@turmind/halo 0.2.1-bc7cf2b → 0.2.2

package/bundled-docs/design/web.md

@@ -170,10 +170,8 @@ node server.js
 
 ### Security model
 
-- `HALO_TOKEN` and `HALO_API` are server-side only, never exposed to the browser
-- Frontend uses same-origin relative paths (`/chat`, `/history`, etc.)
-- web-demo server proxies all requests to Halo, injecting the token in `x-token` header
-- Session auth: random hex token stored in `x-session` header + localStorage
+- **Proxy mode (default)**: `HALO_TOKEN` and `HALO_API` are server-side only, never exposed to the browser; frontend uses same-origin relative paths (`/chat`, `/history`, etc.); web-demo server proxies all requests to Halo, injecting the token in `x-token` header. Session auth: HMAC token in `x-session` header + localStorage. All proxy routes including `GET /file` are gated by the auth middleware.
+- **Direct-connect mode (opt-in)**: the gear panel takes a halo server URL + web-channel token; the browser then calls `<server>/api/web/*` directly with `x-token`, bypassing the proxy (no password step). The token is stored in that browser's localStorage by explicit user choice — the UI says so next to the field. One slot; clearing it returns to proxy mode. Works because the server CORS reflects any origin and allowlists `x-token`.
 
 ### Proxy routes
 
@@ -183,17 +181,21 @@ node server.js
 | `POST /stop` | `POST /api/web/stop` |
 | `GET /history` | `GET /api/web/history` |
 | `GET /subscribe` | `GET /api/web/subscribe` |
+| `GET /file` | `GET /api/web/file` |
 
 ### Features
 
-- SSE streaming with tool call display (collapsible)
-- Auto-reconnect: if session is running on page load, subscribes to live stream
+- Markdown rendering for assistant text (marked@12, gfm + breaks) with typewriter streaming; user text stays escaped plain text
+- SSE streaming with collapsible thinking / tool-call step blocks
+- Auto-reconnect: if session is running on page load, subscribes to live stream; history renders rebuild-from-scratch (never append)
 - Message queue: can send while agent is running, messages queue and send sequentially
-- Slash commands (`/help`, `/session`, `/agent`, `/skill`, `/workspace`)
-- Image upload (file picker + camera capture)
+- Slash commands (`/help`, `/session`, `/agent`, `/skill`, `/workspace`), session/agent switcher menus
+- Image upload + camera capture (camera button is mobile-only — the `capture` attribute is a no-op on desktop, where it would duplicate the file picker)
 - Voice recording (webm audio saved to workspace, path given to agent)
 - Stop/interrupt button
 - i18n: auto-detects browser language (`navigator.language`), toggle button in header, persists to `localStorage`
+- Mobile-first layout: 100dvh-safe, safe-area insets, ≥44px touch targets, bottom-sheet menus/settings on small widths, visual language shared with `packages/agentcore-demo`
+- Page load needs internet for two CDN deps (tailwindcss, marked) — no longer fully self-contained
 
 ## Integration guide (custom frontend)
 

package/bundled-docs/dev/api.md

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ File: `packages/server/src/routes/web.ts`
 | POST | `/api/web/stop` | Stop running task → `{stopped: boolean}` |
 | GET | `/api/web/history` | Active session history → `{sessionId, messages[], running}` |
 | GET | `/api/web/subscribe` | Reconnect SSE to running session |
-| GET | `/api/web/file?path=` | Inline-serve a workspace-relative file (image / video / pdf etc.). Path-traversal-checked against the token's bound workspace. |
+| GET | `/api/web/file?path=` | Inline-serve a workspace-relative file (image / video / pdf etc.). Path-traversal-checked against the token's bound workspace: the lexical check is re-verified against the realpath'd root, so a symlink inside the workspace pointing outside it returns 403; a dangling symlink (target doesn't exist) returns 404. |
 
 See [design/web.md](../design/web.md).
 
