@tinycloud/sdk-services 3.11.0-beta.2 → 3.12.0-beta.3

package/dist/encryption/resource.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/encryption/resource.ts","../../src/encryption/networkId.ts","../../src/encryption/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Typed encryption resources: bare networks, named keys and key prefixes.\n *\n *   network: urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>\n *   key:     urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<path>\n *   prefix:  urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<prefix>/\n *\n * Grammar rules:\n * - The owner DID contains no `/`. The string is split at the FIRST `/` into\n *   `<ownerDid>:<network>` and the path; that head splits at its last `:`.\n * - A key path has 1 to 8 segments joined by `/`; each segment is 1 to 64 bytes\n *   of `[a-z0-9._-]` starting with `[a-z0-9]` (so `.` and `..` are impossible);\n *   the whole path is at most 255 bytes.\n * - A prefix is the key form with exactly ONE trailing `/`. The trailing `/` is\n *   significant: `apps/foo/` and `apps/foo` are different resources and\n *   `apps/foo/` does not cover `apps/foobar`.\n * - Under the reserved first segment `apps`, a key needs at least 3 segments\n *   (`apps/<id>/<name>`) and a prefix at least 2 (`apps/<id>/`); `apps`,\n *   `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n * - The canonical form is the exact input. Non-canonical input is rejected and\n *   never normalized: wrong case, bad characters, empty segments, a\n *   non-canonical owner (EIP-55 for `did:pkh:eip155`).\n * - Bare networks follow `parseNetworkId` unchanged. When PARSING a key or\n *   prefix the network part must match `[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}`; builders\n *   take a network id that `parseNetworkId` produced, so emitted names stay strict.\n */\n\nimport { pkhDid } from \"@tinycloud/bootstrap\";\nimport {\n  ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX,\n  NetworkIdError,\n  parseNetworkId,\n} from \"./networkId\";\nimport { DECRYPT_ACTION } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Path grammar. This is the only place the key-path charset/limits live. */\nconst SEGMENT_SOURCE = \"[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}\";\nconst PATH_SOURCE = `${SEGMENT_SOURCE}(?:/${SEGMENT_SOURCE}){0,7}`;\nconst KEY_PATH_RE = new RegExp(`^${PATH_SOURCE}$`);\n/**\n * Network part of a KEY or PREFIX resource: printable ASCII, first character\n * alphanumeric, at most 64 characters. Bare networks are not checked against\n * this; they go through `parseNetworkId` unchanged.\n */\nconst KEY_NETWORK_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;\n/** `<ownerDid>:<network>` head, then the raw path (prefix keeps its trailing `/`). */\nconst RESOURCE_RE = /^(did:[a-z0-9]+:[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+):([^:/]+)(?:\\/(.*))?$/s;\nconst MAX_PATH_BYTES = 255;\nconst PKH_EIP155_PREFIX = \"did:pkh:eip155:\";\nconst MAX_U64 = 18446744073709551615n;\n\n/** Ability URNs for named encryption keys. */\nexport const KEY_CREATE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.create\";\nexport const KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.block\";\nexport const KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.unblock\";\nexport const KEY_DELETE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.delete\";\n\n/** Key abilities that may appear in a delegation: decrypt, create, block, unblock. `key.delete` never does. */\nexport const DELEGABLE_KEY_ABILITIES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([\n  DECRYPT_ACTION,\n  KEY_CREATE_ABILITY,\n  KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY,\n  KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY,\n]);\n\n/** Node `/info` feature string advertising named-key support. */\nexport const NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE = \"encryption-named-keys-v1\";\n\nexport type EncryptionResourceErrorCode =\n  | \"not_encryption_urn\"\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"bad_owner\"\n  | \"non_canonical_owner\"\n  | \"bad_network\"\n  | \"empty_path\"\n  | \"bad_path\"\n  | \"path_too_long\";\n\nexport class EncryptionResourceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode;\n  constructor(code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode, message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"EncryptionResourceError\";\n    this.code = code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkResource {\n  kind: \"network\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedKeyResource {\n  kind: \"key\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedPrefixResource {\n  kind: \"prefix\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Path without the trailing `/`. */\n  prefix: string;\n}\n\nexport type ParsedEncryptionResource =\n  | ParsedNetworkResource\n  | ParsedKeyResource\n  | ParsedPrefixResource;\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an owner DID, matching the node: `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`\n * needs a positive u64 decimal chain id and a 20-byte hex address (rendered EIP-55);\n * every other DID that passed the owner grammar is returned as is.\n */\nfunction canonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): string {\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX)) return ownerDid;\n  const rest = ownerDid.slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length);\n  const colon = rest.indexOf(\":\");\n  const chain = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(0, colon);\n  const address = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(colon + 1);\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(chain) || !/^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$/.test(address)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not a valid did:pkh:eip155 (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const chainId = BigInt(chain);\n  if (chainId === 0n || chainId > MAX_U64) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `did:pkh:eip155 chain id must be a positive u64 (got ${JSON.stringify(chain)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Checksum through chain 1 so the chain id is never narrowed to a Number.\n  const checksummed = pkhDid(address, 1).slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length + 2);\n  return `${PKH_EIP155_PREFIX}${chainId}:${checksummed}`;\n}\n\nfunction assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): void {\n  const canonical = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  if (canonical !== ownerDid) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"non_canonical_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not canonical (expected ${canonical})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertPath(path: string, what: \"key path\" | \"prefix\"): void {\n  if (path.length === 0) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"empty_path\", `${what} must not be empty`);\n  }\n  if (new TextEncoder().encode(path).length > MAX_PATH_BYTES) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"path_too_long\",\n      `${what} exceeds ${MAX_PATH_BYTES} bytes`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!KEY_PATH_RE.test(path)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} must match ${KEY_PATH_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Depth rule for the reserved `apps` first segment: a key is\n  // `apps/<id>/<name>...` (3 or more segments), a prefix is `apps/<id>/...`\n  // (2 or more). `apps`, `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n  const segments = path.split(\"/\");\n  if (segments[0] === \"apps\" && segments.length < (what === \"key path\" ? 3 : 2)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} under apps/ needs ${what === \"key path\" ? \"apps/<id>/<name>\" : \"apps/<id>/\"}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an encryption resource URN into a bare network, a named key or a key\n * prefix. Throws {@link EncryptionResourceError} on anything that is not\n * already in canonical form.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(uri: string): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  if (typeof uri !== \"string\" || !uri.startsWith(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"not_encryption_urn\",\n      `resource must start with ${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = uri.slice(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX.length);\n  const match = RESOURCE_RE.exec(body);\n  if (match === null) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `resource is not <ownerDid>:<network>[/<path>] (got ${JSON.stringify(uri)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = match[1]!;\n  const network = match[2]!;\n  const rawPath = match[3];\n  if (rawPath === undefined) {\n    // Bare networks are normalized (the node does the same); key ids never are.\n    const canonicalOwnerDid = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n    const bareId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${canonicalOwnerDid}:${network}`;\n    try {\n      parseNetworkId(bareId);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n        throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n      }\n      throw error;\n    }\n    return { kind: \"network\", ownerDid: canonicalOwnerDid, network, networkId: bareId };\n  }\n  if (!KEY_NETWORK_RE.test(network)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_network\",\n      `network ${JSON.stringify(network)} must match ${KEY_NETWORK_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  const networkId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${network}`;\n\n  if (rawPath.endsWith(\"/\")) {\n    const prefix = rawPath.slice(0, -1);\n    assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n    return { kind: \"prefix\", ownerDid, network, networkId, prefix };\n  }\n  assertPath(rawPath, \"key path\");\n  return { kind: \"key\", ownerDid, network, networkId, path: rawPath };\n}\n\nfunction canonicalNetworkId(networkId: string): string {\n  let parsed;\n  try {\n    parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n      throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n    }\n    throw error;\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(parsed.ownerDid);\n  return parsed.networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builders re-parse their output so they can never emit a URN the parser\n * would reject (for example an owner outside the owner grammar).\n */\nfunction parseBuilt(resource: string, networkId: string): void {\n  if (parseEncryptionResource(resource).networkId !== networkId) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `built resource does not round-trip (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a named key. */\nexport function formatKeyResource(networkId: string, path: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(path, \"key path\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${path}`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a key prefix grant (one trailing `/`). */\nexport function formatPrefixResource(networkId: string, prefix: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${prefix}/`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the `granted` resource cover the `requested` resource?\n * exact == exact; a prefix covers keys whose path starts with `<prefix>/` and\n * prefixes whose `/`-terminated form starts with the granted one; a bare\n * network covers only the same bare network. Every other pair is false, and\n * so is anything that does not parse.\n */\nexport function encryptionResourceContains(\n  granted: string,\n  requested: string,\n): boolean {\n  let g: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  let r: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  try {\n    g = parseEncryptionResource(granted);\n    r = parseEncryptionResource(requested);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (g.networkId !== r.networkId) return false;\n  switch (g.kind) {\n    case \"network\":\n      return r.kind === \"network\";\n    case \"key\":\n      return r.kind === \"key\" && r.path === g.path;\n    case \"prefix\":\n      if (r.kind === \"key\") return r.path.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      if (r.kind === \"prefix\") return `${r.prefix}/`.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only when the node `/info` response lists exactly\n * `\"encryption-named-keys-v1\"` in `features`.\n */\nexport function nodeSupportsNamedKeys(\n  info: { features?: unknown } | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  const features = info?.features;\n  return Array.isArray(features) && features.includes(NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE);\n}\n","/**\n * TinyCloud encryption network identifiers.\n *\n * A network id is `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>` where\n * `ownerDid` is the owner's DID and `network` is a\n * non-empty label drawn from `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`.\n *\n * The embedded owner DID is the root authority for the network: any\n * delegation chain ending in a `tinycloud.encryption/decrypt` grant on\n * the network must root at this owner DID.\n */\n\nconst URN_PREFIX = \"urn:tinycloud:encryption:\";\nconst NETWORK_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;\nconst PKH_EIP155_DID_RE = /^did:pkh:eip155:(\\d+):(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})$/;\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** The full URN string. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Owner DID embedded in the URN (the network's root authority). */\n  ownerDid: string;\n  /** Network label (the suffix after the owner DID). */\n  name: string;\n}\n\nexport class NetworkIdError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"NetworkIdError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network id string into its owner DID and name components.\n *\n * Throws {@link NetworkIdError} when the input does not match\n * `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<did>:<name>`, when the embedded DID is\n * malformed, or when the network name fails {@link NETWORK_NAME_RE}.\n */\nexport function parseNetworkId(networkId: string): ParsedNetworkId {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\" || networkId.length === 0) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"networkId must be a non-empty string\");\n  }\n  if (!networkId.startsWith(URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId must start with ${URN_PREFIX} (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = networkId.slice(URN_PREFIX.length);\n  // `body` = \"<ownerDid>:<network>\"\n  // ownerDid contains ':' (e.g. did:key:z6Mk...), so we split on the LAST colon\n  // and treat the suffix as the network name.