@tpsdev-ai/flair 0.28.0 → 0.30.0

package/dist/resources/Integration.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 const FORBIDDEN = (msg) => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: msg }), { status: 403, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });
 const UNAUTH = () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "authentication required" }), { status: 401, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });

package/dist/resources/MCPClientMetadata.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { mcpIssuer } from "./mcp-oauth-flag.js";
 import { agentPublicKeyToJwk, buildCimdDocument } from "./mcp-client-metadata-fields.js";
 /**

package/dist/resources/Memory.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { patchRecord, withDetachedTxn } from "./table-helpers.js";
 import { isAdmin, resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { localInstanceId } from "./instance-identity.js";

package/dist/resources/MemoryBootstrap.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { allowVerified, resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { getEmbedding } from "./embeddings-provider.js";
 import { wrapUntrusted } from "./content-safety.js";

package/dist/resources/MemoryCandidate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+import { databases } from "harper";
+import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
+import { makeAuthGate, makeReadScope, makeByIdReadGate, resolveAuthGate, stampAttribution, FORBIDDEN, UNAUTH, } from "./record-type-kit.js";
+import { RECORD_TYPES } from "./record-types.js";
+// Parameterized from RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate (record-types slice 2,
+// flair#520) rather than a hand-typed "owner-only" literal — the registry is
+// the single source of truth this class draws its read-scope mode from.
+// Exported solely so test/unit/record-types-registry.test.ts's drift
+// tripwire can introspect the composed resolver's tagged `.mode`/
+// `.ownerField` against RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate — not for any other
+// runtime consumer.
+export const memoryCandidateReadScope = makeReadScope(RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.readScope, RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.ownerField);
+const memoryCandidateByIdReadGate = makeByIdReadGate(memoryCandidateReadScope);
+// See makeAuthGate's doc (record-type-kit.ts): must be wired as a genuine
+// prototype method below, never a class-field assignment.
+const memoryCandidateAuthGate = makeAuthGate();
+/**
+ * MemoryCandidate resource — closes flair#849.
+ *
+ * The schema (schemas/memory.graphql) declared `@table` for this type with
+ * no `@export` and no resource file at all, so it had NO REST surface —
+ * `flair rem candidates`/`promote`/`reject` (src/cli.ts) all 404'd on every
+ * call, a clean-room dogfood blocker. Adding bare `@export` would have
+ * reopened the exact P0 leak the memory-soul-read-gate family fix closed for
+ * every other agent-facing table: Harper's `Resource` default is
+ * `allowRead/allowCreate/allowUpdate/allowDelete(user) { return
+ * user?.role.permission.super_user }` (test/unit/resource-allow-decision.test.ts
+ * enforces every exported resource makes an explicit allow-decision instead
+ * of falling through to that default), so an unguarded `@export` is reachable
+ * by `authorizeLocal`'s forged loopback super_user and, once the global gate
+ * stops rejecting a genuinely anonymous remote caller, by that caller too.
+ *
+ * Read: identity-gated (allowRead — verified agents, admins, and trusted
+ * internal calls pass; anonymous HTTP denied) AND per-agent scoped