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ runtime so the frontend can render rooms (workspaces) + characters (sessions).
 | GET | `/api/show/state` | `full` or `observer` token → every known workspace; otherwise the account's own. Returns `{ serverTime, uptime, accessLevel, skills[], workspaces[] }` |
 | GET | `/api/show/session?ws=&id=` | Inspector-panel detail for a single session. Trimmed message log (last 40, content/tool I/O capped) plus `contextTokens` / `outputTokens` / `maxContextTokens` / `isRunning`. Non-`full`/`observer` tokens may only read their own workspace. |
 
+`observer` is more than an aggregate-counts role: past `/show/state`, it can also call `/show/session` to read **any workspace's** session transcript (last 40 messages, content truncated to 600 chars, tool input to 200 chars). Mint it knowing it grants cross-workspace transcript read access, not just dashboard counters.
+
 Each `workspace` = `{ path, key, label, counts{running,idle,stopped}, totalSessions, skills[], sessions[] }`; each `session` = `{ id, parentId, depth, agentName, description, status, lastTool, activeSkill, contextTokens, outputTokens, messageCount, updatedAt }`. `lastTool` / `activeSkill` come from the live in-memory UI log (empty when the session isn't loaded). Sessions per room are capped (`totalSessions` reports the true total). Frontend: `halo-city/` at repo root.
 
 **Read-only by construction — degraded snapshots.** Both endpoints resolve a workspace's runtime via `registry.peek()` — in-memory lookup only, **never** `getOrCreate`: constructing a SessionManager has write side effects (boot orphan-reconciliation batch-stops live sub-session rows; `.halo/` scaffolding), so a pure visualization poll must not trigger it. When no live SessionManager exists in this process, the handler opens that workspace's `.halo/halo.db` **read-only** (cached connection; missing db/tables silently degrade to an empty room) and projects rows / the persisted session file into the same wire shape. Sessions not in memory therefore return a **persisted snapshot**: `status` / token counts / `messageCount` may lag behind the last persistence point, and the live-only signals (`lastTool` / `activeSkill`) are empty by definition. The degraded `/api/show/session` path reports `maxContextTokens: 0` (the real cap needs a live agent config; the city inspector hides the meter when the cap is unknown).

package/bundled-docs/dev/deploy.md

@@ -152,6 +152,14 @@ This installs the `halo` binary on `$PATH`. Subcommands available:
 1. `halo upgrade` — bumps the on-disk npm package
 2. `halo server restart` — server's startup check sees `~/.halo/global/.template-version` is behind the new bundled `TEMPLATE_VERSION`, runs `ensureHaloHome` automatically, then starts. Refreshes `docs/`, built-in agents, built-in skills, system prompts, and the model registry. User-owned files (USER.md, custom agents/skills, INSTRUCTIONS.md overrides) are left alone. See `init.ts` for the per-category overwrite policy.
 
+### Release checklist (before `npm publish`)
+
+1. **Bump version** in root `package.json` (and any workspace `package.json` that mirrors it).
+2. **Update `CHANGELOG.md`**: rename `[Unreleased]` → `[x.y.z] - YYYY-MM-DD`, add a fresh empty `[Unreleased]` section above it.
+3. **Bump `TEMPLATE_VERSION`** in `packages/server/src/init.ts` if any file under `templates/` was touched.
+4. **Build admin**: `pnpm --filter @turmind/halo-admin build` — verify `admin/out/monaco/vs/loader.js` exists.
+5. Commit, tag `vx.y.z`, push, then publish.
+
 The published package contains a single bundled JS entry (~620 KB), all built-in templates (agents / skills / prompts / models), bundled platform docs, and the admin Web UI static export. Total install footprint ≈ 120 MB after npm dedupes shared deps.
 
