@trusty-squire/mcp 1.1.28 → 1.1.29-rc.2

package/dist/bot/browser.js

@@ -513,8 +513,6 @@ export class BrowserController {
         return "closed";
     }
     async initializePages(context, hardened, remoteMode) {
-        // Speed: optionally abort heavy/irrelevant requests before any navigation.
-        await this.installResourceBlocking();
         const contextInitScripts = contextInitScriptsFor({ hardened, remoteMode });
         // Never register context init scripts under patchright. Its injection path
         // rewrites text/html after decoding the response as UTF-8, corrupting
@@ -740,54 +738,6 @@ export class BrowserController {
     get stealthProfile() {
         return this.processOwner.stealthProfile;
     }
-    // Resource blocking for speed (BOT_BLOCK_RESOURCES, default OFF). Aborts
-    // image/media/font requests to cut page-load wall-clock. Exempt captcha/challenge + payment
-    // scripts (blocking those breaks the Turnstile/hCaptcha token poll and the
-    // signup form). CSS + first-party JS are never blocked (not in BLOCK_TYPES) —
-    // the SPA form renders from them and the vision planner reads the styled
-    // render. DUAL RISK, hence default-OFF + an OF#2 A/B before flipping on:
-    //   (1) a browser that loads ZERO images is itself an anti-bot fingerprint;
-    //   (2) the screenshot the vision planner reads loses detail — mitigated
-    //       because the DOM inventory is the authoritative action space, but
-    //       still a regression risk on image-only affordances.
-    // Registered on the CONTEXT so it covers OAuth popups + iframes.
-    async installResourceBlocking() {
-        const ctx = this.context;
-        if (ctx === null)
-            return;
-        if (!/^(1|true|on)$/i.test(process.env.BOT_BLOCK_RESOURCES ?? ""))
-            return;
-        const BLOCK_TYPES = new Set(["image", "media", "font"]);
-        // NEVER block — these break signup (captcha/challenge widgets + payment SDK).
-        const ALWAYS_ALLOW = [
-            "challenges.cloudflare.com",
-            "turnstile",
-            "hcaptcha.com",
-            "newassets.hcaptcha.com",
-            "recaptcha",
-            "gstatic.com/recaptcha",
-            "js.stripe.com",
-        ];
-        await ctx.route("**/*", async (route) => {
-            try {
-                const url = route.request().url();
-                if (ALWAYS_ALLOW.some((h) => url.includes(h))) {
-                    await route.continue();
-                    return;
-                }
-                const type = route.request().resourceType();
-                if (BLOCK_TYPES.has(type)) {
-                    await route.abort();
-                    return;
-                }
-                await route.continue();
-            }
-            catch {
-                // Routing race / already-handled — never let a decision crash nav.
-            }
-        });
-        this.logOperatorDiagnostic("[operator] resource blocking ON (image/media/font aborted; captcha/CSS/JS allowed)");
-    }
     async start() {
         // A satellite's page is already attached by attachSessionPage() — there is
         // no process for it to start.
@@ -3840,51 +3790,8 @@ export class BrowserController {
             await cdp.detach().catch(() => undefined);
         }
     }
-    async getState(page = this.page) {
-        if (!page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        // page.content() / page.title() / screenshot() all throw
-        // "Execution context was destroyed" when the page is mid-
-        // navigation — common after an OAuth-button click that kicks off
-        // a 3-5 hop redirect chain (sentry.io → accounts.google.com →
-        // consent → callback → onboarding). Retry once after a short
-        // settle: most navigations finish in <500ms even on slow links.
-        try {
-            return await this.snapshotState(page);
-        }
-        catch {
-            await this.wait(0.8);
-            return await this.snapshotState(page);
-        }
-    }
-    async snapshotState(page = this.page) {
-        if (!page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return {
-            url: page.url(),
-            title: await page.title(),
-            html: await page.content(),
-            screenshot: await page
-                .screenshot({ fullPage: false, type: "jpeg", quality: 70, timeout: 8_000 })
-                .then((shot) => shot.toString("base64"))
-                .catch(() => ""),
-        };
-    }
-    async extractText() {
-        if (!this.page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return (await this.page.textContent("body")) || "";
-    }
-    // RENDERED, visibility-respecting body text. extractText() reads
-    // textContent("body"), which includes display:none / visibility:hidden /
-    // off-screen nodes — so a fully-rendered dashboard whose DOM merely
-    // CONTAINS a hidden skeleton / "Loading…" / "Please wait 30 seconds…"
-    // string (Next.js RSC inline payloads, lazy placeholders, aria-hidden
-    // spinners) reads as still-loading and false-trips the loading-shell gate.
