@tokenoftrust/cli 1.4.0-rc.2 → 1.4.0-rc.20

package/src/activity.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/**
+ * emitActivity — the CLI's operational-activity emitter (card D3).
+ *
+ * This is a hand-maintained JS MIRROR of the D0 actor×action contract that lives,
+ * in TypeScript, in `packages/public-runtime/src/activity/` (event.ts / catalog.ts
+ * / redaction.ts). The CLI is published to npm STANDALONE and is deliberately pure
+ * JS with NO dependency on `@tot/public-runtime` (a TS package) — see that module's
+ * README ("Consuming this from the downstream cards → D3"). So instead of importing
+ * the contract, we mirror the slice of it the CLI needs, and a keep-in-step test
+ * (activity-mirror.test.mjs) fails LOUDLY the moment this mirror drifts from the TS
+ * source of truth (the same discipline as no-gitea-links.test.mjs).
+ *
+ * What this mirrors, exactly:
+ *   • the ActivityEvent envelope shape + ACTIVITY_SCHEMA_VERSION + newEventId()
+ *   • the CLI-relevant subset of ACTION_CATALOG (the `cli.*` action keys + their
+ *     default-deny argsAllow/renderedAllow allowlists)
+ *   • the redaction contract (REDACTION_MARKER, MAX_VALUE_LEN, the VALUE_CANARIES,
+ *     the KEY_NAME_CANARY, and redactPayload/createActivityEvent) — byte-for-byte,
+ *     so a value that the server-side contract would scrub is scrubbed here too.
+ * If you add a `cli.*` action, change an allowlist, or touch a canary in the TS
+ * source, you MUST update this file in lockstep — the keep-in-step test enforces it.
+ *
+ * Transport + gate (generalized from the obstacle beacon, obstacle-beacon.cjs):
+ *   emitActivity() is a SILENT NO-OP without a bridge credential configured — it
+ *   never makes a network call and never fails/blocks a command when the developer
+ *   isn't connected to a hosted /dev bridge (a bare `tot login`, an older session,
+ *   CI, the `--sample` path). With a credential it POSTs the redacted envelope to
+ *   the SAME `<activityUrl>/api/dev/activity` endpoint the obstacle beacon and the
+ *   dev heartbeat already use — best-effort, bounded by a hard timeout, and fully
+ *   swallowed so telemetry can never disrupt or delay the developer's command.
+ *
+ * Dependency-free (node: builtins + global fetch, Node ≥22).
+ */
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { defaultCredentialsPath, readCredentials } from "./token-store.mjs";
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Envelope (mirror of event.ts)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Envelope contract version — MIRROR of event.ts ACTIVITY_SCHEMA_VERSION. */
+export const ACTIVITY_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+
+/** Node-native UUID v4 (Node ≥22 has globalThis.crypto). Mirror of event.ts newEventId(). */
+export function newEventId() {
+  const c = globalThis.crypto;
+  if (c && typeof c.randomUUID === "function") return c.randomUUID();
+  // Fallback (should never be reached on a supported Node) — node:crypto.
+  return createHash("sha256").update(String(Math.random()) + Date.now()).digest("hex").slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Action catalog — the CLI-relevant SUBSET (mirror of the `cli.*` keys in catalog.ts).
