@trusty-squire/mcp 0.8.15 → 0.8.16

package/dist/bot/agent.js

@@ -55,10 +55,48 @@ const VERIFICATION_EXPECTED_PATTERNS = [
     "almost there",
     "one more step",
 ];
-// Short probe when the post-submit page never prompted the user to check
-// their email. Legitimate verification mail almost always lands inside a
+// Short probe when, even after a settle, the post-submit page still never
+// prompted the user to check their email AND no account-created signal
+// appeared. Legitimate verification mail almost always lands inside a
 // minute; this catches the fast case without 300s of dead air.
 const VERIFICATION_PROBE_SECONDS = 45;
+// Settle window before the SECOND post-submit page read. SPA signups
+// (Postmark, ElevenLabs, Browserbase, Grafana Cloud, …) swap in their
+// "check your email" confirmation screen a beat AFTER submit. Reading the
+// DOM the instant extraction fails races that render and mislabels the
+// run as "no email expected", collapsing the poll to the 45s probe and
+// abandoning mail that was, in fact, on its way.
+const SUBMIT_SETTLE_SECONDS = 3;
+// Poll floor once the form CLEANLY SUBMITTED but the page text stayed
+// inconclusive about an email prompt (no "check your email", but also no
+// hard error/rejection). A clean submit means an account was created, so
+// real verification mail is plausibly inbound; transactional senders on a
+// fresh send (Postmark, SendGrid) routinely take longer than the 45s
+// probe. Polling 120s here — rather than bailing at 45s — is the
+// difference between catching that mail and a false `verification_not_sent`.
+// Still bounded so a genuinely-silent service doesn't hold the run for the
+// full 180s expected-email timeout.
+const SUBMITTED_PROBE_FLOOR_SECONDS = 120;
+// Post-submit page text that means the submit was REJECTED, not accepted —
+// no account was created, so no verification mail is coming and even the
+// 45s probe is wasted. Lets the bot bail immediately instead of polling.
+// Kept conservative: only unambiguous rejection phrasings.
+const SUBMIT_REJECTED_PATTERNS = [
+    /\balready\s+(?:registered|exists|in\s+use|taken|have\s+an\s+account)\b/i,
+    /\b(?:email|account|username)\s+(?:is\s+)?already\s+(?:registered|taken|in\s+use)\b/i,
+    /\bthat\s+email\s+is\s+already\b/i,
+    /\ban?\s+account\s+(?:with\s+(?:this|that)\s+email\s+)?already\s+exists\b/i,
+    /\bplease\s+(?:try\s+again|correct\s+the\s+errors?)\b/i,
+    /\bthis\s+field\s+is\s+required\b/i,
+    /\b(?:email|password)\s+cannot\s+be\s+empty\b/i,
+    /\binvalid\s+(?:email|password)\b/i,
+];
+// Exported for unit testing. True when the post-submit page reads like a
+// rejected submit (account not created), so the bot should not poll for a
+// verification email that will never arrive.
+export function submitWasRejected(pageText) {
+    return SUBMIT_REJECTED_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(pageText));
+}
 // T7: page text that means the post-OAuth API key sits behind a
 // billing / payment-method wall. When the OAuth onboarding loop ends
 // without a key and the page reads like this, the run ends
@@ -174,18 +212,75 @@ const STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS = [
     "/settings/tokens",
     "/settings/api-tokens",
     "/settings/account/api/auth-tokens/",
+    // 0.8.3-rc.2 — added after the post-OAuth onboarding drain
+    // (amplitude/groq/launchdarkly/modal/weaviate/…). These conventions
+    // were absent from the generic list and each cost a service its
+    // whole post-verify budget: LaunchDarkly hosts keys at
+    // /settings/authorization, a cohort of consoles use a bare
+    // /settings/access-tokens or /settings/api, and several put the
+    // developer surface at /settings/developers. They sit AFTER the
+    // historic, more-common paths so we don't regress an existing hit.
+    "/settings/authorization",
+    "/settings/access-tokens",
+    "/settings/developers",
+    "/settings/developer",
+    "/settings/api",
     "/account/api-keys",
     "/account/api_tokens",
+    "/account/api-tokens",
     "/account/keys",
     "/account/tokens",
+    "/account/access-tokens",
     "/api-keys",
     "/api_keys",
+    "/api-tokens",
     "/keys",
     "/tokens",
+    "/access-tokens",
     "/auth-tokens",
+    "/developers",
     "/dashboard/api-keys",
     "/dashboard/keys",
 ];
+// 0.8.3-rc.2 — curated per-service API-key paths, consulted BEFORE the
+// generic STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS list when the stuck origin belongs
+// to one of these vendors. The generic conventions can't reach these:
+// the path is either non-obvious (LaunchDarkly's /settings/authorization),
+// or the vendor splits the convention differently than the majority
+// (groq keys live at a bare /keys but the planner kept guessing
+// /settings/api-keys, which 404s). Keyed by service SLUG (lowercased,
+// alphanumerics only) so it survives the inbox-alias slug the bot is
+// invoked with, and additionally matched against the stuck URL's host so
+// a curated path is only ever composed onto the vendor it was harvested
+// from. Each entry is ordered most-specific-first.
