that may not, and the fact is already in the payload
+ * (`write` plus a non-empty `write_scope`), so this reads it rather than asking the caller to declare a
+ * capability. That matters because a caller who must name their own capability is a caller who can name the
+ * cheap one.
+ *
+ * @param {{write?: boolean, write_scope?: string[]}} args
+ * @returns {{capability: string, detail: string}}
+ */
+export function capabilityForDispatch(args) {
+  const writes = args?.write === true;
+  const scope = Array.isArray(args?.write_scope) ? args.write_scope.filter((s) => typeof s === 'string' && s.trim() !== '') : [];
+  if (!writes) return { capability: 'dispatch_readonly', detail: 'write is not true, so the machines cannot write' };
+  if (scope.length === 0) {
+    // A write with no scope is refused upstream by the dispatch path itself. Reporting it as the writing
+    // capability rather than the read-only one is the conservative direction: if that upstream check ever
+    // moved, this would not silently hand out the cheaper permission.
+    return { capability: 'dispatch_writing', detail: 'write is true with an empty scope, which the dispatch path refuses separately' };
+  }
+  return { capability: 'dispatch_writing', detail: `write is true inside ${scope.length} declared scope prefix(es)` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The gate a dispatch passes through.
+ *
+ * ## Why an unset level is not the same as a low one
+ *
+ * `tools.mjs` states plainly that **no parameter of any tool can widen what a machine will run**, and that
+ * there is no way for a caller to set anything authority-shaped. So a plugin that has not been configured
+ * with an actor level has no actor to judge. Two answers were available and only one is honest:
+ *
+ *   * treat an unset level as `0` — which would refuse every writing dispatch on every machine that has not
+ *     opted in, breaking a working fleet to enforce a policy nobody asked for;
+ *   * treat it as **unenforced**, and say so in the verdict, so the caller can tell "allowed" from "not
+ *     checked".
+ *
+ * The second is what this does, and the `enforced` flag is the whole point: a gate that reports `ALLOW` and a
+ * gate that reports `not checked` must never look alike, because the first is a decision and the second is an
+ * absence of one.
+ *
+ * @param {{write?: boolean, write_scope?: string[]}} args
+ * @param {number|null|undefined} actorLevel
+ * @returns {{decision: object, enforced: boolean, capability: string, detail: string}}
+ */
+export function gateDispatch(args, actorLevel) {
+  const { capability, detail } = capabilityForDispatch(args);
+  if (actorLevel === null || actorLevel === undefined) {
+    return {
+      decision: {
+        verdict: AUTHORITY_VERDICT.ALLOW,
+        capability,
+        level: null,
+        required: permissionFor(capability),
+        shortfall: null,
+        destructive: isDestructive(capability),
+        reason_code: 'GATE_NOT_ENFORCED',
+        detail: 'no authority level is configured, so this dispatch was not checked',
+      },
+      enforced: false,
+      capability,
+      detail: `not enforced: ${detail}; no actor level is configured`,
+    };
+  }
+  return { decision: decide(capability, actorLevel), enforced: true, capability, detail };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the approval request for a dispatch that needs one, or `null` when it does not.
+ *
+ * Shaped to hand straight to the cross-session approval index, which is the point: a permission gate and an
+ * approval queue that do not meet are two features that each look finished and jointly do nothing.
+ *
+ * @param {object} decision from {@link decide}
+ * @param {{taskId?: string, machineId?: string, requestedBy?: string}} context
+ */
+export function approvalRequestFor(decision, context = {}) {
+  if (decision === null || typeof decision !== 'object' || decision.verdict !== AUTHORITY_VERDICT.NEEDS_APPROVAL) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return {
+    // The subject level travels WITH the request, recorded now, because it is a fact about who asked and must
+    // not be re-derived later from a caller who might be the approver.
+    subject_level: decision.level,
+    required_level: decision.required,
+    capability: decision.capability,
+    task_id: context.taskId ?? null,
+    machine_id: context.machineId ?? null,
+    requested_by: context.requestedBy ?? null,
+    destructive: decision.destructive === true,
+    // A destructive request is never auto-settleable, so it is marked here rather than left for the queue to
+    // infer from the capability name.
+    auto_settleable: mayAutoSettle(decision).auto,
+    detail: decision.detail,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a decision may be settled automatically.
+ *
+ * Only `ALLOW` and only for a non-destructive capability. A destructive action that reaches an approver's
+ * queue is a decision for a person even when the approver's level is far above the requirement — the level
+ * answers "may this actor", not "should this happen now".
+ *
+ * @returns {{auto: boolean, detail: string}}
+ */
+export function mayAutoSettle(decision) {
+  if (decision === null || typeof decision !== 'object') return { auto: false, detail: 'no decision supplied' };
+  if (decision.verdict !== AUTHORITY_VERDICT.ALLOW) {
+    return { auto: false, detail: `verdict is ${decision.verdict}, which is not an allow` };
+  }
+  if (decision.destructive === true) {
+    return { auto: false, detail: `${decision.capability} is destructive, so a person settles it however high the level` };
+  }
+  return { auto: true, detail: `${decision.capability} is allowed and not destructive` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check that every declared capability is reachable by somebody.
+ *
+ * **An unreachable capability is a defect in the table, not a safety feature.** If its minimum authority
+ * exceeds `AUTHORITY_MAX`, no actor can ever exercise it and the entry is dead — which reads as policy while
+ * doing nothing. Called at test time rather than at load time, because a table with a mistake in it should
+ * fail its own tests rather than make a machine refuse to start.
+ *
+ * @returns {{ok: boolean, unreachable: string[], detail: string}}
+ */
+export function auditCapabilities() {
+  const unreachable = [];
+  for (const c of CAPABILITIES) {
+    if (!Number.isInteger(c.min_authority) || c.min_authority < 0 || c.min_authority > AUTHORITY_MAX) {
+      unreachable.push(`${c.name} (min_authority ${c.min_authority} is outside 0..${AUTHORITY_MAX})`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Reachability by a real actor, not merely by the number: a level in a declared band must exist at or
+    // above the requirement.
+    const reachable = AUTHORITY_BANDS.some((b) => b.min >= c.min_authority || (b.max ?? AUTHORITY_MAX) >= c.min_authority);
+    if (!reachable) unreachable.push(`${c.name} (no band reaches ${c.min_authority})`);
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: unreachable.length === 0,
+    unreachable,
+    detail: unreachable.length === 0
+      ? `all ${CAPABILITIES.length} declared capability(ies) are reachable by some band`
+      : `${unreachable.length} declared capability(ies) no actor can exercise: ${unreachable.join('; ')}`,
+  };
+}

package/src/plugin/tools.mjs

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ const MAX_STAGES = 16;
  * `package.json` during `scripts/pack.mjs` rather than hand-maintained, and `W2M_PLUGIN_VERSION`
  * overrides it at runtime for tests and packagers.
  */
-const PLUGIN_VERSION = '0.20.0';
+const PLUGIN_VERSION = '0.22.0';
 
 /** How long any single HTTP call may take before it is aborted, in milliseconds. */
 const DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;