-    // innerText is layout-aware: it omits hidden text and reflects what a user
-    // would actually see. Use this for the SHELL decision ONLY — credential/key
-    // extraction and wall-text checks deliberately read RAW text via
-    // extractText() and must stay byte-identical, so this is purely additive.
+    // Visible page text omits hidden skeletons and placeholders that could
+    // otherwise make a rendered page look like it is still loading.
     async extractVisibleText(page = this.page) {
         if (page === null)
             throw new Error("Browser not started");
@@ -4195,20 +4102,6 @@ export class BrowserController {
             return false;
         }
     }
-    // Discrete strings an API key might occupy — for credential
-    // extraction. Gathered so a key is read WHOLE and un-glued from its
-    // neighbours: extractText() concatenates the whole <body>, which
-    // fuses a key to an adjacent "Copy"/"Done" button with no separator.
-    //
-    // Two surfaces:
-    //   1. input/textarea VALUES — a copy-to-clipboard key field. An
-    //      input's value is not in textContent at all. Hidden and
-    //      password fields are excluded (captcha tokens / the signup
-    //      password), keeping this a clean credential surface.
-    //   2. Each element's OWN direct text — the text nodes that are its
-    //      immediate children, excluding descendants. A key in a
-    //      <code>/<span>/<div> yields its clean value here even when a
-    //      sibling button shares the same parent.
     // F10: read the clipboard contents (typically populated by the
     // user-modal's Copy button — every modern API-key reveal modal puts
     // the full secret here while displaying a masked stub). Requires
@@ -4247,644 +4140,6 @@ export class BrowserController {
             }
         });
     }
-    // F10 fallback: ALL <input> / <textarea> values, ignoring
-    // visibility and type filters. extractCredentialCandidates
-    // deliberately skips `type=hidden` / `type=password` / invisible
-    // elements (correct for general candidate scanning), but some
-    // API-key modals stash the full key in a hidden input the masked
-    // display reads from — and that needs to be reachable when the
-    // visible extraction comes back truncated.
-    async extractAllInputValues(page = this.page) {
-        if (!page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return await page.evaluate(() => {
-            const out = [];
-            document.querySelectorAll("input, textarea").forEach((el) => {
-                if (!(el instanceof HTMLInputElement) && !(el instanceof HTMLTextAreaElement))
-                    return;
-                // Only text-shaped controls RENDER a value. A checkbox/radio/button's
-                // `value` is a markup constant (or the control's id) and must never be
-                // read as a credential candidate.
-                if (el instanceof HTMLInputElement &&
-                    !["text", "search", "url", "tel", "number", "email", ""].includes(el.type))
-                    return;
-                const value = el.value;
-                if (value.trim().length > 0)
-                    out.push(value.trim());
-            });
-            return out;
-        });
-    }
-    // Last-resort scan: walk innerText looking for credential-shaped
-    // tokens (UUIDs and other long alnum+hyphen blobs) inside any DOM
-    // subtree that ALSO contains a "Copy" / "Copy token" / "Copy to
-    // clipboard" affordance. The Copy-button colocation is what tells
-    // us "the UI is presenting this string AS a credential" — without
-    // it, we'd false-positive on session IDs in URLs, cache-buster
-    // query params, etc. Returns every match it finds; the caller picks
-    // the first that survives extractApiKeyFromText.