 ### Non-interactive (Docker / CI) details
@@ -196,3 +204,5 @@ server {
     }
 }
 ```
+
+Behind a reverse proxy, set `general.server.trust_proxy: true` in `settings.yaml` (global scope only). Without it, brute-force rate-limiting / lockout resolves the client IP from the direct socket address — which behind a proxy is the proxy's own IP, so every client collapses into one bucket and can't be told apart. Only enable this when the proxy in front is one you control and it rewrites `x-forwarded-for` itself; otherwise a client can forge the header and bypass lockouts. Default is `false` (direct-connect deployments).

package/bundled-docs/dev/env.md

@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ settings.yaml only (no env override):
 - `general.compact.max_summary_input` (default 15000) — local compaction fallback input cap
 - `general.compact.max_message_slice` (default 800) — local compaction per-message cap
 - `general.compact.summarize_timeout_sec` (default 300) — self-compact timeout
-- `general.sandbox.hidden_dirs` (default `~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker`) — bwrap tmpfs overlays, scope: global
-- `general.sandbox.hidden_files` (default `~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig`) — bwrap /dev/null binds, scope: global
+- `general.server.trust_proxy` (default `false`) — trust `x-forwarded-for` for client IP resolution, scope: global (enable only behind a reverse proxy you control)
+- `general.sandbox.hidden_dirs` (default `~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker,~/.config/gh`) — bwrap tmpfs overlays, scope: global
+- `general.sandbox.hidden_files` (default `~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig,~/.git-credentials,~/.netrc`) — bwrap /dev/null binds, scope: global
 - `general.logging.level` (default `warn`) — log level: debug | info | warn | error
 
 `<provider-id>.secrets.*` (server-only, hard-rejected by `{{}}` substitution; declared in `models/<provider-id>.yaml` `secrets:`):

package/bundled-docs/dev/tools.md

@@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ Configured in `settings.yaml` under `general.sandbox`:
 
 | Setting | Default | Method |
 |---|---|---|
-| `hidden_dirs` | `~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker` | `--tmpfs` overlay (empty directory) |
-| `hidden_files` | `~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig` | `--ro-bind /dev/null` (empty file) |
+| `hidden_dirs` | `~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker,~/.config/gh` | `--tmpfs` overlay (empty directory) |
+| `hidden_files` | `~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig,~/.git-credentials,~/.netrc` | `--ro-bind /dev/null` (empty file) |
 
-Changes take effect immediately — `config.ts` reads settings.yaml via an mtime-watched lazy cache, so the next `shell_exec` reads the latest values. A workspace-level `settings.yaml` can override these the same way it overrides any other key (no global-scope lock).
+Changes take effect immediately — `config.ts` reads settings.yaml via an mtime-watched lazy cache, so the next `shell_exec` reads the latest values. These keys are `globalOnly` in the schema — a workspace `settings.yaml` cannot override them, since they define the security boundary agents run inside.
 
 `/tmp` is not in the hidden list — it receives a standalone `--tmpfs` mount for process isolation (each bwrap invocation gets its own empty `/tmp`), not for hiding secrets.
 
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ Start a sub-agent session asynchronously. When the sub-agent finishes, its **wra
 | `agent_id` | string | yes | Agent ID (e.g. `"coder"`) |
 | `message` | string | yes | Task description |
 | `system_prompt_context` | string | no | Extra context prepended to the initial message |
+| `title` | string | no | Session title shown in the admin sidebar. When omitted, auto-generated from the task message (first 60 chars of `description`). |
 | `working_dir` | string | no | Sub-agent's focus directory (absolute or workspace-relative; default: project root). It's persistent session identity (stored in the DB, restored on resume), so the directory-chain `.halo/INSTRUCTIONS.md` along the path root→dir is baked into the sub-agent's **system prompt every turn** (it never forgets the directory's rules), and the prompt is tagged with this focus. Does **not** change where tools run. |
 
 **Output (JSON string)**

package/bundled-docs/guide/channels/web.md

@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ Environment variables:
 
 The demo holds your token server-side and exposes its own password-based session — the browser never sees the halo token. Open `http://localhost:9528` to use it.
 
+Alternatively, the gear icon (header / login screen) opens **direct-connect mode**: enter any halo server's URL + a web-channel token and the browser talks to that server's `/api/web/*` directly, skipping the proxy and its password. Handy for pointing one deployed web-demo at several halo servers. The token is kept in that browser's localStorage — only use it on devices you trust; clear it in the same panel to return to proxy mode.
+
 ## Security notes
 
 - **Tokens are unhashed** in `~/.halo/secrets/channels/channels.db`. Restrict that file to the user that runs halo

package/bundled-docs/requirements/settings.md

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ Global + workspace configuration. The shape mirrors VSCode's `contributes.config
 ```yaml
 # ~/.halo/secrets/settings.yaml — values only
 general:                                  # built-in declarer (server itself)
+  server:
+    trust_proxy: false                    # true only behind a reverse proxy you control — see below
   session:
     max_queue_size: 256
     max_nesting_depth: 16
@@ -15,8 +17,8 @@ general:                                  # built-in declarer (server itself)
     max_summary_input: 15000
     ...
   sandbox:
-    hidden_dirs: "~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker"
-    hidden_files: "~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig"
+    hidden_dirs: "~/.halo/secrets,~/.aws,~/.ssh,~/.gnupg,~/.docker,~/.config/gh"
+    hidden_files: "~/.npmrc,~/.bash_history,~/.gitconfig,~/.git-credentials,~/.netrc"
     writable_dirs: ""                     # e.g. ~/.kiro,~/.local/share/kiro-cli — rw bind-mounts in bwrap; ignored for readonly sessions
   logging:
     level: warn
@@ -91,7 +93,11 @@ secrets: []
 