+//
+// Keep this in lockstep with packages/public-runtime/src/activity/catalog.ts. Only
+// the `cli.*` domain is mirrored here (the CLI never emits server/ui actions); the
+// keep-in-step test asserts that (a) this set is EXACTLY the `cli.*` keys in the TS
+// catalog and (b) each argsAllow/renderedAllow matches the TS entry.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export const CLI_ACTION_CATALOG = {
+  "cli.command.invoked": {
+    argsAllow: ["command", "subcommand", "cliVersion", "node"],
+    renderedAllow: [],
+  },
+  "cli.command.result": {
+    argsAllow: ["command", "subcommand", "cliVersion", "exitCode", "durationMs"],
+    renderedAllow: [],
+  },
+  "cli.obstacle.reported": {
+    argsAllow: ["kind", "have", "need", "cliVersion"],
+    renderedAllow: [],
+  },
+  "cli.signin.requested": {
+    argsAllow: ["cliVersion"],
+    renderedAllow: [],
+  },
+};
+
+/** All CLI action keys as a runtime array. */
+export const CLI_ACTION_KEYS = Object.keys(CLI_ACTION_CATALOG);
+
+/** Deny-by-default guard — is this an allowlisted CLI action key? */
+export function isCliActionKey(v) {
+  return typeof v === "string" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(CLI_ACTION_CATALOG, v);
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Redaction contract (mirror of redaction.ts) — MUST match byte-for-byte.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Marker stored in place of a value that tripped a canary. Mirror of REDACTION_MARKER. */
+export const REDACTION_MARKER = "«redacted»";
+/** Cap on a stored rendered/arg string. Mirror of MAX_VALUE_LEN. */
+export const MAX_VALUE_LEN = 512;
+
+/**
+ * Secret/PII VALUE canaries — MIRROR of redaction.ts VALUE_CANARIES. The regex
+ * SOURCES here must stay identical to the TS side; the keep-in-step test compares
+ * them literally.
+ */
+export const VALUE_CANARIES = [
+  { label: "private_key", re: /-----BEGIN(?: [A-Z]+)? PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
+  { label: "jwt", re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/ },
+  { label: "bearer", re: /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]{12,}=*/i },
+  { label: "aws_access_key", re: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/ },
+  { label: "gh_token", re: /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr|github_pat)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}/ },
+  { label: "slack_token", re: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/ },
+  { label: "openai_key", re: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },
+  { label: "email", re: /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/ },
+  { label: "card_number", re: /\b(?:\d[ -]?){13,19}\b/ },
+  { label: "phone", re: /\b\+?\d[\d ().-]{9,}\d\b/ },
+  { label: "high_entropy", re: /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])[A-Za-z0-9_-]{28,}(?:$|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])/ },
+];
+
+/** Secret-looking KEY NAMES — dropped outright. MIRROR of redaction.ts KEY_NAME_CANARY. */
+export const KEY_NAME_CANARY =
+  /(?:secret|token|passwd|password|authorization|api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|credential|cookie|session|bearer|jwt)/i;
+
+function isPrimitive(v) {
+  const t = typeof v;
+  return t === "string" || t === "number" || t === "boolean";
+}
+
+/** Scan a stringified value against the value canaries. Mirror of scanValueCanary. */
+export function scanValueCanary(value) {
+  for (const c of VALUE_CANARIES) if (c.re.test(value)) return c.label;
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+function redactLane(lane, raw, allow, hits) {
+  if (!raw) return undefined;
+  const allowSet = new Set(allow);
+  const out = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+    if (KEY_NAME_CANARY.test(key)) {
+      hits.push({ lane, key, reason: "key_name_canary" });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!allowSet.has(key)) {
+      hits.push({ lane, key, reason: "not_allowlisted" });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!isPrimitive(value)) {
+      hits.push({ lane, key, reason: "non_primitive" });
+      continue;
+    }
+    const str = String(value).slice(0, MAX_VALUE_LEN);
+    const canary = scanValueCanary(str);
+    if (canary) {
+      hits.push({ lane, key, reason: "value_canary", canary });
+      out[key] = REDACTION_MARKER;
+      continue;
+    }
+    out[key] = typeof value === "string" ? str : value;
+  }
+  return Object.keys(out).length > 0 ? out : undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Apply the redaction contract to a raw payload for a CLI action. Pure. Mirror of
+ * redaction.ts redactPayload (restricted to the CLI catalog). An unknown action
+ * yields an empty payload (deny-all).