-    async extractCredentialsNearCopyButtons(page = this.page) {
-        if (!page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return await page.evaluate(() => {
-            const out = [];
-            const isVisible = (el) => {
-                const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
-                return r.width > 2 && r.height > 2;
-            };
-            // Find every Copy- OR reveal-class affordance. A secret table-cell value
-            // (deepinfra's keys table) lives in a row next to BOTH a copy and a
-            // toggle-visibility/reveal control — but those are often icon buttons
-            // whose accessible NAME is the row's date, not "copy". So match the
-            // element's id / class / data-testid too, which carry the semantic name
-            // ("copy-key", "toggle-token-visibility"). Reveal patterns are scoped to
-            // key/token/secret/visibility context so a generic "Show more" doesn't
-            // anchor a harvest.
-            const copyButtons = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('button, [role="button"], a, [aria-label]')).filter((el) => {
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return false;
-                const name = `${el.textContent ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("aria-label") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("title") ?? ""}`.toLowerCase();
-                // el.className is an SVGAnimatedString on SVG elements — read via attr.
-                const attrs = `${el.id} ${el.getAttribute("class") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("data-testid") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("data-test") ?? ""}`.toLowerCase();
-                const hay = `${name} ${attrs}`;
-                return /\bcopy\b|clipboard|reveal|toggle[-_ ]?(?:token|visibility)|show[-_ ]?(?:key|token|secret|api)/.test(hay);
-            });
-            // For each, walk up a few ancestors and dump the subtree's
-            // innerText. The token is somewhere in there.
-            const seen = new Set();
-            const harvest = (text) => {
-                if (text.length === 0 || text.length > 4096)
-                    return;
-                // Tokenize by whitespace — each token is a separate candidate.
-                text.split(/\s+/).forEach((tok) => {
-                    if (tok.length < 16 || tok.length > 256)
-                        return;
-                    if (seen.has(tok))
-                        return;
-                    seen.add(tok);
-                    out.push(tok);
-                });
-            };
-            for (const btn of copyButtons) {
-                // The value often lives in the copy button's OWN aria-label/title
-                // ("Copy to clipboard: GOCSPX-…", "Copy api key sk-…") rather than in
-                // any visible text node — GCP's new client-secret reveal does exactly
-                // this, so the innerText-only walk below would miss it entirely.
-                harvest(`${btn.getAttribute("aria-label") ?? ""} ${btn.getAttribute("title") ?? ""}`.trim());
-                // Then walk up a few ancestors and dump the subtree's innerText.
-                let anc = btn;
-                for (let i = 0; i < 6 && anc !== null; i++) {
-                    anc = anc.parentElement;
-                }
-                if (anc === null)
-                    continue;
-                harvest((anc.innerText ?? "").trim());
-            }
-            return out;
-        });
-    }
-    // DOM-proximity labeled credential candidates. Walks every visible
-    // input/code/text element looking for credential-shape strings,
-    // pairs each one with its nearest credential-label text in the DOM
-    // tree, and returns the labeled tuples for the multi-cred extractor
-    // to fold into the credentials Record.
-    //
-    // Complements the Phase E planner-quoted extractor — when the
-    // planner's prose doesn't explicitly label values (multi-cred page
-    // where the planner missed one), this DOM-grounded pass picks them
-    // up via the visible labels the page itself renders.
-    //
-    // Returns shape:
-    //   { value: "<credential-shape string>",
-    //     label: "<the closest matching label text>" | null,
-    //     isMasked: true if the value looks like a redacted display
-    //               (••••, ****, contains "•" or runs of "*") }
-    //
-    // The caller maps label
-    // text to canonical credential keys using the same vocabulary the
-    // Phase E parser uses.
-    async extractLabeledCredentialCandidates(page = this.page) {
-        if (!page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return await page.evaluate(() => {
-            const LABEL_PHRASES = [
-                // Generic
-                "api key",
-                "api token",
-                "api secret",
-                "secret key",
-                "access key",
-                "access token",
-                "auth token",
-                "bearer token",
-                "personal access token",
-                "client id",
-                "client secret",
-                "team id",
-                "project id",
-                "client key",
-                // Cloudinary
-                "cloud name",
-                "cloudname",
-                // Algolia
-                "application id",
-                "app id",
-                "admin api key",
-                "search api key",
-                "monitoring api key",
-                "search-only api key",
-                // Twilio
-                "account sid",
-                "auth token",
-                // Stripe
-                "publishable key",
-                "secret key",
-                // AWS
-                "access key id",
-                "secret access key",
-                // OAuth1
-                "consumer key",
-                "consumer secret",
-                "access token secret",
-                // Misc
-                "project api key",
-                "personal api key",
-                "organization id",
-                "org id",
-                "app key",
-                "app secret",
-                // Pusher (and other keys tables) label fields bare: key / secret /
-                // cluster. Without these the value inherits the nearest recognized
-                // label (the app_id field), mislabeling key + secret as "app id".
