@totalreclaw/totalreclaw 3.2.3 → 3.3.0-rc.2

package/pair-crypto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+/**
+ * pair-crypto — gateway-side cryptographic primitives for the v3.3.0
+ * QR-pairing flow.
+ *
+ * Cipher suite (per design doc section 3a-3b, ratified 2026-04-20):
+ *   - ECDH on x25519 for key agreement.
+ *   - HKDF-SHA256 for symmetric-key derivation from the shared secret.
+ *   - ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD for the ciphertext payload, with the sid
+ *     bound as associated data (AD = sid UTF-8 bytes).
+ *
+ * Every primitive is provided by the Node built-in `node:crypto` module
+ * on Node 18.19+ and above. NO third-party crypto dependency is added
+ * to the plugin for the gateway side. (The BROWSER side of the flow in
+ * P2 uses WebCrypto with a `@noble/curves` + `@noble/ciphers` fallback
+ * for older Safari — those ship as part of the served pairing page and
+ * do NOT affect the plugin's server-side dep tree.)
+ *
+ * Scope and guarantees
+ * --------------------
+ *   - This module ONLY runs on the gateway host. The device side
+ *     (browser) implements the mirror of these functions in a separate
+ *     bundle served by pair-http.ts.
+ *   - Round-trip correctness: deriveSessionKey on both sides with
+ *     matching (sk_local, pk_remote) produces the same key.
+ *   - AD (sid) binding: a ciphertext encrypted for session A CANNOT
+ *     decrypt under session B's keys, even with identical plaintext
+ *     and nonce. This is the AEAD contract; validated by tests.
+ *   - No logging of key material. The only public thing this module
+ *     emits is base64url-encoded raw public keys (32 bytes → 43 chars),
+ *     which are safe for the QR payload.
+ *   - No `fs.*` calls, no `process.env` reads, no network primitives.
+ *     Keeps scanner surface isolated (see `check-scanner.mjs`).
+ *
+ * Interoperability with browser WebCrypto
+ * ---------------------------------------
+ *   The WebCrypto x25519 + HKDF + ChaCha20-Poly1305 APIs are bit-for-bit
+ *   compatible with Node's `crypto` as long as:
+ *     - Raw 32-byte public/private keys are used (not DER/SPKI).
+ *     - HKDF parameters are (hash=SHA-256, salt=sid bytes, info fixed
+ *       ASCII string, length=32 bytes → 256-bit AEAD key).
+ *     - AEAD uses a 12-byte random nonce + 16-byte tag, AD = sid bytes.
+ *   See tests for fixed test vectors.
+ */
+
+import {
+  createPrivateKey,
+  createPublicKey,
+  diffieHellman,
+  generateKeyPairSync,
+  hkdfSync,
+  createCipheriv,
+  createDecipheriv,
+  randomBytes,
+  timingSafeEqual,
+} from 'node:crypto';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * HKDF "info" parameter — fixes the domain separation for this protocol.
+ * MUST match the browser-side constant in the pair-page bundle (P2).
+ * Versioned so we can roll to a new KDF without breaking old ciphertexts.
