@timber-js/app 0.2.0-alpha.185 → 0.2.0-alpha.187

package/src/shared/param-value.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/**
+ * The canonical form of a segment param value.
+ *
+ * `getSegmentParams()` on the server and `useSegmentParams()` on the client
+ * must return the same value — same prototype, same own properties. This
+ * module is how that is guaranteed, and the mechanism matters:
+ *
+ * **Both sides are images of one normalizer.** A codec's output is deep-cloned
+ * into a closed canonical domain at coercion time, and *that clone* is what the
+ * server returns and what goes on the wire. Server and client agree by
+ * construction, because neither holds the codec's original.
+ *
+ * That replaces predicting what React Flight would do to an arbitrary value.
+ * Prediction is what the previous design attempted and it cannot be finished:
+ * the question "will Flight's decode output be observably identical to this
+ * input?" ranges over every way a JS object can carry state that is not in its
+ * serialization — own keys, enumerability, symbols, holes, accessors,
+ * subclassing, exotic objects — and a `Proxy` defeats it outright, since a
+ * lying `getPrototypeOf` trap makes any static check unsound. Twelve review
+ * findings on PR #992 were each one more case of that set, and the set does
+ * not close.
+ *
+ * Normalizing closes it. The only remaining question is whether Flight
+ * round-trips the normalizer's *output range* — a finite domain we defined,
+ * covered by `tests/e2e/segment-params.test.ts` against the real serializer.
+ *
+ * ## The domain
+ *
+ * - `undefined`, `null`, `string`, `number`, `boolean`, `bigint`
+ * - null-prototype objects, own enumerable string keys only
+ * - dense arrays
+ * - `Date`, `Map`, `Set` — rebuilt, never the codec's instance
+ *
+ * ...and it is a **tree**: no value appears twice, and nothing is cyclic.
+ * That is not a simplification, it is the last prediction being removed.
+ * Flight encodes a `Date` by value at each occurrence but tracks plain objects
+ * for reference dedup, so preserving aliasing would carry it across for some
+ * types and drop it for others — and knowing which is exactly the kind of
+ * guess this design exists to stop making (codex, PR #992). A tree has no
+ * sharing to preserve or lose, so what Flight does about it is unobservable.
+ *
+ * Anything else throws, naming the param and what it was. Note what is *not*
+ * a rejection: a `Date` subclass normalizes to a `Date`, a decorated array to
+ * a plain one, a sparse array to a dense one, a getter to the value it
+ * returned. Those used to be twelve separate checks. They are not divergences
+ * any more, because the normalization happens once and both sides see its
+ * result — so they need no checks at all.
+ *
+ * Own properties that Flight would drop (non-enumerable, symbol-keyed) are
+ * dropped here instead, symmetrically. Prototype pollution is handled by the
+ * same pass: `__proto__` is never copied, and every object is
+ * `Object.create(null)` (design/13-security.md #36b/#36c, TIM-873).
+ *
+ * ## The prototype flip
+ *
+ * Flight refuses to serialize a null-prototype object, so the canonical form
+ * cannot go on the wire as-is. `toPlainRecord` and `toNullProtoRecord` flip
+ * the prototype on the way out and back. They are exact inverses and both
+ * total, because they only ever see canonical values — there is nothing to
+ * validate and no shape to special-case.
+ *
+ * See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".
+ */
+
+/** Types the canonical form rebuilds rather than rejects. */
+const REBUILT = ['Date', 'Map', 'Set'] as const;
+
+/** The domain, for error messages. Derived, never a second hand-written list. */
+const DOMAIN = `a string, number, boolean, bigint, null, undefined, a plain object, an array, or ${REBUILT.join('/')}`;
+
+function reject(path: string, was: string, hint: string): never {
+  throw new Error(
+    `[timber] Segment param "${path || '(root)'}" was coerced to ${was}, which cannot ` +
+      `cross to the client. A param value may be ${DOMAIN}.\n` +
+      `  ${hint}\n` +
+      `  See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".`
+  );
+}
+
+function describe(value: object): string {
+  return (value as { constructor?: { name?: string } }).constructor?.name ?? 'an object';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Deep-clone a codec's output into the canonical form, or throw.