-                "cluster",
-                "key",
-                "secret",
-            ];
-            const isVisible = (el) => {
-                const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
-                return r.width > 2 && r.height > 2;
-            };
-            const isCredentialShape = (s) => {
-                // Reasonable credential length range
-                if (s.length < 6 || s.length > 256)
-                    return false;
-                // Reject pure prose (spaces inside)
-                if (/\s/.test(s))
-                    return false;
-                // Must include some entropy markers: digit + letter combo OR
-                // a credential prefix like sk_/pk_/api_/ etc.
-                const hasDigit = /\d/.test(s);
-                const hasLetter = /[A-Za-z]/.test(s);
-                if (!hasDigit && !hasLetter)
-                    return false;
-                // Reject pure URL fragments
-                if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(s))
-                    return false;
-                // Reject simple words / capitalized phrases
-                if (/^[A-Za-z]+$/.test(s) && s.length < 12)
-                    return false;
-                // Reject label-text masquerading as a value: a short token of only
-                // letters + separators with NO digit (e.g. the literal "app_id" /
-                // "secret" label text pusher renders next to the real value). Real
-                // credentials carry a digit or are long; field labels don't.
-                if (!hasDigit && /^[a-z][a-z_-]*$/i.test(s) && s.length < 16)
-                    return false;
-                return true;
-            };
-            // Inline mirror of credential-shape.ts MASKED_DISPLAY_RE — page.evaluate
-            // code can't import, so keep this regex byte-identical to the canonical.
-            // Any mask glyph: bullet/circle, 3+ asterisks, ellipsis, or 3+ dots. (Was
-            // `[•●⬤]{3,}|\*{4,}`, which MISSED the ellipsis masks GCP/Zilliz/S3 use.)
-            const isMaskedShape = (s) => /[•●⬤]|\*{3,}|…|\.{3,}/.test(s);
-            // Compute element-center coords for proximity matching.
-            const centerOf = (el) => {
-                const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
-                return { x: r.left + r.width / 2, y: r.top + r.height / 2 };
-            };
-            const labelHits = [];
-            document.querySelectorAll("body *").forEach((el) => {
-                if (el.tagName === "SCRIPT" || el.tagName === "STYLE")
-                    return;
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                // Only consider DIRECT text content — child element text gets
-                // claimed by THOSE elements' own label scans.
-                let direct = "";
-                el.childNodes.forEach((n) => {
-                    if (n.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE)
-                        direct += n.textContent ?? "";
-                });
-                direct = direct.trim().toLowerCase();
-                if (direct.length === 0 || direct.length > 100)
-                    return;
-                // Normalize separators so underscore/hyphen field labels match the
-                // space-form phrases: pusher renders "app_id" / "app_key" / "app_secret"
-                // and "app_id".includes("app id") is false, so every value used to
-                // inherit a far "App keys" heading. With this, each field label matches
-                // its own phrase and wins the proximity match.
-                const directNorm = direct.replace(/[_-]+/g, " ");
-                for (const phrase of LABEL_PHRASES) {
-                    if (directNorm.includes(phrase)) {
-                        const c = centerOf(el);
-                        labelHits.push({ phrase, x: c.x, y: c.y, el });
-                        break; // one label per element is enough
-                    }
-                }
-            });
-            // Detect reveal buttons (eye / show / unmask icons) — any visible
-            // button or [role=button] / svg whose aria-label / title / text
-            // matches the reveal vocabulary. We only check WHETHER one exists
-            // near a candidate; the clicker (revealMaskedCredentials below)
-            // does the actual click pass.
