@timber-js/app 0.2.0-alpha.19 → 0.2.0-alpha.190

package/src/shared/href-validation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * Shared href/URL validation for all navigation sinks.
+ *
+ * Used by <Link>, useRouter().push/replace, and redirectExternal().
+ * Single source of truth for dangerous-scheme detection — prevents
+ * control-character smuggling that bypasses naive regex checks.
+ *
+ * See design/13-security.md §"Link scheme injection" (test #9)
+ * and design/07-routing.md §"<Link> Scheme Validation".
+ */
+
+/**
+ * All C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) that browsers strip during
+ * URL preprocessing. Browsers and `new URL()` strip the full C0 range,
+ * not just tab/LF/CR — so we must match that behavior to prevent
+ * bypass vectors like `\x00javascript:alert(1)`.
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: must match all C0 controls to prevent bypass
+const CONTROL_CHARS_RE = /[\x00-\x1f]/g;
+
+const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = new Set(['javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:']);
+
+/**
+ * Strip C0 control chars and leading whitespace, then extract the scheme.
+ * Returns the lowercase scheme (e.g. "javascript:") or null if no scheme.
+ */
+function extractScheme(href: string): string | null {
+  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart();
+  const match = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:)/i.exec(cleaned);
+  return match ? match[1].toLowerCase() : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate an href for navigation sinks (<Link>, useRouter, etc.).
+ *
+ * Rejects dangerous schemes (javascript:, data:, vbscript:) even when
+ * control characters are embedded to bypass naive regex checks.
+ * Also rejects protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com).
+ *
+ * Throws on rejection. Safe hrefs pass through silently.
+ */
+export function validateNavigationHref(href: string): void {
+  // Normalize for validation: strip C0 controls, trim, then replace backslashes
+  // with forward slashes. Browsers normalize \ → / during URL resolution, so
+  // "/\evil.com" becomes "//evil.com" (protocol-relative open redirect).
+  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart().replaceAll('\\', '/');
+
+  // Protocol-relative URLs can redirect to attacker-controlled origins
+  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Navigation received a protocol-relative or backslash-prefixed URL: "${href}". ` +
+        'Use an absolute URL with an explicit scheme or a relative path.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  const scheme = extractScheme(href);
+  if (scheme && DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Navigation received a dangerous href: "${href}". ` +
+        'javascript:, data:, and vbscript: URLs are not allowed.'
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if an href is internal (same-origin navigation) or external.
+ *
+ * Strips control characters before checking so that "java\tscript:" is
+ * correctly identified as having a scheme (and thus not internal).
+ */
+export function isInternalHref(href: string): boolean {
+  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart().replaceAll('\\', '/');
+
+  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) return false;
+  if (cleaned.startsWith('/') || cleaned.startsWith('#') || cleaned.startsWith('?')) return true;
+
+  const scheme = extractScheme(href);
+  if (scheme) return false;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+/** Pattern matching absolute URLs: any scheme (http:, javascript:, …) or protocol-relative // */
+const ABSOLUTE_URL_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\d+\-.]*:|\/\/)/;
+
+/**
+ * Assert that a redirect target is a relative path — rejects absolute and
+ * protocol-relative URLs. Used by both the server `redirect()` primitive and
+ * the client next/navigation shim so they enforce identical semantics.
+ *
+ * Normalizes for validation only: strips C0 controls, trims, then replaces
+ * backslashes with forward slashes. Browsers normalize \ → / during URL
+ * resolution, so "/\evil.com" becomes "//evil.com" (protocol-relative open
+ * redirect). See design/13-security.md tests #8, #8a–#8c.
+ */
+export function assertRelativeRedirectPath(path: string): void {
+  const cleaned = path.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart().replaceAll('\\', '/');
+
+  if (ABSOLUTE_URL_RE.test(cleaned)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `redirect() only accepts relative URLs. Got absolute URL: "${path}". ` +
+        'Use redirectExternal(url, allowList) for external redirects.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: must match C0 controls
+  if (/[\x00-\x1f]/.test(path)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `redirect() received a path containing control characters (U+0000–U+001F). ` +
+        'Sanitize user input before passing it to redirect().'
