@tpsdev-ai/flair 0.9.0 → 0.10.1

package/dist/resources/auth-middleware.js

@@ -110,12 +110,18 @@ async function backfillEmbedding(memoryId) {
 // ─── HTTP middleware ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 server.http(async (request, nextLayer) => {
     const url = new URL(request.url, "http://" + (request.headers.get("host") || "localhost"));
+    // A2A discovery endpoints: GET returns public agent-card metadata (per
+    // A2A spec, cards are intentionally public). POST invokes JSON-RPC
+    // actions (message/send writes OrgEvents on behalf of agents,
+    // tasks/list reads Beads issues, message/stream subscribes to
+    // OrgEvents) — those must be authenticated. Narrowing to GET-only
+    // closes the P0 where any caller could forge OrgEvents as any agent
+    // and read all internal Beads issues unauthenticated.
+    const isA2APath = url.pathname === "/a2a" || url.pathname === "/A2AAdapter" || url.pathname.startsWith("/A2AAdapter/");
     if (url.pathname === "/health" ||
         url.pathname === "/Health" ||
-        url.pathname === "/a2a" ||
-        url.pathname === "/A2AAdapter" ||
+        (request.method === "GET" && isA2APath) ||
         url.pathname === "/AgentCard" ||
-        url.pathname.startsWith("/A2AAdapter/") ||
         url.pathname.startsWith("/AgentCard/") ||
         // FederationSync uses Ed25519 body-signature auth with anti-replay, validated
         // by the resource handler (allowCreate=true, same pattern as FederationPair).
@@ -136,7 +142,7 @@ server.http(async (request, nextLayer) => {
         // and inline JS, with no embedded data. The JS prompts for admin-pass and
         // auths every API call (/Agent, /SemanticSearch, /FederationPeers, etc).
         // Without this allow-list entry, the HTML is 401-blocked on hosted Flair
-        // instances (rockit-local works only because authorizeLocal=true).
+        // instances (a localhost caller works only because authorizeLocal=true).
         url.pathname === "/ObservationCenter")
         return nextLayer(request);
     // If Harper has already authorized this request (e.g. authorizeLocal=true on localhost),
@@ -266,32 +272,34 @@ server.http(async (request, nextLayer) => {
     request.tpsAgent = agentId;
     request._tpsAuthVerified = true;
     request.tpsAgentIsAdmin = await isAdmin(agentId);
-    // Swap the Authorization header to Basic admin auth so Harper's internal auth
-    // pipeline (passport) authenticates the request with full permissions including
-    // HNSW vector search. This requires HDB_ADMIN_PASSWORD to be set.
-    // NOTE: server.getUser() alone doesn't grant HNSW permissions in Harper v5.
-    const adminPass = getAdminPass();
-    if (adminPass !== null) {
-        try {
-            const superAuth = "Basic " + btoa("admin:" + adminPass);
-            request.headers.set("authorization", superAuth);
-            if (request.headers.asObject)
-                request.headers.asObject.authorization = superAuth;
-        }
-        catch {
-            // Header manipulation failed — fall back to getUser
-            try {
-                request.user = await server.getUser("admin", null, request);
-            }
-            catch { }
-        }
+    // Grant Harper-level permissions for the cryptographically-verified agent by
+    // setting request.user directly to the admin super_user.
+    //
+    // Prior approach swapped the Authorization header to "Basic admin:<pass>" so
+    // Harper's auth pipeline would re-authenticate with full (HNSW-capable)
+    // permissions. That silently broke under Harper 5.0.9: its authentication
+    // layer (security/auth.ts `authentication()`) reads the Authorization header
+    // and resolves request.user BEFORE invoking this middleware via nextHandler.
+    // A TPS-Ed25519 header matches no Basic/Bearer strategy, so Harper sets
+    // request.user = null and never re-reads the header — our post-hoc swap was
+    // ignored, the request ran unauthenticated, and Harper surfaced it downstream
+    // as a generic "Login failed" 401. (Broke at the 2026-05-27 daemon restart,
+    // which loaded 5.0.9 fresh; the prior long-running process held an older
+    // in-memory Harper where the late header read still worked.)
+    //
+    // Setting request.user directly is the supported extension path and is honored
+    // by all downstream resources, including HNSW vector search. getUser(admin,
+    // null) looks up the admin record WITHOUT password validation — safe here
+    // because the Ed25519 signature verified above already proves agent identity
+    // cryptographically; no Basic credential is presented. This preserves the
+    // prior privilege model (verified agents act with admin perms; per-agent data
+    // isolation is still enforced downstream via the x-tps-agent header below).
+    try {
+        request.user = await server.getUser("admin", null, request);
     }
-    else {
-        // No admin password configured — try server.getUser as fallback (limited permissions)
-        try {
-            request.user = await server.getUser("admin", null, request);
-        }
-        catch { }
+    catch {
+        // Admin record unavailable — request proceeds as the verified tpsAgent
+        // without elevated perms; resource-level scoping still applies.
     }
     // Propagate authenticated agent to downstream resources via header.
     // Resources can read this to enforce agent-level scoping.