+ */
+export const HKDF_INFO = 'totalreclaw-pair-v1';
+
+/** HKDF output length — 32 bytes = 256-bit ChaCha20-Poly1305 key. */
+export const AEAD_KEY_BYTES = 32;
+
+/** ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce length — 12 bytes per RFC 7539. */
+export const AEAD_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
+
+/** ChaCha20-Poly1305 auth tag length — 16 bytes standard. */
+export const AEAD_TAG_BYTES = 16;
+
+/** Raw x25519 public/private key length — 32 bytes per RFC 7748. */
+export const X25519_KEY_BYTES = 32;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Types
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Raw 32-byte x25519 public key, base64url-encoded. */
+export type PublicKeyB64 = string;
+
+/** Raw 32-byte x25519 private key, base64url-encoded. */
+export type PrivateKeyB64 = string;
+
+/** Raw 12-byte AEAD nonce, base64url-encoded. */
+export type NonceB64 = string;
+
+/** AEAD ciphertext + appended tag, base64url-encoded. */
+export type CiphertextB64 = string;
+
+/** An ephemeral gateway keypair, both halves base64url-encoded. */
+export interface GatewayKeypair {
+  skB64: PrivateKeyB64;
+  pkB64: PublicKeyB64;
+}
+
+/** Fully-derived session keys — caller uses kEnc for AEAD ops. */
+export interface SessionKeys {
+  /** 32-byte ChaCha20-Poly1305 key. */
+  kEnc: Buffer;
+}
+
+/** Inputs to the gateway-side decryption happy path. */
+export interface DecryptInputs {
+  /** Gateway's base64url private key (from pair-session-store). */
+  skGatewayB64: PrivateKeyB64;
+  /** Device's ephemeral public key, base64url. */
+  pkDeviceB64: PublicKeyB64;
+  /** Session id, used as HKDF salt AND AEAD AD. */
+  sid: string;
+  /** Base64url nonce (12 bytes). */
+  nonceB64: NonceB64;
+  /** Base64url ciphertext (plaintext || 16-byte tag). */
+  ciphertextB64: CiphertextB64;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Inputs for the gateway-side encrypt helper. Only used by tests (the
+ * actual encrypt side lives in the browser bundle) — exposed because
+ * the test vectors need a round-trip, and because future "gateway
+ * replies with an encrypted ACK" flows (4.x) could reuse it.
+ */
+export interface EncryptInputs {
+  /** Gateway's private key (or ephemeral-side's private key). */
+  skLocalB64: PrivateKeyB64;
+  /** Peer's public key. */
+  pkRemoteB64: PublicKeyB64;
+  sid: string;
+  plaintext: Buffer | Uint8Array;
+  /** Override the 12-byte nonce. Used for tests that need deterministic output. */
+  nonceB64?: NonceB64;
+}
+
+export interface EncryptOutput {
+  nonceB64: NonceB64;
+  ciphertextB64: CiphertextB64;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Key generation / conversion
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Generate a fresh ephemeral x25519 keypair for a pairing session.
+ *
+ * Returns raw 32-byte values base64url-encoded. The caller persists the
+ * private half in pair-session-store (under the session record's 0600
+ * file) and embeds the public half in the QR URL fragment.
+ *
+ * The returned keys are raw x25519 — NOT DER/SPKI/PEM. The browser
+ * side's WebCrypto needs raw bytes to import.
+ */
+export function generateGatewayKeypair(): GatewayKeypair {
+  const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('x25519');
+  return {
+    skB64: extractRawPrivate(privateKey),
+    pkB64: extractRawPublic(publicKey),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Re-constitute a Node `KeyObject` from raw base64url public-key bytes.
+ * Uses the JWK OKP encoding because Node doesn't accept raw-format
+ * inputs to `createPublicKey` directly.
+ */
+function publicKeyFromB64(pkB64: PublicKeyB64): ReturnType<typeof createPublicKey> {
+  const raw = Buffer.from(pkB64, 'base64url');
+  if (raw.length !== X25519_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: public key must be ${X25519_KEY_BYTES} bytes (got ${raw.length})`);
+  }
+  return createPublicKey({
+    key: { kty: 'OKP', crv: 'X25519', x: raw.toString('base64url') },
+    format: 'jwk',
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Re-constitute a Node `KeyObject` from raw base64url private-key bytes.
+ *
+ * JWK OKP private keys require the `x` (public) field too; we derive it
+ * by first constructing a temporary KeyObject from `d` alone, then
+ * exporting its public half. This is cheap (one scalarmult) and keeps
+ * the call sites clean.
+ *
+ * Mirror of the browser-side WebCrypto `importKey('raw', ...)` path.