+ *
+ * `seen` accumulates every object the walk has entered, and a second encounter
+ * is rejected. That is one rule for two things — a shared reference and a cycle
+ * are both "this object again" — and it is what keeps the result a tree.
+ */
+export function normalizeParamValue(value: unknown, path = ''): unknown {
+  return normalize(value, path, new Set());
+}
+
+function normalize(value: unknown, path: string, seen: Set<object>): unknown {
+  if (value === null) return null;
+
+  const kind = typeof value;
+  if (kind === 'string' || kind === 'number' || kind === 'boolean' || kind === 'bigint') {
+    return value;
+  }
+  if (kind === 'undefined') return undefined;
+  if (kind === 'function') {
+    reject(path, 'a function', 'Return the data it would produce, not the function.');
+  }
+  if (kind === 'symbol') {
+    reject(path, 'a symbol', 'Return a string instead — a symbol has no wire representation.');
+  }
+
+  const object = value as object;
+  if (seen.has(object)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `[timber] Segment param "${path || '(root)'}" is a value that already appears ` +
+        `elsewhere in the same param — a shared reference or a cycle. A param value is a ` +
+        `tree: React Flight carries a repeated \`Date\` by value and a repeated object by ` +
+        `reference, so sharing would survive for some types and not others.\n` +
+        `  Return separate values, or move the shared part outside the params.\n` +
+        `  See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".`
+    );
+  }
+  seen.add(object);
+
+  if (Array.isArray(object)) {
+    // Read by index, so holes become `undefined` — on both sides, which is
+    // the point. A subclass and any own properties are left behind for the
+    // same reason: the clone is a plain, dense array either way.
+    const out: unknown[] = [];
+    for (let index = 0; index < object.length; index++) {
+      out.push(normalize((object as unknown[])[index], `${path}[${index}]`, seen));
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Date) {
+    // A fresh Date, so a subclass or an attached property cannot travel half
+    // way and be dropped by the wire.
+    return new Date(object.getTime());
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Map) {
+    const out = new Map<unknown, unknown>();
+    for (const [key, entry] of object) {
+      out.set(
+        normalize(key, `${path}<key>`, seen),
+        normalize(entry, `${path}.get(${keyLabel(key)})`, seen)
+      );
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Set) {
+    const out = new Set<unknown>();
+    let index = 0;
+    for (const entry of object) out.add(normalize(entry, `${path}[${index++}]`, seen));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  // Everything else is judged by its prototype. A `Proxy` can lie here, and
+  // that is fine: whatever it answers, the clone below reads through it once
+  // and both sides see the same snapshot.
+  const prototype = Object.getPrototypeOf(object);
+  if (prototype !== null && prototype !== Object.prototype) {
+    reject(
+      path,
+      `a ${describe(object)} instance`,
+      'Return a plain object with the fields you need.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Own *enumerable string* keys only — the rest is what Flight would drop,
+  // so dropping it here keeps the two sides identical. `__proto__` is skipped
+  // rather than copied: it has a language-level setter that would change the
+  // prototype chain of the copy (TIM-655, TIM-855, TIM-873).
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = Object.create(null);
+  for (const key of Object.keys(object)) {
+    if (key === '__proto__') continue;
+    out[key] = normalize(
+      (object as Record<string, unknown>)[key],
+      path ? `${path}.${key}` : key,
+      seen
+    );
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function keyLabel(key: unknown): string {
+  return typeof key === 'string' ? JSON.stringify(key) : String(key);
+}
+
+// ─── Prototype flip ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Canonical form → wire form. React Flight rejects a null prototype
+ * ("Classes or null prototypes are not supported"), so objects cross as plain
+ * ones and are restored on arrival.