\n  const lastColon = body.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  if (lastColon <= 0 || lastColon === body.length - 1) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId missing ownerDid or name segment (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = body.slice(0, lastColon);\n  const name = body.slice(lastColon + 1);\n\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid must be a DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Minimal DID shape: did:<method>:<id> — three colon-separated segments,\n  // each non-empty.\n  const didParts = ownerDid.split(\":\");\n  if (didParts.length < 3 || didParts.some((p) => p.length === 0)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid is not a well-formed DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { networkId, ownerDid, name };\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedEncryptionResource extends ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** Named-key path, if the resource is scoped below a network. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network-root or named-key encryption resource.\n *\n * A trailing slash on keyPath denotes a prefix grant; empty and traversal\n * segments are rejected so resource matching cannot escape the named path.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(\n  resource: string,\n): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  const networkSeparator = resource.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  const nameAndPath = resource.slice(networkSeparator + 1);\n  const pathSeparator = nameAndPath.indexOf(\"/\");\n  const name =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? nameAndPath\n      : nameAndPath.slice(0, pathSeparator);\n  const networkId =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? resource\n      : `${resource.slice(0, networkSeparator + 1)}${name}`;\n  const parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  if (pathSeparator === -1) return parsed;\n\n  const keyPath = nameAndPath.slice(pathSeparator + 1);\n  const segments = keyPath.split(\"/\");\n  const prefix = keyPath.endsWith(\"/\");\n  if (\n    keyPath.length === 0 ||\n    /[\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\\\]/.test(keyPath) ||\n    segments.some(\n      (segment, index) =>\n        segment === \".\" ||\n        segment === \"..\" ||\n        (segment.length === 0 && !(prefix && index === segments.length - 1)),\n    )\n  ) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `encryption resource has an invalid keyPath (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...parsed, keyPath };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a network id URN from an owner DID and a network name.\n * Validates inputs and throws {@link NetworkIdError} on bad shape.\n */\nexport function buildNetworkId(ownerDid: string, name: string): string {\n  if (typeof ownerDid !== \"string\" || !ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"ownerDid must be a DID\");\n  }\n  if (typeof name !== \"string\" || !NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const networkId = `${URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${name}`;\n  // Re-validate the composed result so the same error path triggers\n  // for caller inputs that compose into a malformed URN.\n  parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  return networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when {@link networkId} is a syntactically valid network URN.\n */\nexport function isNetworkId(networkId: unknown): networkId is string {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  try {\n    parseNetworkId(networkId);\n    return true;\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parsePkhOwnerDid(ownerDid: string):\n  | { chainId: string; address: string }\n  | null {\n  const match = ownerDid.match(PKH_EIP155_DID_RE);\n  if (!match) return null;\n  return {\n    chainId: match[1],\n    address: match[2].toLowerCase(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare owner DIDs as network principals. For `did:pkh:eip155`, EVM\n * address casing is not part of principal identity; other DID methods\n * remain exact string matches.\n */\nexport function ownerDidMatches(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const aPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(a);\n  const bPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(b);\n  if (aPkh && bPkh) {\n    return aPkh.chainId === bPkh.chainId && aPkh.address === bPkh.address;\n  }\n  return a === b;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the discovery key used to look up a network's descriptor under\n * an owner's public account-space.\n *\n * Format: `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>`.\n */\nexport function networkDiscoveryKey(name: string): string {\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return `.well-known/encryption/network/${name}`;\n}\n\nexport const ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX = URN_PREFIX;\nexport const NETWORK_NAME_PATTERN = NETWORK_NAME_RE;\n","/**\n * Type definitions for TinyCloud one-of-one encryption.\n *\n * Wire shapes mirror the protocol described in the encryption\n * architecture: inline envelopes carry the encrypted symmetric key\n * alongside the ciphertext; decrypt requests are short-lived UCAN\n * invocations against a target node plus networkId.\n */\n\nimport type { Json } from \"./canonical\";\nimport type { PermissionHint } from \"../types\";\n\n/** Default ciphersuite identifier for v1 envelopes. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_ALG = \"x25519-aes256gcm/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Inline-envelope schema version. */\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Default key version on freshly-created networks. */\nexport const DEFAULT_KEY_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Decrypt-invocation fact type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE = \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt response type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE =\n  \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt-result/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Encryption service identifier (manifest long form). */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE = \"tinycloud.encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Short form used in recap/abilities maps. */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE_SHORT = \"encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt ability URN. */\nexport const DECRYPT_ACTION = \"tinycloud.encryption/decrypt\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Inline encrypted envelope persisted in KV/SQL records.\n *\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKey` is opaque to the SDK; only the network can\n *   unwrap it.\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash` is the canonical hash of the wrapped key\n   *   bytes (hex-encoded sha-256 of the base64 string's canonical JSON\n   *   form). The node recomputes this on every decrypt request.\n * - `ciphertext` and `aad` are payload bytes only; the node never sees\n *   them.\n */\nexport interface InlineEncryptedEnvelope {\n  v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n  /** Network id URN. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path; absent on network-root v1 envelopes. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  /** Ciphersuite identifier. */\n  alg: string;\n  /** Network key version that was used to wrap the symmetric key. */\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key / capsule. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Hex sha-256 of the canonical encryptedSymmetricKey string. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded payload ciphertext. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded associated data, if any. */\n  aad?: string;\n  /** Caller-supplied metadata. Not authenticated against the node. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Node-published network descriptor. The node DB is authoritative; a\n * cached copy may also live under\n * `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>` in the owner's account\n * space (a discovery record only).\n */\nexport interface NetworkDescriptor {\n  networkId: string;\n  ownerDid: string;\n  name: string;\n  members: ReadonlyArray<{ nodeId: string; role: \"primary\" | \"share\" }>;\n  threshold: { n: number; t: number };\n  state: \"pending\" | \"generating\" | \"active\" | \"rotating\" | \"revoked\" | \"failed\";\n  /** Base64-encoded network public key. */\n  publicEncryptionKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  keyBackend: \"local-one-of-one\" | \"dstack\" | \"threshold\";\n  createdAt: string;\n  updatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-request body sent over the wire. Hashed (canonically) and\n * bound to the UCAN invocation via `facts.bodyHash`.\n */\nexport interface DecryptRequestBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key from the envelope. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Recomputed hash of the wrapped key. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded per-request receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hash of the receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-response body returned by the node. The SDK verifies the\n * signature, recomputes hashes, then unwraps `wrappedKey` with the\n * per-request receiver private key before decrypting the payload.\n */\nexport interface DecryptResponseBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  invocationCid: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded symmetric key re-encrypted to receiverPublicKey. */\n  wrappedKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  requestHash: string;\n  nodeId: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded ed25519 signature over canonical(response - signature field). */\n  nodeSignature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-invocation facts attached to the UCAN. Verifiers recompute\n * `bodyHash`, `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash`, and `receiverPublicKeyHash`\n * from the request body and reject any mismatch.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationFact {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  bodyHash: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request receiver key pair (x25519). The private key never\n * leaves the SDK; the public key is sent to the node so the node can\n * rewrap the symmetric key.\n */\nexport interface ReceiverKeyPair {\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n  privateKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Crypto primitives injected into the encryption module. The SDK\n * provides these via WASM bindings; tests provide simple in-memory\n * implementations.\n */\nexport interface EncryptionCrypto {\n  /** SHA-256 → 32-byte digest. */\n  sha256(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. */\n  randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array;\n  /** Derive an x25519 key pair from a 32-byte seed. */\n  x25519FromSeed(seed: Uint8Array): ReceiverKeyPair;\n  /** Compute the x25519 ECDH shared secret. */\n  x25519Dh(privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric encryption (the node's symmetric scheme). */\n  authEncrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    plaintext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric decryption (matched to authEncrypt). */\n  authDecrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Wrap a symmetric key for the network's public encryption key using\n   * a sealed-box / hpke / x25519+symmetric construction. Implementation\n   * is opaque; only the node can unwrap.\n   */\n  sealToNetworkKey(\n    networkPublicKey: Uint8Array,\n    symmetricKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Open a wrapped symmetric key that was re-encrypted to the\n   * per-request receiver public key. The matching private key must be\n   * supplied here; the SDK never sends it to the node.\n   */\n  openWithReceiverKey(\n    receiverPrivateKey: Uint8Array,\n    wrappedKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Verify an ed25519 signature over `message` produced by the node\n   * identified by `nodeId` (the public-key DID).\n   */\n  verifyNodeSignature(\n    nodeId: string,\n    message: Uint8Array,\n    signature: Uint8Array,\n  ): boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signer interface used to derive a receiver key pair from a wallet or\n * session signer. 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WASM bindings\n * implement this with the same session signer used for KV/SQL\n * invocations; tests can stub it.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationSigner {\n  signDecryptInvocation(input: BuildDecryptInvocationInput): Promise<BuiltDecryptInvocation>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Errors thrown / returned from the encryption module.\n */\nexport type EncryptionErrorInput =\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_FOUND\"; networkId?: string; name?: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_ACTIVE\"; state: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_NETWORK_ID\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_ENVELOPE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"DECRYPT_DENIED\"; message: string; permissionHint?: PermissionHint }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_RESPONSE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_SIGNATURE_INVALID\"; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_BINDING_MISMATCH\"; field: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"TRANSPORT_ERROR\"; cause: Error; message?: string }\n  | { code: 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/encryption/resource.ts","../../src/encryption/networkId.ts","../../src/encryption/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Typed encryption resources: bare networks, named keys and key prefixes.\n *\n *   network: urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>\n *   key:     urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<path>\n *   prefix:  urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<prefix>/\n *\n * Grammar rules:\n * - The owner DID contains no `/`. The string is split at the FIRST `/` into\n *   `<ownerDid>:<network>` and the path; that head splits at its last `:`.\n * - A key path has 1 to 8 segments joined by `/`; each segment is 1 to 64 bytes\n *   of `[a-z0-9._-]` starting with `[a-z0-9]` (so `.` and `..` are impossible);\n *   the whole path is at most 255 bytes.\n * - A prefix is the key form with exactly ONE trailing `/`. The trailing `/` is\n *   significant: `apps/foo/` and `apps/foo` are different resources and\n *   `apps/foo/` does not cover `apps/foobar`.