-            const REVEAL_PATTERN = /\b(?:reveal|show|unmask|view|toggle|copy)\b/i;
-            const revealButtons = [];
-            document
-                .querySelectorAll('button, [role="button"], a, [aria-label], [title]')
-                .forEach((el) => {
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                const hay = `${el.textContent ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("aria-label") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("title") ?? ""}`;
-                if (!REVEAL_PATTERN.test(hay))
-                    return;
-                const c = centerOf(el);
-                revealButtons.push({ x: c.x, y: c.y, el });
-            });
-            // For each candidate, find nearest label by Euclidean distance.
-            const findNearestLabel = (x, y) => {
-                let best = null;
-                for (const lh of labelHits) {
-                    const dx = lh.x - x;
-                    const dy = lh.y - y;
-                    const d = Math.sqrt(dx * dx + dy * dy);
-                    // Conservative cap — labels more than 400px away from the
-                    // value aren't visually grouped with it. Roughly: a typical
-                    // table-row width.
-                    if (d > 400)
-                        continue;
-                    if (best === null || d < best.d)
-                        best = { phrase: lh.phrase, d };
-                }
-                return best?.phrase ?? null;
-            };
-            const hasNearbyReveal = (x, y) => {
-                for (const rb of revealButtons) {
-                    const dx = rb.x - x;
-                    const dy = rb.y - y;
-                    // Reveal/copy buttons are usually right next to the value —
-                    // 200px is generous.
-                    if (Math.sqrt(dx * dx + dy * dy) < 200)
-                        return true;
-                }
-                return false;
-            };
-            const seen = new Set();
-            const out = [];
-            const pushCandidate = (value, el) => {
-                const trimmed = value.trim();
-                if (trimmed.length === 0)
-                    return;
-                const masked = isMaskedShape(trimmed);
-                if (!masked && !isCredentialShape(trimmed)) {
-                    // 0.8.2-rc.17 — when the whole text-node string has
-                    // whitespace (Cloudinary's "Cloud name: dlq4xgrca" sits
-                    // in a SINGLE <div> with the label and value glued
-                    // together), isCredentialShape rejects the whole string.
-                    // Try to split on the canonical label-value separator
-                    // patterns ("Label: value", "Label = value", "Label\nvalue")
-                    // and re-evaluate each side. The token side gets the
-                    // candidate slot; the label side already lives on its own
-                    // (we don't need to push it). First-wins on duplicates.
-                    const split = /^([A-Za-z][A-Za-z _-]{1,40}?)\s*[:=]\s*([A-Za-z0-9._\-]{4,256})$/.exec(trimmed);
-                    if (split === null)
-                        return;
-                    const valueToken = split[2];
-                    if (valueToken === undefined)
-                        return;
-                    if (!isCredentialShape(valueToken))
-                        return;
-                    if (seen.has(valueToken))
-                        return;
-                    seen.add(valueToken);
-                    const c = centerOf(el);
-                    const label = findNearestLabel(c.x, c.y);
-                    out.push({
-                        value: valueToken,
-                        label,
-                        isMasked: false,
-                        hasRevealButton: false,
-                    });
-                    return;
-                }
-                if (seen.has(trimmed))
-                    return;
-                seen.add(trimmed);
-                const c = centerOf(el);
-                const label = findNearestLabel(c.x, c.y);
-                const hasReveal = masked ? hasNearbyReveal(c.x, c.y) : false;
-                out.push({
-                    value: trimmed,
-                    label,
-                    isMasked: masked,
-                    hasRevealButton: hasReveal,
-                });
-            };
-            // 0. Inline config snippets: a credential block listing multiple
-            //    label = "value" pairs in one text run (pusher's App Keys page:
-            //    app_id = "2164307" key = "..." secret = "..." cluster = "ap3").
-            //    No separate label ELEMENTS exist, so the proximity matcher mislabels
-            //    every value with whatever heading is nearest. Parse the label-value
-            //    pairs straight from the page text — each pair's own label is
-            //    authoritative. Runs FIRST so its correctly-labeled candidates win
-            //    the `seen` dedup over the proximity passes. Noise pairs are harmless:
-            //    a skill only matches the labels it asks for.