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+const SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);
+
+/**
+ * Validate and canonicalize an external redirect URL.
+ *
+ * Requires http: or https: scheme and checks origin against an allow-list.
+ * Returns the parsed canonical URL string (from URL.href) to prevent
+ * raw user input from reaching the Location header.
+ *
+ * @throws On invalid URL, dangerous scheme, or origin not in allow-list.
+ */
+export function validateExternalRedirectUrl(url: string, allowList: string[]): string {
+  // Strip control chars before parsing to prevent scheme smuggling
+  const cleaned = url.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart();
+
+  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `redirectExternal() received a protocol-relative URL: "${url}". ` +
+        'Use an absolute URL with http: or https: scheme.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(cleaned);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`redirectExternal() received an invalid URL: "${url}"`);
+  }
+
+  if (!SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `redirectExternal() received a non-http(s) URL: "${url}". ` +
+        'Only http: and https: schemes are allowed for external redirects.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (!allowList.includes(parsed.origin)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `redirectExternal() target "${parsed.origin}" is not in the allow-list. ` +
+        `Allowed: [${allowList.join(', ')}]`
+    );
+  }
+
+  return parsed.href;
+}

package/src/shared/merge-search-params.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Shared utility for merging preserved search params into a target URL.
+ *
+ * Used by both <Link> (client) and redirect() (server). Extracted to a shared
+ * module to avoid importing client code ('use client') from server modules.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Merge preserved search params from the current URL into a target href.
+ *
+ * When `preserve` is `true`, all current search params are merged.
+ * When `preserve` is a `string[]`, only the named params are merged.
+ *
+ * The target href's own search params take precedence — preserved params
+ * are only added if the target doesn't already define them.
+ *
+ * @param targetHref - The resolved target href (may already contain query string)
+ * @param currentSearch - The current URL's search string (e.g. "?private=access&page=2")
+ * @param preserve - `true` to preserve all, or `string[]` to preserve specific params
+ * @returns The target href with preserved search params merged in
+ */
+export function mergePreservedSearchParams(
+  targetHref: string,
+  currentSearch: string,
+  preserve: true | string[]
+): string {
+  const currentParams = new URLSearchParams(currentSearch);
+  if (currentParams.size === 0) return targetHref;
+
+  // Split hash fragment from target before processing query params.
+  // Hash must come after query string: /path?query=value#hash
+  const hashIdx = targetHref.indexOf('#');
+  const hrefWithoutHash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(0, hashIdx) : targetHref;
+  const hash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(hashIdx) : '';
+
+  // Split target into path and existing query
+  const qIdx = hrefWithoutHash.indexOf('?');
+  const targetPath = qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(0, qIdx) : hrefWithoutHash;
+  const targetParams = new URLSearchParams(qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(qIdx + 1) : '');
+
+  // Collect params to preserve (that aren't already in the target)
+  const merged = new URLSearchParams(targetParams);
+  for (const [key, value] of currentParams) {
+    // Only preserve if: (a) not already in target, and (b) included in preserve list
+    if (!targetParams.has(key)) {
+      if (preserve === true || preserve.includes(key)) {
+        merged.append(key, value);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  const qs = merged.toString();
+  const pathWithQuery = qs ? `${targetPath}?${qs}` : targetPath;
+  return pathWithQuery + hash;
+}

package/src/shared/param-value.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/**
+ * The canonical form of a segment param value.
+ *
+ * `getSegmentParams()` on the server and `useSegmentParams()` on the client
+ * must return the same value — same prototype, same own properties. This
+ * module is how that is guaranteed, and the mechanism matters:
+ *
+ * **Both sides are images of one normalizer.** A codec's output is deep-cloned
+ * into a closed canonical domain at coercion time, and *that clone* is what the
+ * server returns and what goes on the wire. Server and client agree by
+ * construction, because neither holds the codec's original.