\n * - Under the reserved first segment `apps`, a key needs at least 3 segments\n *   (`apps/<id>/<name>`) and a prefix at least 2 (`apps/<id>/`); `apps`,\n *   `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n * - The canonical form is the exact input. Non-canonical input is rejected and\n *   never normalized: wrong case, bad characters, empty segments, a\n *   non-canonical owner (EIP-55 for `did:pkh:eip155`).\n * - Bare networks follow `parseNetworkId` unchanged. When PARSING a key or\n *   prefix the network part must match `[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}`; builders\n *   take a network id that `parseNetworkId` produced, so emitted names stay strict.\n */\n\nimport { pkhDid } from \"@tinycloud/bootstrap\";\nimport {\n  ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX,\n  NetworkIdError,\n  parseNetworkId,\n} from \"./networkId\";\nimport { DECRYPT_ACTION } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Path grammar. This is the only place the key-path charset/limits live. */\nconst SEGMENT_SOURCE = \"[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}\";\nconst PATH_SOURCE = `${SEGMENT_SOURCE}(?:/${SEGMENT_SOURCE}){0,7}`;\nconst KEY_PATH_RE = new RegExp(`^${PATH_SOURCE}$`);\n/**\n * Network part of a KEY or PREFIX resource: printable ASCII, first character\n * alphanumeric, at most 64 characters. Bare networks are not checked against\n * this; they go through `parseNetworkId` unchanged.\n */\nconst KEY_NETWORK_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;\n/** `<ownerDid>:<network>` head, then the raw path (prefix keeps its trailing `/`). */\nconst RESOURCE_RE = /^(did:[a-z0-9]+:[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+):([^:/]+)(?:\\/(.*))?$/s;\nconst MAX_PATH_BYTES = 255;\nconst PKH_EIP155_PREFIX = \"did:pkh:eip155:\";\nconst MAX_U64 = 18446744073709551615n;\n\n/** Ability URNs for named encryption keys. */\nexport const KEY_CREATE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.create\";\nexport const KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.block\";\nexport const KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.unblock\";\nexport const KEY_DELETE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.delete\";\n\n/** Key abilities that may appear in a delegation: decrypt, create, block, unblock. `key.delete` never does. */\nexport const DELEGABLE_KEY_ABILITIES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([\n  DECRYPT_ACTION,\n  KEY_CREATE_ABILITY,\n  KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY,\n  KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY,\n]);\n\n/** Node `/info` feature string advertising named-key support. */\nexport const NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE = \"encryption-named-keys-v1\";\n\nexport type EncryptionResourceErrorCode =\n  | \"not_encryption_urn\"\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"bad_owner\"\n  | \"non_canonical_owner\"\n  | \"bad_network\"\n  | \"empty_path\"\n  | \"bad_path\"\n  | \"path_too_long\";\n\nexport class EncryptionResourceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode;\n  constructor(code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode, message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"EncryptionResourceError\";\n    this.code = code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkResource {\n  kind: \"network\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedKeyResource {\n  kind: \"key\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedPrefixResource {\n  kind: \"prefix\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Path without the trailing `/`. */\n  prefix: string;\n}\n\nexport type ParsedEncryptionResource =\n  | ParsedNetworkResource\n  | ParsedKeyResource\n  | ParsedPrefixResource;\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an owner DID, matching the node: `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`\n * needs a positive u64 decimal chain id and a 20-byte hex address (rendered EIP-55);\n * every other DID that passed the owner grammar is returned as is.\n */\nfunction canonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): string {\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX)) return ownerDid;\n  const rest = ownerDid.slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length);\n  const colon = rest.indexOf(\":\");\n  const chain = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(0, colon);\n  const address = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(colon + 1);\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(chain) || !/^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$/.test(address)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not a valid did:pkh:eip155 (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const chainId = BigInt(chain);\n  if (chainId === 0n || chainId > MAX_U64) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `did:pkh:eip155 chain id must be a positive u64 (got ${JSON.stringify(chain)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Checksum through chain 1 so the chain id is never narrowed to a Number.\n  const checksummed = pkhDid(address, 1).slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length + 2);\n  return `${PKH_EIP155_PREFIX}${chainId}:${checksummed}`;\n}\n\nfunction assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): void {\n  const canonical = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  if (canonical !== ownerDid) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"non_canonical_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not canonical (expected ${canonical})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertPath(path: string, what: \"key path\" | \"prefix\"): void {\n  if (path.length === 0) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"empty_path\", `${what} must not be empty`);\n  }\n  if (new TextEncoder().encode(path).length > MAX_PATH_BYTES) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"path_too_long\",\n      `${what} exceeds ${MAX_PATH_BYTES} bytes`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!KEY_PATH_RE.test(path)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} must match ${KEY_PATH_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Depth rule for the reserved `apps` first segment: a key is\n  // `apps/<id>/<name>...` (3 or more segments), a prefix is `apps/<id>/...`\n  // (2 or more). `apps`, `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n  const segments = path.split(\"/\");\n  if (segments[0] === \"apps\" && segments.length < (what === \"key path\" ? 3 : 2)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} under apps/ needs ${what === \"key path\" ? \"apps/<id>/<name>\" : \"apps/<id>/\"}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an encryption resource URN into a bare network, a named key or a key\n * prefix. Throws {@link EncryptionResourceError} on anything that is not\n * already in canonical form.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(uri: string): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  if (typeof uri !== \"string\" || !uri.startsWith(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"not_encryption_urn\",\n      `resource must start with ${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = uri.slice(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX.length);\n  const match = RESOURCE_RE.exec(body);\n  if (match === null) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `resource is not <ownerDid>:<network>[/<path>] (got ${JSON.stringify(uri)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = match[1]!;\n  const network = match[2]!;\n  const rawPath = match[3];\n  if (rawPath === undefined) {\n    // Bare networks are normalized (the node does the same); key ids never are.\n    const canonicalOwnerDid = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n    const bareId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${canonicalOwnerDid}:${network}`;\n    try {\n      parseNetworkId(bareId);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n        throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n      }\n      throw error;\n    }\n    return { kind: \"network\", ownerDid: canonicalOwnerDid, network, networkId: bareId };\n  }\n  if (!KEY_NETWORK_RE.test(network)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_network\",\n      `network ${JSON.stringify(network)} must match ${KEY_NETWORK_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  const networkId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${network}`;\n\n  if (rawPath.endsWith(\"/\")) {\n    const prefix = rawPath.slice(0, -1);\n    assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n    return { kind: \"prefix\", ownerDid, network, networkId, prefix };\n  }\n  assertPath(rawPath, \"key path\");\n  return { kind: \"key\", ownerDid, network, networkId, path: rawPath };\n}\n\nfunction canonicalNetworkId(networkId: string): string {\n  let parsed;\n  try {\n    parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n      throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n    }\n    throw error;\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(parsed.ownerDid);\n  return parsed.networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builders re-parse their output so they can never emit a URN the parser\n * would reject (for example an owner outside the owner grammar).\n */\nfunction parseBuilt(resource: string, networkId: string): void {\n  if (parseEncryptionResource(resource).networkId !== networkId) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `built resource does not round-trip (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a named key. */\nexport function formatKeyResource(networkId: string, path: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(path, \"key path\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${path}`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a key prefix grant (one trailing `/`). */\nexport function formatPrefixResource(networkId: string, prefix: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${prefix}/`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the `granted` resource cover the `requested` resource?\n * exact == exact; a prefix covers keys whose path starts with `<prefix>/` and\n * prefixes whose `/`-terminated form starts with the granted one; a bare\n * network covers only the same bare network. Every other pair is false, and\n * so is anything that does not parse.\n */\nexport function encryptionResourceContains(\n  granted: string,\n  requested: string,\n): boolean {\n  let g: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  let r: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  try {\n    g = parseEncryptionResource(granted);\n    r = parseEncryptionResource(requested);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (g.networkId !== r.networkId) return false;\n  switch (g.kind) {\n    case \"network\":\n      return r.kind === \"network\";\n    case \"key\":\n      return r.kind === \"key\" && r.path === g.path;\n    case \"prefix\":\n      if (r.kind === \"key\") return r.path.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      if (r.kind === \"prefix\") return `${r.prefix}/`.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only when the node `/info` response lists exactly\n * `\"encryption-named-keys-v1\"` in `features`.\n */\nexport function nodeSupportsNamedKeys(\n  info: { features?: unknown } | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  const features = info?.features;\n  return Array.isArray(features) && features.includes(NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE);\n}\n","/**\n * TinyCloud encryption network identifiers.\n *\n * A network id is `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>` where\n * `ownerDid` is the owner's DID and `network` is a\n * non-empty label drawn from `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`.\n *\n * The embedded owner DID is the root authority for the network: any\n * delegation chain ending in a `tinycloud.encryption/decrypt` grant on\n * the network must root at this owner DID.\n */\n\nconst URN_PREFIX = \"urn:tinycloud:encryption:\";\nconst NETWORK_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;\nconst PKH_EIP155_DID_RE = /^did:pkh:eip155:(\\d+):(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})$/;\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** The full URN string. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Owner DID embedded in the URN (the network's root authority). */\n  ownerDid: string;\n  /** Network label (the suffix after the owner DID). */\n  name: string;\n}\n\nexport class NetworkIdError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"NetworkIdError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network id string into its owner DID and name components.\n *\n * Throws {@link NetworkIdError} when the input does not match\n * `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<did>:<name>`, when the embedded DID is\n * malformed, or when the network name fails {@link NETWORK_NAME_RE}.\n */\nexport function parseNetworkId(networkId: string): ParsedNetworkId {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\" || networkId.length === 0) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"networkId must be a non-empty string\");\n  }\n  if (!networkId.startsWith(URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId must start with ${URN_PREFIX} (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = networkId.slice(URN_PREFIX.length);\n  // `body` = \"<ownerDid>:<network>\"\n  // ownerDid contains ':' (e.g. did:key:z6Mk...), so we split on the LAST colon\n  // and treat the suffix as the network name.\n  const lastColon = body.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  if (lastColon <= 0 || lastColon === body.length - 1) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId missing ownerDid or name segment (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = body.slice(0, lastColon);\n  const name = body.slice(lastColon + 1);\n\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid must be a DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Minimal DID shape: did:<method>:<id> — three colon-separated segments,\n  // each non-empty.\n  const didParts = ownerDid.split(\":\");\n  if (didParts.length < 3 || didParts.some((p) => p.length === 0)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid is not a well-formed DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { networkId, ownerDid, name };\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedEncryptionResource extends ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** Named-key path, if the resource is scoped below a network. