@tinycloud/sdk-core 3.0.0-beta.7 → 3.0.0-beta.9

package/dist/index.js

@@ -8879,25 +8879,33 @@ function parsePublishedShareLink(link, options2 = {}) {
   }
   const origin2 = normalizeOrigin(url.origin);
   if (options2.trustedOrigins !== void 0 && !options2.trustedOrigins.map(normalizeOrigin).includes(origin2)) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("origin-mismatch", "share link origin is not trusted");
-  if (url.search !== "" || url.username !== "" || url.password !== "") throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share link is not canonical");
-  if (url.pathname === "/s/inline" && url.hash.startsWith("#v=2&p=")) {
+  if (url.username !== "" || url.password !== "") throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share link is not canonical");
+  if (url.pathname === "/viewer") {
+    const secretPayload = url.search === "" && url.hash.startsWith("#tc2=") ? url.hash.slice("#tc2=".length) : void 0;
+    const publicPayload = url.hash === "" && url.searchParams.size === 1 ? url.searchParams.get("tc2") ?? void 0 : void 0;
+    if (secretPayload === void 0 && publicPayload === void 0) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "published share link is invalid");
+    if (publicPayload !== void 0 && url.search !== `?tc2=${publicPayload}`) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "published share link is not canonical");
     let payload;
     try {
-      const bytes2 = base64UrlToBytes(url.hash.slice("#v=2&p=".length));
+      const bytes2 = base64UrlToBytes(secretPayload ?? publicPayload);
       if (bytes2.length > (options2.maxInlineBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_INLINE_BYTES) * 2) throw new Error("inline payload too large");
-      const value = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes2));
+      const text2 = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes2);
+      const value = JSON.parse(text2);
       if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error("inline payload shape");
+      if (canonicalJson(value) !== text2) throw new Error("inline payload is not canonical JSON");
       payload = value;
     } catch (error) {
       throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", error instanceof Error ? error.message : "invalid inline payload");
     }
-    if (payload.v !== 2 || typeof payload.c !== "string" || typeof payload.cid !== "string" || payload.k !== void 0 && typeof payload.k !== "string" || Object.keys(payload).some((key3) => !["v", "c", "cid", "k"].includes(key3))) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "inline payload fields are invalid");
+    const payloadKeys = Object.keys(payload);
+    if (payload.v !== 2 || typeof payload.c !== "string" || typeof payload.cid !== "string" || payload.k !== void 0 && typeof payload.k !== "string" || payloadKeys.some((key3) => !["v", "c", "cid", "k"].includes(key3)) || publicPayload !== void 0 && (payloadKeys.length !== 3 || payload.k !== void 0)) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "inline payload fields are invalid");
     const sealed = base64UrlToBytes(payload.c);
     if (!verifyPublishedShareCid(payload.cid, sealed)) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("cid-mismatch", "inline payload CID does not match");
     const key2 = payload.k === void 0 ? void 0 : base64UrlToBytes(payload.k);
     if (key2 !== void 0 && key2.length !== 32) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "inline payload key is invalid");
     return { origin: origin2, cid: payload.cid, ...key2 === void 0 ? {} : { key: key2 }, sealed };
   }
+  if (url.search !== "") throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share link is not canonical");
   const match = /^\/s\/([a-z2-7]+)$/.exec(url.pathname);
   if (match === null || !url.hash.startsWith("#k=")) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "published share link is invalid");
   const key = base64UrlToBytes(url.hash.slice(3));
@@ -8917,13 +8925,13 @@ function parseShareUrl(link, options2 = {}) {
   } catch {
     throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share link must be an absolute URL");
   }
-  if (url.search !== "") throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share links must not contain query parameters");
   const origin2 = normalizeOrigin(url.origin);
