@tuturuuu/utils 0.0.3 → 0.6.1

package/src/abuse-protection/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1545 @@
+/**
+ * OTP Abuse Protection System
+ *
+ * Provides rate limiting and IP blocking for OTP-related operations
+ * to prevent brute force attacks and enumeration.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { SupabaseClient } from '@tuturuuu/supabase';
+import type { Database, Json } from '@tuturuuu/types';
+import { getUpstashRestRedisClient, hasUpstashRestEnv } from '../upstash-rest';
+import {
+  ABUSE_THRESHOLDS,
+  BLOCK_DURATIONS,
+  MAX_BLOCK_LEVEL,
+  REDIS_KEYS,
+  WINDOW_MS,
+} from './constants';
+import type {
+  AbuseCheckResult,
+  AbuseEventType,
+  AbuseProtectionLogContext,
+  BlockInfo,
+  LogAbuseEventOptions,
+  RedisClient,
+} from './types';
+
+// Re-export types and constants
+export * from './constants';
+export * from './reputation';
+export * from './types';
+export * from './user-agent';
+
+// In-memory fallback store
+const memoryStore = new Map<string, { count: number; expiresAt: number }>();
+
+// Redis client singleton (lazy initialized)
+let redisClient: RedisClient | null = null;
+let redisInitialized = false;
+
+function parsePositiveIntEnv(name: string, fallback: number): number {
+  const rawValue = process.env[name];
+  if (!rawValue) {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+
+  const parsed = Number.parseInt(rawValue, 10);
+  return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : fallback;
+}
+
+function getOTPSendIpLimits() {
+  return {
+    perDay: parsePositiveIntEnv(
+      'ABUSE_OTP_SEND_IP_LIMIT_DAY',
+      ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_PER_DAY
+    ),
+    perHour: parsePositiveIntEnv(
+      'ABUSE_OTP_SEND_IP_LIMIT_HOUR',
+      ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_PER_HOUR
+    ),
+    perMinute: parsePositiveIntEnv(
+      'ABUSE_OTP_SEND_IP_LIMIT_MINUTE',
+      ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_PER_MINUTE
+    ),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Initialize Redis client from Upstash environment variables
+ */
+async function getRedisClient(): Promise<RedisClient | null> {
+  if (redisInitialized) return redisClient;
+
+  try {
+    if (!hasUpstashRestEnv()) {
+      console.warn(
+        '[Abuse Protection] Redis not configured - falling back to memory'
+      );
+      redisInitialized = true;
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    redisClient = await getUpstashRestRedisClient();
+    redisInitialized = true;
+    return redisClient;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.warn('[Abuse Protection] Redis unavailable:', error);
+    redisInitialized = true;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate IP address format
+ */
+function isValidIP(ip: string): boolean {
+  const ipv4Regex = /^(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/;
+  const ipv6Regex = /^([0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}:){2,7}[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}$/;
+  return ipv4Regex.test(ip) || ipv6Regex.test(ip);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract client IP address from request headers
+ * Works with Next.js headers() in Server Actions
+ */
+export function extractIPFromHeaders(
+  headers: Headers | Map<string, string> | Record<string, string | null>
+): string {
+  const getHeader = (name: string): string | null => {
+    if (headers instanceof Headers) {
+      return headers.get(name);
+    }
+    if (headers instanceof Map) {
+      return headers.get(name) || null;
+    }
+    return headers[name] || null;
+  };
+
+  // Check cf-connecting-ip (Cloudflare)
+  const cfIP = getHeader('cf-connecting-ip');
+  if (cfIP && isValidIP(cfIP)) {
+    return cfIP;
+  }
+
+  // Check true-client-ip (some Cloudflare/enterprise proxy setups)
+  const trueClientIP = getHeader('true-client-ip');
+  if (trueClientIP && isValidIP(trueClientIP)) {
+    return trueClientIP;
+  }
+
+  // Check x-forwarded-for after explicit client IP headers
+  const forwardedFor = getHeader('x-forwarded-for');
+  if (forwardedFor) {
+    const firstIP = forwardedFor.split(',')[0]?.trim();
+    if (firstIP && isValidIP(firstIP)) {
+      return firstIP;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check x-real-ip (Nginx)
+  const realIP = getHeader('x-real-ip');
+  if (realIP && isValidIP(realIP)) {
+    return realIP;
+  }
+
+  return 'unknown';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hash email for privacy when storing in logs
+ */
+export function hashEmail(email: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256')
+    .update(email.trim().toLowerCase())
+    .digest('hex')
+    .substring(0, 16);
+}
+
+function normalizeAbuseEventEmail(email?: string): string | null {
+  const normalized = email?.trim().toLowerCase();
+  return normalized ? normalized : null;