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network-root or named-key encryption resource.\n *\n * A trailing slash on keyPath denotes a prefix grant; empty and traversal\n * segments are rejected so resource matching cannot escape the named path.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(\n  resource: string,\n): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  const networkSeparator = resource.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  const nameAndPath = resource.slice(networkSeparator + 1);\n  const pathSeparator = nameAndPath.indexOf(\"/\");\n  const name =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? nameAndPath\n      : nameAndPath.slice(0, pathSeparator);\n  const networkId =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? resource\n      : `${resource.slice(0, networkSeparator + 1)}${name}`;\n  const parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  if (pathSeparator === -1) return parsed;\n\n  const keyPath = nameAndPath.slice(pathSeparator + 1);\n  const segments = keyPath.split(\"/\");\n  const prefix = keyPath.endsWith(\"/\");\n  if (\n    keyPath.length === 0 ||\n    /[\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\\\]/.test(keyPath) ||\n    segments.some(\n      (segment, index) =>\n        segment === \".\" ||\n        segment === \"..\" ||\n        (segment.length === 0 && !(prefix && index === segments.length - 1)),\n    )\n  ) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `encryption resource has an invalid keyPath (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...parsed, keyPath };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a network id URN from an owner DID and a network name.\n * Validates inputs and throws {@link NetworkIdError} on bad shape.\n */\nexport function buildNetworkId(ownerDid: string, name: string): string {\n  if (typeof ownerDid !== \"string\" || !ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"ownerDid must be a DID\");\n  }\n  if (typeof name !== \"string\" || !NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const networkId = `${URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${name}`;\n  // Re-validate the composed result so the same error path triggers\n  // for caller inputs that compose into a malformed URN.\n  parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  return networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when {@link networkId} is a syntactically valid network URN.\n */\nexport function isNetworkId(networkId: unknown): networkId is string {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  try {\n    parseNetworkId(networkId);\n    return true;\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parsePkhOwnerDid(ownerDid: string):\n  | { chainId: string; address: string }\n  | null {\n  const match = ownerDid.match(PKH_EIP155_DID_RE);\n  if (!match) return null;\n  return {\n    chainId: match[1],\n    address: match[2].toLowerCase(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare owner DIDs as network principals. For `did:pkh:eip155`, EVM\n * address casing is not part of principal identity; other DID methods\n * remain exact string matches.\n */\nexport function ownerDidMatches(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const aPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(a);\n  const bPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(b);\n  if (aPkh && bPkh) {\n    return aPkh.chainId === bPkh.chainId && aPkh.address === bPkh.address;\n  }\n  return a === b;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the discovery key used to look up a network's descriptor under\n * an owner's public account-space.\n *\n * Format: `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>`.\n */\nexport function networkDiscoveryKey(name: string): string {\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return `.well-known/encryption/network/${name}`;\n}\n\nexport const ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX = URN_PREFIX;\nexport const NETWORK_NAME_PATTERN = NETWORK_NAME_RE;\n","/**\n * Type definitions for TinyCloud one-of-one encryption.\n *\n * Wire shapes mirror the protocol described in the encryption\n * architecture: inline envelopes carry the encrypted symmetric key\n * alongside the ciphertext; decrypt requests are short-lived UCAN\n * invocations against a target node plus networkId.\n */\n\nimport type { Json } from \"./canonical\";\nimport type { PermissionHint } from \"../types\";\nimport type { RoutingFailure } from \"../resourceRouting\";\n\n/** Default ciphersuite identifier for v1 envelopes. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_ALG = \"x25519-aes256gcm/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Inline-envelope schema version. */\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Default key version on freshly-created networks. */\nexport const DEFAULT_KEY_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Decrypt-invocation fact type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE = \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt response type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE =\n  \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt-result/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Encryption service identifier (manifest long form). */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE = \"tinycloud.encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Short form used in recap/abilities maps. */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE_SHORT = \"encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt ability URN. */\nexport const DECRYPT_ACTION = \"tinycloud.encryption/decrypt\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Inline encrypted envelope persisted in KV/SQL records.\n *\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKey` is opaque to the SDK; only the network can\n *   unwrap it.\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash` is the canonical hash of the wrapped key\n   *   bytes (hex-encoded sha-256 of the base64 string's canonical JSON\n   *   form). The node recomputes this on every decrypt request.\n * - `ciphertext` and `aad` are payload bytes only; the node never sees\n *   them.\n */\nexport interface InlineEncryptedEnvelope {\n  v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n  /** Network id URN. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path; absent on network-root v1 envelopes. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  /** Ciphersuite identifier. */\n  alg: string;\n  /** Network key version that was used to wrap the symmetric key. */\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key / capsule. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Hex sha-256 of the canonical encryptedSymmetricKey string. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded payload ciphertext. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded associated data, if any. */\n  aad?: string;\n  /** Caller-supplied metadata. Not authenticated against the node. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Node-published network descriptor. The node DB is authoritative; a\n * cached copy may also live under\n * `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>` in the owner's account\n * space (a discovery record only).\n */\nexport interface NetworkDescriptor {\n  networkId: string;\n  ownerDid: string;\n  name: string;\n  members: ReadonlyArray<{ nodeId: string; role: \"primary\" | \"share\" }>;\n  threshold: { n: number; t: number };\n  state: \"pending\" | \"generating\" | \"active\" | \"rotating\" | \"revoked\" | \"failed\";\n  /** Base64-encoded network public key. */\n  publicEncryptionKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  keyBackend: \"local-one-of-one\" | \"dstack\" | \"threshold\";\n  createdAt: string;\n  updatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-request body sent over the wire. Hashed (canonically) and\n * bound to the UCAN invocation via `facts.bodyHash`.\n */\nexport interface DecryptRequestBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key from the envelope. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Recomputed hash of the wrapped key. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded per-request receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hash of the receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-response body returned by the node. The SDK verifies the\n * signature, recomputes hashes, then unwraps `wrappedKey` with the\n * per-request receiver private key before decrypting the payload.\n */\nexport interface DecryptResponseBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  invocationCid: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded symmetric key re-encrypted to receiverPublicKey. */\n  wrappedKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  requestHash: string;\n  nodeId: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded ed25519 signature over canonical(response - signature field). */\n  nodeSignature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-invocation facts attached to the UCAN. Verifiers recompute\n * `bodyHash`, `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash`, and `receiverPublicKeyHash`\n * from the request body and reject any mismatch.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationFact {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  bodyHash: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request receiver key pair (x25519). The private key never\n * leaves the SDK; the public key is sent to the node so the node can\n * rewrap the symmetric key.\n */\nexport interface ReceiverKeyPair {\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n  privateKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Crypto primitives injected into the encryption module. The SDK\n * provides these via WASM bindings; tests provide simple in-memory\n * implementations.\n */\nexport interface EncryptionCrypto {\n  /** SHA-256 → 32-byte digest. */\n  sha256(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. */\n  randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array;\n  /** Derive an x25519 key pair from a 32-byte seed. */\n  x25519FromSeed(seed: Uint8Array): ReceiverKeyPair;\n  /** Compute the x25519 ECDH shared secret. */\n  x25519Dh(privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric encryption (the node's symmetric scheme). */\n  authEncrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    plaintext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric decryption (matched to authEncrypt). */\n  authDecrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Wrap a symmetric key for the network's public encryption key using\n   * a sealed-box / hpke / x25519+symmetric construction. Implementation\n   * is opaque; only the node can unwrap.\n   */\n  sealToNetworkKey(\n    networkPublicKey: Uint8Array,\n    symmetricKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Open a wrapped symmetric key that was re-encrypted to the\n   * per-request receiver public key. The matching private key must be\n   * supplied here; the SDK never sends it to the node.\n   */\n  openWithReceiverKey(\n    receiverPrivateKey: Uint8Array,\n    wrappedKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Verify an ed25519 signature over `message` produced by the node\n   * identified by `nodeId` (the public-key DID).\n   */\n  verifyNodeSignature(\n    nodeId: string,\n    message: Uint8Array,\n    signature: Uint8Array,\n  ): boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signer interface used to derive a receiver key pair from a wallet or\n * session signer. 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package/dist/encryption/resource.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/encryption/resource.ts","../../src/encryption/networkId.ts","../../src/encryption/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Typed encryption resources: bare networks, named keys and key prefixes.\n *\n *   network: urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>\n *   key:     urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<path>\n *   prefix:  urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<prefix>/\n *\n * Grammar rules:\n * - The owner DID contains no `/`. The string is split at the FIRST `/` into\n *   `<ownerDid>:<network>` and the path; that head splits at its last `:`.\n * - A key path has 1 to 8 segments joined by `/`; each segment is 1 to 64 bytes\n *   of `[a-z0-9._-]` starting with `[a-z0-9]` (so `.` and `..` are impossible);\n *   the whole path is at most 255 bytes.\n * - A prefix is the key form with exactly ONE trailing `/`. The trailing `/` is\n *   significant: `apps/foo/` and `apps/foo` are different resources and\n *   `apps/foo/` does not cover `apps/foobar`.\n * - Under the reserved first segment `apps`, a key needs at least 3 segments\n *   (`apps/<id>/<name>`) and a prefix at least 2 (`apps/<id>/`); `apps`,\n *   `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n * - The canonical form is the exact input. Non-canonical input is rejected and\n *   never normalized: wrong case, bad characters, empty segments, a\n *   non-canonical owner (EIP-55 for `did:pkh:eip155`).\n * - Bare networks follow `parseNetworkId` unchanged. 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Bare networks are not checked against\n * this; they go through `parseNetworkId` unchanged.\n */\nconst KEY_NETWORK_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;\n/** `<ownerDid>:<network>` head, then the raw path (prefix keeps its trailing `/`). */\nconst RESOURCE_RE = /^(did:[a-z0-9]+:[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+):([^:/]+)(?:\\/(.*))?