+ */
+export function toPlainRecord<T>(value: T): T {
+  return reproto(value, {}) as T;
+}
+
+/** Wire form → canonical form. The exact inverse of `toPlainRecord`. */
+export function toNullProtoRecord<T>(value: T): T {
+  return reproto(value, null) as T;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Rebuild a canonical value with objects on `proto`.
+ *
+ * Total by construction: its input is always canonical, so the cases are the
+ * domain and nothing else. No validation, no shape it might not have seen, and
+ * no cycle to guard — a canonical value is a tree. That is what moving the
+ * checking to `normalizeParamValue` bought.
+ */
+function reproto(value: unknown, proto: object | null): unknown {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
+
+  const object = value as object;
+
+  // A Date carries no nested values, so it crosses as itself.
+  if (object instanceof Date) return object;
+
+  if (Array.isArray(object)) {
+    return (object as unknown[]).map((item) => reproto(item, proto));
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Map) {
+    const out = new Map<unknown, unknown>();
+    for (const [key, entry] of object) out.set(reproto(key, proto), reproto(entry, proto));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  if (object instanceof Set) {
+    const out = new Set<unknown>();
+    for (const entry of object) out.add(reproto(entry, proto));
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = proto === null ? Object.create(null) : {};
+  for (const key of Object.keys(object)) {
+    if (key === '__proto__') continue;
+    out[key] = reproto((object as Record<string, unknown>)[key], proto);
+  }
+  return out;
+}

package/src/shared/payload-root.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * The shape of an RSC payload's root row.
+ *
+ * Every tree the server sends the browser is serialized as
+ * `{ tree, params, slotParams }` — the route's element tree, plus the coerced
+ * params it rendered with, as *siblings* rather than as a wrapper around the
+ * tree. See design/41-global-params.md §"Transport".
+ *
+ * Two reasons it is a sibling field rather than a provider inside the payload
+ * (TIM-1297, which is TIM-1294's mechanism corrected):
+ *
+ * 1. **A provider inside the payload cannot serve a partial navigation.** The
+ *    client keeps the previous tree and splices the new payload in at the
+ *    first updated `SegmentOutlet`, so the payload's own provider lands
+ *    *below* the retained region — and the retained region's root is the
+ *    *departing* route's provider, which therefore wins for every reader in a
+ *    skipped layout. Wrapping something above it does not help: context
+ *    resolves to the nearest provider, and the departing one is nearer.
+ *    Params belong to the *navigation*, so the provider has to be owned by the
+ *    client, above the merge point, and there must be exactly one.
+ *
+ * 2. **Element props are not readable at the instant the root resolves.**
+ *    Flight outlines a React element's props and fills the record in after the
+ *    root row resolves, so a reader that unblocks on the root sees `{}` — and
+ *    since the object is filled *in place*, its identity never changes and any
+ *    memo keyed on it caches the empty snapshot permanently. A plain model
+ *    field has no such window: the root chunk stays blocked until everything
+ *    it references has resolved.
+ *
+ * This module is the single declaration of that shape. The server builds roots
+ * through `server/publish-params.ts` and the client reads them through the
+ * helpers here — producer and consumer do not each describe the payload.
+ */
+
+import type { SlotParamsRecord } from './slot-params.js';
+
+/** The params published beside a tree. */
+export interface PublishedParams {
+  /** The main route's coerced params. */
+  params: Record<string, string | string[]>;
+  /** Per-slot params, or null when the route rendered no slots with params. */
+  slotParams: SlotParamsRecord | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Params ready to publish: settled, or a promise the root provider suspends on.
