@tokenops/sdk 1.0.0

package/SECURITY.md

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+# Security Policy
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+Report security vulnerabilities to **security@tokenops.xyz**.
+
+We aim to acknowledge reports within **48 hours** and provide an initial assessment within **5 business days**.
+
+Please include:
+
+- A clear description of the vulnerability
+- Steps to reproduce (proof-of-concept code if possible)
+- The affected SDK version and subpath (`@tokenops/sdk/fhe-vesting`, `/fhe-airdrop`, `/fhe-disperse`, etc.)
+- Your assessment of severity and impact
+
+Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
+
+## Scope
+
+The following are **in scope** for security reports against this SDK:
+
+- FHE encryption flow in `src/fhe/` — incorrect handle construction, proof generation errors, ACL grant omissions
+- Factory and clone ACL setup — missing `FHE.allow*` calls, transient-vs-persistent ACL confusion
+- KMS proof handling — binding to wrong `contractAddress` or `userAddress`, proof replay vectors
+- Scale-ratio helpers in `src/fhe/scale-ratio.ts` — integer overflow in scaled numerator/denominator
+- Input validation boundaries — plaintext values exceeding `uint64` range passed to `encryptUint64`
+- EIP-712 signature construction in `signClaimAuthorization` — domain separator fields, struct hash
+
+## Out of Scope
+
+The following are **not in scope** for this SDK's security policy:
+
+- **`viem`** — report to [wevm/viem](https://github.com/wevm/viem/blob/main/SECURITY.md)
+- **`@zama-fhe/sdk`** — report to Zama via their [responsible disclosure policy](https://github.com/zama-ai/fhevm/blob/main/SECURITY.md)
+- **Underlying fhEVM contracts** — report to [zama-ai/fhevm](https://github.com/zama-ai/fhevm)
+- Deployed factory and singleton contracts — the contracts themselves are audited separately; the SDK is a client library
+- Third-party RPC endpoints or wallet providers
+
+## Security Considerations for SDK Users
+
+**ACL grants are append-only.** Once a handle is granted to an address via `FHE.allow`, the grant cannot be revoked. Design your ACL flows with this in mind — do not grant to untrusted addresses.
+
+**Encrypted handles must come from receipts, not simulation.** `simulateContract` returns a handle computed from pre-tx state that diverges from the handle the executed tx grants ACL on. Always parse handles from `ACL.Allowed` events in the confirmed receipt. The SDK does this internally in `encryptedView` patterns.
+
+**`FHE.sub` wraps silently on underflow.** Use `FHE.min(requested, available)` before subtraction. The SDK's `partialClaim` and `splitVesting` paths handle this; custom extensions must do so explicitly.
+
+**Encryptor binding is address-scoped.** Input proofs from `encryptUint64` are bound to `(contractAddress, userAddress)` — they cannot be replayed against a different contract or submitted by a different sender. Do not reuse proofs across different contract deployments.
+
+**Operator approvals (`setOperator`) have a deadline.** Set the deadline appropriately for your use case. The SDK exports `ERC_7984_OPERATOR_MAX_DEADLINE` for production flows and warns when the deadline is in the past.
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+| Version | Supported          |
+| ------- | ------------------ |
+| 1.x     | :white_check_mark: |
+
+## Acknowledgments
+
+We will acknowledge reporters in the relevant release notes unless they request anonymity.