+ * ("owner-only" — see RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate's doc comment for why: a
+ * candidate is an unreviewed draft distillation, not yet promoted, and must
+ * not be org-readable). Same "owner-only" composition Relationship.ts uses,
+ * parameterized from the registry — this is NOT MemoryGrant.ts's bespoke
+ * owner-OR-grantee model (MemoryCandidate has no second-party field).
+ *
+ * Write: post()/put()/delete() all self-enforce inline (no allowCreate/
+ * allowUpdate/allowDelete wrapper — same deliberate omission Memory.ts's
+ * allowRead() doc explains: adding an unverified allow* gate on top of
+ * self-enforcing methods risks regressing owner writes). Non-admin agents
+ * may create/modify only their OWN candidates (`agentId` no-forge
+ * attribution, "validate-truthy" — present+mismatched agentId is rejected,
+ * absent passes through, matching Memory.post()/put()'s exact idiom for the
+ * same single-owner-field shape) and may delete only their own candidates
+ * (mirrors MemoryGrant.ts's delete() ownership check). Internal calls (the
+ * FLAIR-NIGHTLY-REM staging writer — resources/MemoryReflect.ts's
+ * `databases.flair.MemoryCandidate.put(row)` — and resources/health.ts's
+ * pending-count read) and admin agents pass every method unfiltered, exactly
+ * like every other table this pattern covers.
+ */
+export class MemoryCandidate extends databases.flair.MemoryCandidate {
+    /**
+     * Self-authorize now that the global gate is non-rejecting (memory-soul-
+     * read-gate family fix — same pattern as Memory.ts/Relationship.ts/
+     * WorkspaceState.ts/OrgEvent.ts/Soul.ts/MemoryGrant.ts). Harper routes
+     * `GET /MemoryCandidate/<id>` to get() and the collection describe
+     * (`GET /MemoryCandidate`) outside search(), so both must be gated here,
+     * not just search(). Per-record owner scoping happens in get() below; the
+     * collection scope is still in search().
+     */
+    allowRead() { return memoryCandidateAuthGate.call(this); }
+    /**
+     * Override get() to scope by-id reads the same way search() scopes
+     * collection reads. Never distinguishes "doesn't exist" from "exists but
+     * not yours" — both return 404, never 403, so a denied caller can't use
+     * get() to enumerate other agents' candidate ids (same discipline
+     * makeByIdReadGate documents, and MemoryGrant.ts's get() hand-rolls
+     * identically). `flair rem promote`/`flair rem reject` (src/cli.ts) both
+     * fetch a candidate by id before writing back — this is their read path.
+     */
+    async get(target) {
+        // Collection / query reads arrive as a RequestTarget with
+        // `isCollection === true`, and are governed by search() (same owner
+        // scoping). Only a genuine by-id get is ownership-checked below.
+        if (!target || (typeof target === "object" && target.isCollection)) {
+            return this.search(target);
+        }
+        return memoryCandidateByIdReadGate.call(this, target, (t) => super.get(t));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Scope collection reads to the caller's own candidates. This is the
+     * handler `flair rem candidates` reaches via `POST
+     * /MemoryCandidate/search_by_conditions` (src/cli.ts) — the agentId
+     * condition is wrapped as the OUTERMOST `and` block (Relationship.ts's
+     * same "Security Critical" discipline) so a caller-supplied `operator:
+     * "or"` in the request body cannot boolean-inject past the owner scope.
+     */
+    async search(query) {
+        const ctx = this.getContext?.();
+        const gate = await resolveAuthGate(ctx, UNAUTH());
+        if (gate.kind === "denied")