$/s;\nconst MAX_PATH_BYTES = 255;\nconst PKH_EIP155_PREFIX = \"did:pkh:eip155:\";\nconst MAX_U64 = 18446744073709551615n;\n\n/** Ability URNs for named encryption keys. */\nexport const KEY_CREATE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.create\";\nexport const KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.block\";\nexport const KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.unblock\";\nexport const KEY_DELETE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.delete\";\n\n/** Key abilities that may appear in a delegation: decrypt, create, block, unblock. `key.delete` never does. */\nexport const DELEGABLE_KEY_ABILITIES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([\n  DECRYPT_ACTION,\n  KEY_CREATE_ABILITY,\n  KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY,\n  KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY,\n]);\n\n/** Node `/info` feature string advertising named-key support. */\nexport const NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE = \"encryption-named-keys-v1\";\n\nexport type EncryptionResourceErrorCode =\n  | \"not_encryption_urn\"\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"bad_owner\"\n  | \"non_canonical_owner\"\n  | \"bad_network\"\n  | \"empty_path\"\n  | \"bad_path\"\n  | \"path_too_long\";\n\nexport class EncryptionResourceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode;\n  constructor(code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode, message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"EncryptionResourceError\";\n    this.code = code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkResource {\n  kind: \"network\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedKeyResource {\n  kind: \"key\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedPrefixResource {\n  kind: \"prefix\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Path without the trailing `/`. */\n  prefix: string;\n}\n\nexport type ParsedEncryptionResource =\n  | ParsedNetworkResource\n  | ParsedKeyResource\n  | ParsedPrefixResource;\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an owner DID, matching the node: `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`\n * needs a positive u64 decimal chain id and a 20-byte hex address (rendered EIP-55);\n * every other DID that passed the owner grammar is returned as is.\n */\nfunction canonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): string {\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX)) return ownerDid;\n  const rest = ownerDid.slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length);\n  const colon = rest.indexOf(\":\");\n  const chain = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(0, colon);\n  const address = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(colon + 1);\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(chain) || !/^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$/.test(address)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not a valid did:pkh:eip155 (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const chainId = BigInt(chain);\n  if (chainId === 0n || chainId > MAX_U64) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `did:pkh:eip155 chain id must be a positive u64 (got ${JSON.stringify(chain)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Checksum through chain 1 so the chain id is never narrowed to a Number.\n  const checksummed = pkhDid(address, 1).slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length + 2);\n  return `${PKH_EIP155_PREFIX}${chainId}:${checksummed}`;\n}\n\nfunction assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): void {\n  const canonical = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  if (canonical !== ownerDid) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"non_canonical_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not canonical (expected ${canonical})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertPath(path: string, what: \"key path\" | \"prefix\"): void {\n  if (path.length === 0) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"empty_path\", `${what} must not be empty`);\n  }\n  if (new TextEncoder().encode(path).length > MAX_PATH_BYTES) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"path_too_long\",\n      `${what} exceeds ${MAX_PATH_BYTES} bytes`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!KEY_PATH_RE.test(path)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} must match ${KEY_PATH_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Depth rule for the reserved `apps` first segment: a key is\n  // `apps/<id>/<name>...` (3 or more segments), a prefix is `apps/<id>/...`\n  // (2 or more). `apps`, `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n  const segments = path.split(\"/\");\n  if (segments[0] === \"apps\" && segments.length < (what === \"key path\" ? 3 : 2)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} under apps/ needs ${what === \"key path\" ? \"apps/<id>/<name>\" : \"apps/<id>/\"}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an encryption resource URN into a bare network, a named key or a key\n * prefix. Throws {@link EncryptionResourceError} on anything that is not\n * already in canonical form.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(uri: string): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  if (typeof uri !== \"string\" || !uri.startsWith(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"not_encryption_urn\",\n      `resource must start with ${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = uri.slice(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX.length);\n  const match = RESOURCE_RE.exec(body);\n  if (match === null) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `resource is not <ownerDid>:<network>[/<path>] (got ${JSON.stringify(uri)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = match[1]!;\n  const network = match[2]!;\n  const rawPath = match[3];\n  if (rawPath === undefined) {\n    // Bare networks are normalized (the node does the same); key ids never are.\n    const canonicalOwnerDid = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n    const bareId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${canonicalOwnerDid}:${network}`;\n    try {\n      parseNetworkId(bareId);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n        throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n      }\n      throw error;\n    }\n    return { kind: \"network\", ownerDid: canonicalOwnerDid, network, networkId: bareId };\n  }\n  if (!KEY_NETWORK_RE.test(network)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_network\",\n      `network ${JSON.stringify(network)} must match ${KEY_NETWORK_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  const networkId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${network}`;\n\n  if (rawPath.endsWith(\"/\")) {\n    const prefix = rawPath.slice(0, -1);\n    assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n    return { kind: \"prefix\", ownerDid, network, networkId, prefix };\n  }\n  assertPath(rawPath, \"key path\");\n  return { kind: \"key\", ownerDid, network, networkId, path: rawPath };\n}\n\nfunction canonicalNetworkId(networkId: string): string {\n  let parsed;\n  try {\n    parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n      throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n    }\n    throw error;\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(parsed.ownerDid);\n  return parsed.networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builders re-parse their output so they can never emit a URN the parser\n * would reject (for example an owner outside the owner grammar).\n */\nfunction parseBuilt(resource: string, networkId: string): void {\n  if (parseEncryptionResource(resource).networkId !== networkId) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `built resource does not round-trip (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a named key. */\nexport function formatKeyResource(networkId: string, path: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(path, \"key path\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${path}`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a key prefix grant (one trailing `/`). */\nexport function formatPrefixResource(networkId: string, prefix: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${prefix}/`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the `granted` resource cover the `requested` resource?\n * exact == exact; a prefix covers keys whose path starts with `<prefix>/` and\n * prefixes whose `/`-terminated form starts with the granted one; a bare\n * network covers only the same bare network. Every other pair is false, and\n * so is anything that does not parse.\n */\nexport function encryptionResourceContains(\n  granted: string,\n  requested: string,\n): boolean {\n  let g: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  let r: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  try {\n    g = parseEncryptionResource(granted);\n    r = parseEncryptionResource(requested);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (g.networkId !== r.networkId) return false;\n  switch (g.kind) {\n    case \"network\":\n      return r.kind === \"network\";\n    case \"key\":\n      return r.kind === \"key\" && r.path === g.path;\n    case \"prefix\":\n      if (r.kind === \"key\") return r.path.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      if (r.kind === \"prefix\") return `${r.prefix}/`.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only when the node `/info` response lists exactly\n * `\"encryption-named-keys-v1\"` in `features`.\n */\nexport function nodeSupportsNamedKeys(\n  info: { features?: unknown } | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  const features = info?.features;\n  return Array.isArray(features) && features.includes(NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE);\n}\n","/**\n * TinyCloud encryption network identifiers.\n *\n * A network id is `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>` where\n * `ownerDid` is the owner's DID and `network` is a\n * non-empty label drawn from `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`.\n *\n * The embedded owner DID is the root authority for the network: any\n * delegation chain ending in a `tinycloud.encryption/decrypt` grant on\n * the network must root at this owner DID.\n */\n\nconst URN_PREFIX = \"urn:tinycloud:encryption:\";\nconst NETWORK_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;\nconst PKH_EIP155_DID_RE = /^did:pkh:eip155:(\\d+):(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})$/;\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** The full URN string. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Owner DID embedded in the URN (the network's root authority). */\n  ownerDid: string;\n  /** Network label (the suffix after the owner DID). */\n  name: string;\n}\n\nexport class NetworkIdError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"NetworkIdError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network id string into its owner DID and name components.\n *\n * Throws {@link NetworkIdError} when the input does not match\n * `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<did>:<name>`, when the embedded DID is\n * malformed, or when the network name fails {@link NETWORK_NAME_RE}.\n */\nexport function parseNetworkId(networkId: string): ParsedNetworkId {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\" || networkId.length === 0) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"networkId must be a non-empty string\");\n  }\n  if (!networkId.startsWith(URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId must start with ${URN_PREFIX} (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = networkId.slice(URN_PREFIX.length);\n  // `body` = \"<ownerDid>:<network>\"\n  // ownerDid contains ':' (e.g. did:key:z6Mk...), so we split on the LAST colon\n  // and treat the suffix as the network name.\n  const lastColon = body.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  if (lastColon <= 0 || lastColon === body.length - 1) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId missing ownerDid or name segment (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = body.slice(0, lastColon);\n  const name = body.slice(lastColon + 1);\n\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid must be a DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Minimal DID shape: did:<method>:<id> — three colon-separated segments,\n  // each non-empty.\n  const didParts = ownerDid.split(\":\");\n  if (didParts.length < 3 || didParts.some((p) => p.length === 0)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid is not a well-formed DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { networkId, ownerDid, name };\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedEncryptionResource extends ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** Named-key path, if the resource is scoped below a network. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network-root or named-key encryption resource.\n *\n * A trailing slash on keyPath denotes a prefix grant; empty and traversal\n * segments are rejected so resource matching cannot escape the named path.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(\n  resource: string,\n): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  const networkSeparator = resource.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  const nameAndPath = resource.slice(networkSeparator + 1);\n  const pathSeparator = nameAndPath.indexOf(\"/\");\n  const name =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? nameAndPath\n      : nameAndPath.slice(0, pathSeparator);\n  const networkId =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? resource\n      : `${resource.slice(0, networkSeparator + 1)}${name}`;\n  const parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  if (pathSeparator === -1) return parsed;\n\n  const keyPath = nameAndPath.slice(pathSeparator + 1);\n  const segments = keyPath.split(\"/\");\n  const prefix = keyPath.endsWith(\"/\");\n  if (\n    keyPath.length === 0 ||\n    /[\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\\\]/.test(keyPath) ||\n    segments.some(\n      (segment, index) =>\n        segment === \".\" ||\n        segment === \"..\" ||\n        (segment.length === 0 && !(prefix && index === segments.length - 1)),\n    )\n  ) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `encryption resource has an invalid keyPath (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...parsed, keyPath };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a network id URN from an owner DID and a network name.\n * Validates inputs and throws {@link NetworkIdError} on bad shape.\n */\nexport function buildNetworkId(ownerDid: string, name: string): string {\n  if (typeof ownerDid !== \"string\" || !ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"ownerDid must be a DID\");\n  }\n  if (typeof name !== \"string\" || !NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const networkId = `${URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${name}`;\n  // Re-validate the composed result so the same error path triggers\n  // for caller inputs that compose into a malformed URN.\n  parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  return networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when {@link networkId} is a syntactically valid network URN.\n */\nexport function isNetworkId(networkId: unknown): networkId is string {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  try {\n    parseNetworkId(networkId);\n    return true;\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parsePkhOwnerDid(ownerDid: string):\n  | { chainId: string; address: string }\n  | null {\n  const match = ownerDid.match(PKH_EIP155_DID_RE);\n  if (!match) return null;\n  return {\n    chainId: match[1],\n    address: match[2].toLowerCase(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare owner DIDs as network principals. For `did:pkh:eip155`, EVM\n * address casing is not part of principal identity; other DID methods\n * remain exact string matches.