+ *
+ * That replaces predicting what React Flight would do to an arbitrary value.
+ * Prediction is what the previous design attempted and it cannot be finished:
+ * the question "will Flight's decode output be observably identical to this
+ * input?" ranges over every way a JS object can carry state that is not in its
+ * serialization — own keys, enumerability, symbols, holes, accessors,
+ * subclassing, exotic objects — and a `Proxy` defeats it outright, since a
+ * lying `getPrototypeOf` trap makes any static check unsound. Twelve review
+ * findings on PR #992 were each one more case of that set, and the set does
+ * not close.
+ *
+ * Normalizing closes it. The only remaining question is whether Flight
+ * round-trips the normalizer's *output range* — a finite domain we defined,
+ * covered by `tests/e2e/segment-params.test.ts` against the real serializer.
+ *
+ * ## The domain
+ *
+ * - `undefined`, `null`, `string`, `number`, `boolean`, `bigint`
+ * - null-prototype objects, own enumerable string keys only
+ * - dense arrays
+ * - `Date`, `Map`, `Set` — rebuilt, never the codec's instance
+ *
+ * ...and it is a **tree**: no value appears twice, and nothing is cyclic.
+ * That is not a simplification, it is the last prediction being removed.
+ * Flight encodes a `Date` by value at each occurrence but tracks plain objects
+ * for reference dedup, so preserving aliasing would carry it across for some
+ * types and drop it for others — and knowing which is exactly the kind of
+ * guess this design exists to stop making (codex, PR #992). A tree has no
+ * sharing to preserve or lose, so what Flight does about it is unobservable.
+ *
+ * Anything else throws, naming the param and what it was. Note what is *not*
+ * a rejection: a `Date` subclass normalizes to a `Date`, a decorated array to
+ * a plain one, a sparse array to a dense one, a getter to the value it
+ * returned. Those used to be twelve separate checks. They are not divergences
+ * any more, because the normalization happens once and both sides see its
+ * result — so they need no checks at all.
+ *
+ * Own properties that Flight would drop (non-enumerable, symbol-keyed) are
+ * dropped here instead, symmetrically. Prototype pollution is handled by the
+ * same pass: `__proto__` is never copied, and every object is
+ * `Object.create(null)` (design/13-security.md #36b/#36c, TIM-873).
+ *
+ * ## The prototype flip
+ *
+ * Flight refuses to serialize a null-prototype object, so the canonical form
+ * cannot go on the wire as-is. `toPlainRecord` and `toNullProtoRecord` flip
+ * the prototype on the way out and back. They are exact inverses and both
+ * total, because they only ever see canonical values — there is nothing to
+ * validate and no shape to special-case.
+ *
+ * See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".
+ */
+
+/** Types the canonical form rebuilds rather than rejects. */
+const REBUILT = ['Date', 'Map', 'Set'] as const;
+
+/** The domain, for error messages. Derived, never a second hand-written list. */
+const DOMAIN = `a string, number, boolean, bigint, null, undefined, a plain object, an array, or ${REBUILT.join('/')}`;
+
+function reject(path: string, was: string, hint: string): never {
+  throw new Error(
+    `[timber] Segment param "${path || '(root)'}" was coerced to ${was}, which cannot ` +
+      `cross to the client. A param value may be ${DOMAIN}.\n` +
+      `  ${hint}\n` +
+      `  See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".`
+  );
+}
+
+function describe(value: object): string {
+  return (value as { constructor?: { name?: string } }).constructor?.name ?? 'an object';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Deep-clone a codec's output into the canonical form, or throw.
+ *
+ * `seen` accumulates every object the walk has entered, and a second encounter
+ * is rejected. That is one rule for two things — a shared reference and a cycle
+ * are both "this object again" — and it is what keeps the result a tree.