+            return gate.response;
+        if (gate.kind === "unfiltered")
+            return super.search(query);
+        // Non-admin agent: scope to own candidates only.
+        const scope = await memoryCandidateReadScope(gate.agentId);
+        const agentCondition = scope.condition;
+        if (!query?.conditions) {
+            return super.search({ conditions: [agentCondition], ...(query || {}) });
+        }
+        return super.search({
+            ...query,
+            conditions: [agentCondition, { conditions: query.conditions, operator: query.operator || "and" }],
+            operator: "and",
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * No shipped CLI path calls POST today (the FLAIR-NIGHTLY-REM staging
+     * writer uses an internal `.put()`, not `.post()` — see MemoryReflect.ts).
+     * Guarded anyway, on the same "don't leave any exported verb unguarded"
+     * discipline the rest of this file follows: anonymous denied; a non-admin
+     * agent may only stage a candidate attributed to itself.
+     */
+    async post(content) {
+        const ctx = this.getContext?.();
+        const auth = await resolveAgentAuth(ctx);
+        if (auth.kind === "anonymous")
+            return UNAUTH();
+        const attr = stampAttribution(auth, content, RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.ownerField, RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.attribution.post, "forbidden: cannot stage a memory candidate for another agent");
+        if (attr.denied)
+            return attr.denied;
+        return super.post(content);
+    }
+    /**
+     * `flair rem promote`/`flair rem reject` (src/cli.ts) both PUT the
+     * candidate row back with an updated status/reviewerId/reviewRationale/
+     * decidedAt, spreading the existing record (agentId included, unchanged).
+     * Non-admin: the no-forge attribution check rejects a PRESENT, mismatched
+     * agentId (an agent can't repurpose this endpoint to rewrite another
+     * agent's candidate) but never stamps one in — the promote/reject flow
+     * always carries the original agentId forward untouched.
+     */
+    async put(content) {
+        const ctx = this.getContext?.();
+        const auth = await resolveAgentAuth(ctx);
+        if (auth.kind === "anonymous")
+            return UNAUTH();
+        const attr = stampAttribution(auth, content, RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.ownerField, RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.attribution.put, "forbidden: cannot modify a memory candidate owned by another agent");
+        if (attr.denied)
+            return attr.denied;
+        return super.put(content);
+    }
+    /**
+     * No shipped CLI path calls DELETE today. Guarded on the same discipline
+     * as post() above — mirrors MemoryGrant.ts's delete(): owner-only,
+     * admin/internal unfiltered, a genuinely-missing id is a clean no-op
+     * super.delete() rather than a FORBIDDEN (no existence oracle).
+     */
+    async delete(id, context) {
+        const ctx = this.getContext?.();
+        const gate = await resolveAuthGate(ctx, UNAUTH());
+        if (gate.kind === "denied")
+            return gate.response;
+        if (gate.kind === "unfiltered")
+            return super.delete(id, context);
+        const record = await super.get(id);
+        if (!record)
+            return super.delete(id, context);
+        if (record[RECORD_TYPES.MemoryCandidate.ownerField] !== gate.agentId) {
+            return FORBIDDEN("forbidden: cannot delete a memory candidate owned by another agent");
+        }
+        return super.delete(id, context);
+    }
+}