+//
+// This is deliberately a SMALL map of paths the generic heuristic
+// provably can't derive — not a 12-service URL table. Most services in
+// the onboarding-drain cohort are fixed by the widened generic list
+// above; only the ones whose real path is genuinely un-guessable land
+// here.
+const SERVICE_KEYS_PATHS = {
+    // console.groq.com/keys — the planner kept trying /settings/api-keys
+    // (404). The bare /keys IS in the generic list but lands deep in the
+    // order; pin it first for groq so the first escalation hits.
+    groq: ["/keys", "/settings/keys"],
+    // app.launchdarkly.com/settings/authorization — LD's access-token UI.
+    // /settings/api-keys and /settings/generated-credentials both 404.
+    launchdarkly: ["/settings/authorization"],
+    // Weaviate keys are issued per-cluster, but the org-level admin page
+    // is the closest reachable surface; account-scoped guesses all 404.
+    weaviate: ["/account", "/settings/api-keys"],
+    // northflank hosts user API keys under the account menu, not a
+    // top-level /settings/keys.
+    northflank: ["/account/api", "/settings/api"],
+};
+// Normalize a service name to the slug used as a SERVICE_KEYS_PATHS key:
+// lowercased, alphanumerics only. Mirrors guessSignupUrl's slug rule so
+// the inbox-alias-derived service string (e.g. "Groq Cloud") resolves to
+// the same key the map is authored under. Exported for unit testing.
+export function serviceSlug(service) {
+    return service.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, "");
+}
 // 0.8.2-rc.10 — heuristic for "this account already exists on the
 // service and its API keys are masked, with no path to reveal them."
 // The test identity (methoxine@gmail.com) accumulates state across
@@ -252,34 +347,120 @@ export function detectExistingAccountNoExtract(input) {
         return true;
     return false;
 }
-// Pick the next fallback URL to try from STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS
-// keyed against the origin of the currently-stuck URL. Returns null
-// when every path has already been attempted. Exported for unit tests.
-export function pickStuckLoopFallbackUrl(currentUrl, alreadyTried) {
-    let origin;
+// A "mint a fresh key" affordance — a button/link that creates a new
+// API key/token. The label vocabulary is deliberately broad ("create",
+// "generate", "new", "add" paired with a key/token noun) but must be
+// paired with a credential noun so a bare "New project" / "Add member"
+// button on a dashboard isn't mistaken for a key-minting control.
+//
+// Word-boundary-anchored to avoid matching "recreate" / "regenerate
+// password" style false friends — though "regenerate" + a key noun IS
+// a valid mint affordance (rotating a key produces a fresh value), so
+// it's included explicitly.
+const CREATE_KEY_VERB = /\b(?:create|generate|regenerate|new|add|issue|mint)\b/i;
+const CREATE_KEY_NOUN = /\b(?:api[\s_-]*keys?|secret[\s_-]*keys?|access[\s_-]*tokens?|personal[\s_-]*access[\s_-]*tokens?|api[\s_-]*tokens?|auth[\s_-]*tokens?|tokens?|keys?|credentials?)\b/i;
+// A standalone phrase that is unambiguously a key-minting control even
+// without the verb+noun co-occurrence test (some buttons read just
+// "New API key" with the verb folded into "new"). Kept separate so the
+// generic verb/noun pairing can stay strict.
+const CREATE_KEY_PHRASE = /\b(?:create|generate|new|add|issue|mint)\s+(?:a\s+)?(?:new\s+)?(?:api|secret|access|auth|personal\s+access)?\s*(?:keys?|tokens?|credentials?)\b/i;
+// Scan an inventory for the single best "create new key / generate API
+// key / new token" affordance. Returns the matching element or null.
+// Exported for unit tests. Pure — operates on the inventory shape only,
+// no browser access, so it can be unit-tested with synthetic elements.
+export function findCreateKeyAffordance(inventory) {
+    const candidates = [];
+    for (const el of inventory) {
+        // Only buttons / links / role=button are mint controls; an <input>
+        // (a text field named "key") is never the create action.
+        const isClickable = el.tag === "button" ||
+            el.tag === "a" ||
+            el.role === "button" ||
+            el.role === "link";
+        if (!isClickable)
+            continue;
+        // A non-visible element can't be clicked reliably; skip when the
+        // live extractor told us it's hidden (test fixtures that omit
+        // `visible` are treated as visible).
+        if (el.visible === false)
+            continue;
+        const haystack = [
+            el.visibleText,
+            el.ariaLabel,
+            el.title,
+            el.labelText,
+            el.iconLabel,
+        ]
+            .filter((s) => s !== null && s !== undefined)
+            .join(" ")
+            .trim();
+        if (haystack.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        const phraseHit = CREATE_KEY_PHRASE.test(haystack);
+        const verbNounHit = CREATE_KEY_VERB.test(haystack) && CREATE_KEY_NOUN.test(haystack);
+        if (!phraseHit && !verbNounHit)
+            continue;
+        // Score: a full phrase match is the strongest signal; an explicit
+        // "api key" / "token" noun beats a bare "key"; in-viewport beats
+        // off-screen. Highest score wins so a precise "Create API Key" is
+        // preferred over a generic "Add key".
