@trac3er/oh-my-god 2.2.3 → 2.3.0

package/build/lib/hooks/secret-guard.py

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""PreToolUse Hook (Read/Write/Edit/MultiEdit): Secret File Guard (Enterprise)
-
-Delegates file policy decisions to policy_engine.py.
-"""
-import json
-import os
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-
-HOOKS_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent)
-PROJECT_ROOT = str(Path(HOOKS_DIR).parent)
-PORTABLE_RUNTIME_ROOT = str(Path(PROJECT_ROOT) / "omg-runtime")
-for path in (HOOKS_DIR, PROJECT_ROOT, PORTABLE_RUNTIME_ROOT):
-    if path not in sys.path:
-        sys.path.insert(0, path)
-
-from _common import bootstrap_runtime_paths, setup_crash_handler, json_input, deny_decision, is_bypass_mode, get_project_dir
-
-bootstrap_runtime_paths(__file__)
-
-# Fail-closed: deny on crash (security hook)
-setup_crash_handler("secret-guard", fail_closed=True)
-
-try:
-    from policy_engine import evaluate_file_access, to_pretool_hook_output
-    from secret_audit import log_secret_access
-    from runtime.mutation_gate import check_mutation_allowed
-except Exception as _import_err:
-    print(f"OMG secret-guard: policy_engine import failed: {_import_err}", file=sys.stderr)
-    deny_decision(f"OMG secret-guard crash: policy_engine import failed: {_import_err}. Denying for safety.")
-    sys.exit(0)
-
-data = json_input()
-
-tool = data.get("tool_name", "")
-if tool not in ("Read", "Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit"):
-    sys.exit(0)
-
-file_path = data.get("tool_input", {}).get("file_path", "")
-if not file_path:
-    sys.exit(0)
-
-if tool in ("Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit"):
-    tool_input = data.get("tool_input", {})
-    metadata = tool_input.get("metadata") if isinstance(tool_input, dict) else None
-    lock_id = tool_input.get("lock_id") if isinstance(tool_input, dict) else None
-    if not isinstance(lock_id, str) and isinstance(metadata, dict):
-        lock_id = metadata.get("lock_id")
-    exemption = tool_input.get("exemption") if isinstance(tool_input, dict) else None
-
-    gate_result = check_mutation_allowed(
-        tool=tool,
-        file_path=file_path,
-        project_dir=get_project_dir(),
-        lock_id=lock_id if isinstance(lock_id, str) else None,
-        exemption=exemption if isinstance(exemption, str) else None,
-    )
-    if gate_result.get("status") == "blocked":
-        deny_reason = str(gate_result.get("reason", "mutation denied by test intent lock gate"))
-        try:
-            log_secret_access(
-                project_dir=get_project_dir(),
-                tool=tool,
-                file_path=file_path,
-                decision="deny",
-                reason=deny_reason,
-                allowlisted=False,
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-        deny_decision(deny_reason)
-        sys.exit(0)
-
-decision = evaluate_file_access(tool, file_path)
-
-# Audit log: record every secret access decision
-try:
-    log_secret_access(
-        project_dir=get_project_dir(),
-        tool=tool,
-        file_path=file_path,
-        decision=decision.action,
-        reason=decision.reason,
-        allowlisted=False,
-    )
-except Exception:
-    pass  # Crash isolation: audit logging must never break the hook
-
-# In bypass-permission mode, only enforce hard denials (critical safety).
-# Skip "ask" decisions so the user is not prompted for confirmation.
-if is_bypass_mode(data) and decision.action != "deny":
-    sys.exit(0)
-
-out = to_pretool_hook_output(decision)
-if out:
-    json.dump(out, sys.stdout)
-
-sys.exit(0)