+ */
+export function redactPayload(action, raw) {
+  const hits = [];
+  const spec = CLI_ACTION_CATALOG[action];
+  if (!spec) {
+    if (raw?.args) for (const k of Object.keys(raw.args)) hits.push({ lane: "args", key: k, reason: "unknown_action" });
+    if (raw?.rendered) for (const k of Object.keys(raw.rendered)) hits.push({ lane: "rendered", key: k, reason: "unknown_action" });
+    return { payload: undefined, report: { keptArgs: [], keptRendered: [], hits, canaryTripped: false } };
+  }
+  const args = redactLane("args", raw?.args, spec.argsAllow, hits);
+  const renderedRaw = redactLane("rendered", raw?.rendered, spec.renderedAllow, hits);
+  const rendered = renderedRaw
+    ? Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(renderedRaw).map(([k, v]) => [k, String(v)]))
+    : undefined;
+  const payload = args || rendered ? { ...(args ? { args } : {}), ...(rendered ? { rendered } : {}) } : undefined;
+  return {
+    payload,
+    report: {
+      keptArgs: args ? Object.keys(args) : [],
+      keptRendered: rendered ? Object.keys(rendered) : [],
+      hits,
+      canaryTripped: hits.some((h) => h.reason === "value_canary"),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The safe constructor — mirror of redaction.ts createActivityEvent. Fills v/id/at
+ * and runs the raw payload through redactPayload() so the returned event's payload
+ * is already default-denied + canary-scanned. Throws only on an out-of-catalog
+ * (non-`cli.*`) action — a programming error.
+ */
+export function createActivityEvent({ action, actor, source = "cli", outcome, scope, payload, at, id }) {
+  if (!isCliActionKey(action)) throw new Error(`activity: unknown CLI action "${action}" (not in the CLI mirror catalog)`);
+  const { payload: redacted, report } = redactPayload(action, payload);
+  const event = {
+    v: ACTIVITY_SCHEMA_VERSION,
+    id: id ?? newEventId(),
+    at: at ?? new Date().toISOString(),
+    actor,
+    action,
+    source,
+    scope: scope ?? {},
+    outcome,
+    ...(redacted ? { payload: redacted } : {}),
+  };
+  return { event, report };
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Bridge resolution + emit
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Hard cap on how long a single emit may take before it's abandoned (never blocks a command). */
+const EMIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 1500;
+
+/**
+ * The ONE activity-telemetry kill switch (card D8) — the SAME flag name the server
+ * honours (`apps/storefront/src/lib/activity/killSwitch.ts`). Set
+ * `ACTIVITY_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1` (or true/yes/on) and every CLI emit becomes a silent
+ * no-op — no build, no redaction, no network — while the command itself runs unchanged
+ * (fail-open). Unset ⇒ telemetry enabled (the normal state).
+ */
+export const ACTIVITY_KILL_SWITCH_FLAG = "ACTIVITY_TELEMETRY_DISABLED";
+export function isActivityDisabled(env = process.env) {
+  const v = env && env[ACTIVITY_KILL_SWITCH_FLAG];
+  return typeof v === "string" && ["1", "true", "yes", "on"].includes(v.trim().toLowerCase());
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the local→hosted activity-bridge credential, or null when none is
+ * configured (→ emitActivity is a no-op). Mirrors the resolution the obstacle
+ * beacon (obstacle.mjs) and the heartbeat (dev-heartbeat.mjs) use: the env override
+ * `TOT_DEV_ACTIVITY_URL`/`TOT_DEV_ACTIVITY_TOKEN` (threaded to runner-spawning
+ * paths) wins, else the `activityUrl`/`activityToken` cached in ~/.tot/credentials.json.