+        let score = 0;
+        if (phraseHit)
+            score += 4;
+        if (/\bapi[\s_-]*keys?\b|\bapi[\s_-]*tokens?\b/i.test(haystack))
+            score += 2;
+        if (el.inViewport === true)
+            score += 1;
+        candidates.push({ el, score });
+    }
+    if (candidates.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    candidates.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score);
+    return candidates[0].el;
+}
+// Pick the next fallback URL to try, keyed against the origin of the
+// currently-stuck URL. The curated SERVICE_KEYS_PATHS for the run's
+// service (when its host matches the stuck origin) are tried FIRST,
+// then the generic STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS. Returns null when every
+// path has already been attempted. Exported for unit tests.
+export function pickStuckLoopFallbackUrl(currentUrl, alreadyTried, service) {
+    let parsed;
     try {
-        origin = new URL(currentUrl).origin;
+        parsed = new URL(currentUrl);
     }
     catch {
         return null;
     }
+    const origin = parsed.origin;
     // Skip a candidate when the current URL's path ALREADY matches it
     // (case-insensitive, trailing-slash tolerant). The planner is stuck
     // ON the page the candidate points to — navigating to the same URL
     // again won't break the cycle, only a different path will.
-    const currentPath = (() => {
-        try {
-            return new URL(currentUrl).pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "").toLowerCase();
-        }
-        catch {
-            return "";
-        }
-    })();
-    for (const path of STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS) {
+    const currentPath = parsed.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "").toLowerCase();
+    // Compose curated per-service paths first, but only when the stuck
+    // origin's host actually belongs to the named service. The slug is
+    // a substring of the host for the vendors we curate (groq →
+    // console.groq.com, launchdarkly → app.launchdarkly.com, …); this
+    // host gate stops a curated path from being composed onto an
+    // unrelated origin the bot wandered onto (e.g. an OAuth provider or
+    // a redirect to a marketing domain).
+    const slug = service !== undefined ? serviceSlug(service) : "";
+    const curated = slug !== "" &&
+        SERVICE_KEYS_PATHS[slug] !== undefined &&
+        parsed.hostname.toLowerCase().includes(slug)
+        ? SERVICE_KEYS_PATHS[slug]
+        : [];
+    // Curated paths lead; the generic list follows. De-dup so a path that
+    // appears in both (groq's /keys, /settings/keys) isn't offered twice.
+    const seen = new Set();
+    for (const path of [...curated, ...STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS]) {
+        const candidatePath = path.replace(/\/+$/, "").toLowerCase();
+        if (seen.has(candidatePath))
+            continue;
+        seen.add(candidatePath);
         const candidate = `${origin}${path}`;
         if (alreadyTried.has(candidate))
             continue;
-        const candidatePath = path.replace(/\/+$/, "").toLowerCase();
         if (candidatePath === currentPath)
             continue;
         return candidate;
@@ -581,6 +762,21 @@ export function parseSignupPlan(raw, allowedSelectors) {
         ? { actions, submit_selector: submitSelector, confidence, notes }
         : { actions, submit_selector: submitSelector, confidence };
 }
+// True when a clickSubmit failure is a Playwright visibility/attach
+// timeout rather than a genuine hard error. A timeout means the submit
+// selector resolved at plan-time but was gone by click-time — almost
+// always because an earlier action in the same plan advanced a
+// multi-step SPA (Paddle's "Continue" → next screen), so the right
+// recovery is a re-plan against the new page, not a run-ending
+// submit_failed. Matches Playwright's `locator.waitFor`/`waitForSelector`
+// timeout text; deliberately does NOT match `submit_disabled` (handled
+// separately) or other click errors (genuine failures). Exported for
+// unit testing.
+export function isSubmitTimeout(reason) {
+    if (reason.startsWith("submit_disabled"))
+        return false;
+    return /Timeout \d+ms exceeded/i.test(reason) && /waitfor|waiting for/i.test(reason);
+}
 // Render the element inventory as a compact text block for the
 // planner — one line per element, ending with the verified
 // `selector=` the planner must copy verbatim (F3 T3).
@@ -1338,6 +1534,48 @@ export function findFirstOAuthButton(inventory, providers) {
     }
     return null;
 }
+// A page can gate the real login UI behind a generic "Sign In to
+// Continue" interstitial that renders NO provider affordance yet —
+// Qdrant's session-expiry flow redirects to /logout?aerr=expired whose
+// only element is a "Sign In to Continue" button; the Google button
+// lives one click deeper. The OAuth-first scan finds no provider
+// affordance and was bailing `oauth_required` without ever advancing.
+// This finds a generic sign-in-ish button to CLICK so the next scan can
+// see the provider buttons. Strictly gated on sign-in vocabulary so we
+// never click an arbitrary CTA: a bare "Continue" / "Get started" /
+// "Go to Dashboard" / 404-recovery / "Join Workspace" button does NOT
+// match — only text that explicitly reads as advancing into a login.