package/build/lib/hooks/secret_audit.py

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Secret access audit logging for OMG v1 (T21).
-
-Logs every secret access attempt (allow/deny/ask) to
-.omg/state/ledger/secret-access.jsonl with:
-- fcntl file locking (same pattern as tool-ledger.py)
-- 5MB rotation with single .1 archive
-- Secret path masking (redact paths matching secret patterns)
-
-Pure stdlib — no external dependencies.
-"""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import re
-import shutil
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-
-# --- Constants ---
-
-SECRET_ACCESS_LOG = "secret-access.jsonl"
-SECRET_ACCESS_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024  # 5MB
-
-# Patterns that indicate a path should be redacted in audit logs.
-# Aligned with policy_engine.py SECRET_FILE_PATTERNS / BLOCKED_PATH_PATTERNS.
-_REDACT_PATH_PATTERNS = [
-    r"\.(env|pem|key|p12|pfx|jks|keystore|netrc|npmrc|pypirc)(\.\w+)?$",
-    r"(^|/)\.aws/",
-    r"(^|/)\.ssh/",
-    r"(^|/)\.kube/",
-    r"(^|/)\.gnupg/",
-    r"(^|/)secrets?/",
-    r"(^|/)credentials?\.",
-    r"(^|/)passwords?\.",
-    r"(^|/)tokens?\.",
-]
-
-# Safe env reference files that should NOT be redacted
-_SAFE_ENV_PATTERN = re.compile(r"\.env\.(example|sample|template)$", re.IGNORECASE)
-
-
-def mask_secret_path(file_path: str) -> str:
-    """Redact file paths that match secret patterns.
-
-    Returns '[REDACTED]' for paths matching known secret file patterns.
-    Safe references (.env.example, .env.sample, .env.template) are NOT redacted.
-    """
-    if not file_path:
-        return file_path
-
-    # Safe env references pass through unmasked
-    basename = os.path.basename(file_path)
-    if _SAFE_ENV_PATTERN.search(basename):
-        return file_path
-
-    for pat in _REDACT_PATH_PATTERNS:
-        if re.search(pat, file_path, re.IGNORECASE):
-            return "[REDACTED]"
-
-    return file_path
-
-
-def _rotate_log(log_path: str) -> None:
-    """Rotate log file if it exceeds 5MB. Same pattern as tool-ledger.py."""
-    try:
-        if not os.path.exists(log_path):
-            return
-        size = os.path.getsize(log_path)
-        if size <= SECRET_ACCESS_MAX_BYTES:
-            return
-
-        archive = log_path + ".1"
-        # Keep only one archive — replace old one
-        if os.path.exists(archive):
-            try:
-                os.remove(archive)
-            except OSError:
-                pass
-        shutil.move(log_path, archive)
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-
-
-def log_secret_access(
-    project_dir: str,
-    tool: str,
-    file_path: str,
-    decision: str,
-    reason: str,
-    allowlisted: bool,
-) -> None:
-    """Log a secret access decision to .omg/state/ledger/secret-access.jsonl.
-
-    Args:
-        project_dir: Project root directory
-        tool: Tool name (Read, Write, Edit, MultiEdit)
-        file_path: File being accessed (will be masked if it matches secret patterns)
-        decision: Policy decision (allow, deny, ask)
-        reason: Human-readable reason for the decision
-        allowlisted: Whether the access was via an allowlist bypass
-
-    Creates the ledger directory if it doesn't exist.
-    Uses fcntl file locking for concurrent safety.
-    Rotates at 5MB with a single .1 archive.
-    Silently fails — never raises exceptions (crash isolation invariant).
-    """
-    try:
-        ledger_dir = os.path.join(project_dir, ".omg", "state", "ledger")
-        os.makedirs(ledger_dir, exist_ok=True)
-
-        log_path = os.path.join(ledger_dir, SECRET_ACCESS_LOG)
-
-        # Rotate if needed
-        _rotate_log(log_path)
-
-        # Build entry with masked path
-        entry = {
-            "ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-            "tool": tool,
-            "file": mask_secret_path(file_path),
-            "decision": decision,
-            "reason": reason,
-            "allowlisted": allowlisted,
-        }
-
-        # Write with fcntl locking (same pattern as tool-ledger.py)
-        try:
-            import fcntl
-
-            fd = open(log_path, "a")
-            fcntl.flock(fd.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX | fcntl.LOCK_NB)
-            fd.write(json.dumps(entry, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n")
-            fcntl.flock(fd.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            fd.close()
-        except (ImportError, BlockingIOError):
-            # Fallback: write without locking
-            try:
-                with open(log_path, "a") as f:
-                    f.write(json.dumps(entry, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n")
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-    except Exception:
-        pass  # Crash isolation: never fail the hook

package/build/lib/hooks/security_validators.py

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-"""Shared validation helpers for security-sensitive filesystem and config writes."""
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-from pathlib import Path
-from urllib.parse import urlparse
-
-
-_OPAQUE_IDENTIFIER_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$")
-_SERVER_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$")
-
-
-def validate_opaque_identifier(value: str, field_name: str, max_length: int = 64) -> str:
-    """Validate an opaque identifier used in filenames or paths."""
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid {field_name}: must be a string")
-
-    normalized = value.strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid {field_name}: value is required")
-    if len(normalized) > max_length:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid {field_name}: exceeds {max_length} characters")
-    if ".." in normalized or not _OPAQUE_IDENTIFIER_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"Invalid {field_name}: use only ASCII letters, numbers, dot, underscore, and dash"
-        )
-    return normalized
-
-
-def ensure_path_within_dir(base_dir: str | Path, candidate_path: str | Path) -> str:
-    """Return a resolved path and reject traversal outside the intended base directory."""
-    base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)
-    candidate = Path(candidate_path).resolve(strict=False)
-    try:
-        candidate.relative_to(base)
-    except ValueError as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f"Resolved path escapes base directory: {candidate}") from exc
-    return str(candidate)
-
-
-def validate_server_name(server_name: str, max_length: int = 64) -> str:
-    """Validate an MCP server identifier suitable for JSON keys and TOML table names."""
-    if not isinstance(server_name, str):
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_name: must be a string")
-
-    normalized = server_name.strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_name: value is required")
-    if len(normalized) > max_length:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid server_name: exceeds {max_length} characters")
-    if not _SERVER_NAME_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_name: use only ASCII letters, numbers, underscore, and dash")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def validate_server_url(server_url: str) -> str:
-    """Validate an MCP server URL and reject newline/control injection."""
-    if not isinstance(server_url, str):
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_url: must be a string")
-
-    normalized = server_url.strip()
-    if not normalized:
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_url: value is required")
-    if "\n" in normalized or "\r" in normalized:
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_url: newline characters are not allowed")
-
-    parsed = urlparse(normalized)
-    if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
-        raise ValueError("Invalid server_url: must be an http or https URL")
-    return normalized
-
-
-def toml_quote_string(value: str) -> str:
-    """Escape TOML basic string content."""
-    return value.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')