+}
+
+function sanitizeAbuseLogValue(value: string | null | undefined) {
+  const normalized = value?.trim();
+  return normalized ? normalized.slice(0, 256) : null;
+}
+
+function createAbuseLogContext(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+) {
+  return {
+    ipAddress,
+    operation: 'is_ip_blocked',
+    route: sanitizeAbuseLogValue(context?.route),
+    source: sanitizeAbuseLogValue(context?.source),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Increment a counter in Redis or memory with automatic expiration
+ */
+async function incrementCounter(
+  key: string,
+  windowMs: number
+): Promise<{ count: number; ttl: number }> {
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      const count = await redis.incr(key);
+      if (count === 1) {
+        await redis.expire(key, Math.ceil(windowMs / 1000));
+      }
+      const ttl = await redis.ttl(key);
+      return { count, ttl: ttl > 0 ? ttl : Math.ceil(windowMs / 1000) };
+    } catch (error) {
+      console.error('[Abuse Protection] Redis error:', error);
+      // Fall through to memory
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Memory fallback
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const existing = memoryStore.get(key);
+
+  if (!existing || now > existing.expiresAt) {
+    memoryStore.set(key, { count: 1, expiresAt: now + windowMs });
+    return { count: 1, ttl: Math.ceil(windowMs / 1000) };
+  }
+
+  existing.count++;
+  return {
+    count: existing.count,
+    ttl: Math.ceil((existing.expiresAt - now) / 1000),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get counter value from Redis or memory
+ */
+async function getCounter(key: string): Promise<number> {
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      const count = await redis.get<number>(key);
+      return count || 0;
+    } catch {
+      // Fall through to memory
+    }
+  }
+
+  const existing = memoryStore.get(key);
+  if (!existing || Date.now() > existing.expiresAt) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return existing.count;
+}
+
+async function getCounterWithTTL(
+  key: string
+): Promise<{ count: number; ttl: number }> {
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      const [count, ttl] = await Promise.all([
+        redis.get<number>(key),
+        redis.ttl(key),
+      ]);
+
+      return {
+        count: count || 0,
+        ttl: ttl > 0 ? ttl : 0,
+      };
+    } catch {
+      // Fall through to memory
+    }
+  }
+
+  const existing = memoryStore.get(key);
+  if (!existing) {
+    return { count: 0, ttl: 0 };
+  }
+
+  const now = Date.now();
+  if (now > existing.expiresAt) {
+    memoryStore.delete(key);
+    return { count: 0, ttl: 0 };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    count: existing.count,
+    ttl: Math.ceil((existing.expiresAt - now) / 1000),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Delete keys from Redis or memory
+ */
+async function deleteKeys(...keys: string[]): Promise<void> {
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      await redis.del(...keys);
+      return;
+    } catch {
+      // Fall through to memory
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    memoryStore.delete(key);
+  }
+}
+
+async function deleteKeysWithCount(...keys: string[]): Promise<number> {
+  if (keys.length === 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      const deleted = await redis.del(...keys);
+      return typeof deleted === 'number' ? deleted : 0;
+    } catch {
+      // Fall through to memory
+    }
+  }
+
+  let deleted = 0;
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    if (memoryStore.delete(key)) {
+      deleted++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return deleted;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create Supabase admin client for database operations
+ */
+async function getSupabaseAdmin(): Promise<SupabaseClient<Database> | null> {
+  try {
+    const { createAdminClient } = await import(
+      '@tuturuuu/supabase/next/server'
+    );
+    return (await createAdminClient()) as SupabaseClient<Database>;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error(
+      '[Abuse Protection] Failed to create Supabase client:',
+      error
+    );
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if an IP is currently blocked
+ */
+export async function isIPBlocked(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<BlockInfo | null> {
+  const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+  // Check Redis cache first
+  if (redis) {
+    try {
+      const cached = await redis.get<string>(REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCKED(ipAddress));
+      if (cached) {
+        const blockInfo =
+          typeof cached === 'string' ? JSON.parse(cached) : cached;
+        if (new Date(blockInfo.expiresAt) > new Date()) {
+          return {