+ *
+ * Both forms exist on purpose. The hydration path cannot await — `hydrateRoot`
+ * has to be called before the inline Flight stream has necessarily produced
+ * the root row — so it hands over the promise and suspends exactly where React
+ * was already going to suspend on the tree. Every other path settles it inside
+ * the navigation transition first, which is what keeps a decode failure inside
+ * the app's own error boundaries instead of above them (TIM-1297).
+ */
+export type ParamsSource = PublishedParams | Promise<PublishedParams>;
+
+/** The root row of an RSC payload. */
+export interface RscPayloadRoot extends PublishedParams {
+  /** The route's element tree. */
+  tree: unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * What a reader gets when the value it was handed is not a payload root.
+ *
+ * In the browser this is unreachable for a real response: all four producers
+ * of a route payload go through `withPublishedParams`, and a client talking to
+ * a different build is answered with 204 at Stage 1c
+ * (`server/pipeline-phases.ts`) before any payload exists. It is reachable in
+ * the router's test/fallback path, where `decodeRsc` is absent and the
+ * "payload" is the raw response text.
+ */
+export const NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS: PublishedParams = { params: {}, slotParams: null };
+
+/** True when `value` carries published params — a root, or a read of one. */
+function hasPublishedParams(value: unknown): value is PublishedParams {
+  return (
+    typeof value === 'object' &&
+    value !== null &&
+    'params' in value &&
+    typeof (value as PublishedParams).params === 'object' &&
+    (value as PublishedParams).params !== null
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the params published beside a tree.
+ *
+ * Accepts a payload root *or* a `PublishedParams` already split off one, so
+ * the client can pre-resolve on the navigation path and still hand the same
+ * value to the same provider. Never throws.
+ */
+export function readPublishedParams(source: unknown): PublishedParams {
+  if (!hasPublishedParams(source)) return NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS;
+  return { params: source.params, slotParams: source.slotParams ?? null };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the renderable tree out of a payload root.
+ *
+ * Returns the value unchanged when it is not a root — the router's fallback
+ * path stores raw response text under the same name, and a test asserting on
+ * that text should see the text.
+ */
+export function readPayloadTree(root: unknown): unknown {
+  if (typeof root === 'object' && root !== null && 'tree' in root && hasPublishedParams(root)) {
+    return (root as RscPayloadRoot).tree;
+  }
+  return root;
+}
+
+/** A decoded payload, split into the two things the client does with it. */
+export interface SplitPayload {
+  /** The renderable tree — an element, or a thenable React suspends on. */
+  tree: unknown;
+  /**
+   * The params published beside it. Settled when the root already is, so the
+   * hydration path can render without an extra await.
+   *
+   * **Never rejects.** A decode failure has to surface where React renders
+   * `tree`, so the error boundary *around the tree* catches it. Rejecting here
+   * too would take down the provider above every boundary in the app, turning
+   * a contained failure into a blank page (TIM-1297).
+   */
+  params: ParamsSource;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Split a decoded payload root into its tree and its params.
+ *
+ * Accepts a settled root or a thenable of one, and preserves which it was: a
+ * settled root splits synchronously, so no code path gains a suspend point it
+ * did not already have.
+ */
+export function splitPayloadRoot(root: unknown): SplitPayload {
+  if (
+    typeof root !== 'object' ||
+    root === null ||
+    typeof (root as PromiseLike<unknown>).then !== 'function'
+  ) {
+    return { tree: readPayloadTree(root), params: readPublishedParams(root) };
+  }
+  const settled = root as PromiseLike<unknown>;
+  const tree = Promise.resolve(settled).then(readPayloadTree);
+  // The rejection still reaches React through its own read of `tree`; this
+  // only marks it handled for the case where nothing renders it (a partial
+  // navigation whose segment update finds no matching outlet).
+  tree.catch(() => {});
+  const params = Promise.resolve(settled).then(readPublishedParams, () => NO_PUBLISHED_PARAMS);
+  return { tree, params };
+}

package/src/shared/rsc-cache-key.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/**
+ * The `_rsc` payload cache key — derived identically on both sides.