+ */
+export function normalizeParamValue(value: unknown, path = ''): unknown {
+  return normalize(value, path, new Set());
+}
+
+function normalize(value: unknown, path: string, seen: Set<object>): unknown {
+  if (value === null) return null;
+
+  const kind = typeof value;
+  if (kind === 'string' || kind === 'number' || kind === 'boolean' || kind === 'bigint') {
+    return value;
+  }
+  if (kind === 'undefined') return undefined;
+  if (kind === 'function') {
+    reject(path, 'a function', 'Return the data it would produce, not the function.');
+  }
+  if (kind === 'symbol') {
+    reject(path, 'a symbol', 'Return a string instead — a symbol has no wire representation.');
+  }
+
+  const object = value as object;
+  if (seen.has(object)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `[timber] Segment param "${path || '(root)'}" is a value that already appears ` +
+        `elsewhere in the same param — a shared reference or a cycle. A param value is a ` +
+        `tree: React Flight carries a repeated \`Date\` by value and a repeated object by ` +
+        `reference, so sharing would survive for some types and not others.\n` +
+        `  Return separate values, or move the shared part outside the params.\n` +
+        `  See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".`
+    );
+  }
+  seen.add(object);
+
+  if (Array.isArray(object)) {
+    // Read by index, so holes become `undefined` — on both sides, which is
+    // the point. A subclass and any own properties are left behind for the
+    // same reason: the clone is a plain, dense array either way.
+    const out: unknown[] = [];
+    for (let index = 0; index < object.length; index++) {
+      out.push(normalize((object as unknown[])[index], `${path}[${index}]`, seen));
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Date) {
+    // A fresh Date, so a subclass or an attached property cannot travel half
+    // way and be dropped by the wire.
+    return new Date(object.getTime());
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Map) {
+    const out = new Map<unknown, unknown>();
+    for (const [key, entry] of object) {
+      out.set(
+        normalize(key, `${path}<key>`, seen),
+        normalize(entry, `${path}.get(${keyLabel(key)})`, seen)
+      );
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Set) {
+    const out = new Set<unknown>();
+    let index = 0;
+    for (const entry of object) out.add(normalize(entry, `${path}[${index++}]`, seen));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  // Everything else is judged by its prototype. A `Proxy` can lie here, and
+  // that is fine: whatever it answers, the clone below reads through it once
+  // and both sides see the same snapshot.
+  const prototype = Object.getPrototypeOf(object);
+  if (prototype !== null && prototype !== Object.prototype) {
+    reject(
+      path,
+      `a ${describe(object)} instance`,
+      'Return a plain object with the fields you need.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Own *enumerable string* keys only — the rest is what Flight would drop,
+  // so dropping it here keeps the two sides identical. `__proto__` is skipped
+  // rather than copied: it has a language-level setter that would change the
+  // prototype chain of the copy (TIM-655, TIM-855, TIM-873).
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = Object.create(null);
+  for (const key of Object.keys(object)) {
+    if (key === '__proto__') continue;
+    out[key] = normalize(
+      (object as Record<string, unknown>)[key],
+      path ? `${path}.${key}` : key,
+      seen
+    );
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function keyLabel(key: unknown): string {
+  return typeof key === 'string' ? JSON.stringify(key) : String(key);
+}
+
+// ─── Prototype flip ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Canonical form → wire form. React Flight rejects a null prototype
+ * ("Classes or null prototypes are not supported"), so objects cross as plain
+ * ones and are restored on arrival.
+ */
+export function toPlainRecord<T>(value: T): T {
+  return reproto(value, {}) as T;
+}
+
+/** Wire form → canonical form. The exact inverse of `toPlainRecord`. */
+export function toNullProtoRecord<T>(value: T): T {
+  return reproto(value, null) as T;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Rebuild a canonical value with objects on `proto`.