+// Caller bounds the number of click-throughs. Returns null when no such
+// affordance exists (the page is then either genuinely SSO-only, a 404,
+// or already authenticated). Exported for unit testing.
+const SIGN_IN_ADVANCE_RE = /\b(?:sign[\s-]?in|log[\s-]?in|continue with email|continue to (?:sign|log)|get started)\b/i;
+export function findSignInAdvanceButton(inventory, providers) {
+    // If a provider affordance is already present, advancing is pointless
+    // — the caller would have taken the OAuth path. Guard so a page that
+    // has both (e.g. a "Sign in" header link + "Continue with Google")
+    // never routes through this click-through path.
+    if (findFirstOAuthButton(inventory, providers) !== null)
+        return null;
+    for (const e of inventory) {
+        const isButtonish = e.tag === "button" ||
+            e.tag === "a" ||
+            e.role === "button" ||
+            e.type === "submit" ||
+            e.type === "button";
+        if (!isButtonish)
+            continue;
+        const text = `${e.visibleText ?? ""} ${e.ariaLabel ?? ""}`
+            .replace(/\s+/g, " ")
+            .trim();
+        // Sanity-cap: a real sign-in button is short. A long string is a
+        // paragraph / card that happens to contain "sign in".
+        if (text.length === 0 || text.length > MAX_OAUTH_BUTTON_TEXT_CHARS)
+            continue;
+        if (SIGN_IN_ADVANCE_RE.test(text))
+            return e;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
 // Order the OAuth providers the bot may use for a signup, given the
 // service's yaml pin (if any) and the providers the persistent profile
 // actually has a session for. `findFirstOAuthButton` walks this list in
@@ -1915,6 +2153,56 @@ export function extractApiKeyFromText(text) {
     }
     return null;
 }
+// Password-manager / autofill UI affordances that render as short
+// word-tokens on credential pages. A render API-keys page ships a
+// "Save to 1Password" / "1Password" autofill button next to the real
+// `rnd_…` key; LastPass, Bitwarden, and Dashlane do the same. These
+// strings are alphanumeric, often carry a digit ("1Password"), and sit
+// EARLIER in DOM order than the credential — so the validator-blind
+// candidate-scan tiers (replay-skill.ts) used to return them as the
+// "credential" and the downstream length validator then rejected them
+// (the 0DTW2V66 render skill: `got="1Password" length 9 below min 32`).
+// They are never credentials; reject them at the candidate layer so the
+// scan moves on to the real key instead of the right key being shadowed
+// by a UI word. Matched case-insensitively as a whole token (the
+// candidates the scan tiers feed in are already whitespace-trimmed
+// single tokens). Exported for unit testing.
+const CREDENTIAL_NOISE_TOKENS = [
+    "1password",
+    "lastpass",
+    "bitwarden",
+    "dashlane",
+    "keepass",
+    "keeper",
+    "nordpass",
+    "proton pass",
+    "protonpass",
+    "autofill",
+    "passwords",
+];
+// Verb-prefixed UI affordances ("Save to 1Password", "Copy to
+// clipboard", "Add to vault"). The candidate-scan tiers tokenize on
+// whitespace so a multi-word affordance rarely survives as one
+// candidate — but extractText()/innerText passes glue it together, so
+// guard the leading verbs too.
+const CREDENTIAL_NOISE_PREFIXES = [
+    "save to ",
+    "copy to ",
+    "add to ",
+    "store in ",
+];
+// True when a candidate string is a password-manager / autofill UI
+// affordance rather than a real credential value. Used by the replay
+// engine's raw-candidate scan tiers to keep "1Password"-class words
+// out of the credential slot. Exported for unit testing.
+export function isCredentialNoiseCandidate(candidate) {
+    const lower = candidate.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (lower.length === 0)
+        return false;
+    if (CREDENTIAL_NOISE_TOKENS.includes(lower))
+        return true;
+    return CREDENTIAL_NOISE_PREFIXES.some((p) => lower.startsWith(p));
+}
 // Choose which link in a verification email to click. Scores each URL
 // by keyword and picks the best — but only if it scored positive.
 //
@@ -2170,6 +2458,12 @@ export class SignupAgent {
         let progressReplans = 0;
         let emptyPlans = 0;
         let oauthScanRetries = 0;
+        // Bounded click-throughs of a generic "Sign In to Continue"
+        // interstitial that gates the provider buttons (Qdrant). Capped so
+        // an SSO-only page that keeps re-showing a sign-in button (or a
+        // redirect loop) still terminates at oauth_required.
+        let signInAdvanceClicks = 0;
+        const MAX_SIGN_IN_ADVANCE_CLICKS = 2;
         let hint;
         // F14 — selectors the planner clicked WITHOUT advancing the page.
