@tollbooth-dpyc/web 1.4.0 → 1.4.1

package/dist/client.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js";
 import { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js";
 import { tollboothConfig, toolName } from "./config.js";
-import { debugPush } from "./debugLog.js";
+import { debugPush, redact } from "./debugLog.js";
 import { clearStoredProof, forgetRecentLogin, getStoredNpub, getStoredProof, } from "./identity.js";
 import { signInlineProof } from "./inlineProof.js";
 import { isTransportFailure, NetworkError } from "./networkError.js";
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ export async function callToolWithContent(tool, args = {}, opts = {}) {
     // `args` holds only the caller's own parameters — the envelope is added
     // below — so it is safe to log.
     if (!quiet)
-        debugPush("call", `${name}(${JSON.stringify(args).slice(0, 140)})`);
+        debugPush("call", `${name}(${redact(JSON.stringify(args)).slice(0, 140)})`);
     const bootstrap = STANDARD_BOOTSTRAP.includes(tool) || cfg.extraBootstrapTools.includes(tool);
     const merged = bootstrap
         ? { ...args }
@@ -154,14 +154,14 @@ export async function callToolWithContent(tool, args = {}, opts = {}) {
     if (result.isError) {
         const text = errorText(result);
         if (!quiet)
-            debugPush("error", `${name}: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+            debugPush("error", `${name}: ${redact(text).slice(0, 200)}`);
         throw new Error(text);
     }
     const { payload, images } = readToolResult(result);
     if (!quiet) {
         const preview = typeof payload === "string" ? payload : JSON.stringify(payload);
         const tail = images.length ? ` +${images.length} image` : "";
-        debugPush(looksFailed(payload) ? "error" : "result", `${name} → ${String(preview).slice(0, 220)}${tail}`);
+        debugPush(looksFailed(payload) ? "error" : "result", `${name} → ${redact(String(preview)).slice(0, 220)}${tail}`);
     }
     if (!opts.bestEffort) {
         const bounced = proofBounceMessage(payload);

package/dist/debugLog.d.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@
  * that flips the view can still be read and copied afterward.
  *
  * Every message is scrubbed on the way in: an nsec, a 64-hex key, a bearer
- * token, and the value of any secret-named field (dpop_token, proof, poison,
- * password, api_key, …) never reach the buffer, the clipboard or storage.
+ * token, the value of any secret-named field (dpop_token, proof, poison,
+ * password, api_key, …), and a secret inside a URL (a query token, a
+ * bearer-like path segment, userinfo) never reach the buffer, the clipboard
+ * or storage.
  * That is the one guarantee a panel relies on — it renders what is here.
  *
  * Merged from the fleet's copies (goodearth, beesknees, cypher, excalibur,