+ *
+ * Total by construction: its input is always canonical, so the cases are the
+ * domain and nothing else. No validation, no shape it might not have seen, and
+ * no cycle to guard — a canonical value is a tree. That is what moving the
+ * checking to `normalizeParamValue` bought.
+ */
+function reproto(value: unknown, proto: object | null): unknown {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
+
+  const object = value as object;
+
+  // A Date carries no nested values, so it crosses as itself.
+  if (object instanceof Date) return object;
+
+  if (Array.isArray(object)) {
+    return (object as unknown[]).map((item) => reproto(item, proto));
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Map) {
+    const out = new Map<unknown, unknown>();
+    for (const [key, entry] of object) out.set(reproto(key, proto), reproto(entry, proto));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Set) {
+    const out = new Set<unknown>();
+    for (const entry of object) out.add(reproto(entry, proto));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = proto === null ? Object.create(null) : {};
+  for (const key of Object.keys(object)) {
+    if (key === '__proto__') continue;
+    out[key] = reproto((object as Record<string, unknown>)[key], proto);
+  }
+  return out;
+}

package/src/shared/payload-root.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * The shape of an RSC payload's root row.
+ *
+ * Every tree the server sends the browser is serialized as
+ * `{ tree, params, slotParams }` — the route's element tree, plus the coerced
+ * params it rendered with, as *siblings* rather than as a wrapper around the
+ * tree. See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".
+ *
+ * Two reasons it is a sibling field rather than a provider inside the payload
+ * (TIM-1297, which is TIM-1294's mechanism corrected):
+ *
+ * 1. **A provider inside the payload cannot serve a partial navigation.** The
+ *    client keeps the previous tree and splices the new payload in at the
+ *    first updated `SegmentOutlet`, so the payload's own provider lands
+ *    *below* the retained region — and the retained region's root is the
+ *    *departing* route's provider, which therefore wins for every reader in a
+ *    skipped layout. Wrapping something above it does not help: context
+ *    resolves to the nearest provider, and the departing one is nearer.
+ *    Params belong to the *navigation*, so the provider has to be owned by the
+ *    client, above the merge point, and there must be exactly one.
+ *
+ * 2. **Element props are not readable at the instant the root resolves.**
+ *    Flight outlines a React element's props and fills the record in after the
+ *    root row resolves, so a reader that unblocks on the root sees `{}` — and
+ *    since the object is filled *in place*, its identity never changes and any
+ *    memo keyed on it caches the empty snapshot permanently. A plain model
+ *    field has no such window: the root chunk stays blocked until everything
+ *    it references has resolved.
+ *
+ * This module is the single declaration of that shape. The server builds roots
+ * through `server/publish-params.ts` and the client reads them through the
+ * helpers here — producer and consumer do not each describe the payload.
+ */
+
+import type { SlotParamsRecord } from './slot-params.js';
+
+/** The params published beside a tree. */
+export interface PublishedParams {
+  /** The main route's coerced params. */
+  params: Record<string, string | string[]>;
+  /** Per-slot params, or null when the route rendered no slots with params. */
+  slotParams: SlotParamsRecord | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Params ready to publish: settled, or a promise the root provider suspends on.
+ *
+ * Both forms exist on purpose. The hydration path cannot await — `hydrateRoot`
+ * has to be called before the inline Flight stream has necessarily produced
+ * the root row — so it hands over the promise and suspends exactly where React
+ * was already going to suspend on the tree. Every other path settles it inside
+ * the navigation transition first, which is what keeps a decode failure inside
+ * the app's own error boundaries instead of above them (TIM-1297).
+ */
+export type ParamsSource = PublishedParams | Promise<PublishedParams>;
+
+/** The root row of an RSC payload. */
+export interface RscPayloadRoot extends PublishedParams {
+  /** The route's element tree. */
+  tree: unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * What a reader gets when the value it was handed is not a payload root.