   if (options2.trustedOrigins !== void 0 && !options2.trustedOrigins.map(normalizeOrigin).includes(origin2)) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("origin-mismatch", "share link origin is not trusted");
-  if (url.pathname === "/s/inline" && url.hash.startsWith("#v=2&p=")) {
+  if (url.pathname === "/viewer" && (url.hash.startsWith("#tc2=") || url.searchParams.has("tc2"))) {
     const published = parsePublishedShareLink(link, options2);
     return { kind: "inline", origin: origin2, cid: published.cid, key: published.key, url: `${url.origin}${url.pathname}`, protocol: "share-envelope-v2" };
   }
+  if (url.search !== "") throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share links must not contain query parameters");
   const match = url.pathname.match(/^\/s\/(i\/)?([^/]+)$/);
   if (!match) throw new ShareEnvelopeError("invalid-link", "share link path is invalid");
   const fragmentParams = url.hash === "" ? void 0 : new URLSearchParams(url.hash.slice(1));
@@ -8946,7 +8954,8 @@ function parseShareUrl(link, options2 = {}) {
 }
 function isV2ShareLink(link) {
   try {
-    return new URL(link).pathname.startsWith("/s/");
+    const url = new URL(link);
+    return url.pathname.startsWith("/s/") || url.pathname === "/viewer";
   } catch {
     return link.startsWith(INLINE_PREFIX);
   }
@@ -11759,114 +11768,13 @@ function validateOwnerSharePolicyRegistrationBytes(bytesValue, expected) {
   return validateOwnerSharePolicyRegistration(value, expected);
 }
 
-// src/delegations/share-delivery.ts
-import { ed25519 as ed255199 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
-var SHARE_DELIVERY_AUTHORIZATION_DOMAIN = "xyz.tinycloud.share/delivery-authorization/v2\0";
-function isCanonicalHttpsOrigin(value) {
-  let url;
-  try {
-    url = new URL(value);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return url.protocol === "https:" && url.origin === value && url.pathname === "/" && url.search === "" && url.hash === "" && url.username === "" && url.password === "";
-}
-var AUTHORIZATION_KEYS = [
-  "type",
-  "version",
-  "jti",
-  "shareCid",
-  "shareId",
-  "registrationCid",
-  "delegationCid",
-  "enforcementDelegationCid",
-  "envelopeCid",
-  "policyCid",
-  "nodeAudience",
-  "targetOrigin",
-  "openCredentialsAudience",
-  "holder",
-  "recipientMatcher",
-  "deliveryEmail",
-  "shareUrl",
-  "returnOrigin",
-  "documentName",
-  "senderDid",
-  "senderTrust",
-  "contentSource",
-  "contentSourceDigest",
-  "shareExpiresAt",
-  "issuedAt",
-  "reportAbuseToken",
-  "actions",
-  "resource",
-  "authorityMaterialHandle",
-  "authorityMaterialDigest",
-  "requestBodyDigest",
-  "idempotencyKey",
-  "expiresAt",
-  "dataAuthority"
-];
-function assertObject2(value, keys, label) {
-  if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error(`${label} is invalid`);
-  const record2 = value;
-  if (Object.keys(record2).length !== keys.length || keys.some((key) => !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(record2, key))) throw new Error(`${label} has unknown or missing fields`);
-  return record2;
-}
-function fromB642(value) {
-  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(value)) throw new Error("share delivery value is not canonical base64url");
-  if (typeof atob === "function") {
-    const padded = value.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/") + "=".repeat((4 - value.length % 4) % 4);
-    return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (character) => character.charCodeAt(0));
-  }
-  if (typeof Buffer !== "undefined") return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(value, "base64url"));
-  throw new Error("base64url decoding is unavailable");
-}
-function validateShareDeliveryAuthorizationBytes(bytesValue, expected) {
-  let value;
-  try {
-    value = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(bytesValue));
-  } catch {
-    throw new Error("share delivery authorization response is not valid UTF-8 JSON");
-  }
-  const root = assertObject2(value, ["authorization", "proof"], "share delivery authorization response");
-  const authorization = assertObject2(root.authorization, AUTHORIZATION_KEYS, "share delivery authorization");
-  const proof = assertObject2(root.proof, ["alg", "kid", "signature"], "share delivery authorization proof");
-  const request = expected.request;