\n */\nexport function ownerDidMatches(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const aPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(a);\n  const bPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(b);\n  if (aPkh && bPkh) {\n    return aPkh.chainId === bPkh.chainId && aPkh.address === bPkh.address;\n  }\n  return a === b;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the discovery key used to look up a network's descriptor under\n * an owner's public account-space.\n *\n * Format: `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>`.\n */\nexport function networkDiscoveryKey(name: string): string {\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return `.well-known/encryption/network/${name}`;\n}\n\nexport const ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX = URN_PREFIX;\nexport const NETWORK_NAME_PATTERN = NETWORK_NAME_RE;\n","/**\n * Type definitions for TinyCloud one-of-one encryption.\n *\n * Wire shapes mirror the protocol described in the encryption\n * architecture: inline envelopes carry the encrypted symmetric key\n * alongside the ciphertext; decrypt requests are short-lived UCAN\n * invocations against a target node plus networkId.\n */\n\nimport type { Json } from \"./canonical\";\nimport type { PermissionHint } from \"../types\";\n\n/** Default ciphersuite identifier for v1 envelopes. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_ALG = \"x25519-aes256gcm/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Inline-envelope schema version. */\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Default key version on freshly-created networks. */\nexport const DEFAULT_KEY_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Decrypt-invocation fact type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE = \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt response type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE =\n  \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt-result/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Encryption service identifier (manifest long form). */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE = \"tinycloud.encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Short form used in recap/abilities maps. */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE_SHORT = \"encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt ability URN. */\nexport const DECRYPT_ACTION = \"tinycloud.encryption/decrypt\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Inline encrypted envelope persisted in KV/SQL records.\n *\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKey` is opaque to the SDK; only the network can\n *   unwrap it.\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash` is the canonical hash of the wrapped key\n   *   bytes (hex-encoded sha-256 of the base64 string's canonical JSON\n   *   form). The node recomputes this on every decrypt request.\n * - `ciphertext` and `aad` are payload bytes only; the node never sees\n *   them.\n */\nexport interface InlineEncryptedEnvelope {\n  v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n  /** Network id URN. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path; absent on network-root v1 envelopes. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  /** Ciphersuite identifier. */\n  alg: string;\n  /** Network key version that was used to wrap the symmetric key. */\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key / capsule. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Hex sha-256 of the canonical encryptedSymmetricKey string. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded payload ciphertext. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded associated data, if any. */\n  aad?: string;\n  /** Caller-supplied metadata. Not authenticated against the node. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Node-published network descriptor. The node DB is authoritative; a\n * cached copy may also live under\n * `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>` in the owner's account\n * space (a discovery record only).\n */\nexport interface NetworkDescriptor {\n  networkId: string;\n  ownerDid: string;\n  name: string;\n  members: ReadonlyArray<{ nodeId: string; role: \"primary\" | \"share\" }>;\n  threshold: { n: number; t: number };\n  state: \"pending\" | \"generating\" | \"active\" | \"rotating\" | \"revoked\" | \"failed\";\n  /** Base64-encoded network public key. */\n  publicEncryptionKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  keyBackend: \"local-one-of-one\" | \"dstack\" | \"threshold\";\n  createdAt: string;\n  updatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-request body sent over the wire. Hashed (canonically) and\n * bound to the UCAN invocation via `facts.bodyHash`.\n */\nexport interface DecryptRequestBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key from the envelope. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Recomputed hash of the wrapped key. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded per-request receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hash of the receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-response body returned by the node. The SDK verifies the\n * signature, recomputes hashes, then unwraps `wrappedKey` with the\n * per-request receiver private key before decrypting the payload.\n */\nexport interface DecryptResponseBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  invocationCid: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded symmetric key re-encrypted to receiverPublicKey. */\n  wrappedKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  requestHash: string;\n  nodeId: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded ed25519 signature over canonical(response - signature field). */\n  nodeSignature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-invocation facts attached to the UCAN. Verifiers recompute\n * `bodyHash`, `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash`, and `receiverPublicKeyHash`\n * from the request body and reject any mismatch.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationFact {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  bodyHash: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request receiver key pair (x25519). The private key never\n * leaves the SDK; the public key is sent to the node so the node can\n * rewrap the symmetric key.\n */\nexport interface ReceiverKeyPair {\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n  privateKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Crypto primitives injected into the encryption module. The SDK\n * provides these via WASM bindings; tests provide simple in-memory\n * implementations.\n */\nexport interface EncryptionCrypto {\n  /** SHA-256 → 32-byte digest. */\n  sha256(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. */\n  randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array;\n  /** Derive an x25519 key pair from a 32-byte seed. */\n  x25519FromSeed(seed: Uint8Array): ReceiverKeyPair;\n  /** Compute the x25519 ECDH shared secret. */\n  x25519Dh(privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric encryption (the node's symmetric scheme). */\n  authEncrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    plaintext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric decryption (matched to authEncrypt). */\n  authDecrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Wrap a symmetric key for the network's public encryption key using\n   * a sealed-box / hpke / x25519+symmetric construction. Implementation\n   * is opaque; only the node can unwrap.\n   */\n  sealToNetworkKey(\n    networkPublicKey: Uint8Array,\n    symmetricKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Open a wrapped symmetric key that was re-encrypted to the\n   * per-request receiver public key. The matching private key must be\n   * supplied here; the SDK never sends it to the node.\n   */\n  openWithReceiverKey(\n    receiverPrivateKey: Uint8Array,\n    wrappedKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Verify an ed25519 signature over `message` produced by the node\n   * identified by `nodeId` (the public-key DID).\n   */\n  verifyNodeSignature(\n    nodeId: string,\n    message: Uint8Array,\n    signature: Uint8Array,\n  ): boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signer interface used to derive a receiver key pair from a wallet or\n * session signer. 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WASM bindings\n * implement this with the same session signer used for KV/SQL\n * invocations; tests can stub it.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationSigner {\n  signDecryptInvocation(input: BuildDecryptInvocationInput): Promise<BuiltDecryptInvocation>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Errors thrown / returned from the encryption module.\n */\nexport type EncryptionErrorInput =\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_FOUND\"; networkId?: string; name?: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_ACTIVE\"; state: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_NETWORK_ID\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_ENVELOPE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"DECRYPT_DENIED\"; message: string; permissionHint?: PermissionHint }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_RESPONSE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_SIGNATURE_INVALID\"; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_BINDING_MISMATCH\"; field: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"TRANSPORT_ERROR\"; cause: Error; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_INPUT\"; message: string };\n\nexport type EncryptionError = EncryptionErrorInput & {\n  service: \"encryption\";\n  message: string;\n};\n\nfunction defaultEncryptionMessage(input: EncryptionErrorInput): string {\n  switch (input.code) {\n    case \"NETWORK_NOT_FOUND\":\n      return (\n        input.message ??\n        `Network not found: ${input.networkId ?? input.name ?? \"<unknown>\"}`\n      );\n    case \"NETWORK_NOT_ACTIVE\":\n      return input.message ?? `Network not active (state=${input.state})`;\n    case \"INVALID_NETWORK_ID\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"INVALID_ENVELOPE\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"DECRYPT_DENIED\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"INVALID_RESPONSE\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"RESPONSE_SIGNATURE_INVALID\":\n      return input.message ?? \"Node response signature failed to verify\";\n    case \"RESPONSE_BINDING_MISMATCH\":\n      return (\n        input.message ??\n        `Node response 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/encryption/resource.ts","../../src/encryption/networkId.ts","../../src/encryption/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Typed encryption resources: bare networks, named keys and key prefixes.\n *\n *   network: urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>\n *   key:     urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<path>\n *   prefix:  urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>/<prefix>/\n *\n * Grammar rules:\n * - The owner DID contains no `/`. The string is split at the FIRST `/` into\n *   `<ownerDid>:<network>` and the path; that head splits at its last `:`.\n * - A key path has 1 to 8 segments joined by `/`; each segment is 1 to 64 bytes\n *   of `[a-z0-9._-]` starting with `[a-z0-9]` (so `.` and `..` are impossible);\n *   the whole path is at most 255 bytes.\n * - A prefix is the key form with exactly ONE trailing `/`. The trailing `/` is\n *   significant: `apps/foo/` and `apps/foo` are different resources and\n *   `apps/foo/` does not cover `apps/foobar`.\n * - Under the reserved first segment `apps`, a key needs at least 3 segments\n *   (`apps/<id>/<name>`) and a prefix at least 2 (`apps/<id>/`); `apps`,\n *   `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n * - The canonical form is the exact input. Non-canonical input is rejected and\n *   never normalized: wrong case, bad characters, empty segments, a\n *   non-canonical owner (EIP-55 for `did:pkh:eip155`).\n * - Bare networks follow `parseNetworkId` unchanged. When PARSING a key or\n *   prefix the network part must match `[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}`; builders\n *   take a network id that `parseNetworkId` produced, so emitted names stay strict.\n */\n\nimport { pkhDid } from \"@tinycloud/bootstrap\";\nimport {\n  ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX,\n  NetworkIdError,\n  parseNetworkId,\n} from \"./networkId\";\nimport { DECRYPT_ACTION } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Path grammar. This is the only place the key-path charset/limits live. */\nconst SEGMENT_SOURCE = \"[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}\";\nconst PATH_SOURCE = `${SEGMENT_SOURCE}(?:/${SEGMENT_SOURCE}){0,7}`;\nconst KEY_PATH_RE = new RegExp(`^${PATH_SOURCE}$`);\n/**\n * Network part of a KEY or PREFIX resource: printable ASCII, first character\n * alphanumeric, at most 64 characters. Bare networks are not checked against\n * this; they go through `parseNetworkId` unchanged.\n */\nconst KEY_NETWORK_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;\n/** `<ownerDid>:<network>` head, then the raw path (prefix keeps its trailing `/`). */\nconst RESOURCE_RE = /^(did:[a-z0-9]+:[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+):([^:/]+)(?:\\/(.*))?$/s;\nconst MAX_PATH_BYTES = 255;\nconst PKH_EIP155_PREFIX = \"did:pkh:eip155:\";\nconst MAX_U64 = 18446744073709551615n;\n\n/** Ability URNs for named encryption keys. */\nexport const KEY_CREATE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.create\";\nexport const KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.block\";\nexport const KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.unblock\";\nexport const KEY_DELETE_ABILITY = \"tinycloud.encryption/key.delete\";\n\n/** Key abilities that may appear in a delegation: decrypt, create, block, unblock. `key.delete` never does. */\nexport const DELEGABLE_KEY_ABILITIES: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([\n  DECRYPT_ACTION,\n  KEY_CREATE_ABILITY,\n  KEY_BLOCK_ABILITY,\n  KEY_UNBLOCK_ABILITY,\n]);\n\n/** Node `/info` feature string advertising named-key support. */\nexport const NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE = \"encryption-named-keys-v1\";\n\nexport type EncryptionResourceErrorCode =\n  | \"not_encryption_urn\"\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"bad_owner\"\n  | \"non_canonical_owner\"\n  | \"bad_network\"\n  | \"empty_path\"\n  | \"bad_path\"\n  | \"path_too_long\";\n\nexport class EncryptionResourceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode;\n  constructor(code: EncryptionResourceErrorCode, message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"EncryptionResourceError\";\n    this.code = code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkResource {\n  kind: \"network\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedKeyResource {\n  kind: \"key\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  path: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedPrefixResource {\n  kind: \"prefix\";\n  ownerDid: string;\n  network: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Path without the trailing `/`. */\n  prefix: string;\n}\n\nexport type ParsedEncryptionResource =\n  | ParsedNetworkResource\n  | ParsedKeyResource\n  | ParsedPrefixResource;\n\n/**\n * Canonical form of an owner DID, matching the node: `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`\n * needs a positive u64 decimal chain id and a 20-byte hex address (rendered EIP-55);\n * every other DID that passed the owner grammar is returned as is.