         // Each no-progress plan records its click selectors here; the next
@@ -2253,6 +2547,36 @@ export class SignupAgent {
                         "treating as already authenticated, jumping to post-verify navigation");
                     return { kind: "already_oauth" };
                 }
+                // The provider buttons can sit one click behind a generic
+                // "Sign In to Continue" interstitial (Qdrant's session-expiry
+                // /logout?aerr=expired redirect renders only that button). The
+                // OAuth scan above found nothing because the real login UI
+                // hasn't been reached yet. Click the sign-in-ish affordance to
+                // advance, reset the async-render retries, and re-scan — bounded
+                // so a page that just keeps showing a sign-in button (genuine
+                // SSO-only / a redirect loop) still terminates at oauth_required
+                // rather than clicking forever.
+                if (signInAdvanceClicks < MAX_SIGN_IN_ADVANCE_CLICKS) {
+                    const advance = findSignInAdvanceButton(inventory, oauthCandidates);
+                    if (advance !== null) {
+                        signInAdvanceClicks += 1;
+                        steps.push(`OAuth-first: no provider affordance, but found a generic ` +
+                            `sign-in affordance (${JSON.stringify(advance.visibleText ?? advance.ariaLabel ?? "")}) ` +
+                            `— clicking it to advance to the real login page ` +
+                            `(${signInAdvanceClicks}/${MAX_SIGN_IN_ADVANCE_CLICKS})`);
+                        try {
+                            await this.browser.click(advance.selector);
+                        }
+                        catch (err) {
+                            steps.push(`OAuth-first: sign-in advance click failed (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}) ` +
+                                `— falling through to form-fill`);
+                        }
+                        // Reset the async-render budget for the now-advanced page so
+                        // its provider buttons get the same couple of render retries.
+                        oauthScanRetries = 0;
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                }
                 steps.push("OAuth-first: no usable provider affordance on the page — " +
                     "falling back to form-fill");
                 // Dump visible buttons/links so we can see what the OAuth-
@@ -2539,6 +2863,27 @@ export class SignupAgent {
                             emptyInputHint;
                     continue;
                 }
+                // A submit-selector visibility timeout means the element the
+                // planner picked is no longer on the page — typically because an
+                // earlier action in THIS plan advanced a multi-step SPA (Paddle's
+                // signup: a "Continue" click navigates to a new screen, so the
+                // submit selector that resolved at plan-time has vanished by the
+                // time clickSubmit polls for it). The page DID move forward, so
+                // re-plan against the new state rather than failing the whole run
+                // on a stale selector. Bounded by the same progressReplans
+                // headroom as the disabled-submit / post-validation re-plans.
+                if (isSubmitTimeout(reason)) {
+                    if (++progressReplans > MAX_PROGRESS_REPLANS) {
+                        return { kind: "submit_failed", reason };
+                    }
+                    steps.push(`⚠ submit selector went stale (${reason.split("\n")[0]}) — the page likely advanced; re-planning`);
+                    hint =
+                        "The submit button selected last round was no longer present when " +
+                            "we tried to click it — an earlier action probably advanced the page. " +
+                            "Re-read the now-visible form and plan the next step (pick the submit " +
+                            "button that is actually on the current screen).";
+                    continue;
+                }
                 steps.push(`⚠ submit click failed: ${reason}`);
                 return { kind: "submit_failed", reason };
             }
@@ -3250,10 +3595,25 @@ export class SignupAgent {
             // Step 7: Email verification + post-verification navigation.
             let verificationFailed;
             if (credentials.api_key === undefined && credentials.username === undefined) {
-                // S3: read the post-submit page first. Whether it is actually
-                // asking the user to confirm by email decides both the no-inbox
-                // bail (M2) and, when an inbox exists, the poll duration.
-                const expectsEmail = expectsVerificationEmail(await this.browser.extractText());
+                // S3: read the post-submit page to decide both the no-inbox bail
+                // (M2) and, when an inbox exists, the poll duration. The page is
+                // read up to TWICE: once immediately, then — only if the first
+                // read was inconclusive — again after a short settle, because SPA
+                // signups render the "check your email" screen a beat after submit
+                // and sampling once races that render (the bug behind the
+                // Postmark/ElevenLabs/Browserbase/Grafana false `verification_not_sent`).
+                let postSubmitText = await this.browser.extractText();
+                let expectsEmail = expectsVerificationEmail(postSubmitText);
+                if (!expectsEmail && !submitWasRejected(postSubmitText)) {
+                    await this.browser.wait(SUBMIT_SETTLE_SECONDS);
+                    postSubmitText = await this.browser.extractText();
+                    expectsEmail = expectsVerificationEmail(postSubmitText);
+                }
+                // A clean submit that did NOT visibly reject created an account —
+                // verification mail is plausibly inbound even without a "check
+                // your email" screen. Distinguish that from a rejected submit
+                // (already-registered, validation error) where no mail is coming.
+                const submitRejected = submitWasRejected(postSubmitText);
                 if (task.inbox === undefined) {
                     // M2/S3: no inbox to receive a verification email (the SES
                     // inbound pipeline is mothballed — TODOS M1). If the page is
@@ -3273,15 +3633,25 @@ export class SignupAgent {
                     }
                 }
                 else {
-                    // S3: don't blind-wait. If the page explicitly tells the user
-                    // to check their email, poll the full timeout; if not, the
-                    // service most likely sent nothing — run a short probe.