package/dist/debugLog.js

@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@
  * that flips the view can still be read and copied afterward.
  *
  * Every message is scrubbed on the way in: an nsec, a 64-hex key, a bearer
- * token, and the value of any secret-named field (dpop_token, proof, poison,
- * password, api_key, …) never reach the buffer, the clipboard or storage.
+ * token, the value of any secret-named field (dpop_token, proof, poison,
+ * password, api_key, …), and a secret inside a URL (a query token, a
+ * bearer-like path segment, userinfo) never reach the buffer, the clipboard
+ * or storage.
  * That is the one guarantee a panel relies on — it renders what is here.
  *
  * Merged from the fleet's copies (goodearth, beesknees, cypher, excalibur,
@@ -34,7 +36,7 @@ const SECRET_FIELD = "(?:nsec|ncryptsec|dpop_token|proof|poison|password|passphr
 // a bare one up to a delimiter. Stopping at the first quote of either kind let
 // the tail of a secret holding `'` or `\"` through.
 function fieldValue(names) {
-    return new RegExp(`((?:\\\\*["'])?\\b${names}(?:\\\\*["'])?\\s*[:=]\\s*)(?:(\\\\*["'])(?:\\\\.|\\\\$|(?!\\2)[^\\\\])*?(?=\\2|$)|[^"'\\\\,}\\]&\\s]+)`, "gi");
+    return new RegExp(`((?:\\\\*["'])?\\b${names}(?:\\\\*["'])?\\s*[:=]\\s*)(?:(\\\\*["'])(?:\\\\.|\\\\$|(?!\\2)[^\\\\])*?(?=\\2|$)|(?!\\[redacted\\])[^"'\\\\,}\\]&\\s]+)`, "gi");
 }
 const FIELD_VALUE = fieldValue(SECRET_FIELD);
 // update_patron_credential / update_operator_credential carry the secret as
@@ -47,6 +49,54 @@ const BEARER = /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/g;
 function scrubbed(_match, head, quote) {
     return `${head}${quote ?? ""}${REDACTED}`;
 }
+// ── Secrets inside URLs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// A capability link carries its secret in the URL itself — Good Earth's
+// calendar feed is `https://host/calendar/<32 hex>.ics` — and a link read
+// back in a tool result is logged whole. Three places a URL hides a secret:
+// the userinfo, a query or fragment parameter, and a bearer-like path segment.
+/** Query/fragment parameter names whose value is a secret (matched whole). */
+const URL_SECRET_PARAM = /([?&#;](?:token|access_token|refresh_token|id_token|auth|authorization|key|api_key|apikey|secret|client_secret|password|pass|sig|signature|code|proof|dpop_token|session|sessionid|nsec)=)[^&#;\s"'\\<>]*/gi;
+// A URL up to whitespace, a quote, an escape or an angle bracket — so one
+// inside JSON (or JSON inside JSON) ends at its own closing quote.
+const URL_IN_TEXT = /\b(?:https?|webcal|wss?):\/\/[^\s"'\\<>]+/gi;
+const USERINFO = /^([a-z]+:\/\/)[^/?#@]+@/i;
+/**
+ * A path segment that reads as a bearer secret rather than a name: 32+ hex,
+ * or 24+ base64url characters holding both a letter and a digit and one
+ * unbroken alphanumeric run of 16+ (a slug's words are short; a token's are
+ * not). An npub is public and stays.
+ */
+function isSecretSegment(seg) {
+    if (/^npub1/i.test(seg))
+        return false;
+    if (/^[0-9a-f]{32,}$/i.test(seg))
+        return true;
+    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}$/.test(seg))
+        return false;
+    if (!/[0-9]/.test(seg) || !/[A-Za-z]/.test(seg))
+        return false;
+    return /[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/.test(seg);
+}
+function scrubUrl(url) {
+    const head = url.replace(USERINFO, `$1${REDACTED}@`);
+    const pathStart = head.indexOf("/", head.indexOf("://") + 3);
+    if (pathStart < 0)
+        return head;
+    const tailAt = head.slice(pathStart).search(/[?#]/);
+    const pathEnd = tailAt < 0 ? head.length : pathStart + tailAt;
+    const path = head
+        .slice(pathStart, pathEnd)
+        .split("/")
+        .map((seg) => {
+        // `<token>.ics`: judge the name, keep the extension.
+        const dot = seg.indexOf(".");
+        const name = dot < 0 ? seg : seg.slice(0, dot);
+        return isSecretSegment(name) ? REDACTED + (dot < 0 ? "" : seg.slice(dot)) : seg;
+    })
+        .join("/");
+    return head.slice(0, pathStart) + path + head.slice(pathEnd);
+}
 /**
  * Scrub secrets from a log line. Deliberately over-eager: a 64-hex event id
  * is hidden along with a hex private key, because the two look alike.
@@ -55,7 +105,9 @@ export function redact(message) {
     let out = message
         .replace(NSEC, REDACTED)
         .replace(BEARER, `Bearer ${REDACTED}`)
-        .replace(FIELD_VALUE, scrubbed);
+        .replace(URL_IN_TEXT, scrubUrl)
+        .replace(FIELD_VALUE, scrubbed)
+        .replace(URL_SECRET_PARAM, `$1${REDACTED}`);
     if (HAS_FIELD.test(out))
         out = out.replace(CREDENTIAL_VALUE, scrubbed);
     return out.replace(HEX_KEY, REDACTED);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tollbooth-dpyc/web",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.4.1",
   "description": "Shared browser SDK for Tollbooth DPYC operator front ends: npub sign-in, proofs, MCP client, profile and wallet",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "Lonnie VanZandt",