+ */
+export function resolveActivityBridge(env = process.env) {
+  const url = env.TOT_DEV_ACTIVITY_URL;
+  const token = env.TOT_DEV_ACTIVITY_TOKEN;
+  if (url && token) return { url, token };
+  try {
+    const creds = readCredentials(defaultCredentialsPath(env));
+    if (creds?.activityUrl && creds?.activityToken) {
+      return { url: creds.activityUrl, token: creds.activityToken };
+    }
+  } catch {
+    /* best-effort — no bridge */
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The event's actor — kind `dev` (or `agent` when the caller signals an automated
+ * run) with an OPAQUE, non-reversible id, per the D0 contract (actor.id in the core
+ * zone is NEVER raw PII). Until the canonical pseudonymization salt lands (an open
+ * question owned by D1/D4 — see redaction.ts header), we derive the id from an
+ * already-opaque handle: the masked emailHint if present, else a one-way hash of the
+ * bridge token, else "anonymous". Never reversible, never raw PII.
+ */
+export function resolveActor(env = process.env) {
+  const kind = env.TOT_ACTOR_KIND === "agent" ? "agent" : "dev";
+  let seed = "anonymous";
+  try {
+    const creds = readCredentials(defaultCredentialsPath(env));
+    if (creds?.emailHint) seed = `hint:${creds.emailHint}`;
+    else if (creds?.activityToken) seed = `tok:${creds.activityToken}`;
+  } catch {
+    /* fall through to anonymous */
+  }
+  const id = seed === "anonymous" ? "anonymous" : createHash("sha256").update(seed).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+  return { kind, id };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The scope threaded onto every CLI event — the storefront-minted invite→problem
+ * `traceId` from the credential cache, when present, so a CLI event and the server
+ * event it triggers share one trace (matching the existing feedback/heartbeat use).
+ */
+function resolveScope(env = process.env, extra = {}) {
+  const scope = { ...extra };
+  try {
+    const creds = readCredentials(defaultCredentialsPath(env));
+    if (creds?.traceId && !scope.traceId) scope.traceId = creds.traceId;
+  } catch {
+    /* best-effort */
+  }
+  return scope;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Emit one activity event. SILENT NO-OP without a bridge credential (returns
+ * `{ sent:false }`) — no network call, never throws, never blocks a command. With
+ * a credential it builds the redacted envelope (via createActivityEvent) and POSTs
+ * it best-effort to `<url>/api/dev/activity`, bounded by EMIT_TIMEOUT_MS.
+ *
+ * Returns `{ sent, event?, report? }` so callers/tests can assert what would be
+ * emitted without any network. `fetchImpl` and `bridge` are injectable for tests.
+ *
+ * @param {{ action: string, outcome: object, actor?: object, scope?: object,
+ *   payload?: object, source?: string, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
+ *   fetchImpl?: typeof fetch, bridge?: {url:string,token:string}|null }} input
+ * @returns {Promise<{sent:boolean, event?:object, report?:object}>}
+ */
+export async function emitActivity({
+  action,
+  outcome,
+  actor,
+  scope,
+  payload,
+  source = "cli",
+  env = process.env,
+  fetchImpl,
+  bridge,
+} = {}) {
+  try {
+    // Kill switch (D8): telemetry off ⇒ true no-op (no build/redaction/network),
+    // fail-open — the command is unaffected.
+    if (isActivityDisabled(env)) return { sent: false, disabled: true };
+    const resolvedBridge = bridge !== undefined ? bridge : resolveActivityBridge(env);
+    // Build the redacted event even when we won't send it — so a caller/test can
+    // inspect the exact shape, and so redaction always runs on the emit path.
+    const { event, report } = createActivityEvent({
+      action,
+      actor: actor ?? resolveActor(env),
+      source,
+      outcome,
+      scope: resolveScope(env, scope ?? {}),
+      payload,
+    });
+    if (!resolvedBridge) return { sent: false, event, report };
+
+    const doFetch = fetchImpl || globalThis.fetch;
+    if (typeof doFetch !== "function") return { sent: false, event, report };
+
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), EMIT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    if (typeof timer.unref === "function") timer.unref();
+    try {
+      await doFetch(`${String(resolvedBridge.url).replace(/\/+$/, "")}/api/dev/activity`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {
+          "content-type": "application/json",
+          authorization: `Bearer ${resolvedBridge.token}`,
+        },
+        // `event: "activity"` tags the stream for the bridge/D4 ingest to route,
+        // alongside the D0 envelope. Best-effort — an older bridge that doesn't
+        // recognize it simply ignores the post.
