@timber-js/app 0.2.0-alpha.16 → 0.2.0-alpha.160

package/dist/_chunks/href-validation-CMc5JRls.js

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+//#region src/shared/merge-search-params.ts
+/**
+* Shared utility for merging preserved search params into a target URL.
+*
+* Used by both <Link> (client) and redirect() (server). Extracted to a shared
+* module to avoid importing client code ('use client') from server modules.
+*/
+/**
+* Merge preserved search params from the current URL into a target href.
+*
+* When `preserve` is `true`, all current search params are merged.
+* When `preserve` is a `string[]`, only the named params are merged.
+*
+* The target href's own search params take precedence — preserved params
+* are only added if the target doesn't already define them.
+*
+* @param targetHref - The resolved target href (may already contain query string)
+* @param currentSearch - The current URL's search string (e.g. "?private=access&page=2")
+* @param preserve - `true` to preserve all, or `string[]` to preserve specific params
+* @returns The target href with preserved search params merged in
+*/
+function mergePreservedSearchParams(targetHref, currentSearch, preserve) {
+	const currentParams = new URLSearchParams(currentSearch);
+	if (currentParams.size === 0) return targetHref;
+	const hashIdx = targetHref.indexOf("#");
+	const hrefWithoutHash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(0, hashIdx) : targetHref;
+	const hash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(hashIdx) : "";
+	const qIdx = hrefWithoutHash.indexOf("?");
+	const targetPath = qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(0, qIdx) : hrefWithoutHash;
+	const targetParams = new URLSearchParams(qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(qIdx + 1) : "");
+	const merged = new URLSearchParams(targetParams);
+	for (const [key, value] of currentParams) if (!targetParams.has(key)) {
+		if (preserve === true || preserve.includes(key)) merged.append(key, value);
+	}
+	const qs = merged.toString();
+	return (qs ? `${targetPath}?${qs}` : targetPath) + hash;
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/shared/href-validation.ts
+/**
+* Shared href/URL validation for all navigation sinks.
+*
+* Used by <Link>, useRouter().push/replace, and redirectExternal().
+* Single source of truth for dangerous-scheme detection — prevents
+* control-character smuggling that bypasses naive regex checks.
+*
+* See design/13-security.md §"Link scheme injection" (test #9)
+* and design/07-routing.md §"<Link> Scheme Validation".
+*/
+/**
+* All C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) that browsers strip during
+* URL preprocessing. Browsers and `new URL()` strip the full C0 range,
+* not just tab/LF/CR — so we must match that behavior to prevent
+* bypass vectors like `\x00javascript:alert(1)`.
+*/
+var CONTROL_CHARS_RE = /[\x00-\x1f]/g;
+var DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+	"javascript:",
+	"data:",
+	"vbscript:"
+]);
+/**
+* Strip C0 control chars and leading whitespace, then extract the scheme.
+* Returns the lowercase scheme (e.g. "javascript:") or null if no scheme.
+*/
+function extractScheme(href) {
+	const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, "").trimStart();
+	const match = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:)/i.exec(cleaned);
+	return match ? match[1].toLowerCase() : null;
+}
+/**
+* Validate an href for navigation sinks (<Link>, useRouter, etc.).
+*
+* Rejects dangerous schemes (javascript:, data:, vbscript:) even when
+* control characters are embedded to bypass naive regex checks.
+* Also rejects protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com).
+*
+* Throws on rejection. Safe hrefs pass through silently.
+*/
+function validateNavigationHref(href) {
+	if (href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, "").trimStart().replaceAll("\\", "/").startsWith("//")) throw new Error(`Navigation received a protocol-relative or backslash-prefixed URL: "${href}". Use an absolute URL with an explicit scheme or a relative path.`);
+	const scheme = extractScheme(href);
+	if (scheme && DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) throw new Error(`Navigation received a dangerous href: "${href}". javascript:, data:, and vbscript: URLs are not allowed.`);
+}
+/**
+* Check if an href is internal (same-origin navigation) or external.
+*
+* Strips control characters before checking so that "java\tscript:" is
+* correctly identified as having a scheme (and thus not internal).
+*/
+function isInternalHref(href) {
+	const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, "").trimStart().replaceAll("\\", "/");
+	if (cleaned.startsWith("//")) return false;
+	if (cleaned.startsWith("/") || cleaned.startsWith("#") || cleaned.startsWith("?")) return true;
+	if (extractScheme(href)) return false;
+	return true;
+}
+/** Pattern matching absolute URLs: any scheme (http:, javascript:, …) or protocol-relative // */
+var ABSOLUTE_URL_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\d+\-.]*:|\/\/)/;
+/**
+* Assert that a redirect target is a relative path — rejects absolute and
+* protocol-relative URLs. Used by both the server `redirect()` primitive and
+* the client next/navigation shim so they enforce identical semantics.
+*
+* Normalizes for validation only: strips C0 controls, trims, then replaces
+* backslashes with forward slashes. Browsers normalize \ → / during URL
+* resolution, so "/\evil.com" becomes "//evil.com" (protocol-relative open
+* redirect). See design/13-security.md tests #8, #8a–#8c.
+*/
+function assertRelativeRedirectPath(path) {
+	const cleaned = path.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, "").trimStart().replaceAll("\\", "/");
+	if (ABSOLUTE_URL_RE.test(cleaned)) throw new Error(`redirect() only accepts relative URLs. Got absolute URL: "${path}". Use redirectExternal(url, allowList) for external redirects.`);
+	if (/[\x00-\x1f]/.test(path)) throw new Error("redirect() received a path containing control characters (U+0000–U+001F). Sanitize user input before passing it to redirect().");
+}
+var SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["http:", "https:"]);
+/**
+* Validate and canonicalize an external redirect URL.
+*
+* Requires http: or https: scheme and checks origin against an allow-list.
+* Returns the parsed canonical URL string (from URL.href) to prevent
+* raw user input from reaching the Location header.
+*
+* @throws On invalid URL, dangerous scheme, or origin not in allow-list.
+*/
+function validateExternalRedirectUrl(url, allowList) {
+	const cleaned = url.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, "").trimStart();
+	if (cleaned.startsWith("//")) throw new Error(`redirectExternal() received a protocol-relative URL: "${url}". Use an absolute URL with http: or https: scheme.`);
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(cleaned);
+	} catch {
+		throw new Error(`redirectExternal() received an invalid URL: "${url}"`);
+	}
+	if (!SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) throw new Error(`redirectExternal() received a non-http(s) URL: "${url}". Only http: and https: schemes are allowed for external redirects.`);
+	if (!allowList.includes(parsed.origin)) throw new Error(`redirectExternal() target "${parsed.origin}" is not in the allow-list. Allowed: [${allowList.join(", ")}]`);
+	return parsed.href;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { mergePreservedSearchParams as a, validateNavigationHref as i, isInternalHref as n, validateExternalRedirectUrl as r, assertRelativeRedirectPath as t };
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=href-validation-CMc5JRls.js.map