-  if (authorization.type !== "TinyCloudShareDeliveryAuthorization" || authorization.version !== 2 || authorization.dataAuthority !== false || authorization.jti !== request.jti || authorization.shareCid !== request.shareCid || authorization.shareId !== request.shareId || authorization.registrationCid !== request.registrationCid || authorization.delegationCid !== request.delegationCid || authorization.enforcementDelegationCid !== request.enforcementDelegationCid || authorization.envelopeCid !== request.envelopeCid || authorization.policyCid !== request.policyCid || authorization.deliveryEmail !== request.recipientEmail || authorization.shareUrl !== request.shareUrl || authorization.documentName !== request.documentName || authorization.requestBodyDigest !== request.requestBodyDigest || authorization.expiresAt !== request.expiresAt || authorization.idempotencyKey !== request.idempotencyKey || authorization.reportAbuseToken !== request.jti || authorization.authorityMaterialHandle !== request.registrationCid) {
-    throw new Error("share delivery authorization is not bound to the submitted request");
-  }
-  if (typeof authorization.issuedAt !== "string" || Date.parse(authorization.issuedAt) > Date.now() + 6e4) throw new Error("share delivery authorization issuedAt is invalid");
-  if (new Date(authorization.expiresAt).toISOString() !== authorization.expiresAt) throw new Error("share delivery authorization expiresAt is non-canonical");
-  if (typeof authorization.openCredentialsAudience !== "string" || !isCanonicalHttpsOrigin(authorization.openCredentialsAudience) || authorization.openCredentialsAudience !== expected.credentialsAudience || authorization.openCredentialsAudience === authorization.nodeAudience || authorization.openCredentialsAudience === authorization.returnOrigin) {
-    throw new Error("share delivery authorization openCredentialsAudience is missing or untrusted");
-  }
-  if (proof.alg !== "EdDSA" || typeof proof.kid !== "string" || typeof proof.signature !== "string") throw new Error("share delivery authorization proof is invalid");
-  if (proof.kid !== expected.nodeProof.kid) throw new Error("share delivery authorization proof key is not trusted");
-  const encodedKid = expected.nodeProof.publicKey;
-  const publicKey = encodedKid.length === 34 && encodedKid[0] === 237 && encodedKid[1] === 1 ? encodedKid.slice(2) : encodedKid;
-  if (publicKey.length !== 32) throw new Error("share delivery authorization proof key is invalid");
-  const signatureBytes = fromB642(proof.signature);
-  const signedBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(`${SHARE_DELIVERY_AUTHORIZATION_DOMAIN}${canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(authorization)}`);
-  if (signatureBytes.length !== 64 || !ed255199.verify(signatureBytes, signedBytes, publicKey)) throw new Error("share delivery authorization proof signature is invalid");
-  return { authorization, proof };
-}
-function shareDeliveryTrustedKid(publicKey) {
-  if (publicKey.length !== 32) throw new Error("share delivery node key must be a raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key");
-  const prefixed = new Uint8Array(34);
-  prefixed.set([237, 1]);
-  prefixed.set(publicKey, 2);
-  const did = `did:key:${base58btc.encode(prefixed)}`;
-  return `${did}#${did.slice("did:key:".length)}`;
-}
-
 // src/delegations/share-delivery-v3.ts
-import { ed25519 as ed2551910 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
+import { ed25519 as ed255199 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
 import { sha256 as sha25611 } from "@noble/hashes/sha256";
 var CREDENTIAL_INVITATION_REQUEST_DOMAIN = "xyz.tinycloud.credentials/invitation-request/v1\0";
 var DELIVERY_ADMISSION_DOMAIN = "xyz.tinycloud.policy/delivery-admission/v0\0";
-var REQUEST_KEYS = ["schema", "policyId", "recipient", "resource", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce"];
-var ADMISSION_KEYS = ["schema", "policyId", "ownerDid", "recipient", "resource", "actions", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "senderKeyDid", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce", "signature"];
+var REQUEST_KEYS = ["schema", "policyId", "recipient", "resource", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "label", "shareExpiresAt", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce"];
+var ADMISSION_KEYS = ["schema", "policyId", "ownerDid", "recipient", "resource", "actions", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "label", "shareExpiresAt", "senderKeyDid", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce", "signature"];