+            id: blockInfo.id,
+            blockLevel: blockInfo.level,
+            reason: blockInfo.reason,
+            expiresAt: new Date(blockInfo.expiresAt),
+            blockedAt: new Date(blockInfo.blockedAt),
+          };
+        }
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      console.error(
+        '[Abuse Protection] Redis cache error:',
+        error,
+        createAbuseLogContext(ipAddress, context)
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check database
+  try {
+    const sbAdmin = await getSupabaseAdmin();
+    if (!sbAdmin) return null;
+
+    const { data, error } = await sbAdmin.rpc('get_active_ip_block', {
+      p_ip_address: ipAddress,
+    });
+
+    if (error || !data || (Array.isArray(data) && data.length === 0)) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    const block = Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data;
+    if (!block) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const blockInfo: BlockInfo = {
+      id: block.id,
+      blockLevel: block.block_level,
+      reason: block.reason,
+      expiresAt: new Date(block.expires_at),
+      blockedAt: new Date(block.blocked_at),
+    };
+
+    // Cache in Redis
+    if (redis && blockInfo.expiresAt > new Date()) {
+      const ttl = Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      );
+      await redis.set(
+        REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCKED(ipAddress),
+        JSON.stringify({
+          id: blockInfo.id,
+          level: blockInfo.blockLevel,
+          reason: blockInfo.reason,
+          expiresAt: blockInfo.expiresAt.toISOString(),
+          blockedAt: blockInfo.blockedAt.toISOString(),
+        }),
+        { ex: ttl }
+      );
+    }
+
+    return blockInfo;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('[Abuse Protection] DB error checking block:', error);
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Block an IP address with progressive duration
+ */
+export async function blockIP(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  reason: AbuseEventType,
+  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const sbAdmin = await getSupabaseAdmin();
+    if (!sbAdmin) return;
+
+    const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+    // Get current block level
+    let currentLevel = 0;
+    if (redis) {
+      try {
+        const level = await redis.get<number>(
+          REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCK_LEVEL(ipAddress)
+        );
+        currentLevel = level || 0;
+      } catch {
+        // Check DB fallback
+        const { data } = await sbAdmin.rpc('get_ip_block_level', {
+          p_ip_address: ipAddress,
+        });
+        currentLevel = (data as number) || 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      const { data } = await sbAdmin.rpc('get_ip_block_level', {
+        p_ip_address: ipAddress,
+      });
+      currentLevel = (data as number) || 0;
+    }
+
+    // Calculate new block level (max 4)
+    const newLevel = Math.min(currentLevel + 1, MAX_BLOCK_LEVEL) as
+      | 1
+      | 2
+      | 3
+      | 4;
+    const blockDuration = BLOCK_DURATIONS[newLevel];
+    const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + blockDuration * 1000);
+
+    // Insert block record
+    const { data: blockRecord, error } = await sbAdmin
+      .from('blocked_ips')
+      .insert([
+        {
+          ip_address: ipAddress,
+          reason: reason as never,
+          block_level: newLevel,
+          expires_at: expiresAt.toISOString(),
+          metadata: (metadata || {}) as Json,
+        },
+      ])
+      .select('id')
+      .single();
+
+    if (error) {
+      console.error('[Abuse Protection] Error creating block:', error);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Update Redis cache
+    if (redis) {
+      await Promise.all([
+        redis.set(
+          REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCKED(ipAddress),
+          JSON.stringify({
+            id: blockRecord.id,
+            level: newLevel,
+            reason,
+            expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString(),
+            blockedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+          }),
+          { ex: blockDuration }
+        ),
+        redis.set(REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCK_LEVEL(ipAddress), newLevel, {
+          ex: WINDOW_MS.TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS / 1000,
+        }),
+      ]);
+    }
+
+    console.log(
+      `[Abuse Protection] Blocked IP ${ipAddress} at level ${newLevel} for ${blockDuration}s due to ${reason}`
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('[Abuse Protection] Error blocking IP:', error);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Manually unblock an IP address
+ */