+ */
+function privateKeyFromB64(skB64: PrivateKeyB64): ReturnType<typeof createPrivateKey> {
+  const raw = Buffer.from(skB64, 'base64url');
+  if (raw.length !== X25519_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: private key must be ${X25519_KEY_BYTES} bytes (got ${raw.length})`);
+  }
+
+  // The JWK OKP format requires `x` (public) alongside `d` (private).
+  // Derive `x` by first constructing a public KeyObject from the scalar
+  // via the OKP JWK path — Node accepts `d` alone and returns a usable
+  // private KeyObject from which we can derive the public half.
+  const tempPriv = createPrivateKey({
+    key: { kty: 'OKP', crv: 'X25519', d: raw.toString('base64url'), x: '' },
+    format: 'jwk',
+  });
+  // Derive the public half.
+  const pubObj = createPublicKey(tempPriv);
+  const pubJwk = pubObj.export({ format: 'jwk' }) as { x: string };
+
+  // Re-construct with the full (x, d) pair. This is the canonical form
+  // the rest of the code holds onto.
+  return createPrivateKey({
+    key: { kty: 'OKP', crv: 'X25519', d: raw.toString('base64url'), x: pubJwk.x },
+    format: 'jwk',
+  });
+}
+
+/** Extract the raw 32-byte public-key bytes from a Node KeyObject → base64url. */
+function extractRawPublic(pk: ReturnType<typeof createPublicKey>): PublicKeyB64 {
+  const jwk = pk.export({ format: 'jwk' }) as { x?: string };
+  if (!jwk.x) throw new Error('pair-crypto: public key JWK is missing the x field');
+  return jwk.x; // JWK `x` is already base64url-encoded raw bytes.
+}
+
+/** Extract the raw 32-byte private-key bytes from a Node KeyObject → base64url. */
+function extractRawPrivate(sk: ReturnType<typeof createPrivateKey>): PrivateKeyB64 {
+  const jwk = sk.export({ format: 'jwk' }) as { d?: string };
+  if (!jwk.d) throw new Error('pair-crypto: private key JWK is missing the d field');
+  return jwk.d;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive the public key from a raw base64url private key. Exposed for
+ * tests and for the session-store's self-consistency checks — the
+ * default `createPairSession` doesn't call this (it generates both
+ * halves at once via `generateGatewayKeypair`).
+ */
+export function derivePublicFromPrivate(skB64: PrivateKeyB64): PublicKeyB64 {
+  const sk = privateKeyFromB64(skB64);
+  const pk = createPublicKey(sk);
+  return extractRawPublic(pk);
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ECDH + HKDF
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Perform x25519 ECDH between (local private key, remote public key),
+ * producing a 32-byte shared secret.
+ *
+ * BOTH sides running this with swapped halves MUST produce the same
+ * shared secret. This is the foundation of the pairing key agreement.
+ *
+ * Validation: throws if either key is the wrong byte length, or if
+ * the underlying `diffieHellman` call fails (which Node will do for
+ * invalid curve points).
+ */
+export function computeSharedSecret(opts: {
+  skLocalB64: PrivateKeyB64;
+  pkRemoteB64: PublicKeyB64;
+}): Buffer {
+  const sk = privateKeyFromB64(opts.skLocalB64);
+  const pk = publicKeyFromB64(opts.pkRemoteB64);
+  const shared = diffieHellman({ privateKey: sk, publicKey: pk });
+  if (shared.length !== X25519_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `pair-crypto: ECDH output wrong length (got ${shared.length}, expected ${X25519_KEY_BYTES})`,
+    );
+  }
+  return shared;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive the AEAD key from a shared secret via HKDF-SHA256. Uses the
+ * session id as the salt and the fixed protocol tag as the info.
+ *
+ * Mathematical sketch (per RFC 5869):
+ *   PRK = HMAC-SHA256(salt, shared)
+ *   OKM = HMAC-SHA256(PRK, info || 0x01)[:L]
+ *
+ * Where L = 32 bytes = AEAD_KEY_BYTES.