 function exactObject2(value, keys, label) {
   if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error(`${label} is invalid`);
   const record2 = value;
@@ -11910,15 +11818,16 @@ function validateShareDeliveryAuthorizationV3Bytes(bytes2, expected) {
   const contentSource = object3(envelope.contentSource, "v3 content source");
   const envelopeSignature = object3(envelope.signature, "v3 envelope signature");
   const target = object3(envelope.target, "v3 target");
-  const fields = ["policyId", "recipient", "resource", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce"];
-  if (request.schema !== "xyz.tinycloud.credentials/invitation-request/v1" || admission.schema !== "xyz.tinycloud.policy/delivery-admission/v0" || fields.some((field) => request[field] !== admission[field]) || request.policyId !== envelope.policyCid || request.recipient !== expected.request.recipientEmail || request.resource !== contentSource.kvResource || request.credentialType !== credentialType.id || request.credentialType !== "opencredentials.email/v1" || request.returnLink !== expected.request.shareUrl || request.envelopeRef !== expected.request.shareCid || request.audience !== expected.credentialsAudience || request.expiresAt !== expected.request.expiresAt || request.nonce !== expected.request.jti || admission.ownerDid !== envelopeSignature.signerDid || admission.senderKeyDid !== expected.senderKeyDid || canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(admission.actions) !== canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(["tinycloud.kv/get"]) || signature.suite !== "eddsa-ed25519-sha256-jcs-v1" || signature.signerDid !== target.nodeAudience) throw new Error("v3 share delivery authorization is not bound to the submitted request");
+  const binding = object3(envelope.attestedEnforcerBinding, "v3 attested enforcer binding");
+  const fields = ["policyId", "recipient", "resource", "credentialType", "returnLink", "envelopeRef", "label", "shareExpiresAt", "audience", "issuedAt", "expiresAt", "nonce"];
+  if (request.schema !== "xyz.tinycloud.credentials/invitation-request/v1" || admission.schema !== "xyz.tinycloud.policy/delivery-admission/v0" || fields.some((field) => request[field] !== admission[field]) || request.policyId !== envelope.policyCid || request.recipient !== expected.request.recipientEmail || request.resource !== contentSource.kvResource || request.credentialType !== credentialType.id || request.credentialType !== "opencredentials.email/v1" || request.returnLink !== expected.request.shareUrl || request.envelopeRef !== expected.request.shareCid || request.label !== expected.request.documentName || request.shareExpiresAt !== envelope.expiry || request.audience !== expected.deliveryAudience || request.expiresAt !== expected.request.expiresAt || request.nonce !== expected.request.jti || admission.ownerDid !== envelopeSignature.signerDid || admission.senderKeyDid !== expected.senderKeyDid || canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(admission.actions) !== canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(["tinycloud.kv/get"]) || signature.suite !== "eddsa-ed25519-sha256-jcs-v1" || target.nodeAudience !== binding.nodeAudience || signature.signerDid !== binding.nodeAudience) throw new Error("v3 share delivery authorization is not bound to the submitted request");
   const issuedAt = Date.parse(String(request.issuedAt));
   const expiresAt = Date.parse(String(request.expiresAt));
   if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAt) || !Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= issuedAt || expiresAt - issuedAt > 15 * 6e4) throw new Error("v3 share delivery authorization time is invalid");
   const admissionSignature = decodeBase64Url3(signature.value);
   const { signature: _signature, ...unsignedAdmission } = admission;
   const digest4 = sha25611(new TextEncoder().encode(`${DELIVERY_ADMISSION_DOMAIN}${canonicalizeSignedObjectUnsigned(unsignedAdmission)}`));
-  if (admissionSignature.length !== 64 || !ed2551910.verify(admissionSignature, digest4, didKeyBytes2(String(signature.signerDid)))) throw new Error("v3 share delivery admission signature is invalid");
+  if (admissionSignature.length !== 64 || !ed255199.verify(admissionSignature, digest4, didKeyBytes2(String(signature.signerDid)))) throw new Error("v3 share delivery admission signature is invalid");