+                    // S3: don't blind-wait, but don't under-poll a clean submit
+                    // either. Three cases:
+                    //   - page says "check your email"  → full timeout (mail is
+                    //     definitely coming).
+                    //   - submit visibly rejected       → 45s probe (no account was
+                    //     created; no mail is coming).
+                    //   - inconclusive but submit clean → 120s floor (an account was
+                    //     created, so transactional mail is plausibly inbound and
+                    //     can outlast the 45s probe; bounded below the full timeout).
                     const verificationTimeoutSeconds = expectsEmail
                         ? (task.verificationTimeoutSeconds ?? 180)
-                        : VERIFICATION_PROBE_SECONDS;
+                        : submitRejected
+                            ? VERIFICATION_PROBE_SECONDS
+                            : SUBMITTED_PROBE_FLOOR_SECONDS;
                     steps.push(expectsEmail
                         ? `Post-submit page asks to check email — polling inbox (up to ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s)...`
-                        : `Post-submit page shows no "check your email" prompt — short ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s probe (S3: the service likely sent no verification email)...`);
+                        : submitRejected
+                            ? `Post-submit page shows a rejected submit — short ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s probe (S3: no account created, no verification email expected)...`
+                            : `Post-submit page is inconclusive but submit was clean — polling inbox up to ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s (S3: an account may have been created and mail can lag)...`);
                     try {
                         const email = await this.waitForVerificationEmail(task.inbox, task.email, verificationTimeoutSeconds);
                         steps.push(`Received: "${email.subject}" from ${email.from_address}`);
@@ -3325,7 +3695,9 @@ export class SignupAgent {
                         steps.push(`Inbox poll failed: ${detail}`);
                         verificationFailed = expectsEmail
                             ? `verification_not_sent: form submitted and the page asked to check email, but none arrived in ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s — the service likely withheld it (anti-abuse) or requires manual signup`
-                            : `verification_not_sent: form submitted but the page never prompted to check email and none arrived in the ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s probe — the service most likely dispatched no verification email`;
+                            : submitRejected
+                                ? `verification_not_sent: form submitted but the page reported a rejected submit (already-registered / validation error) and no mail arrived in the ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s probe — no account was created`
+                                : `verification_not_sent: form submitted cleanly but no "check your email" prompt appeared and none arrived in ${verificationTimeoutSeconds}s — the service likely withheld it (fresh-domain anti-abuse) or verifies by another channel (SMS / authenticator)`;
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -4445,6 +4817,206 @@ ${formatInventory(input.inventory)}`,
         }
         return out;
     }
+    // Run every visible-credential extraction tier the post-verify loop
+    // uses (legacy regex/clipboard/hidden-input + DOM-proximity labeled),
+    // merging first-wins into a single bundle. Used by attemptMintNewKey
+    // so the freshly-minted key — which may render as a modal value, a
+    // copy-button-only token, or a labeled table row — is caught by
+    // whichever tier fits the vendor's reveal UI.
+    async harvestVisibleCredentials() {
+        const out = {};
+        try {
+            const legacy = await this.extractCredentials();
+            for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(legacy)) {
+                if (out[k] === undefined)
+                    out[k] = v;
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best-effort — fall through to DOM-proximity
+        }
+        try {
+            const labeled = await this.extractFromDomProximity();
+            for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(labeled)) {
+                if (out[k] === undefined)
+                    out[k] = v;
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best-effort
+        }
+        return out;
+    }
+    // SUCCEED on an already-signed-in / existing-account dashboard.
+    //
+    // When the bot lands on an authenticated dashboard whose API-keys
+    // page shows only NAMES of pre-existing keys (values are shown once
+    // at create-time and are unrecoverable), the historic behavior was to
+    // bail with existing_account_no_extract / no_credentials_after_already
+    // _signed_in. That's a usable outcome the bot threw away: a new key is
+    // a perfectly valid credential.
+    //
+    // This routine, given the current (existing-account) state:
+    //   1. Tries to extract a READABLE key right where we are — some
+    //      dashboards do show a usable value (a default key on a freshly
+    //      reused account, or a reveal affordance the loop hadn't fired).
+    //   2. If the current page isn't a keys page, walks the same
+    //      hardcoded keys-path fallbacks the stuck-loop escalation uses,
+    //      re-trying the readable-key extract at each.
+    //   3. On a keys page with no readable key, finds a "Create new key /
+    //      Generate API key / New token" affordance and CLICKS it, then
+    //      harvests the freshly-minted value (modal reveal + copy-button +
+    //      clipboard + labeled-row, via harvestVisibleCredentials, after a
+    //      short poll for the server round-trip that mints the key).
+    //
+    // Returns the minted/extracted credentials on success, or null when
+    // there is genuinely no way to produce a key for this identity (no
+    // create affordance anywhere — e.g. key creation is paywalled). The
+    // caller then falls through to the honest existing_account bail.
+    //
+    // Best-effort throughout: any browser error degrades to "couldn't
+    // mint" (null) rather than throwing — the existing classifier remains
+    // the safety net.