+ *
+ * The sid binding means a ciphertext encrypted for session A is
+ * DECRYPTABLE only under session A's derived key. Replaying ct from
+ * session A into session B's decrypt path produces a different key →
+ * AEAD tag fails → rejected.
+ */
+export function deriveSessionKeys(opts: {
+  sharedSecret: Buffer;
+  sid: string;
+}): SessionKeys {
+  if (opts.sharedSecret.length !== X25519_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error('pair-crypto: shared secret must be 32 bytes');
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.sid !== 'string' || opts.sid.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('pair-crypto: sid is required for HKDF salt binding');
+  }
+  const salt = Buffer.from(opts.sid, 'utf-8');
+  const info = Buffer.from(HKDF_INFO, 'utf-8');
+  const okm = hkdfSync('sha256', opts.sharedSecret, salt, info, AEAD_KEY_BYTES);
+  return { kEnc: Buffer.from(okm) };
+}
+
+/**
+ * One-shot convenience: ECDH + HKDF in a single call. Used by both the
+ * HTTP respond handler (decrypt side) and the tests.
+ */
+export function deriveAeadKeyFromEcdh(opts: {
+  skLocalB64: PrivateKeyB64;
+  pkRemoteB64: PublicKeyB64;
+  sid: string;
+}): SessionKeys {
+  const shared = computeSharedSecret({
+    skLocalB64: opts.skLocalB64,
+    pkRemoteB64: opts.pkRemoteB64,
+  });
+  return deriveSessionKeys({ sharedSecret: shared, sid: opts.sid });
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// AEAD
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Decrypt a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD ciphertext. Returns the plaintext
+ * on success; throws if the tag is invalid (which includes both
+ * tampering and wrong-key attempts).
+ *
+ * Ciphertext is expected in the combined form `plaintext || tag`, where
+ * tag is the trailing 16 bytes. The caller MUST supply the same
+ * (kEnc, nonce, sid-as-AD) used for encryption.
+ */
+export function aeadDecrypt(opts: {
+  kEnc: Buffer;
+  nonceB64: NonceB64;
+  sid: string;
+  ciphertextB64: CiphertextB64;
+}): Buffer {
+  const nonce = Buffer.from(opts.nonceB64, 'base64url');
+  if (nonce.length !== AEAD_NONCE_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: nonce must be ${AEAD_NONCE_BYTES} bytes (got ${nonce.length})`);
+  }
+  if (opts.kEnc.length !== AEAD_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: AEAD key must be ${AEAD_KEY_BYTES} bytes`);
+  }
+  const combined = Buffer.from(opts.ciphertextB64, 'base64url');
+  if (combined.length < AEAD_TAG_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error('pair-crypto: ciphertext too short to contain tag');
+  }
+  const ct = combined.subarray(0, combined.length - AEAD_TAG_BYTES);
+  const tag = combined.subarray(combined.length - AEAD_TAG_BYTES);
+
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv('chacha20-poly1305', opts.kEnc, nonce, {
+    authTagLength: AEAD_TAG_BYTES,
+  });
+  decipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(opts.sid, 'utf-8'), { plaintextLength: ct.length });
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+
+  const pt1 = decipher.update(ct);
+  const pt2 = decipher.final();
+  return Buffer.concat([pt1, pt2]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * One-shot decrypt: ECDH + HKDF + AEAD in one call. This is what the
+ * HTTP respond handler calls. Returns the plaintext Buffer on success.
+ *
+ * Throws on ANY failure (wrong key length, invalid curve point, tag
+ * mismatch). The caller catches and returns 400 to the device.
+ */
+export function decryptPairingPayload(inputs: DecryptInputs): Buffer {
+  const { kEnc } = deriveAeadKeyFromEcdh({
+    skLocalB64: inputs.skGatewayB64,
+    pkRemoteB64: inputs.pkDeviceB64,
+    sid: inputs.sid,
+  });
+  return aeadDecrypt({
+    kEnc,
+    nonceB64: inputs.nonceB64,
+    sid: inputs.sid,
+    ciphertextB64: inputs.ciphertextB64,
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encrypt a plaintext payload. Used by tests; also used by any future
+ * gateway-to-device encrypted ACK path.