+        body: JSON.stringify({ event: "activity", ...event }),
+        signal: controller.signal,
+      });
+    } catch {
+      /* best-effort — a failed/offline/aborted post never disrupts the command */
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+    }
+    return { sent: true, event, report };
+  } catch {
+    // Absolutely never throw into a command's control flow.
+    return { sent: false };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cap + surface a bit of rendered output for a command-result event. The full raw
+ * stdout is NEVER stored — this caps to MAX_VALUE_LEN and hands the string to the
+ * redaction mirror via payload.rendered. NB the `cli.command.*` actions carry an
+ * EMPTY renderedAllow in the D0 catalog, so this string is DROPPED at redaction by
+ * design (the safe default for a high-volume action) — running it through the
+ * mirror is the belt-and-suspenders the contract prescribes, and keeps the emit
+ * path honest if the allowlist ever opens. Pure.
+ */
+export function capRendered(text) {
+  const s = String(text ?? "").trim();
+  if (!s) return undefined;
+  return s.slice(0, MAX_VALUE_LEN);
+}

package/src/candidate-state.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/**
+ * The "active candidate" pointer — which open candidate PR a plain `tot submit`
+ * updates, per forge repo.
+ *
+ * `tot submit` is idempotent on a STABLE changeId (`deriveChangeId`) so a re-submit
+ * updates the same PR by default — the common case needs NO state and writes
+ * nothing here (backward-compatible with the stateless original). This file only
+ * records a DIVERGENCE from that stable default:
+ *
+ *   - `tot submit --new` forks a fresh candidate and remembers it here, so the
+ *     NEXT plain `tot submit` keeps updating the NEW PR (like pushing more commits
+ *     to a `gh pr` branch), not the old one; and
+ *   - a terminal-roll (the active candidate was merged/closed) records the fresh
+ *     candidate it rolled to, so you're never wedged submitting to a dead PR.
+ *
+ * ONE file, `~/.tot/candidates.json`, a map keyed by `<mcpUrl>::<repo>` on the
+ * DEFAULT branch and `<mcpUrl>::<repo>::<branch>` on any other (u4 — branch-bound
+ * candidates): a different MCP, repo, OR non-default git branch is a different
+ * candidate namespace, so a feature branch gets its OWN candidate PR instead of
+ * fighting main's over the same handle. The default branch deliberately keeps the
+ * OLD branch-less key so existing devs' state is byte-identical (zero migration),
+ * and a branch-scoped read that misses FALLS BACK to that old key so state written
+ * before the rekey (or by the default branch) is never orphaned. Same atomic-write
+ * discipline as last-tenant.mjs (0600 in a 0700 dir, write-tmp-then-rename).
+ * Dependency-free (node:fs/os/path). `TOT_HOME` overrides home (tests).
+ */
+import {
+  readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, renameSync, chmodSync,
+} from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { join, dirname } from "node:path";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+
+/** Absolute path to the active-candidate map for this machine. */
+export function defaultCandidateStatePath(env = process.env) {
+  const home = env.TOT_HOME || homedir();
+  return join(home, ".tot", "candidates.json");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Branch names that are treated as the repo's DEFAULT — their candidates keep the
+ * OLD branch-less key (zero migration). A null/empty/detached ("HEAD") branch is
+ * treated as default too, so an environment where the branch can't be resolved
+ * degrades to exactly today's behavior rather than minting a spurious namespace.
