@tinycloud/share-sdk 1.4.1-beta.3 → 1.4.1-beta.4

package/dist/{web-recipient-entry-Bn3yRB7g.d.cts → web-recipient-entry-DF_BMFq8.d.cts}

@@ -226,7 +226,11 @@ declare class ShareRecipientClient {
     authorize(envelope: ShareEnvelopeV2): Promise<ShareAuthorizedContent>;
     establishPolicySession(): Promise<SharePolicySession>;
     private establishV3;
-    /** Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content, independently checking canonical and registered raw-key digests. */
+    /**
+     * Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content. The wrapped-key digest is compared by source kind: the raw-byte digest
+     * when the source has `encryptionKeyPath`, the canonical hash for a no-path source. The envelope's own canonical hash
+     * is checked independently either way.
+     */
     decryptV3Content(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{
         readonly bytes: Uint8Array;
         readonly mediaType: string;

package/dist/{web-recipient-entry-CTFoIH8l.d.ts → web-recipient-entry-mcC6d4ao.d.ts}

@@ -226,7 +226,11 @@ declare class ShareRecipientClient {
     authorize(envelope: ShareEnvelopeV2): Promise<ShareAuthorizedContent>;
     establishPolicySession(): Promise<SharePolicySession>;
     private establishV3;
-    /** Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content, independently checking canonical and registered raw-key digests. */
+    /**
+     * Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content. The wrapped-key digest is compared by source kind: the raw-byte digest
+     * when the source has `encryptionKeyPath`, the canonical hash for a no-path source. The envelope's own canonical hash
+     * is checked independently either way.
+     */
     decryptV3Content(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<{
         readonly bytes: Uint8Array;
         readonly mediaType: string;

package/dist/web-recipient.cjs

@@ -6249,6 +6249,10 @@ function matchesInitialCiphertextDigest(bytes, expected) {
 function canonicalHashHex(value) {
   return hex2((0, import_sha2562.sha256)(new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalize(value))));
 }
+function registeredWrappedKeyDigest(encryptedSymmetricKey, pathBound) {
+  const rawDigest = hex2((0, import_sha2562.sha256)(fromBase64(encryptedSymmetricKey, "v3 encrypted symmetric key")));
+  return pathBound ? rawDigest : canonicalHashHex(encryptedSymmetricKey);
+}
 async function aesGcmDecrypt(key, blob, aad) {
   if (key.length !== 32 || blob.length < 28) throw new Error("encrypted content is malformed");
   const cryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", key, "AES-GCM", false, ["decrypt"]);
@@ -6275,7 +6279,7 @@ function parseV3InlineEncryptedEnvelope(bytes, expected) {
   const record = value;
   const allowed = ["v", "networkId", "keyPath", "alg", "keyVersion", "encryptedSymmetricKey", "encryptedSymmetricKeyHash", "ciphertext", "aad", "metadata"];
   const source = expected.contentSource;
-  if (Object.keys(record).some((key) => !allowed.includes(key)) || record.v !== (source.encryptionKeyPath === void 0 ? 1 : 2) || record.networkId !== source.encryptionNetwork || record.networkId !== expected.encryptionNetwork || record.keyPath !== source.encryptionKeyPath || record.keyPath !== void 0 && record.keyPath !== `share/${expected.shareId}` || record.alg !== "x25519-aes256gcm/v1" || record.keyVersion !== source.keyVersion || typeof record.encryptedSymmetricKey !== "string" || typeof record.encryptedSymmetricKeyHash !== "string" || hex2((0, import_sha2562.sha256)(fromBase64(record.encryptedSymmetricKey, "v3 encrypted symmetric key"))) !== source.encryptedSymmetricKeyDigestHex || record.encryptedSymmetricKeyHash !== canonicalHashHex(record.encryptedSymmetricKey) || typeof record.ciphertext !== "string" || record.aad !== void 0 && typeof record.aad !== "string" || record.metadata !== void 0 && (record.metadata === null || typeof record.metadata !== "object" || Array.isArray(record.metadata) || Object.values(record.metadata).some((entry) => typeof entry !== "string"))) {
+  if (Object.keys(record).some((key) => !allowed.includes(key)) || record.v !== (source.encryptionKeyPath === void 0 ? 1 : 2) || record.networkId !== source.encryptionNetwork || record.networkId !== expected.encryptionNetwork || record.keyPath !== source.encryptionKeyPath || record.keyPath !== void 0 && record.keyPath !== `share/${expected.shareId}` || record.alg !== "x25519-aes256gcm/v1" || record.keyVersion !== source.keyVersion || typeof record.encryptedSymmetricKey !== "string" || typeof record.encryptedSymmetricKeyHash !== "string" || registeredWrappedKeyDigest(record.encryptedSymmetricKey, source.encryptionKeyPath !== void 0) !== source.encryptedSymmetricKeyDigestHex || record.encryptedSymmetricKeyHash !== canonicalHashHex(record.encryptedSymmetricKey) || typeof record.ciphertext !== "string" || record.aad !== void 0 && typeof record.aad !== "string" || record.metadata !== void 0 && (record.metadata === null || typeof record.metadata !== "object" || Array.isArray(record.metadata) || Object.values(record.metadata).some((entry) => typeof entry !== "string"))) {
     throw new Error("encrypted content envelope binding is invalid");
   }
   return record;
@@ -6396,7 +6400,11 @@ var ShareRecipientClient = class {
     this.session = { sessionId: delegation.sessionCid, expiresAt: new Date(compact.payload.exp * 1e3).toISOString(), actions: envelope.actions, resource: envelope.resource };
     return this.session;
   }
-  /** Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content, independently checking canonical and registered raw-key digests. */
+  /**
+   * Decrypt unscoped v1 or path-bound v2 content. The wrapped-key digest is compared by source kind: the raw-byte digest
+   * when the source has `encryptionKeyPath`, the canonical hash for a no-path source. The envelope's own canonical hash
+   * is checked independently either way.
+   */
   async decryptV3Content(bytes) {
     const envelope = this.options.envelope;
     const signer = this.nativeSigner ?? this.signer;