 ### General — built-in
 
-Declared in [packages/server/src/settings-schema.ts](../../../packages/server/src/settings-schema.ts) `generalSection()`. The server itself is the implicit declarer. Keys: `language`, `agent.*`, `session.*`, `compact.*`, `sandbox.*`, `logging.*`, `evolution.*`, `limits.*`.
+Declared in [packages/server/src/settings-schema.ts](../../../packages/server/src/settings-schema.ts) `generalSection()`. The server itself is the implicit declarer. Keys: `language`, `agent.*`, `server.*`, `session.*`, `compact.*`, `sandbox.*`, `logging.*`, `evolution.*`, `limits.*`.
+
+`server.trust_proxy` (boolean, default `false`, `globalOnly`): whether the brute-force rate limiter (`middleware/brute-force.ts` `getClientIp`) trusts the `x-forwarded-for` header for client IP resolution. Direct-connect deployments leave it `false` and get the socket address. Behind a reverse proxy (nginx / Cloudflare / etc.), set it to `true` so the real client IP is honored instead of the proxy's — but only when that proxy is one you control and rewrites the header itself, otherwise a client can forge XFF to dodge lockouts.
+
+`sandbox.hidden_dirs` / `sandbox.hidden_files` / `sandbox.writable_dirs` are `globalOnly` — they define the security boundary agents run inside, so a workspace `settings.yaml` cannot override them (a workspace overriding them could lift its own sandbox constraints).
 
 `evolution.*` controls the self-evolution subsystem (see [plans/self-evolution.md](../plans/self-evolution.md)). All `evolution.*` keys are `globalOnly` — they live in `~/.halo/secrets/settings.yaml` only, not workspace settings. Notable knobs: `evolution.level` (`L0` = off, `L1` = human + LLM assist), `evolution.max_concurrent_run` / `max_concurrent_apply` (wrapper concurrency caps), `evolution.run_timeout_minutes` / `apply_timeout_minutes` (heartbeat timeouts), `evolution.max_attempts` (per-row retry cap), `evolution.triggers.pre_compact` (snapshot session before compaction).
 
@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ Declared in [packages/server/src/settings-schema.ts](../../../packages/server/sr
 | `description_zh` | no | Chinese description (UI picks based on lang) |
 | `default` | no | Placeholder shown when the value is unset; supports `<<ENV>>` |
 | `secret` | no | `true` → masked in API responses + password input in UI |
+| `globalOnly` | no | `true` → read from global settings only; workspace overrides are ignored at runtime. UI disables the workspace input and shows a "global only" hint |
 
 ## Scope: global vs. workspace