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_BRANCHES = new Set(["main", "master"]);
+
+/** Whether `branch` should use the OLD branch-less candidate key. Pure. */
+export function isDefaultBranch(branch) {
+  return !branch || branch === "HEAD" || DEFAULT_BRANCHES.has(branch);
+}
+
+/** The legacy (branch-less) namespace key — today's exact `<mcpUrl>::<repo>`. */
+function legacyStateKey(mcpUrl, repo) {
+  return `${mcpUrl}::${repo}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Namespace key for one (MCP, repo, branch) candidate pointer. The DEFAULT branch
+ * keeps the legacy `<mcpUrl>::<repo>` key byte-for-byte (zero migration); any other
+ * branch gets its own `<mcpUrl>::<repo>::<branch>` namespace. Pure.
+ */
+function stateKey(mcpUrl, repo, branch) {
+  return isDefaultBranch(branch) ? legacyStateKey(mcpUrl, repo) : `${mcpUrl}::${repo}::${branch}`;
+}
+
+/** Extract a usable changeId from a stored record, or null. Pure. */
+function recordChangeId(rec) {
+  return rec && typeof rec.changeId === "string" && rec.changeId ? rec.changeId : null;
+}
+
+function readMap(filePath) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"));
+    return parsed && typeof parsed === "object" ? parsed : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+
+function writeMap(filePath, map) {
+  mkdirSync(dirname(filePath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const tmp = `${filePath}.tmp`;
+  writeFileSync(tmp, `${JSON.stringify(map, null, 2)}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+  renameSync(tmp, filePath);
+  chmodSync(filePath, 0o600);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The remembered active changeId for `(mcpUrl, repo, branch)`, or null when there
+ * isn't one (absent/unreadable/malformed) — a miss means "use the stable default".
+ * On a non-default branch whose branch-scoped key misses, FALLS BACK to the legacy
+ * branch-less key so state written before the rekey (or by the default branch)
+ * isn't orphaned. Never throws.
+ */
+export function readActiveChangeId(filePath, { mcpUrl, repo, branch }) {
+  const map = readMap(filePath);
+  const primary = recordChangeId(map[stateKey(mcpUrl, repo, branch)]);
+  if (primary) return primary;
+  // Legacy fallback: a branch-scoped miss reads the old branch-less key (a no-op
+  // when we're already on the default branch, which IS the legacy key).
+  if (!isDefaultBranch(branch)) return recordChangeId(map[legacyStateKey(mcpUrl, repo)]);
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** Remember `changeId` as the active candidate for `(mcpUrl, repo, branch)`, atomically. */
+export function writeActiveChangeId(filePath, { mcpUrl, repo, branch, changeId }) {
+  const map = readMap(filePath);
+  map[stateKey(mcpUrl, repo, branch)] = { changeId, updatedAt: Date.now() };
+  writeMap(filePath, map);
+}
+
+/** Forget the active candidate for `(mcpUrl, repo, branch)` (e.g. after closing it). */
+export function clearActiveChangeId(filePath, { mcpUrl, repo, branch }) {
+  const map = readMap(filePath);
+  const key = stateKey(mcpUrl, repo, branch);
+  if (key in map) {
+    delete map[key];
+    writeMap(filePath, map);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A fresh candidate handle forked from a stable base — `<baseId>-<suffix>`, still
+ * matching candidate_open's `[a-z0-9._-]` handle grammar. The suffix defaults to
+ * 6 random hex chars (so two `--new` runs never collide); tests inject a fixed
+ * suffix. Pure given `suffix`.
+ */
+export function mintFreshChangeId(baseId, suffix = randomBytes(3).toString("hex")) {
+  const safe = String(suffix).toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, "").slice(0, 12) || "new";
+  return `${baseId}-${safe}`;
+}
+
+/** Whether a forge candidate state means "no open PR to update" (rolled past). */
+export function isTerminalCandidateState(state) {
+  return state === "merged" || state === "closed";
+}