   return { request, admission };
 }
 
@@ -12042,9 +11951,6 @@ import {
   publishPolicyShare,
   claimShare,
   resumeShareAuthorization,
-  isLegacyShareLink,
-  receiveLegacyShare,
-  migrateShare,
   MemoryEncryptedShareHistoryStorage,
   EncryptedSenderShareHistory
 } from "@tinycloud/share-sdk";
@@ -12052,8 +11958,7 @@ import {
   inspectShare,
   receiveShare,
   ShareReceiveError,
-  toShareErrorInfo,
-  verifyBearerEnvelope
+  toShareErrorInfo
 } from "@tinycloud/share-sdk";
 
 // src/networkId.ts
@@ -14786,6 +14691,7 @@ import {
   SecretsService,
   SECRET_NAME_RE as SECRET_NAME_RE2,
   canonicalizeSecretScope,
+  parseSecretCatalogKey,
   resolveSecretListPrefix,
   resolveSecretPath as resolveSecretPath2,
   EncryptionService,
@@ -17688,7 +17594,7 @@ function portForProtocol(protocol) {
 }
 
 // src/location.ts
-import { ed25519 as ed2551911 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
+import { ed25519 as ed2551910 } from "@noble/curves/ed25519";
 import { verifyMessage as verifyMessage2 } from "viem";
 var DEFAULT_TINYCLOUD_LOCATION_REGISTRY_URL = "https://registry.tinycloud.xyz";
 var DEFAULT_TINYCLOUD_FALLBACK_HOST = "https://node.tinycloud.xyz";
@@ -17696,6 +17602,7 @@ var DEFAULT_LOCAL_NODE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8000";
 var LOCAL_LOOPBACK_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 250;
 var LOCAL_LINK_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 750;
 var LOCAL_LINK_HOST_SUFFIX = ".local.tinycloud.link";
+var OWNER_NODE_BINDING_TIMEOUT_MS = 5e3;
 function createInMemoryLocalNodeIdentityStore() {
   const pins = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   return {
@@ -17828,21 +17735,80 @@ async function verifyLocationRecord(input) {
   }
   return false;
 }
-async function fetchLocationRecord(registryUrl, subject, fetchFn = globalThis.fetch) {
+async function fetchLocationRecord(registryUrl, subject, fetchFn = globalThis.fetch, signal) {
   const url = `${registryUrl.replace(/\/$/, "")}/v1/locations/${encodeURIComponent(subject)}`;
-  const response = await fetchFn(url);
+  const response = await fetchFn(url, {
+    redirect: "error",
+    headers: { accept: "application/json" },
+    ...signal === void 0 ? {} : { signal }
+  });
   if (response.status === 404) {
     return null;
   }
   if (!response.ok) {
     throw new Error(`location registry returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
   }
-  const body = await response.json();
+  const text2 = await boundedResponseText(response, "location registry", 64 * 1024);
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = JSON.parse(text2);
+  } catch {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError("registry response is not JSON");
+  }
   if (body.record === void 0) {
     throw new LocationRecordValidationError("registry response missing record");
   }
   return validateLocationRecord(body.record);
 }
+async function publishLocationRecord(options2) {
+  validateSubject(options2.subject);
+  const registryUrl = exactHttpOrigin(options2.registryUrl, "registry URL");
+  const nodeOrigin = exactHttpOrigin(options2.nodeOrigin, "node origin");
+  const fetchFn = options2.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
+  const current = await fetchLocationRecord(registryUrl, options2.subject, fetchFn);
+  if (current !== null) {
+    if (current.subject !== options2.subject || !await verifyLocationRecord(current)) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("existing location record signature is invalid");
+    }
+    if (publishedHttpOrigins(current).includes(nodeOrigin)) {
+      return current;
+    }
+  }
+  const record2 = await signLocationRecord({
+    version: 1,
+    subject: options2.subject,
+    multiaddrs: [...current?.multiaddrs ?? [], httpUrlToMultiaddr(nodeOrigin)],
+    updated_at: (options2.now?.() ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+    sequence: (current?.sequence ?? -1) + 1
+  }, options2.signer);
+  const response = await fetchFn(
+    `${registryUrl}/v1/locations/${encodeURIComponent(options2.subject)}`,
+    {
+      method: "PUT",
+      redirect: "error",
+      headers: { accept: "application/json", "content-type": "application/json" },
+      body: JSON.stringify(record2)
+    }
+  );