package/dist/resources/federation-classify.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * Pure classifier for federation sync records — no Harper imports.
+ *
+ * Extracted from Federation.ts so the decision can be unit-tested without
+ * spinning up Harper's database module. The same SkipReason names are used
+ * in SyncLog.skippedReasons so operators can grep for them.
+ */
+export function classifyRecord(record, peerRole, receiverInstanceId, local, knownTables, now = new Date()) {
+    if (!knownTables.has(record.table)) {
+        return { action: "skip", reason: "unknown_table" };
+    }
+    const originator = record.originatorInstanceId ?? receiverInstanceId;
+    if (originator !== receiverInstanceId && peerRole !== "hub") {
+        return { action: "skip", reason: "non_originator" };
+    }
+    const fiveMinFromNow = new Date(now.getTime() + 5 * 60 * 1000).toISOString();
+    if (record.updatedAt > fiveMinFromNow) {
+        return { action: "skip", reason: "future_timestamp" };
+    }
+    const remoteContentHash = record.data?.contentHash;
+    if (local &&
+        local.contentHash &&
+        remoteContentHash &&
+        local.contentHash === remoteContentHash &&
+        record.updatedAt <= (local.updatedAt ?? "")) {
+        return { action: "skip", reason: "no_op_same_hash" };
+    }
+    return { action: "merge", originator };
+}

package/dist/resources/health.js

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ const exists = async (path) => {
  * which is what makes /Health work for callers outside `authorizeLocal`'s
  * localhost-bypass. Without this, Harper's intrinsic Basic-auth gate fires
  * BEFORE our HTTP middleware can apply the /Health bypass list in
- * auth-middleware.ts, so remote callers (e.g., from rockit hitting a Fabric-
+ * auth-middleware.ts, so remote callers (e.g., from a remote host hitting a Fabric-
  * hosted Flair) get a 401 even though the Resource handler is intentionally
  * unauthenticated. Symptom matched: Fabric returned 401 + WWW-Authenticate:
- * Basic on /Health while rockit-localhost returned 200 — the difference was
+ * Basic on /Health while a localhost caller returned 200 — the difference was
  * Harper's localhost-auto-auth, not anything in our code.
  *
  * Same pattern as `FederationPair.allowCreate(){ return true }` (PR #299):
@@ -201,13 +201,18 @@ export class HealthDetail extends Resource {
             for await (const s of db.flair.Soul.search({}))
                 souls.push(s);
             stats.soulEntries = souls.length;
-            const byPriority = { critical: 0, high: 0, standard: 0, low: 0 };
+            // Soul entries have no severity dimension — they are keyed identity facts
+            // (role / project / standards / …). A per-priority breakdown was dead
+            // telemetry: nothing writes Soul.priority to anything but "standard", and
+            // the `?? "standard"` fallback also mislabelled *unset* as *standard*, so
+            // it always read 100% standard regardless of the data. Report the honest
+            // dimension instead — a count per key.
+            const byKey = {};
             for (const s of souls) {
-                const p = (s.priority ?? "standard");
-                if (p in byPriority)
-                    byPriority[p]++;
+                const k = (s.key ?? "(unkeyed)");
+                byKey[k] = (byKey[k] ?? 0) + 1;
             }
-            stats.soul = { total: souls.length, byPriority };
+            stats.soul = { total: souls.length, byKey };
         }
         catch {
             stats.soulEntries = null;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tpsdev-ai/flair",
-  "version": "0.9.0",
+  "version": "0.10.1",
   "description": "Identity, memory, and soul for AI agents. Cryptographic identity (Ed25519), semantic memory with local embeddings, and persistent personality — all in a single process.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
     "node": ">=22"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@harperfast/harper": "5.0.9",
+    "@harperfast/harper": "5.0.21",
     "@types/js-yaml": "^4.0.9",
     "commander": "14.0.3",
     "harper-fabric-embeddings": "0.2.3",
@@ -64,6 +64,15 @@
     "tar": "^7.5.13",
     "tweetnacl": "1.0.3"
   },
+  "optionalDependencies": {
+    "@node-llama-cpp/linux-arm64": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/linux-armv7l": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/linux-x64": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/mac-arm64-metal": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/mac-x64": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/win-arm64": "3.18.1",
+    "@node-llama-cpp/win-x64": "3.18.1"
+  },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@playwright/test": "^1.59.1",
     "@types/node": "24.11.0",

package/schemas/federation.graphql

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ type Peer @table(database: "flair") @export {
   role: String @indexed            # "hub" | "spoke"
   endpoint: String                 # wss:// URL for the peer
   status: String @indexed          # "paired" | "connected" | "disconnected" | "revoked"
-  lastSyncAt: String               # last successful sync timestamp
+  lastSyncAt: String               # last contact with this peer (liveness signal)
+  lastMergeAt: String              # last sync where merged > 0 (data-progress signal)
   lastSyncCursor: String           # Lamport clock or ISO timestamp for incremental sync
   relayOnly: Boolean               # true for spoke-to-spoke peers announced by hub
   pairedAt: String
@@ -43,9 +44,11 @@ type SyncLog @table(database: "flair") {
   id: ID @primaryKey
   peerId: String! @indexed         # which peer this sync was with
   direction: String! @indexed      # "push" | "pull"
-  recordCount: Int                 # how many records in this sync batch
+  recordCount: Int                 # how many records merged in this batch
+  skippedCount: Int                # how many records skipped (sum of skippedReasons)
+  skippedReasons: String           # JSON: { unknown_table: N, non_originator: N, future_timestamp: N, no_op_same_hash: N, merge_error: N }
   status: String @indexed          # "success" | "partial" | "failed"
-  error: String                    # error message if failed
+  error: String                    # human-readable summary if partial/failed (includes per-record error messages, capped)
   durationMs: Int                  # how long the sync took
   createdAt: String! @indexed
 }

package/schemas/schema.graphql

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # ─── Observatory tables ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 type ObsOffice @table(database: "flair") @export {
-  id: ID @primaryKey        # e.g. "rockit"
+  id: ID @primaryKey        # e.g. "office1"
   name: String!
   publicKey: String!        # Ed25519 hex public key for auth verification
   status: String @indexed   # "online" | "offline" | "degraded"