package/dist/resources/MemoryConsolidate.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  *   candidates  Array<{ memory, suggestion, reason }>
  *   prompt      string
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { isAdmin, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { evaluate, parseDuration } from "./memory-consolidate-lib.js";
 export class ConsolidateMemories extends Resource {

package/dist/resources/MemoryDedupStats.js

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
  * agent's own memories; this one is never scoped that way — it reads every
  * agent's embeddings — so it follows the admin-gated precedent instead.
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname } from "node:path";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";

package/dist/resources/MemoryFeed.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { computeContentHash, findExistingMemoryByContentHash } from "./memory-feed-lib.js";
 export class FeedMemories extends Resource {

package/dist/resources/MemoryGrant.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 const FORBIDDEN = (msg) => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: msg }), { status: 403, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });
 const UNAUTH = () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "authentication required" }), { status: 401, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });

package/dist/resources/MemoryMaintenance.js

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  * Migrated to the standard `extends Resource` shape with `allowCreate()`
  * to gate auth correctly.
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { isAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 export class MemoryMaintenance extends Resource {
     /** POST requires auth — either an agent acting on its own memories, or admin. */

package/dist/resources/MemoryReflect.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * reflection prompt for a human/agent to run through their own LLM, or (b)
  * with execute:true, runs the distillation server-side via Harper's models
  * facade and stages the results as MemoryCandidate rows for review. See
- * specs/FLAIR-NIGHTLY-REM-SLICE-2-DISTILLATION.md §3A (issue #707).
+ * issue #707 (§3A).
  *
  * Request:
  *   agentId      string   — which agent to reflect on
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  * Resource }` outright — see test/unit/resource-allow.test.ts). This
  * resource is a thin orchestrator over the lib's tested functions.
  */
-import { Resource, databases, models, logger } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases, models, logger } from "harper";
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { isAdmin, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { patchRecordSilent } from "./table-helpers.js";
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ export class ReflectMemories extends Resource {
             existingPendingClaims.push(c.claim);
         }
         const toStage = dedupeCandidates(outcome.candidates, existingPendingClaims);
-        // generatedBy: GenerateResult in the pinned @harperfast/harper 5.1.17 has
+        // generatedBy: GenerateResult in the pinned harper 5.1.17 has
         // no model/backend-id field (content/finishReason/usage/toolCalls/trace
         // only) — the "from the generate result if available" branch is
         // unreachable in this version, so this always falls back to the

package/dist/resources/MemoryReindex.js

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  *
  * This endpoint is idempotent: running it again finds zero drift.
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { isAdmin, allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 export class MemoryReindex extends Resource {
     // Admin-only: permit verified ADMIN agents (Basic-admin is super_user and

package/dist/resources/MemoryUsage.js

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
  * to expose "which agent used which memory" cross-agent, and narrowing this
  * costs nothing.
  */
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 const FORBIDDEN = (msg) => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: msg }), { status: 403, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });
 const UNAUTH = () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "authentication required" }), { status: 401, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } });

package/dist/resources/OAuth.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { handleJwtBearerGrant } from "./XAA.js";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";

package/dist/resources/OAuthClient.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 /**
  * OAuthClient holds registered OAuth client records (incl. secrets) — admin/system

package/dist/resources/OrgEvent.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * requests slipped through once the gate stopped rejecting. resolveAgentAuth
  * distinguishes internal/agent/anonymous explicitly.
  */
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { invalidEntitiesResponse } from "./entity-vocab.js";
 import { makeAuthGate, resolveAuthGate, stampAttribution, FORBIDDEN, UNAUTH, } from "./record-type-kit.js";

package/dist/resources/OrgEventCatchup.js

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * Sorted by createdAt ascending (oldest first for in-order processing).
  * Limit 50 events max.
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { allowVerified, resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 export class OrgEventCatchup extends Resource {
     // Self-authorize via the Ed25519 agent verify (auth reshape removes the gate's

package/dist/resources/OrgEventMaintenance.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * POST /OrgEventMaintenance/ — deletes all records where expiresAt < now.
  * Auth: admin only.
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 export class OrgEventMaintenance extends Resource {
     // Admin-only: permit verified ADMIN agents (Basic-admin is super_user and

package/dist/resources/PairingToken.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 /**
  * PairingToken holds one-time federation pairing secrets — admin/system only,

package/dist/resources/Peer.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 /**
  * Peer holds federation peer records (URLs + credentials) — system/admin data,

package/dist/resources/Presence.js

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
  *     content. get() additionally gates currentTask itself to verified
  *     in-org agents only; see get()'s inline comment.
  */
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ function resolveVersion() {
     return process.env.npm_package_version ?? "dev";
 }
 /**
- * Resolve the running @harperfast/harper version. Unlike flair's own
+ * Resolve the running harper version. Unlike flair's own
  * package.json (readable via a plain relative path above), Harper's package
  * only exports "." → dist/index.js — there's no "./package.json" subpath, so
  * requiring it directly throws (Node's exports-map enforcement). Resolve the
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ function resolveVersion() {
 function resolveHarperVersion() {
     try {
         const req = createRequire(import.meta.url);
-        const mainPath = req.resolve("@harperfast/harper");
+        const mainPath = req.resolve("harper");
         const pkgPath = join(dirname(mainPath), "..", "package.json");
         if (existsSync(pkgPath)) {
             const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pkgPath, "utf-8"));