-            const bodyText = document.body?.innerText ?? "";
-            const INLINE_PAIR = /\b([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,40})\s*[:=]\s*["']?([A-Za-z0-9._-]{6,256})["']?/g;
-            for (const m of bodyText.matchAll(INLINE_PAIR)) {
-                const label = (m[1] ?? "").toLowerCase();
-                const value = m[2] ?? "";
-                if (!isCredentialShape(value))
-                    continue;
-                if (seen.has(value))
-                    continue;
-                seen.add(value);
-                out.push({ value, label, isMasked: false, hasRevealButton: false });
-            }
-            // 1. <input> / <textarea> values (visible only). Only text-shaped
-            //    controls can RENDER a credential: a checkbox/radio/button's `value`
-            //    is a markup constant (or the control's id), not page content — an
-            //    offscreen `<input type="checkbox" id="secret" value="fallback">`
-            //    must never become a stored credential.
-            document.querySelectorAll("input, textarea").forEach((el) => {
-                if (el instanceof HTMLInputElement &&
-                    !["text", "search", "url", "tel", "number", "email", ""].includes(el.type))
-                    return;
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                const value = el instanceof HTMLInputElement || el instanceof HTMLTextAreaElement ? el.value : "";
-                if (value.length > 0)
-                    pushCandidate(value, el);
-            });
-            // 2. Direct text content in visible leaf elements.
-            document.querySelectorAll("body *").forEach((el) => {
-                if (el.tagName === "SCRIPT" || el.tagName === "STYLE")
-                    return;
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                let direct = "";
-                el.childNodes.forEach((n) => {
-                    if (n.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE)
-                        direct += n.textContent ?? "";
-                });
-                direct = direct.trim();
-                if (direct.length === 0 || direct.length > 256)
-                    return;
-                pushCandidate(direct, el);
-            });
-            // 3. Structural containers (code/pre/kbd) where the credential
-            //    is interpolated through nested spans.
-            document.querySelectorAll('code, pre, kbd, samp, [role="textbox"]').forEach((el) => {
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                const full = (el.textContent ?? "").trim();
-                if (full.length === 0 || full.length > 256)
-                    return;
-                pushCandidate(full, el);
-            });
-            return out;
-        });
-    }
-    // Click every visible "Reveal" / "Show" / "Eye" / "Copy" button on
-    // the page that sits next to a masked credential display. Used as a
-    // pre-extract pass for services like Cloudinary that hide the
-    // api_secret behind a click-to-reveal icon. Best-effort: failures
-    // don't throw; subsequent extract pass tries whatever surfaced.
-    // Returns the number of buttons successfully clicked.
-    async revealMaskedCredentials(page = this.page) {
-        if (page === null)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        const probe = await page.evaluate(() => {
-            const isVisible = (el) => {
-                const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
-                return r.width > 2 && r.height > 2;
-            };
-            // Walk up to the nearest "row-like" ancestor — a <tr>, a <li>,
-            // or any container ≤ 800px wide with limited height. Cloudinary,
-            // Algolia, Twilio all use table rows; clicking the reveal in
-            // ROW X must populate the value in ROW X, not some neighbor row.
-            const rowAncestor = (el) => {
-                let cur = el;
-                for (let i = 0; i < 8 && cur !== null; i++) {
-                    if (cur.tagName === "TR" || cur.tagName === "LI")
-                        return cur;
-                    const r = cur.getBoundingClientRect();
-                    if (r.width > 200 && r.width < 900 && r.height < 200)
-                        return cur;
-                    cur = cur.parentElement;
-                }
-                return el.parentElement;
-            };
-            const masked = [];
-            document.querySelectorAll("body *").forEach((el) => {
-                if (el.tagName === "SCRIPT" || el.tagName === "STYLE")
-                    return;
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                let direct = "";
-                el.childNodes.forEach((n) => {
-                    if (n.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE)
-                        direct += n.textContent ?? "";
-                });
-                const t = direct.trim();
-                if (t.length < 3 || t.length > 100)
-                    return;
-                // Canonical MASKED_DISPLAY_RE union (credential-shape.ts): bullet/
-                // circle, 3+ asterisks, ellipsis, or 3+ dots. The old
-                // `[•●⬤*]{3,}` missed the `…`/`...` masks a masked sibling key uses
-                // (`vsk_sandbox_write_20af…`), so its Reveal was never clicked.