+ *
+ * The client puts this in the payload URL so the document and its Flight
+ * payload occupy different cache keys (TIM-1268). The server recomputes it
+ * from the received headers so a request cannot claim one client's key while
+ * sending another client's headers — see `server/rsc-cache-key-guard.ts`.
+ * Both sides must agree exactly, which is why the derivation lives here and
+ * not in either one.
+ *
+ * Isomorphic: no server or client imports. The browser bundle audit
+ * (`tests/client-bundle-audit.test.ts`) enforces the client half of that.
+ *
+ * See design/19-client-navigation.md §"The `_rsc` cache key".
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Digest length in hex characters. 128 bits: the origin guard compares a
+ * caller-supplied key against a recomputed one, so the relevant bound is a
+ * birthday attack (an attacker who can influence a victim's `X-Timber-URL`
+ * gets to search both sides), not second preimage. 64 bits would fall to
+ * ~2^32 work; 128 puts it at 2^64.
+ */
+const KEY_HEX_LENGTH = 32;
+
+/**
+ * Marks a value as a framework-issued key, and versions the derivation.
+ *
+ * Without it, an application value that happened to be 32 lowercase hex — an
+ * MD5, a token — is indistinguishable from a forged claim: both are "the
+ * right shape, the wrong digest", and no information in the value separates
+ * them. So the exemption cannot key on shape alone.
+ *
+ * The prefix resolves that because it is anchored to the address the
+ * victim's own client uses. A payload lives at `?_rsc=1.<digest>`, so
+ * anything aimed at that cache entry must carry the prefix and therefore
+ * gets validated; anything without it cannot be addressing a payload URL at
+ * all, and is exempt as application data. An attacker cannot both hit the
+ * victim's cache key and dodge the check.
+ *
+ * The version component also gives the derivation a migration path: the
+ * client and the origin must agree byte for byte, so a future change to the
+ * canonical form can be rolled out by bumping this instead of a flag day.
+ */
+const KEY_PREFIX = '1.';
+
+/**
+ * The request headers that vary an RSC payload response, in canonical
+ * casing — this list is also emitted verbatim as the response's `Vary`
+ * tokens (`server/pipeline.ts`), since "what varies the response" is one
+ * question with one answer, not two lists that happen to agree.
+ *
+ * This list is the contract, and it is enforced rather than trusted:
+ * `tests/rsc-cache-key.test.ts` asserts that the header names
+ * `buildRscHeaders()` can emit are exactly this set. A header added to the
+ * request without being added here fails that test, because a varying input
+ * outside the key is precisely the cache-poisoning hazard the key exists to
+ * close.
+ *
+ * **No credentials, session identifiers, or user-supplied content may be
+ * added.** Every value here is hashed into a URL, and URLs are logged by
+ * proxies, CDNs, and origin access logs. `fnv1aHash` is a cache-key hash,
+ * not a KDF — a low-entropy secret would be recoverable by brute force.
+ * Authentication travels on cookies, which never enter the key.
+ */
+export const RSC_KEY_HEADERS = [
+  'Accept',
+  'X-Timber-State-Tree',
+  'X-Timber-URL',
+  'X-Timber-Deployment-Id',
+] as const;
+
+/**
+ * Whether a value could be a key this module produced.
+ *
+ * `_rsc` is not a reserved parameter name — an application may already use
+ * it for its own search state, including for a value that happens to look
+ * like a digest. Anything without the `KEY_PREFIX` is therefore application
+ * data, not a claim on a payload cache key, and the origin guard leaves it
+ * alone rather than penalizing the response.
+ *
+ * Derived from `KEY_PREFIX` and `KEY_HEX_LENGTH` rather than spelled again,
+ * so the shape cannot drift from the digest that has to satisfy it.