package/dist/resources/RecordUsage.js

@@ -34,6 +34,17 @@
  * (and its ownership gate) — its own auth model is verified-agent +
  * within-org + explicitly NO ownership requirement.
  *
+ * NO READ-SCOPE GATE — INTENTIONAL ASYMMETRY with citation-on-write
+ * (flair#775): this endpoint deliberately does NOT validate reported ids
+ * against the caller's read scope. Usage feedback is the cross-agent
+ * contract described above (agent B reports using agent A's memory
+ * regardless of A's visibility setting), and the no-enumeration response
+ * below already denies existence probing on this surface. Citation-on-write
+ * (./usage-recording.ts's recordCitations()) DOES scope-gate each cited id —
+ * it is a separate write surface with a narrower threat model; see that
+ * module's doc. Do not "unify" the two: the difference is a K&S binding
+ * condition on the flair#775 locked design, not drift.
+ *
  * WHY THIS ISN'T A @table-BACKED RESOURCE: the actual dedup ledger (one row
  * per (agentId, memoryId) contribution) lives in the `MemoryUsage` table
  * (schemas/memory.graphql), guarded by resources/MemoryUsage.ts. But this
@@ -82,7 +93,7 @@
  * sanitized (control-character-stripped, length-capped) and stored as-is,
  * for audit/analytics only. Treat it as untrusted data, always.
  */
-import { Resource } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitResponse } from "./rate-limiter.js";
 import { recordUsageContribution, MAX_USAGE_IDS_PER_CALL } from "./usage-recording.js";
@@ -164,7 +175,10 @@ export class RecordUsage extends Resource {
                 // ./usage-recording.ts's recordUsageContribution() — a shared,
                 // single-implementation extraction (also used by citation-on-write,
                 // resources/Memory.ts's post()/put()). Byte-identical behavior to
-                // the former private _recordOne() this replaced.
+                // the former private _recordOne() this replaced. Deliberately NO
+                // read-scope check on memoryId here (flair#775 asymmetry — see the
+                // module doc's NO READ-SCOPE GATE paragraph; citation-on-write's
+                // recordCitations() is the surface that scope-gates).
                 await recordUsageContribution(ctx, agentId, memoryId, attribution, now);
             }
             catch (err) {

package/dist/resources/Relationship.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitResponse } from "./rate-limiter.js";
 import { localInstanceId } from "./instance-identity.js";

package/dist/resources/SemanticSearch.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth, allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { getEmbedding, getMode } from "./embeddings-provider.js";
 import { patchRecord } from "./table-helpers.js";

package/dist/resources/SkillScan.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource } from "harper";
 import { allowVerified } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { scanSkillContent } from "./scan/skill-scanner.js";
 /**

package/dist/resources/Soul.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { localInstanceId } from "./instance-identity.js";
 import { makeAuthGate, stampAttribution, UNAUTH } from "./record-type-kit.js";

package/dist/resources/SoulFeed.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Resource, databases } from '@harperfast/harper';
+import { Resource, databases } from 'harper';
 import { allowVerified } from './agent-auth.js';
 export class FeedSouls extends Resource {
     // Self-authorize the subscription via the Ed25519 agent verify (auth reshape

package/dist/resources/WorkspaceLatest.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * GET /WorkspaceLatest/{agentId} — returns most recent WorkspaceState record.
  * Auth: requesting agent must match agentId in path (or be admin).
  */
-import { Resource, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { Resource, databases } from "harper";
 import { allowVerified, resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 export class WorkspaceLatest extends Resource {
     // Self-authorize via the Ed25519 agent verify (auth reshape removes the gate's

package/dist/resources/WorkspaceState.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * Note: Harper's static methods call instance methods with positional args only.
  * Use this.getContext() to access request context (tpsAgent, tpsAgentIsAdmin).
  */
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { resolveAgentAuth } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { invalidEntitiesResponse } from "./entity-vocab.js";
 import { makeAuthGate, makeReadScope, makeByIdReadGate, resolveAuthGate, stampAttribution, FORBIDDEN, UNAUTH, } from "./record-type-kit.js";