+    async attemptMintNewKey(steps) {
+        // The set of keys-page URLs we've navigated, so the fallback walk
+        // doesn't revisit one and the create-affordance search doesn't
+        // re-click on a page already shown to lack one.
+        const visitedKeysUrls = new Set();
+        // Attempt readable-extract → create-and-extract on whatever page is
+        // currently loaded. Returns credentials on success, null otherwise.
+        const tryHere = async () => {
+            // (a) A readable key already on the page (or behind a reveal
+            //     affordance the post-verify loop hadn't clicked yet).
+            let creds = await this.harvestVisibleCredentials();
+            if (hasAnyExtractedCredential(creds)) {
+                steps.push("Existing-account recovery: a readable key was already present on the keys page — extracted it.");
+                return creds;
+            }
+            // (b) Reveal pass — a masked-but-revealable existing key.
+            try {
+                const revealRes = await this.browser.revealMaskedCredentials();
+                if (revealRes.clicked > 0) {
+                    await this.browser.wait(1);
+                    creds = await this.harvestVisibleCredentials();
+                    if (hasAnyExtractedCredential(creds)) {
+                        steps.push(`Existing-account recovery: revealed a masked existing key (clicked ${revealRes.clicked}) and extracted it.`);
+                        return creds;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            catch {
+                // best-effort reveal
+            }
+            // (c) Mint a fresh key. Find + click a create affordance, then
+            //     harvest the newly-shown value.
+            const inventory = await this.buildInventory(steps, undefined, 80);
+            const createBtn = findCreateKeyAffordance(inventory);
+            if (createBtn === null)
+                return null;
+            const label = (createBtn.visibleText ??
+                createBtn.ariaLabel ??
+                createBtn.title ??
+                "create key").trim();
+            steps.push(`Existing-account recovery: no readable key — clicking a key-minting affordance ${JSON.stringify(label.slice(0, 40))}.`);
+            try {
+                await this.browser.click(createBtn.selector);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                steps.push(`Existing-account recovery: create-key click failed (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}).`);
+                return null;
+            }
+            // Poll for the freshly-minted key — minting is a server
+            // round-trip (Render/Mistral/Mailtrap render the value into a
+            // modal after the POST returns). Reuse the modal-reveal poll
+            // budget the click branch uses elsewhere (~8s), early-exiting the
+            // moment any tier surfaces a credential. A confirmation dialog
+            // ("Name your key" → Create) is common; fire the reveal pass each
+            // round so a modal that needs a second confirm-then-show click is
+            // still harvested.
+            const deadline = Date.now() + 8000;
+            while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+                await this.browser.wait(0.5);
+                const minted = await this.harvestVisibleCredentials();
+                if (hasAnyExtractedCredential(minted)) {
+                    steps.push("Existing-account recovery: extracted the freshly-minted key.");
+                    return minted;
+                }
+                // A two-step create modal: clicking the page-level "Create key"
+                // opened a "name + confirm" dialog. Click a now-visible confirm
+                // affordance once, then keep polling.
+                try {
+                    const modalInv = await this.browser.extractInteractiveElements();
+                    const confirmBtn = findCreateKeyAffordance(modalInv);
+                    if (confirmBtn !== null &&
+                        confirmBtn.selector !== createBtn.selector) {
+                        await this.browser.click(confirmBtn.selector);
+                    }
+                }
+                catch {
+                    // best-effort confirm
+                }
+            }
+            // Minted but the value didn't surface — try one last reveal +
+            // harvest (some vendors render the new key masked with a Show
+            // toggle even on first display).
+            try {
+                const revealRes = await this.browser.revealMaskedCredentials();
+                if (revealRes.clicked > 0) {
+                    await this.browser.wait(1);
+                    const afterReveal = await this.harvestVisibleCredentials();
+                    if (hasAnyExtractedCredential(afterReveal)) {
+                        steps.push("Existing-account recovery: revealed and extracted the freshly-minted key.");
+                        return afterReveal;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            catch {
+                // best-effort
+            }
+            return null;
+        };
+        // Step 1 — try on the current page first.
+        try {
+            const state = await this.browser.getState();
+            visitedKeysUrls.add(state.url);
+            if (EXISTING_KEY_URL_HINT.test(state.url)) {
+                const here = await tryHere();
+                if (here !== null)
+                    return here;
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best-effort — fall through to the fallback walk
+        }
+        // Step 2 — walk the hardcoded keys-path fallbacks. Even if Step 1
+        // ran (current page WAS a keys page but had no affordance), a
+        // different keys URL on the same origin may carry the create
+        // control (org-scoped vs account-scoped keys pages).