+ *
+ * Emits (nonce, ciphertext||tag) both base64url-encoded. If the caller
+ * passes an explicit `nonceB64`, it is used verbatim; otherwise a
+ * fresh 12-byte random nonce is generated.
+ */
+export function aeadEncryptWithSessionKey(opts: {
+  kEnc: Buffer;
+  sid: string;
+  plaintext: Buffer | Uint8Array;
+  nonceB64?: NonceB64;
+}): EncryptOutput {
+  if (opts.kEnc.length !== AEAD_KEY_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: AEAD key must be ${AEAD_KEY_BYTES} bytes`);
+  }
+  const nonceBuf =
+    opts.nonceB64 !== undefined
+      ? Buffer.from(opts.nonceB64, 'base64url')
+      : randomBytes(AEAD_NONCE_BYTES);
+  if (nonceBuf.length !== AEAD_NONCE_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(`pair-crypto: nonce must be ${AEAD_NONCE_BYTES} bytes`);
+  }
+
+  const pt = Buffer.isBuffer(opts.plaintext) ? opts.plaintext : Buffer.from(opts.plaintext);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv('chacha20-poly1305', opts.kEnc, nonceBuf, {
+    authTagLength: AEAD_TAG_BYTES,
+  });
+  cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(opts.sid, 'utf-8'), { plaintextLength: pt.length });
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(pt), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return {
+    nonceB64: nonceBuf.toString('base64url'),
+    ciphertextB64: Buffer.concat([ct, tag]).toString('base64url'),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * One-shot encrypt: ECDH + HKDF + AEAD (caller supplies both sides).
+ * Used by the test vectors and future 4.x features. The real device
+ * side does this in the browser, not here.
+ */
+export function encryptPairingPayload(inputs: EncryptInputs): EncryptOutput {
+  const { kEnc } = deriveAeadKeyFromEcdh({
+    skLocalB64: inputs.skLocalB64,
+    pkRemoteB64: inputs.pkRemoteB64,
+    sid: inputs.sid,
+  });
+  return aeadEncryptWithSessionKey({
+    kEnc,
+    sid: inputs.sid,
+    plaintext: inputs.plaintext,
+    nonceB64: inputs.nonceB64,
+  });
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Constant-time secondary-code comparison
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Constant-time compare two 6-digit numeric strings. Used by the HTTP
+ * start/respond handlers to check the user-supplied secondary code
+ * against the session's expected code.
+ *
+ * Returns true on match, false otherwise. Length mismatch returns
+ * false without short-circuit leak of which side was shorter.
+ *
+ * Uses Node `timingSafeEqual`, which requires equal-length inputs.
+ * We pad the SHORTER input with NULs and always compare a fixed
+ * 6-byte window — the length check happens BEFORE the actual compare
+ * and uses boolean AND at the end so both branches run to completion.
+ */
+export function compareSecondaryCodesCT(a: string, b: string): boolean {
+  const aBuf = Buffer.from(a, 'utf-8');
+  const bBuf = Buffer.from(b, 'utf-8');
+  const lenMatch = aBuf.length === bBuf.length;
+  // Always compare a constant window so the total work is independent
+  // of the actual input lengths. Pad the shorter to the longer with
+  // zero bytes; if lengths diverge we force lenMatch=false below.
+  const max = Math.max(aBuf.length, bBuf.length, 6);
+  const aPad = Buffer.alloc(max);
+  const bPad = Buffer.alloc(max);
+  aBuf.copy(aPad);
+  bBuf.copy(bPad);
+  const byteMatch = timingSafeEqual(aPad, bPad);
+  return lenMatch && byteMatch;
+}