\n */\nfunction canonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): string {\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX)) return ownerDid;\n  const rest = ownerDid.slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length);\n  const colon = rest.indexOf(\":\");\n  const chain = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(0, colon);\n  const address = colon === -1 ? \"\" : rest.slice(colon + 1);\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(chain) || !/^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$/.test(address)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not a valid did:pkh:eip155 (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const chainId = BigInt(chain);\n  if (chainId === 0n || chainId > MAX_U64) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_owner\",\n      `did:pkh:eip155 chain id must be a positive u64 (got ${JSON.stringify(chain)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Checksum through chain 1 so the chain id is never narrowed to a Number.\n  const checksummed = pkhDid(address, 1).slice(PKH_EIP155_PREFIX.length + 2);\n  return `${PKH_EIP155_PREFIX}${chainId}:${checksummed}`;\n}\n\nfunction assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid: string): void {\n  const canonical = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  if (canonical !== ownerDid) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"non_canonical_owner\",\n      `owner DID is not canonical (expected ${canonical})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction assertPath(path: string, what: \"key path\" | \"prefix\"): void {\n  if (path.length === 0) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"empty_path\", `${what} must not be empty`);\n  }\n  if (new TextEncoder().encode(path).length > MAX_PATH_BYTES) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"path_too_long\",\n      `${what} exceeds ${MAX_PATH_BYTES} bytes`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!KEY_PATH_RE.test(path)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} must match ${KEY_PATH_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Depth rule for the reserved `apps` first segment: a key is\n  // `apps/<id>/<name>...` (3 or more segments), a prefix is `apps/<id>/...`\n  // (2 or more). `apps`, `apps/<id>` as a key and `apps/` as a prefix are refused.\n  const segments = path.split(\"/\");\n  if (segments[0] === \"apps\" && segments.length < (what === \"key path\" ? 3 : 2)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_path\",\n      `${what} ${JSON.stringify(path)} under apps/ needs ${what === \"key path\" ? \"apps/<id>/<name>\" : \"apps/<id>/\"}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse an encryption resource URN into a bare network, a named key or a key\n * prefix. Throws {@link EncryptionResourceError} on anything that is not\n * already in canonical form.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(uri: string): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  if (typeof uri !== \"string\" || !uri.startsWith(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"not_encryption_urn\",\n      `resource must start with ${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = uri.slice(ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX.length);\n  const match = RESOURCE_RE.exec(body);\n  if (match === null) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `resource is not <ownerDid>:<network>[/<path>] (got ${JSON.stringify(uri)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = match[1]!;\n  const network = match[2]!;\n  const rawPath = match[3];\n  if (rawPath === undefined) {\n    // Bare networks are normalized (the node does the same); key ids never are.\n    const canonicalOwnerDid = canonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n    const bareId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${canonicalOwnerDid}:${network}`;\n    try {\n      parseNetworkId(bareId);\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n        throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n      }\n      throw error;\n    }\n    return { kind: \"network\", ownerDid: canonicalOwnerDid, network, networkId: bareId };\n  }\n  if (!KEY_NETWORK_RE.test(network)) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"bad_network\",\n      `network ${JSON.stringify(network)} must match ${KEY_NETWORK_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(ownerDid);\n  const networkId = `${ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${network}`;\n\n  if (rawPath.endsWith(\"/\")) {\n    const prefix = rawPath.slice(0, -1);\n    assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n    return { kind: \"prefix\", ownerDid, network, networkId, prefix };\n  }\n  assertPath(rawPath, \"key path\");\n  return { kind: \"key\", ownerDid, network, networkId, path: rawPath };\n}\n\nfunction canonicalNetworkId(networkId: string): string {\n  let parsed;\n  try {\n    parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (error instanceof NetworkIdError) {\n      throw new EncryptionResourceError(\"bad_network\", error.message);\n    }\n    throw error;\n  }\n  assertCanonicalOwner(parsed.ownerDid);\n  return parsed.networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builders re-parse their output so they can never emit a URN the parser\n * would reject (for example an owner outside the owner grammar).\n */\nfunction parseBuilt(resource: string, networkId: string): void {\n  if (parseEncryptionResource(resource).networkId !== networkId) {\n    throw new EncryptionResourceError(\n      \"malformed\",\n      `built resource does not round-trip (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a named key. */\nexport function formatKeyResource(networkId: string, path: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(path, \"key path\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${path}`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/** Build the exact canonical URN of a key prefix grant (one trailing `/`). */\nexport function formatPrefixResource(networkId: string, prefix: string): string {\n  const id = canonicalNetworkId(networkId);\n  assertPath(prefix, \"prefix\");\n  const resource = `${id}/${prefix}/`;\n  parseBuilt(resource, id);\n  return resource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the `granted` resource cover the `requested` resource?\n * exact == exact; a prefix covers keys whose path starts with `<prefix>/` and\n * prefixes whose `/`-terminated form starts with the granted one; a bare\n * network covers only the same bare network. Every other pair is false, and\n * so is anything that does not parse.\n */\nexport function encryptionResourceContains(\n  granted: string,\n  requested: string,\n): boolean {\n  let g: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  let r: ParsedEncryptionResource;\n  try {\n    g = parseEncryptionResource(granted);\n    r = parseEncryptionResource(requested);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (g.networkId !== r.networkId) return false;\n  switch (g.kind) {\n    case \"network\":\n      return r.kind === \"network\";\n    case \"key\":\n      return r.kind === \"key\" && r.path === g.path;\n    case \"prefix\":\n      if (r.kind === \"key\") return r.path.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      if (r.kind === \"prefix\") return `${r.prefix}/`.startsWith(`${g.prefix}/`);\n      return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True only when the node `/info` response lists exactly\n * `\"encryption-named-keys-v1\"` in `features`.\n */\nexport function nodeSupportsNamedKeys(\n  info: { features?: unknown } | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  const features = info?.features;\n  return Array.isArray(features) && features.includes(NAMED_KEYS_FEATURE);\n}\n","/**\n * TinyCloud encryption network identifiers.\n *\n * A network id is `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<ownerDid>:<network>` where\n * `ownerDid` is the owner's DID and `network` is a\n * non-empty label drawn from `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*`.\n *\n * The embedded owner DID is the root authority for the network: any\n * delegation chain ending in a `tinycloud.encryption/decrypt` grant on\n * the network must root at this owner DID.\n */\n\nconst URN_PREFIX = \"urn:tinycloud:encryption:\";\nconst NETWORK_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;\nconst PKH_EIP155_DID_RE = /^did:pkh:eip155:(\\d+):(0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40})$/;\n\nexport interface ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** The full URN string. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Owner DID embedded in the URN (the network's root authority). */\n  ownerDid: string;\n  /** Network label (the suffix after the owner DID). */\n  name: string;\n}\n\nexport class NetworkIdError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"NetworkIdError\";\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network id string into its owner DID and name components.\n *\n * Throws {@link NetworkIdError} when the input does not match\n * `urn:tinycloud:encryption:<did>:<name>`, when the embedded DID is\n * malformed, or when the network name fails {@link NETWORK_NAME_RE}.\n */\nexport function parseNetworkId(networkId: string): ParsedNetworkId {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\" || networkId.length === 0) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"networkId must be a non-empty string\");\n  }\n  if (!networkId.startsWith(URN_PREFIX)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId must start with ${URN_PREFIX} (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const body = networkId.slice(URN_PREFIX.length);\n  // `body` = \"<ownerDid>:<network>\"\n  // ownerDid contains ':' (e.g. did:key:z6Mk...), so we split on the LAST colon\n  // and treat the suffix as the network name.\n  const lastColon = body.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  if (lastColon <= 0 || lastColon === body.length - 1) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId missing ownerDid or name segment (got ${JSON.stringify(networkId)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  const ownerDid = body.slice(0, lastColon);\n  const name = body.slice(lastColon + 1);\n\n  if (!ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid must be a DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  // Minimal DID shape: did:<method>:<id> — three colon-separated segments,\n  // each non-empty.\n  const didParts = ownerDid.split(\":\");\n  if (didParts.length < 3 || didParts.some((p) => p.length === 0)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId ownerDid is not a well-formed DID (got ${JSON.stringify(ownerDid)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `networkId name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { networkId, ownerDid, name };\n}\n\nexport interface ParsedEncryptionResource extends ParsedNetworkId {\n  /** Named-key path, if the resource is scoped below a network. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a network-root or named-key encryption resource.\n *\n * A trailing slash on keyPath denotes a prefix grant; empty and traversal\n * segments are rejected so resource matching cannot escape the named path.\n */\nexport function parseEncryptionResource(\n  resource: string,\n): ParsedEncryptionResource {\n  const networkSeparator = resource.lastIndexOf(\":\");\n  const nameAndPath = resource.slice(networkSeparator + 1);\n  const pathSeparator = nameAndPath.indexOf(\"/\");\n  const name =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? nameAndPath\n      : nameAndPath.slice(0, pathSeparator);\n  const networkId =\n    pathSeparator === -1\n      ? resource\n      : `${resource.slice(0, networkSeparator + 1)}${name}`;\n  const parsed = parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  if (pathSeparator === -1) return parsed;\n\n  const keyPath = nameAndPath.slice(pathSeparator + 1);\n  const segments = keyPath.split(\"/\");\n  const prefix = keyPath.endsWith(\"/\");\n  if (\n    keyPath.length === 0 ||\n    /[\\u0000-\\u001f\\u007f\\\\]/.test(keyPath) ||\n    segments.some(\n      (segment, index) =>\n        segment === \".\" ||\n        segment === \"..\" ||\n        (segment.length === 0 && !(prefix && index === segments.length - 1)),\n    )\n  ) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `encryption resource has an invalid keyPath (got ${JSON.stringify(resource)})`,\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...parsed, keyPath };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a network id URN from an owner DID and a network name.\n * Validates inputs and throws {@link NetworkIdError} on bad shape.\n */\nexport function buildNetworkId(ownerDid: string, name: string): string {\n  if (typeof ownerDid !== \"string\" || !ownerDid.startsWith(\"did:\")) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\"ownerDid must be a DID\");\n  }\n  if (typeof name !== \"string\" || !NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  const networkId = `${URN_PREFIX}${ownerDid}:${name}`;\n  // Re-validate the composed result so the same error path triggers\n  // for caller inputs that compose into a malformed URN.\n  parseNetworkId(networkId);\n  return networkId;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when {@link networkId} is a syntactically valid network URN.\n */\nexport function isNetworkId(networkId: unknown): networkId is string {\n  if (typeof networkId !