-                if (!/[•●⬤]|\*{3,}|…|\.{3,}/.test(t))
-                    return;
-                masked.push({ el, row: rowAncestor(el) });
-            });
-            document.querySelectorAll('input[type="password"]').forEach((el) => {
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                masked.push({ el, row: rowAncestor(el) });
-            });
-            const selectorFor = (el) => {
-                const parts = [];
-                let current = el;
-                while (current !== null && current !== document.body) {
-                    const tag = current.tagName.toLowerCase();
-                    const siblings = Array.from(current.parentElement?.children ?? []).filter((sibling) => sibling.tagName === current.tagName);
-                    parts.unshift(`${tag}:nth-of-type(${siblings.indexOf(current) + 1})`);
-                    current = current.parentElement;
-                }
-                return `body > ${parts.join(" > ")}`;
-            };
-            // No masked placeholder anywhere — but some consoles hide the key
-            // ENTIRELY behind a "View/Show Key" button with no ••• shown at all
-            // (Zilliz's "View My Personal Key"). The row-anchored pass below has
-            // nothing to anchor on, so without this the reveal pass bails and the
-            // extractor reports no_legit_credential on a page that DOES have a key.
-            // Anchor-free fallback: click a button whose label pairs a SAFE reveal
-            // verb with a credential noun, excluding destructive verbs (reset/
-            // regenerate/delete/revoke/rotate would mint or destroy a key, not
-            // reveal the existing one).
-            const DESTRUCTIVE = /\b(?:reset|regenerat\w*|delete|revoke|rotate|create|new|remove|add|download)\b/i;
-            if (masked.length === 0) {
-                const KEY_NOUN = /\b(?:api\s*key|secret|token|credential|personal\s+key|access\s+key|key)\b/i;
-                const SAFE_REVEAL = /\b(?:view|show|reveal|display|see)\b/i;
-                const out = [];
-                const diag = [];
-                document
-                    .querySelectorAll('button, [role="button"], a[role="button"]')
-                    .forEach((el) => {
-                    if (!isVisible(el))
-                        return;
-                    const hay = `${el.textContent ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("aria-label") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("title") ?? ""}`
-                        .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
-                        .trim();
-                    if (hay.length === 0 || hay.length > 60)
-                        return;
-                    if (!SAFE_REVEAL.test(hay) || !KEY_NOUN.test(hay))
-                        return;
-                    if (DESTRUCTIVE.test(hay))
-                        return;
-                    out.push(selectorFor(el));
-                    diag.push(`anchorless_key_reveal:"${hay.slice(0, 40)}"`);
-                });
-                return {
-                    selectors: out,
-                    diagnostic: out.length > 0 ? diag : ["no_masked_displays"],
-                };
-            }
-            // 2. Classify candidate buttons. Prefer SHOW/REVEAL/EYE; fall
-            //    back to COPY only when no show button exists in the row.
-            //    (Copy generally puts value in clipboard, not in DOM —
-            //    which our extractor can't read in headless.)
-            const SHOW_PATTERN = /\b(?:reveal|show|unmask|view|toggle|eye)\b/i;
-            const COPY_PATTERN = /\bcopy\b/i;
-            const collectButtonsInRow = (row) => {
-                const showBtns = [];
-                const copyBtns = [];
-                if (row === null)
-                    return { showBtns, copyBtns };
-                row
-                    .querySelectorAll('button, [role="button"], a[role="button"], [aria-label], [title]')
-                    .forEach((el) => {
-                    if (!isVisible(el))
-                        return;
-                    const hay = `${el.textContent ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("aria-label") ?? ""} ${el.getAttribute("title") ?? ""} ${el.className ?? ""}`;
-                    if (DESTRUCTIVE.test(hay))
-                        return;
-                    if (SHOW_PATTERN.test(hay))
-                        showBtns.push(el);
-                    else if (COPY_PATTERN.test(hay))
-                        copyBtns.push(el);
-                });
-                return { showBtns, copyBtns };
-            };
-            const selectors = [];
-            const diagnostic = [];
-            const usedRows = new Set();
-            for (const m of masked) {
-                if (m.row === null)
-                    continue;
-                if (usedRows.has(m.row))
-                    continue;
-                usedRows.add(m.row);
-                const { showBtns, copyBtns } = collectButtonsInRow(m.row);
-                if (showBtns.length > 0) {
-                    const btn = showBtns[0];
-                    const sel = selectorFor(btn);
-                    selectors.push(sel);
-                    const label = (btn.textContent ??