+export async function unblockIP(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  unblockingUserId: string,
+  reason?: string
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const sbAdmin = await getSupabaseAdmin();
+    if (!sbAdmin) return false;
+
+    const redis = await getRedisClient();
+
+    // Update all active blocks for this IP
+    const { error } = await sbAdmin
+      .from('blocked_ips')
+      .update({
+        status: 'manually_unblocked',
+        unblocked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        unblocked_by: unblockingUserId,
+        unblock_reason: reason || 'Manual unblock by admin',
+      })
+      .eq('ip_address', ipAddress)
+      .eq('status', 'active');
+
+    if (error) {
+      console.error('[Abuse Protection] Error unblocking IP:', error);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Clear Redis cache
+    if (redis) {
+      await deleteKeys(
+        REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCKED(ipAddress),
+        REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCK_LEVEL(ipAddress)
+      );
+    }
+
+    console.log(
+      `[Abuse Protection] Unblocked IP ${ipAddress} by user ${unblockingUserId}`
+    );
+    return true;
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('[Abuse Protection] Error unblocking IP:', error);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Log an abuse event for audit trail
+ */
+export async function logAbuseEvent(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  eventType: AbuseEventType,
+  options?: LogAbuseEventOptions
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const sbAdmin = await getSupabaseAdmin();
+    if (!sbAdmin) return;
+    const normalizedEmail = normalizeAbuseEventEmail(options?.email);
+
+    await sbAdmin.from('abuse_events').insert([
+      {
+        ip_address: ipAddress,
+        event_type: eventType as never,
+        email: normalizedEmail,
+        email_hash: normalizedEmail ? hashEmail(normalizedEmail) : null,
+        user_agent: options?.userAgent?.substring(0, 500),
+        endpoint: options?.endpoint,
+        success: options?.success ?? false,
+        metadata: (options?.metadata || {}) as Json,
+      },
+    ]);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('[Abuse Protection] Error logging event:', error);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface ResetOtpLimitsForEmailOptions {
+  email: string;
+  clearEmailScoped: boolean;
+  clearRelatedIpCounters: boolean;
+  clearRelatedIpBlocks: boolean;
+  adminUserId: string;
+  reason?: string;
+  adminIpAddress?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ResetOtpLimitsForEmailResult {
+  relatedIps: string[];
+  clearedEmailKeys: number;
+  clearedIpCounterCount: number;
+  unblockedIpCount: number;
+}
+
+function isAsciiLetterOrDigit(char: string): boolean {
+  const code = char.charCodeAt(0);
+
+  return (
+    (code >= 48 && code <= 57) ||
+    (code >= 65 && code <= 90) ||
+    (code >= 97 && code <= 122)
+  );
+}
+
+function isAllowedLocalEmailCharacter(char: string): boolean {
+  if (isAsciiLetterOrDigit(char)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  switch (char) {
+    case '!':
+    case '#':
+    case '$':
+    case '%':
+    case '&':
+    case "'":
+    case '*':
+    case '+':
+    case '-':
+    case '.':
+    case '/':
+    case '=':
+    case '?':
+    case '^':
+    case '_':
+    case '`':
+    case '{':
+    case '|':
+    case '}':
+    case '~':
+      return true;
+    default:
+      return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function isValidEmailDomainLabel(label: string): boolean {
+  if (!label || label.startsWith('-') || label.endsWith('-')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const char of label) {
+    if (!isAsciiLetterOrDigit(char) && char !== '-') {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+function hasWhitespace(text: string): boolean {
+  for (const char of text) {
+    if (
+      char === ' ' ||
+      char === '\t' ||
+      char === '\n' ||
+      char === '\r' ||
+      char === '\f' ||
+      char === '\v'
+    ) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+function isValidNormalizedEmail(email: string): boolean {
+  if (!email || email.length > 254 || hasWhitespace(email)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const atIndex = email.indexOf('@');
+  if (atIndex <= 0 || atIndex !== email.lastIndexOf('@')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const localPart = email.slice(0, atIndex);
+  const domainPart = email.slice(atIndex + 1);
+
+  if (
+    !localPart ||
+    !domainPart ||
+    localPart.length > 64 ||
+    domainPart.length > 253 ||
+    localPart.startsWith('.') ||
+    localPart.endsWith('.') ||
+    localPart.includes('..') ||
+    domainPart.startsWith('.') ||
+    domainPart.endsWith('.') ||
+    domainPart.includes('..')