+        for (let i = 0; i < STUCK_LOOP_FALLBACK_PATHS.length; i++) {
+            let currentUrl;
+            try {
+                currentUrl = (await this.browser.getState()).url;
+            }
+            catch {
+                break;
+            }
+            const fallback = pickStuckLoopFallbackUrl(currentUrl, visitedKeysUrls);
+            if (fallback === null)
+                break;
+            visitedKeysUrls.add(fallback);
+            try {
+                await this.browser.goto(fallback);
+                await this.browser.waitForInteractiveDom(5, 15_000);
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const here = await tryHere();
+            if (here !== null)
+                return here;
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
     async postVerifyLoop(args) {
         let credentials = await this.extractCredentials();
         // 0.8.2-rc.15 — also seed DOM-proximity at loop entry. If the
@@ -5087,7 +5659,7 @@ ${formatInventory(input.inventory)}`,
                             hint = undefined;
                             continue;
                         }
-                        const fallback = pickStuckLoopFallbackUrl(state.url, triedFallbackUrls);
+                        const fallback = pickStuckLoopFallbackUrl(state.url, triedFallbackUrls, args.service);
                         if (fallback !== null) {
                             triedFallbackUrls.add(fallback);
                             args.steps.push(`Post-verify: stuck-loop detected ${stuckFiresAtUrl}x at ${state.url} — escalating to a hardcoded API-key URL: ${fallback}`);
@@ -5633,24 +6205,69 @@ ${formatInventory(input.inventory)}`,
         // correctly, the state is just unrecoverable for this identity.
         const alreadyClassified = this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason !== null &&
             this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason.startsWith("[");
-        if (credentials.api_key === undefined &&
-            credentials.username === undefined &&
-            !alreadyClassified) {
+        const noCredentialYet = credentials.api_key === undefined && credentials.username === undefined;
+        // Distinct from a generic prior classification: ONLY the existing-
+        // account path is recoverable by minting. A [stuck_loop] / [paywall]
+        // / [anti_bot] marker is a different failure the mint flow can't fix,
+        // so leave those alone.
+        const alreadyExistingAccount = this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason !== null &&
+            this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason.startsWith("[existing_account_no_extract]");
+        // The mint flow is appropriate for the existing-account /
+        // already-signed-in category ONLY. A [stuck_loop] / [paywall] /
+        // [anti_bot] marker is a different, non-recoverable failure — leave
+        // those alone. An UNclassified exit reaching here IS the
+        // already-signed-in case (postVerifyLoop only runs on an
+        // authenticated dashboard — `already_oauth` / post-OAuth), so it's
+        // eligible too; the mint flow self-gates by requiring a real keys
+        // page + a create affordance before it acts.
+        const mintEligible = noCredentialYet && (!alreadyClassified || alreadyExistingAccount);
+        if (mintEligible) {
+            // SUCCEED-EVEN-WHEN-ACCOUNT-EXISTS: before bailing, navigate to
+            // the keys page and either extract a readable key or mint a fresh
+            // one. A new key is a valid outcome. attemptMintNewKey returns
+            // null when there is genuinely no create affordance anywhere (key
+            // creation paywalled / no keys page) — then we fall through to the
+            // honest bail.
+            let minted = null;
             try {
-                const finalState = await this.browser.getState();
-                const finalText = await this.browser.extractText().catch(() => "");
-                if (detectExistingAccountNoExtract({
-                    url: finalState.url,
-                    pageText: finalText,
-                    lastPlannerReason: this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason ?? "",
-                })) {
-                    this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason =
-                        `[existing_account_no_extract] at ${finalState.url}; latest planner reason: ${this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason ?? "(none — loop exhausted)"}`;
-                    args.steps.push("Post-verify: classified as existing_account_no_extract — masked pre-existing key on an authenticated dashboard.");
-                }
+                minted = await this.attemptMintNewKey(args.steps);
             }
             catch {
-                // best-effort classifier — never block returning the (empty) credentials
+                // best-effort — degrade to the existing classifier below
+            }
+            if (minted !== null && hasAnyExtractedCredential(minted)) {
+                for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(minted)) {
+                    if (credentials[k] === undefined)
+                        credentials[k] = v;
+                }
+                // Clear any existing-account sentinel — we recovered.
+                if (alreadyExistingAccount)
+                    this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason = null;
+                args.steps.push("Post-verify: existing-account / already-signed-in dashboard recovered — minted/extracted a usable key instead of bailing.");
+                return credentials;
+            }
+            // Mint failed. If the masked-pre-existing-key shape is detectable
+            // AND not already flagged by the stuck-loop early-exit, mark the
+            // honest existing_account_no_extract bail so the caller surfaces
+            // the precise status rather than the generic
+            // no_credentials_after_already_signed_in.
+            if (!alreadyExistingAccount) {
+                try {
+                    const finalState = await this.browser.getState();
+                    const finalText = await this.browser.extractText().catch(() => "");
+                    if (detectExistingAccountNoExtract({
+                        url: finalState.url,
+                        pageText: finalText,
+                        lastPlannerReason: this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason ?? "",
+                    })) {
+                        this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason =
+                            `[existing_account_no_extract] at ${finalState.url}; latest planner reason: ${this.lastPostVerifyDoneReason ?? "(none — loop exhausted)"}`;
+                        args.steps.push("Post-verify: classified as existing_account_no_extract — pre-existing keys are masked and no key-minting affordance was found.");
+                    }
+                }
+                catch {
+                    // best-effort classifier — never block returning credentials
+                }
             }
         }
         return credentials;