package/dist/resources/XAA.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { allowAdmin } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify } from "jose";

package/dist/resources/a2a-url.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 // reflect the REAL listening port, or a remote A2A peer that follows discovery
 // hits a dead port.
 //
-// Kept free of any @harperfast/harper import so the resolution logic is
+// Kept free of any harper import so the resolution logic is
 // unit-testable without spinning up Harper (mirrors agentcard-fields.ts —
 // avoids the simulator-pattern drift that let the AdminInstance predicate be
 // reproduced-not-imported).

package/dist/resources/agent-auth.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
  * verified against the agent's stored Ed25519 public key. Replay is bounded by a
  * 30s timestamp window + a per-(agent,nonce) seen-set pruned to that window.
  */
-import { databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { databases } from "harper";
 import { WINDOW_MS, isNonceReplay, recordNonce, importEd25519Key, b64ToArrayBuffer, parseTpsEd25519Header } from "./ed25519-auth.js";
 /**
  * Shared Harper user that verified Ed25519 agents resolve to (least-privilege

package/dist/resources/agentcard-fields.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 // fallback that could surface a private soul (an operator's internal note,
 // prompt fragment, or credential reminder) on the public endpoint.
 //
-// Kept free of any @harperfast/harper import so the real logic is unit-testable
+// Kept free of any harper import so the real logic is unit-testable
 // without spinning up Harper (avoids the simulator-pattern that let the
 // description-fallback leak ship untested).
 export function readSoulKind(entry) {

package/dist/resources/auth-middleware.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { patchRecord } from "./table-helpers.js";
-import { server, databases } from "@harperfast/harper";
+import { server, databases } from "harper";
 import { getEmbedding } from "./embeddings-provider.js";
 import { isAdmin, FLAIR_AGENT_USERNAME } from "./agent-auth.js";
 import { WINDOW_MS, isNonceReplay, recordNonce, importEd25519Key, b64ToArrayBuffer, parseTpsEd25519Header } from "./ed25519-auth.js";

package/dist/resources/embeddings-boot.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * The previous mechanism (removed by this change) delivered the registration
  * as a `models.embedding.default` block via the `HARPER_CONFIG` env var
  * (src/cli.ts's old `buildEmbeddingsHarperConfigEnv`) — a "merge layer" that
- * Harper's environment-manager (`@harperfast/harper`'s
+ * Harper's environment-manager (`harper`'s
  * `config/harperConfigEnvVars.js`) reasserts on every boot AND PERSISTS into
  * the instance-root `harper-config.yaml`. That file proved to be config-as-
  * STATE, not config-as-intent: `flair#694`'s downgrade-and-revert CI lane
@@ -28,14 +28,14 @@
  *      to), leaving `models.embedding.default: {}` — an empty shell —
  *      persisted to disk.
  *   3. The next boot's config schema validator
- *      (`@harperfast/harper`'s `validation/configValidator.js`) resolves the
+ *      (`harper`'s `validation/configValidator.js`) resolves the
  *      entry's backend via `Joi.alternatives().conditional('.backend', {...,
  *      otherwise: unknownBackendEntrySchema})`; with `backend` absent, that
  *      falls through to `unknownBackendEntrySchema = Joi.object({backend:
  *      string.required()})`, which throws exactly: "Harper config file
  *      validation error: 'models.embedding.default.backend' is required" —
- *      Harper refuses to boot. Confirmed byte-identical in both @harperfast/
- *      harper 5.1.15 and 5.1.17 (this is upstream env-var-config behavior,
+ *      Harper refuses to boot. Confirmed byte-identical in both harper
+ *      5.1.15 and 5.1.17 (this is upstream env-var-config behavior,
  *      not a schema difference between versions), and reproduced locally by
  *      replaying the exact downgrade-and-revert sequence.
  *