+  ) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const char of localPart) {
+    if (!isAllowedLocalEmailCharacter(char)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const domainLabels = domainPart.split('.');
+  if (domainLabels.length < 2) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const label of domainLabels) {
+    if (!isValidEmailDomainLabel(label)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const topLevelDomain = domainLabels[domainLabels.length - 1];
+  if (!topLevelDomain || topLevelDomain.length < 2) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+function normalizeOtpResetEmail(email: string): string {
+  const normalized = email.trim().toLowerCase();
+
+  if (!isValidNormalizedEmail(normalized)) {
+    throw new Error('Email is invalid');
+  }
+
+  return normalized;
+}
+
+function getOtpResetScopeKeys(ipAddress: string): string[] {
+  return [
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND(ipAddress),
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_HOURLY(ipAddress),
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_DAILY(ipAddress),
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress),
+    REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCK_LEVEL(ipAddress),
+  ];
+}
+
+export async function resetOtpLimitsForEmail({
+  email,
+  clearEmailScoped,
+  clearRelatedIpCounters,
+  clearRelatedIpBlocks,
+  adminUserId,
+  reason,
+  adminIpAddress,
+}: ResetOtpLimitsForEmailOptions): Promise<ResetOtpLimitsForEmailResult> {
+  if (!clearEmailScoped && !clearRelatedIpCounters && !clearRelatedIpBlocks) {
+    throw new Error('At least one OTP reset option is required');
+  }
+
+  const normalizedEmail = normalizeOtpResetEmail(email);
+  const emailHash = hashEmail(normalizedEmail);
+  const sbAdmin = await getSupabaseAdmin();
+
+  if (!sbAdmin) {
+    throw new Error('Failed to create Supabase client');
+  }
+
+  let relatedIps: string[] = [];
+  if (clearRelatedIpCounters || clearRelatedIpBlocks) {
+    const sinceIso = new Date(
+      Date.now() - WINDOW_MS.TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS
+    ).toISOString();
+    const { data: relatedEvents, error: relatedEventsError } = await sbAdmin
+      .from('abuse_events')
+      .select('ip_address')
+      .eq('email', normalizedEmail)
+      .in('event_type', ['otp_send', 'otp_verify_failed'])
+      .gte('created_at', sinceIso);
+
+    if (relatedEventsError) {
+      throw relatedEventsError;
+    }
+
+    relatedIps = Array.from(
+      new Set(
+        (relatedEvents ?? [])
+          .map((event: { ip_address: string | null }) => event.ip_address)
+          .filter((value: string | null): value is string => !!value)
+      )
+    );
+  }
+
+  let clearedEmailKeys = 0;
+  if (clearEmailScoped) {
+    clearedEmailKeys = await deleteKeysWithCount(
+      REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_COOLDOWN(emailHash),
+      REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_HOURLY(emailHash),
+      REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_DAILY(emailHash),
+      REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL(emailHash)
+    );
+  }
+
+  let clearedIpCounterCount = 0;
+  if (clearRelatedIpCounters && relatedIps.length > 0) {
+    const relatedIpKeys = relatedIps.flatMap((ipAddress) =>
+      getOtpResetScopeKeys(ipAddress)
+    );
+    clearedIpCounterCount = await deleteKeysWithCount(...relatedIpKeys);
+  }
+
+  let unblockedIpCount = 0;
+  let unblockedIps: string[] = [];
+  if (clearRelatedIpBlocks && relatedIps.length > 0) {
+    const { data: activeBlocks, error: activeBlocksError } = await sbAdmin
+      .from('blocked_ips')
+      .select('ip_address')
+      .in('ip_address', relatedIps)
+      .in('reason', ['otp_send', 'otp_verify_failed'])
+      .eq('status', 'active');
+
+    if (activeBlocksError) {
+      throw activeBlocksError;
+    }
+
+    unblockedIps = Array.from(
+      new Set(
+        (activeBlocks ?? [])
+          .map((block: { ip_address: string | null }) => block.ip_address)
+          .filter((value: string | null): value is string => !!value)
+      )
+    );
+
+    if (unblockedIps.length > 0) {
+      const { error: unblockError } = await sbAdmin
+        .from('blocked_ips')
+        .update({
+          status: 'manually_unblocked',
+          unblocked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+          unblocked_by: adminUserId,
+          unblock_reason:
+            reason || 'Manual OTP limit reset unblock by infrastructure admin',
+        })
+        .in('ip_address', unblockedIps)
+        .in('reason', ['otp_send', 'otp_verify_failed'])
+        .eq('status', 'active');
+
+      if (unblockError) {
+        throw unblockError;
+      }
+
+      await deleteKeysWithCount(
+        ...unblockedIps.flatMap((ipAddress) => [
+          REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCKED(ipAddress),
+          REDIS_KEYS.IP_BLOCK_LEVEL(ipAddress),
+        ])
+      );
+      unblockedIpCount = unblockedIps.length;
+    }
+  }
+
+  await logAbuseEvent(adminIpAddress || 'unknown', 'otp_limit_reset', {
+    email: normalizedEmail,
+    success: true,
+    metadata: {
+      admin_user_id: adminUserId,
+      reason: reason || null,
+      clearEmailScoped,
+      clearRelatedIpCounters,
+      clearRelatedIpBlocks,
+      related_ips: relatedIps,
+      related_ips_count: relatedIps.length,
+      cleared_email_keys: clearedEmailKeys,
+      cleared_ip_counter_count: clearedIpCounterCount,
+      unblocked_ips: unblockedIps,