+ *
+ * Ignoring a malformed value costs no protection: clients only ever send
+ * well-formed keys, so a URL bearing a malformed one is an address no
+ * legitimate request will ever ask for, and nothing can be poisoned at an
+ * address nobody reads.
+ */
+export function isRscCacheKeyShape(value: string): boolean {
+  if (!value.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) return false;
+  const digest = value.slice(KEY_PREFIX.length);
+  return digest.length === KEY_HEX_LENGTH && /^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(digest);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The query parameter carrying the payload cache key.
+ *
+ * Spelled here rather than at each of the four places that read or write it
+ * — the client that appends it, the origin guard that validates it, and the
+ * strip below — because it is a wire contract between two independent
+ * implementations, exactly like the digest itself.
+ */
+export const RSC_KEY_PARAM = '_rsc';
+
+// ─── Keeping the key out of application state ────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Decode one raw `name` or `value` the way `URLSearchParams` does:
+ * `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, so `+` is a space.
+ *
+ * Malformed percent-escapes throw in `decodeURIComponent`. `URLSearchParams`
+ * leaves those bytes as-is rather than throwing, and so do we — a pair we
+ * cannot decode is by definition not the framework's, so it is kept.
+ */
+function formDecode(raw: string): string {
+  try {
+    return decodeURIComponent(raw.replace(/\+/g, ' '));
+  } catch {
+    return raw;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove framework-issued `_rsc` values from a raw query string.
+ *
+ * Only values matching `isRscCacheKeyShape` are removed. `_rsc` is not a
+ * reserved name (see that function), so `/search?_rsc=foo` is application
+ * state and survives — the same exemption the origin guard applies, derived
+ * from the same predicate so the two cannot disagree about what "ours"
+ * means.
+ *
+ * Operates on the raw string rather than round-tripping through
+ * `URLSearchParams`, so every surviving pair keeps its original bytes.
+ * Re-serializing would rewrite `?b` as `?b=` and `?a=%7E` as `?a=~` on RSC
+ * navigations only, which is the same class of inconsistency this function
+ * exists to remove.
+ *
+ * Matching decodes the name, because `?%5Frsc=<key>` is a `_rsc` parameter
+ * as far as `URLSearchParams` is concerned — the same reasoning as the
+ * guard's fast path.
+ *
+ * @param search - `url.search`, with or without the leading `?`.
+ * @returns The query string including a leading `?`, or `''` if empty.
+ */
+export function stripRscCacheKey(search: string): string {
+  const query = search.startsWith('?') ? search.slice(1) : search;
+  if (query === '') return '';
+  const kept = query.split('&').filter((pair) => {
+    const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+    if (formDecode(eq === -1 ? pair : pair.slice(0, eq)) !== RSC_KEY_PARAM) return true;
+    return !isRscCacheKeyShape(eq === -1 ? '' : formDecode(pair.slice(eq + 1)));
+  });
+  const result = kept.join('&');
+  return result === '' ? '' : `?${result}`;
+}
+
+/** A request's search state as application code should see it. */
+export interface AppVisibleSearch {
+  /** Parsed params, with the framework's cache key removed. */
+  params: URLSearchParams;
+  /** The matching raw query string — `''` or `?…`. */
+  search: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The search state application code sees, for any request URL.
+ *
+ * The `_rsc` key rides on the payload URL of every RSC navigation and on no
+ * other request, so reading search params straight off `req.url` makes the
+ * same page observe different search state depending on whether it was
+ * reached by a full load or a client navigation — and lets the cache key
+ * leak into whatever the page builds from it: a canonical URL, a pagination
+ * link, an analytics payload (TIM-1272).
+ *
+ * Every application-facing derivation of search state goes through here.
+ * `params` and `search` are returned together, from one strip, because they
+ * are two views of one answer and were previously two expressions that had
+ * to agree.
+ *
+ * The raw request URL is deliberately untouched: `server/rsc-cache-key-guard.ts`
+ * still reads the parameter from `req.url` to bind the key to the request.