== \"string\") {\n    return false;\n  }\n  try {\n    parseNetworkId(networkId);\n    return true;\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parsePkhOwnerDid(ownerDid: string):\n  | { chainId: string; address: string }\n  | null {\n  const match = ownerDid.match(PKH_EIP155_DID_RE);\n  if (!match) return null;\n  return {\n    chainId: match[1],\n    address: match[2].toLowerCase(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Compare owner DIDs as network principals. For `did:pkh:eip155`, EVM\n * address casing is not part of principal identity; other DID methods\n * remain exact string matches.\n */\nexport function ownerDidMatches(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const aPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(a);\n  const bPkh = parsePkhOwnerDid(b);\n  if (aPkh && bPkh) {\n    return aPkh.chainId === bPkh.chainId && aPkh.address === bPkh.address;\n  }\n  return a === b;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the discovery key used to look up a network's descriptor under\n * an owner's public account-space.\n *\n * Format: `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>`.\n */\nexport function networkDiscoveryKey(name: string): string {\n  if (!NETWORK_NAME_RE.test(name)) {\n    throw new NetworkIdError(\n      `network name ${JSON.stringify(name)} must match ${NETWORK_NAME_RE.source}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return `.well-known/encryption/network/${name}`;\n}\n\nexport const ENCRYPTION_NETWORK_URN_PREFIX = URN_PREFIX;\nexport const NETWORK_NAME_PATTERN = NETWORK_NAME_RE;\n","/**\n * Type definitions for TinyCloud one-of-one encryption.\n *\n * Wire shapes mirror the protocol described in the encryption\n * architecture: inline envelopes carry the encrypted symmetric key\n * alongside the ciphertext; decrypt requests are short-lived UCAN\n * invocations against a target node plus networkId.\n */\n\nimport type { Json } from \"./canonical\";\nimport type { PermissionHint } from \"../types\";\nimport type { RoutingFailure } from \"../resourceRouting\";\n\n/** Default ciphersuite identifier for v1 envelopes. */\nexport const DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_ALG = \"x25519-aes256gcm/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Inline-envelope schema version. */\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Default key version on freshly-created networks. */\nexport const DEFAULT_KEY_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Decrypt-invocation fact type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE = \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt response type. */\nexport const DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE =\n  \"tinycloud.encryption.decrypt-result/v1\" as const;\n\n/** Encryption service identifier (manifest long form). */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE = \"tinycloud.encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Short form used in recap/abilities maps. */\nexport const ENCRYPTION_SERVICE_SHORT = \"encryption\" as const;\n\n/** Decrypt ability URN. */\nexport const DECRYPT_ACTION = \"tinycloud.encryption/decrypt\" as const;\n\n/**\n * Inline encrypted envelope persisted in KV/SQL records.\n *\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKey` is opaque to the SDK; only the network can\n *   unwrap it.\n * - `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash` is the canonical hash of the wrapped key\n   *   bytes (hex-encoded sha-256 of the base64 string's canonical JSON\n   *   form). The node recomputes this on every decrypt request.\n * - `ciphertext` and `aad` are payload bytes only; the node never sees\n *   them.\n */\nexport interface InlineEncryptedEnvelope {\n  v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n  /** Network id URN. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path; absent on network-root v1 envelopes. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  /** Ciphersuite identifier. */\n  alg: string;\n  /** Network key version that was used to wrap the symmetric key. */\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key / capsule. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Hex sha-256 of the canonical encryptedSymmetricKey string. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded payload ciphertext. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded associated data, if any. */\n  aad?: string;\n  /** Caller-supplied metadata. Not authenticated against the node. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Node-published network descriptor. The node DB is authoritative; a\n * cached copy may also live under\n * `.well-known/encryption/network/<name>` in the owner's account\n * space (a discovery record only).\n */\nexport interface NetworkDescriptor {\n  networkId: string;\n  ownerDid: string;\n  name: string;\n  members: ReadonlyArray<{ nodeId: string; role: \"primary\" | \"share\" }>;\n  threshold: { n: number; t: number };\n  state: \"pending\" | \"generating\" | \"active\" | \"rotating\" | \"revoked\" | \"failed\";\n  /** Base64-encoded network public key. */\n  publicEncryptionKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  keyBackend: \"local-one-of-one\" | \"dstack\" | \"threshold\";\n  createdAt: string;\n  updatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-request body sent over the wire. Hashed (canonically) and\n * bound to the UCAN invocation via `facts.bodyHash`.\n */\nexport interface DecryptRequestBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  /** Base64-encoded wrapped symmetric key from the envelope. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKey: string;\n  /** Recomputed hash of the wrapped key. */\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded per-request receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKey: string;\n  /** Hash of the receiver public key. */\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-response body returned by the node. The SDK verifies the\n * signature, recomputes hashes, then unwraps `wrappedKey` with the\n * per-request receiver private key before decrypting the payload.\n */\nexport interface DecryptResponseBody {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_RESULT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  invocationCid: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded symmetric key re-encrypted to receiverPublicKey. */\n  wrappedKey: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n  requestHash: string;\n  nodeId: string;\n  /** Base64-encoded ed25519 signature over canonical(response - signature field). */\n  nodeSignature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt-invocation facts attached to the UCAN. Verifiers recompute\n * `bodyHash`, `encryptedSymmetricKeyHash`, and `receiverPublicKeyHash`\n * from the request body and reject any mismatch.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationFact {\n  type: typeof DECRYPT_FACT_TYPE;\n  targetNode: string;\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Exact named-key path for path-scoped decrypt, absent for root keys. */\n  keyPath?: string;\n  bodyHash: string;\n  encryptedSymmetricKeyHash: string;\n  receiverPublicKeyHash: string;\n  alg: string;\n  keyVersion: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-request receiver key pair (x25519). The private key never\n * leaves the SDK; the public key is sent to the node so the node can\n * rewrap the symmetric key.\n */\nexport interface ReceiverKeyPair {\n  publicKey: Uint8Array;\n  privateKey: Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * Crypto primitives injected into the encryption module. The SDK\n * provides these via WASM bindings; tests provide simple in-memory\n * implementations.\n */\nexport interface EncryptionCrypto {\n  /** SHA-256 → 32-byte digest. */\n  sha256(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Cryptographically secure random bytes. */\n  randomBytes(length: number): Uint8Array;\n  /** Derive an x25519 key pair from a 32-byte seed. */\n  x25519FromSeed(seed: Uint8Array): ReceiverKeyPair;\n  /** Compute the x25519 ECDH shared secret. */\n  x25519Dh(privateKey: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric encryption (the node's symmetric scheme). */\n  authEncrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    plaintext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /** Authenticated symmetric decryption (matched to authEncrypt). */\n  authDecrypt(\n    key: Uint8Array,\n    ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n    aad?: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Wrap a symmetric key for the network's public encryption key using\n   * a sealed-box / hpke / x25519+symmetric construction. Implementation\n   * is opaque; only the node can unwrap.\n   */\n  sealToNetworkKey(\n    networkPublicKey: Uint8Array,\n    symmetricKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Open a wrapped symmetric key that was re-encrypted to the\n   * per-request receiver public key. The matching private key must be\n   * supplied here; the SDK never sends it to the node.\n   */\n  openWithReceiverKey(\n    receiverPrivateKey: Uint8Array,\n    wrappedKey: Uint8Array,\n  ): Uint8Array;\n  /**\n   * Verify an ed25519 signature over `message` produced by the node\n   * identified by `nodeId` (the public-key DID).\n   */\n  verifyNodeSignature(\n    nodeId: string,\n    message: Uint8Array,\n    signature: Uint8Array,\n  ): boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signer interface used to derive a receiver key pair from a wallet or\n * session signer. The signature is HKDF-extracted into the receiver\n * seed so the public key is reproducible given the same context.\n */\nexport interface ReceiverKeySigner {\n  signMessage(message: string): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** Capability proof material accompanying a decrypt invocation. */\nexport interface DecryptCapabilityProof {\n  /** Delegation chain CIDs rooted at the network owner DID. */\n  proofs: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n  /** Optional Authorization header value to use instead of building one. */\n  authorization?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Inputs to the decrypt invocation builder.\n */\nexport interface BuildDecryptInvocationInput {\n  /** Target node DID — also the UCAN audience. */\n  targetNode: string;\n  /** Network id URN — also the recap resource. */\n  networkId: string;\n  /** Canonical body that will be POSTed. */\n  body: DecryptRequestBody;\n  /** Facts include hashes bound to the canonical body. */\n  facts: DecryptInvocationFact;\n  /** Capability proof chain. */\n  proof: DecryptCapabilityProof;\n  /** Optional `nbf` UCAN field as an ISO date string. */\n  notBefore?: string;\n  /** Optional `exp` UCAN field as an ISO date string. */\n  expiration?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The output of {@link buildDecryptInvocation}.\n */\nexport interface BuiltDecryptInvocation {\n  /** HTTP `Authorization` header value. */\n  authorization: string;\n  /** CID of the invocation (used by the node response binding). */\n  invocationCid: string;\n  /** Canonical body string the node will hash. */\n  canonicalBody: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signer interface for producing the decrypt invocation. WASM bindings\n * implement this with the same session signer used for KV/SQL\n * invocations; tests can stub it.\n */\nexport interface DecryptInvocationSigner {\n  signDecryptInvocation(input: BuildDecryptInvocationInput): Promise<BuiltDecryptInvocation>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Errors thrown / returned from the encryption module.\n */\nexport type EncryptionErrorInput =\n  | RoutingFailure\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_FOUND\"; networkId?: string; name?: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"NETWORK_NOT_ACTIVE\"; state: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_NETWORK_ID\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_ENVELOPE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"DECRYPT_DENIED\"; message: string; permissionHint?: PermissionHint }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_RESPONSE\"; message: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_SIGNATURE_INVALID\"; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"RESPONSE_BINDING_MISMATCH\"; field: string; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"TRANSPORT_ERROR\"; cause: Error; message?: string }\n  | { code: \"INVALID_INPUT\"; message: string };\n\nexport type EncryptionError = EncryptionErrorInput & {\n  service: \"encryption\";\n  message: string;\n};\n\nfunction defaultEncryptionMessage(input: EncryptionErrorInput): string {\n  switch (input.code) {\n    case \"NETWORK_NOT_FOUND\":\n      return (\n        input.message ??\n        `Network not found: ${input.networkId ?? input.name ?? \"<unknown>\"}`\n      );\n    case \"NETWORK_NOT_ACTIVE\":\n      return input.message ?? `Network not active (state=${input.state})`;\n    case \"INVALID_NETWORK_ID\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"INVALID_ENVELOPE\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"DECRYPT_DENIED\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"INVALID_RESPONSE\":\n      return input.message;\n    case \"RESPONSE_SIGNATURE_INVALID\":\n      return input.message ?? \"Node response signature failed to verify\";\n    case \"RESPONSE_BINDING_MISMATCH\":\n      return (\n        input.message ??\n        `Node response binding mismatch on field ${JSON.stringify(input.field)}`\n      );\n    case \"TRANSPORT_ERROR\":\n      return input.message ?? input.cause.message;\n    case \"INVALID_INPUT\":\n      return input.message;\n    default:\n      return input.message ?? input.code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport function encryptionError(input: EncryptionErrorInput): EncryptionError {\n  return {\n    ...input,\n    service: \"encryption\",\n    message: defaultEncryptionMessage(input),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Helper for the test/runtime layers to coerce arbitrary throwables. */\nexport function toError(error: unknown): Error {\n  if (error instanceof Error) return error;\n  if (typeof error === \"object\" && error !== null) {\n    return new Error(JSON.stringify(error));\n  }\n  return new Error(String(error));\n}\n\n/** Re-export for ergonomic typing of canonical payloads. */\nexport type CanonicalJson = 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package/dist/feed/index.cjs

@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ var ErrorCodes = {
   /** HTTP 401: a delegation the cited one rests on was revoked. */
   AUTH_DELEGATION_ANCESTOR_REVOKED: "AUTH_DELEGATION_ANCESTOR_REVOKED",
   NETWORK_ERROR: "NETWORK_ERROR",
+  NODE_NOT_RESPONDING: "NODE_NOT_RESPONDING",
+  NODE_IDENTITY_MISMATCH: "NODE_IDENTITY_MISMATCH",
+  PARTIAL_NODE_WRITE: "PARTIAL_NODE_WRITE",
+  RESOURCE_NOT_ROUTED: "RESOURCE_NOT_ROUTED",
   TIMEOUT: "TIMEOUT",
   ABORTED: "ABORTED",
   INVALID_INPUT: "INVALID_INPUT",