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new Error(`location registry publish returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
+  }
+  const text2 = await boundedResponseText(response, "location registry", 64 * 1024);
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = JSON.parse(text2);
+  } catch {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError("registry publish response is not JSON");
+  }
+  if (body.record === void 0) {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError("registry publish response missing record");
+  }
+  const published = validateLocationRecord(body.record);
+  if (canonicalLocationPayload(locationPayloadForRecord(published)) !== canonicalLocationPayload(locationPayloadForRecord(record2)) || published.signature !== record2.signature || !await verifyLocationRecord(published)) {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError("registry publish response does not match the signed record");
+  }
+  return published;
+}
 async function resolveCloudLocation(subject, options2 = {}) {
   validateSubject(subject);
   const verifyRecords = options2.verifyRecords ?? true;
@@ -18093,6 +18059,123 @@ function multiaddrToHttpUrl(input) {
   }
   return uri;
 }
+function exactHttpOrigin(value, label) {
+  let url;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(value);
+  } catch {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`${label} must be an absolute URL origin`);
+  }
+  const loopback = url.hostname === "localhost" || url.hostname === "127.0.0.1" || url.hostname === "[::1]";
+  if (url.protocol !== "https:" && !(url.protocol === "http:" && loopback)) {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`${label} must use HTTPS (or loopback HTTP)`);
+  }
+  if (url.username !== "" || url.password !== "" || url.pathname !== "/" || url.search !== "" || url.hash !== "") {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`${label} must be an origin without credentials, path, query, or fragment`);
+  }
+  return url.origin;
+}
+function publishedHttpOrigins(record2) {
+  const origins = [];
+  for (const address of record2.multiaddrs) {
+    try {
+      origins.push(exactHttpOrigin(multiaddrToHttpUrl(address), "published node URL"));
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  return origins;
+}
+async function boundedResponseText(response, label, maxBytes) {
+  const declaredLength = response.headers.get("content-length");
+  if (declaredLength !== null && (!/^\d+$/.test(declaredLength) || Number(declaredLength) > maxBytes)) {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`${label} response is too large`);
+  }
+  if (response.body === null) return "";
+  const reader = response.body.getReader();
+  const chunks = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  try {
+    while (true) {
+      const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+      if (done) break;
+      if (value === void 0) continue;
+      total += value.byteLength;
+      if (total > maxBytes) {
+        await reader.cancel().catch(() => void 0);
+        throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`${label} response is too large`);
+      }
+      chunks.push(value);
+    }
+  } finally {
+    reader.releaseLock();
+  }
+  const bytes2 = new Uint8Array(total);
+  let offset = 0;
+  for (const chunk of chunks) {
+    bytes2.set(chunk, offset);
+    offset += chunk.byteLength;
+  }
+  return new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes2);
+}
+function boundedSignal(parent, timeoutMs) {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) || timeoutMs <= 0) {
+    throw new LocationRecordValidationError("owner-node binding timeout must be positive");
+  }
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const abortFromParent = () => controller.abort(parent?.reason);
+  if (parent?.aborted) abortFromParent();
+  else parent?.addEventListener("abort", abortFromParent, { once: true });
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(new DOMException("owner-node binding timed out", "TimeoutError")), timeoutMs);
+  return {
+    signal: controller.signal,
+    dispose() {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      parent?.removeEventListener("abort", abortFromParent);
+    }
+  };
+}
+async function verifyOwnerNodeBinding(options2) {
+  validateSubject(options2.ownerDid);
+  validateSubject(options2.nodeDid);
+  const registryUrl = exactHttpOrigin(options2.registryUrl, "registry URL");