+      unblocked_ip_count: unblockedIpCount,
+    },
+  });
+
+  return {
+    relatedIps,
+    clearedEmailKeys,
+    clearedIpCounterCount,
+    unblockedIpCount,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check and track OTP send attempts
+ */
+export async function checkOTPSendAllowed(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email?: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  // First check if IP is blocked
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress, context);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    const retryAfter = Math.ceil(
+      (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+    );
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}. Block level: ${blockInfo.blockLevel}`,
+      retryAfter,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const minuteKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND(ipAddress);
+  const hourlyKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_HOURLY(ipAddress);
+  const dailyKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_DAILY(ipAddress);
+
+  const [minuteState, hourlyState, dailyState] = await Promise.all([
+    getCounterWithTTL(minuteKey),
+    getCounterWithTTL(hourlyKey),
+    getCounterWithTTL(dailyKey),
+  ]);
+  const ipLimits = getOTPSendIpLimits();
+
+  if (minuteState.count >= ipLimits.perMinute) {
+    // Log and potentially block
+    void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+      email,
+      success: false,
+      metadata: { trigger: 'minute_limit' },
+    });
+
+    if (minuteState.count >= ipLimits.perMinute * 2) {
+      // Aggressive abuse - block IP
+      void blockIP(ipAddress, 'otp_send', { trigger: 'rate_limit_exceeded' });
+    }
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many OTP requests. Please try again later.',
+      retryAfter: minuteState.ttl,
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (hourlyState.count >= ipLimits.perHour) {
+    void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+      email,
+      success: false,
+      metadata: { trigger: 'hourly_rate_limit' },
+    });
+
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'otp_send', { trigger: 'hourly_rate_limit' });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Hourly OTP limit reached. Please try again later.',
+      retryAfter: hourlyState.ttl,
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (dailyState.count >= ipLimits.perDay) {
+    void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+      email,
+      success: false,
+      metadata: { trigger: 'ip_daily_limit' },
+    });
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'otp_send', { trigger: 'ip_daily_limit' });
+
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'OTP limit reached. Please try again later.',
+      retryAfter: dailyState.ttl,
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (email) {
+    const emailHash = hashEmail(email);
+
+    const cooldownKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_COOLDOWN(emailHash);
+    const hourlyEmailKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_HOURLY(emailHash);
+    const dailyEmailKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_DAILY(emailHash);
+
+    const [cooldownState, hourlyEmailState, dailyEmailState] =
+      await Promise.all([
+        getCounterWithTTL(cooldownKey),
+        getCounterWithTTL(hourlyEmailKey),
+        getCounterWithTTL(dailyEmailKey),
+      ]);
+
+    if (cooldownState.count >= 1) {
+      void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+        email,
+        success: false,
+        metadata: { trigger: 'email_cooldown' },
+      });
+
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'Too many OTP requests. Please try again later.',
+        retryAfter: cooldownState.ttl,
+        remainingAttempts: 0,
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (hourlyEmailState.count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_PER_HOUR) {
+      void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+        email,
+        success: false,
+        metadata: { trigger: 'email_hourly_limit' },
+      });
+
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'Hourly OTP limit reached. Please try again later.',
+        retryAfter: hourlyEmailState.ttl,
+        remainingAttempts: 0,
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (dailyEmailState.count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_PER_DAY) {
+      void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', {
+        email,
+        success: false,
+        metadata: { trigger: 'email_daily_limit' },
+      });
+
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'OTP limit reached. Please try again later.',
+        retryAfter: dailyEmailState.ttl,
+        remainingAttempts: 0,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: Math.max(
+      0,
+      ipLimits.perMinute - (minuteState.count + 1)
+    ),
+  };
+}
+
+export async function recordOTPSendSuccess(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email?: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await Promise.all([
+    incrementCounter(REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND(ipAddress), WINDOW_MS.ONE_MINUTE),
+    incrementCounter(REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_HOURLY(ipAddress), WINDOW_MS.ONE_HOUR),
+    incrementCounter(
+      REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_DAILY(ipAddress),
+      WINDOW_MS.TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS
+    ),
+    ...(email
+      ? [
+          incrementCounter(
+            REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_COOLDOWN(hashEmail(email)),
+            ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_COOLDOWN_WINDOW_MS
+          ),
+          incrementCounter(
+            REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_HOURLY(hashEmail(email)),
+            WINDOW_MS.ONE_HOUR
+          ),
+          incrementCounter(
+            REDIS_KEYS.OTP_SEND_EMAIL_DAILY(hashEmail(email)),
+            WINDOW_MS.TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS
+          ),
+        ]
+      : []),
+  ]);
+
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_send', { email, success: true });
+}
+
+// Backward-compatible alias for call sites that still import the old helper.
+export async function checkOTPSendLimit(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email?: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  return checkOTPSendAllowed(ipAddress, email, context);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if OTP verification is allowed
+ */
+export async function checkOTPVerifyLimit(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  // First check if IP is blocked
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress, context);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    const retryAfter = Math.ceil(
+      (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+    );
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Get current counts (don't increment yet - increment on failure)
+  const ipKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const emailKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL(hashEmail(email));
+
+  const [ipCount, emailCount] = await Promise.all([
+    getCounter(ipKey),
+    getCounter(emailKey),
+  ]);
+
+  if (ipCount >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed verification attempts from this IP',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS / 1000
+      ),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (emailCount >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed verification attempts for this email',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL_WINDOW_MS / 1000
+      ),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX - ipCount,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a failed OTP verification attempt
+ */
+export async function recordOTPVerifyFailure(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  const ipKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const emailKey = REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL(hashEmail(email));
+
+  const [{ count: ipCount }] = await Promise.all([
+    incrementCounter(ipKey, ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS),
+    incrementCounter(
+      emailKey,
+      ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL_WINDOW_MS
+    ),
+  ]);
+
+  // Log the failure
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'otp_verify_failed', { email, success: false });
+
+  // Block if threshold exceeded
+  if (ipCount >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'otp_verify_failed', {
+      trigger: 'max_failures_exceeded',
+      failedCount: ipCount,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear failed attempts on successful verification
+ */
+export async function clearOTPVerifyFailures(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await deleteKeys(
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress),
+    REDIS_KEYS.OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_EMAIL(hashEmail(email))
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check and track MFA challenge attempts
+ */
+export async function checkMFAChallengeLimit(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.MFA_CHALLENGE(ipAddress);
+  const { count, ttl } = await incrementCounter(key, WINDOW_MS.ONE_MINUTE);
+
+  if (count > ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_CHALLENGE_PER_MINUTE) {
+    void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'mfa_challenge', { success: false });
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many MFA challenge requests',
+      retryAfter: ttl,
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { allowed: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if MFA verification is allowed
+ */
+export async function checkMFAVerifyLimit(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const count = await getCounter(key);
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed MFA verification attempts',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS / 1000
+      ),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX - count,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a failed MFA verification attempt
+ */
+export async function recordMFAVerifyFailure(ipAddress: string): Promise<void> {
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const { count } = await incrementCounter(
+    key,
+    ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS
+  );
+
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'mfa_verify_failed', { success: false });
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'mfa_verify_failed', {
+      trigger: 'max_failures_exceeded',
+      failedCount: count,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear MFA failures on success
+ */
+export async function clearMFAVerifyFailures(ipAddress: string): Promise<void> {
+  await deleteKeys(REDIS_KEYS.MFA_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check reauthentication send limits