+ */
+export function appVisibleSearch(url: URL): AppVisibleSearch {
+  const search = stripRscCacheKey(url.search);
+  return { params: new URLSearchParams(search), search };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads a header value by name. Must be case-insensitive — `Headers.get()`
+ * already is, and `recordLookup` below makes a plain record so.
+ */
+export type HeaderLookup = (name: string) => string | null | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Compute the `_rsc` cache key for a request.
+ *
+ * Absent headers are omitted rather than sent as empty, so "header missing"
+ * and "header present but empty" produce different keys.
+ *
+ * Values are length-prefixed rather than delimiter-separated. Any delimiter
+ * can be forged by a value that contains it: with a `\0` separator, an
+ * `accept` of `a\nx-timber-url\0b` serializes identically to an `accept` of
+ * `a` alongside an `x-timber-url` of `b`, which would let one header claim
+ * another's key. HTTP forbids control characters in header values and both
+ * `fetch()` and the server runtime reject them, so this is defense in depth
+ * — but a length prefix is unambiguous for *any* content, which is a
+ * property worth having in a function whose whole job is to be agreed on by
+ * two independent implementations.
+ *
+ * SHA-256, truncated to 128 bits. A fast non-cryptographic hash is the
+ * obvious choice for a cache key and is the wrong one here: the origin
+ * *compares* this value against a recomputed one, which makes it a check.
+ * FNV-1a — used for timber's other cache keys — is a multiply-xor over a
+ * fixed field, so an attacker controlling a few bytes of any input (their
+ * own `X-Timber-URL`, say) can solve for a chosen digest rather than search
+ * for one, and forge a key belonging to somebody else.
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when no digest is available — `crypto.subtle` is absent in
+ * non-secure browsing contexts (plain `http://` on a LAN address). Callers
+ * must treat that as "no key", never as "key matches": the client omits the
+ * parameter and the server refuses to share-cache. That returns those
+ * clients to the pre-TIM-1268 posture, where `Vary` alone separates HTML
+ * from Flight — acceptable, because a non-secure origin has no shared-CDN
+ * caching story to protect in the first place.
+ */
+export async function rscCacheKey(lookup: HeaderLookup): Promise<string | null> {
+  const subtle = globalThis.crypto?.subtle;
+  if (!subtle) return null;
+  let canonical = '';
+  for (const name of RSC_KEY_HEADERS) {
+    const value = lookup(name);
+    if (value == null) continue;
+    // Lowercased in the canonical form so the two implementations cannot
+    // disagree over the casing of the constant they share.
+    canonical += `${name.toLowerCase()}:${value.length}:${value}`;
+  }
+  const digest = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));
+  let hex = '';
+  for (const byte of new Uint8Array(digest, 0, KEY_HEX_LENGTH / 2)) {
+    hex += byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  }
+  return KEY_PREFIX + hex;
+}
+
+/**
+ * An unverifiable stand-in key, for the one case where the digest cannot be
+ * computed: `crypto.subtle` is absent in non-secure browsing contexts.
+ * `crypto.getRandomValues` is not gated that way, so it is available exactly
+ * where the digest is not.
+ *
+ * Carries `KEY_PREFIX` like any other key, so the origin reads it as a claim
+ * it cannot verify — and refuses to share-cache the response — rather than
+ * exempting it as application data. Lives here so the prefix has one home.
+ */
+export function randomRscCacheKey(): string {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(KEY_HEX_LENGTH / 2);
+  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+  return KEY_PREFIX + [...bytes].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+}
+
+/** Build a case-insensitive lookup over a plain header record. */
+export function recordLookup(headers: Record<string, string>): HeaderLookup {
+  const lowered: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {
+    lowered[name.toLowerCase()] = headers[name];
+  }
+  return (name) => lowered[name.toLowerCase()];
+}