+ *
+ * In the browser this is unreachable for a real response: all four producers
+ * of a route payload go through `withPublishedParams`, and a client talking to
+ * a different build is answered with 204 at Stage 1c
+ * (`server/pipeline-phases.ts`) before any payload exists. It is reachable in
+ * the router's test/fallback path, where `decodeRsc` is absent and the
+ * "payload" is the raw response text.
+ */
+export const NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS: PublishedParams = { params: {}, slotParams: null };
+
+/** True when `value` carries published params — a root, or a read of one. */
+function hasPublishedParams(value: unknown): value is PublishedParams {
+  return (
+    typeof value === 'object' &&
+    value !== null &&
+    'params' in value &&
+    typeof (value as PublishedParams).params === 'object' &&
+    (value as PublishedParams).params !== null
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the params published beside a tree.
+ *
+ * Accepts a payload root *or* a `PublishedParams` already split off one, so
+ * the client can pre-resolve on the navigation path and still hand the same
+ * value to the same provider. Never throws.
+ */
+export function readPublishedParams(source: unknown): PublishedParams {
+  if (!hasPublishedParams(source)) return NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS;
+  return { params: source.params, slotParams: source.slotParams ?? null };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the renderable tree out of a payload root.
+ *
+ * Returns the value unchanged when it is not a root — the router's fallback
+ * path stores raw response text under the same name, and a test asserting on
+ * that text should see the text.
+ */
+export function readPayloadTree(root: unknown): unknown {
+  if (typeof root === 'object' && root !== null && 'tree' in root && hasPublishedParams(root)) {
+    return (root as RscPayloadRoot).tree;
+  }
+  return root;
+}
+
+/** A decoded payload, split into the two things the client does with it. */
+export interface SplitPayload {
+  /** The renderable tree — an element, or a thenable React suspends on. */
+  tree: unknown;
+  /**
+   * The params published beside it. Settled when the root already is, so the
+   * hydration path can render without an extra await.
+   *
+   * **Never rejects.** A decode failure has to surface where React renders
+   * `tree`, so the error boundary *around the tree* catches it. Rejecting here
+   * too would take down the provider above every boundary in the app, turning
+   * a contained failure into a blank page (TIM-1297).
+   */
+  params: ParamsSource;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Split a decoded payload root into its tree and its params.
+ *
+ * Accepts a settled root or a thenable of one, and preserves which it was: a
+ * settled root splits synchronously, so no code path gains a suspend point it
+ * did not already have.
+ */
+export function splitPayloadRoot(root: unknown): SplitPayload {
+  if (
+    typeof root !== 'object' ||
+    root === null ||
+    typeof (root as PromiseLike<unknown>).then !== 'function'
+  ) {
+    return { tree: readPayloadTree(root), params: readPublishedParams(root) };
+  }
+  const settled = root as PromiseLike<unknown>;
+  const tree = Promise.resolve(settled).then(readPayloadTree);
+  // The rejection still reaches React through its own read of `tree`; this
+  // only marks it handled for the case where nothing renders it (a partial
+  // navigation whose segment update finds no matching outlet).
+  tree.catch(() => {});
+  const params = Promise.resolve(settled).then(readPublishedParams, () => NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS);
+  return { tree, params };
+}

package/src/shared/redirect-type.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * Next.js redirect type discriminator.
+ *
+ * Provided for API compatibility with libraries that import `RedirectType`
+ * from `next/navigation`. In timber, `redirect()` always uses `replace`
+ * semantics (no history entry for the redirect itself).
+ *
+ * Lives in shared/ (isomorphic) so both the server primitives and the
+ * client-only next/navigation shim export the same definition without the
+ * client shim pulling in server code.
+ */
+export const RedirectType = {
+  push: 'push',
+  replace: 'replace',
+} as const;
+
+export type RedirectTypeValue = (typeof RedirectType)[keyof typeof RedirectType];