+ */
+export async function checkReauthSendLimit(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.REAUTH_SEND(ipAddress);
+  const { count, ttl } = await incrementCounter(key, WINDOW_MS.ONE_MINUTE);
+
+  if (count > ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_SEND_PER_MINUTE) {
+    void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'reauth_send', { success: false });
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many reauthentication requests',
+      retryAfter: ttl,
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { allowed: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check reauthentication verify limits
+ */
+export async function checkReauthVerifyLimit(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const count = await getCounter(key);
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed reauthentication attempts',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS / 1000
+      ),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX - count,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record failed reauthentication
+ */
+export async function recordReauthVerifyFailure(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const { count } = await incrementCounter(
+    key,
+    ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED_WINDOW_MS
+  );
+
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'reauth_verify_failed', { success: false });
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED_MAX) {
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'reauth_verify_failed');
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear reauth failures on success
+ */
+export async function clearReauthVerifyFailures(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await deleteKeys(REDIS_KEYS.REAUTH_VERIFY_FAILED(ipAddress));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check password login limits
+ */
+export async function checkPasswordLoginLimit(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress, context);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const count = await getCounter(key);
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed login attempts',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED_WINDOW_MS / 1000
+      ),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED_MAX - count,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record failed password login
+ */
+export async function recordPasswordLoginFailure(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  email?: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const { count } = await incrementCounter(
+    key,
+    ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED_WINDOW_MS
+  );
+
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'password_login_failed', {
+    email,
+    success: false,
+  });
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED_MAX) {
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'password_login_failed', {
+      trigger: 'max_failures_exceeded',
+      failedCount: count,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear password login failures on success
+ */
+export async function clearPasswordLoginFailures(
+  ipAddress: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await deleteKeys(REDIS_KEYS.PASSWORD_LOGIN_FAILED(ipAddress));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if an IP should be blocked for API auth abuse
+ */
+export async function checkApiAuthLimit(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  context?: AbuseProtectionLogContext
+): Promise<AbuseCheckResult> {
+  const blockInfo = await isIPBlocked(ipAddress, context);
+  if (blockInfo) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      blocked: true,
+      reason: `IP blocked due to ${blockInfo.reason}`,
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(
+        (blockInfo.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.API_AUTH_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const count = await getCounter(key);
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.API_AUTH_FAILED_MAX) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'Too many failed API authentication attempts',
+      retryAfter: Math.ceil(ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.API_AUTH_FAILED_WINDOW_MS / 1000),
+      remainingAttempts: 0,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remainingAttempts: ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.API_AUTH_FAILED_MAX - count,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a failed API auth attempt. Auto-blocks IP if threshold exceeded.
+ */
+export async function recordApiAuthFailure(
+  ipAddress: string,
+  endpoint?: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  const key = REDIS_KEYS.API_AUTH_FAILED(ipAddress);
+  const { count } = await incrementCounter(
+    key,
+    ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.API_AUTH_FAILED_WINDOW_MS
+  );
+
+  void logAbuseEvent(ipAddress, 'api_auth_failed', {
+    endpoint,
+    success: false,
+  });
+
+  if (count >= ABUSE_THRESHOLDS.API_AUTH_FAILED_MAX) {
+    void blockIP(ipAddress, 'api_auth_failed', {
+      trigger: 'max_failures_exceeded',
+      failedCount: count,
+      endpoint,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clear API auth failures (e.g. on successful auth from that IP)
+ */
+export async function clearApiAuthFailures(ipAddress: string): Promise<void> {
+  await deleteKeys(REDIS_KEYS.API_AUTH_FAILED(ipAddress));
+}