+  const nodeOrigin = exactHttpOrigin(options2.nodeOrigin, "node origin");
+  const fetchFn = options2.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch.bind(globalThis);
+  const lookup = boundedSignal(options2.signal, options2.timeoutMs ?? OWNER_NODE_BINDING_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  try {
+    const record2 = await fetchLocationRecord(registryUrl, options2.ownerDid, fetchFn, lookup.signal);
+    if (record2 === null) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("owner has no published location record");
+    }
+    if (record2.subject !== options2.ownerDid || !await verifyLocationRecord(record2)) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("owner location record signature is invalid");
+    }
+    const publishedOrigins = publishedHttpOrigins(record2);
+    if (!publishedOrigins.includes(nodeOrigin)) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("share target is not in the owner's signed location record");
+    }
+    const response = await fetchFn(new URL("/info", nodeOrigin), {
+      redirect: "error",
+      headers: { accept: "application/json" },
+      signal: lookup.signal
+    });
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError(`target node /info returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
+    }
+    const text2 = await boundedResponseText(response, "target node /info", 16 * 1024);
+    let body;
+    try {
+      body = JSON.parse(text2);
+    } catch {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("target node /info response is not JSON");
+    }
+    if (body === null || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body) || body.nodeId !== options2.nodeDid) {
+      throw new LocationRecordValidationError("target node identity does not match the share attestation");
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({ record: record2, nodeOrigin, nodeDid: options2.nodeDid });
+  } finally {
+    lookup.dispose();
+  }
+}
 function httpUrlToMultiaddr(input) {
   const url = new URL(input);
   if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") {
@@ -18260,7 +18343,7 @@ function verifyDidKeySignature(did, payload, signature) {
       "did:key signature must be a base64url Ed25519 signature"
     );
   }
-  return ed2551911.verify(
+  return ed2551910.verify(
     signatureBytes,
     new TextEncoder().encode(payload),
     publicKey
@@ -18268,7 +18351,7 @@ function verifyDidKeySignature(did, payload, signature) {
 }
 function verifyDidKeyEd25519Signature(did, payload, signature) {
   const publicKey = ed25519PublicKeyFromDidKey2(did);
-  return ed2551911.verify(signature, payload, publicKey);
+  return ed2551910.verify(signature, payload, publicKey);
 }
 function ed25519PublicKeyFromDidKey2(did) {
   const identifier = did.slice("did:key:".length);
@@ -18429,6 +18512,7 @@ export {
   NETWORK_NAME_PATTERN,
   NetworkIdError,
   OPENKEY_ACTION_ID_SEPARATOR,
+  OWNER_NODE_BINDING_TIMEOUT_MS,
   OpenKeyManageKeyError,
   POLICY_CAPABILITY_V1_DOMAIN,
   POLICY_CAPABILITY_V1_SCHEMA,
@@ -18468,7 +18552,6 @@ export {
   SECRET_RECORDS_SCHEMA,
   SERVICE_LONG_TO_SHORT,
   SERVICE_SHORT_TO_LONG,
-  SHARE_DELIVERY_AUTHORIZATION_DOMAIN,
   SPACE,
   SQL,
   SQLAction,
@@ -18671,6 +18754,7 @@ export {
   parsePolicySessionUcan,
   parsePortableDelegation,
   parseRecapCapabilities,
+  parseSecretCatalogKey,
   parseShareArtifact,
   parseShareUrl,
   parseSpaceUri,
@@ -18683,6 +18767,7 @@ export {
   principalDidEquals,
   projectUnifiedPolicyCapabilities,
   projectUnifiedPolicyCapability,
+  publishLocationRecord,
   recapCaveatsEqual,
   registerPolicyV3,
   renewPolicyRootStatusV3,
@@ -18702,7 +18787,6 @@ export {
   serviceError5 as serviceError,
   sha256Base64Url,
   shareCapabilityAllows,
-  shareDeliveryTrustedKid,
   signCompactUcanAuthorization,
   signCompactUcanRootAuthorization,
   signLocationRecord,
@@ -18739,7 +18823,6 @@ export {
   validatePolicyStatusSignedShape,
   validatePolicyStatusUnsigned,
   validatePolicyUnsigned,
-  validateShareDeliveryAuthorizationBytes,
   validateShareDeliveryAuthorizationV3Bytes,
   validateUnifiedPolicyV2,
   verifyDecryptResponse,
@@ -18747,6 +18830,7 @@ export {
   verifyEip191MessageSignature,
   verifyIssuedCredential,
   verifyLocationRecord,
+  verifyOwnerNodeBinding,
   verifyPolicy,
   verifyPolicyEngineRecord,
   verifyPolicyRootRevocationV3,