-                        btn.getAttribute("aria-label") ??
-                        btn.getAttribute("title") ??
-                        "")
-                        .trim()
-                        .slice(0, 40);
-                    diagnostic.push(`row→show:"${label}"→${sel}`);
-                }
-                else if (copyBtns.length > 0) {
-                    diagnostic.push(`row→copy_only_no_show_button (copy='${copyBtns.length} found' — skipped, would only populate clipboard not DOM)`);
-                }
-                else {
-                    diagnostic.push("row→no_buttons_found");
-                }
-            }
-            return { selectors, diagnostic };
-        });
-        let clicked = 0;
-        for (const sel of probe.selectors) {
-            try {
-                await page.locator(sel).first().click({ timeout: 1500 });
-                clicked += 1;
-                // Reveal click often triggers a fetch (Cloudinary returns the
-                // secret over an XHR before populating the DOM). Wait longer
-                // than the previous 150ms.
-                await this.sleep(800);
-            }
-            catch {
-                // Click failed — best-effort.
-            }
-        }
-        return { clicked, diagnostic: probe.diagnostic };
-    }
-    async extractCredentialCandidates() {
-        if (!this.page)
-            throw new Error("Browser not started");
-        return await this.page.evaluate(() => {
-            const out = [];
-            const isVisible = (el) => {
-                const r = el.getBoundingClientRect();
-                return r.width > 2 && r.height > 2;
-            };
-            document.querySelectorAll("input, textarea").forEach((el) => {
-                // Only text-shaped inputs can RENDER a credential. A checkbox/
-                // radio/button's `value` is a markup constant, not page content —
-                // zilliz's CookieScript banner ships `<input type="checkbox"
-                // value="personalization">` and those words sit earlier in DOM
-                // order than the real key, so the validator-shaped scan tier was
-                // returning them as the "credential".
-                if (el instanceof HTMLInputElement &&
-                    !["text", "search", "url", "tel", "number", "email", ""].includes(el.type)) {
-                    return;
-                }
-                const value = el instanceof HTMLInputElement || el instanceof HTMLTextAreaElement ? el.value : "";
-                if (value.trim().length > 0 && isVisible(el))
-                    out.push(value.trim());
-            });
-            document.querySelectorAll("body *").forEach((el) => {
-                if (el.tagName === "SCRIPT" || el.tagName === "STYLE")
-                    return;
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                let direct = "";
-                el.childNodes.forEach((n) => {
-                    if (n.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE)
-                        direct += n.textContent ?? "";
-                });
-                direct = direct.trim();
-                // A real key is short; a long blob is a paragraph, not a key.
-                if (direct.length > 0 && direct.length <= 256)
-                    out.push(direct);
-            });
-            // Structural containers (<code>, <pre>, kbd, samp, [role=textbox])
-            // often render a credential by interpolating it through nested
-            // <span>s — the loop above sees an empty direct-text and skips
-            // them. Push the full textContent so a UUID built as
-            // <code><span>7</span><span>5</span>…</code> is still scannable.
-            document.querySelectorAll('code, pre, kbd, samp, [role="textbox"]').forEach((el) => {
-                if (!isVisible(el))
-                    return;
-                const full = (el.textContent ?? "").trim();
-                if (full.length > 0 && full.length <= 256)
-                    out.push(full);
-            });
-            return out;
-        });
-    }
     // Wait for the signup form to actually render before the planner
     // screenshots the page (F1). SPA and two-stage signup pages render
     // the form after JS executes; planning against a pre-render