package/dist/_chunks/href-validation-CMc5JRls.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"href-validation-CMc5JRls.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/shared/merge-search-params.ts","../../src/shared/href-validation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Shared utility for merging preserved search params into a target URL.\n *\n * Used by both <Link> (client) and redirect() (server). Extracted to a shared\n * module to avoid importing client code ('use client') from server modules.\n */\n\n/**\n * Merge preserved search params from the current URL into a target href.\n *\n * When `preserve` is `true`, all current search params are merged.\n * When `preserve` is a `string[]`, only the named params are merged.\n *\n * The target href's own search params take precedence — preserved params\n * are only added if the target doesn't already define them.\n *\n * @param targetHref - The resolved target href (may already contain query string)\n * @param currentSearch - The current URL's search string (e.g. \"?private=access&page=2\")\n * @param preserve - `true` to preserve all, or `string[]` to preserve specific params\n * @returns The target href with preserved search params merged in\n */\nexport function mergePreservedSearchParams(\n  targetHref: string,\n  currentSearch: string,\n  preserve: true | string[]\n): string {\n  const currentParams = new URLSearchParams(currentSearch);\n  if (currentParams.size === 0) return targetHref;\n\n  // Split hash fragment from target before processing query params.\n  // Hash must come after query string: /path?query=value#hash\n  const hashIdx = targetHref.indexOf('#');\n  const hrefWithoutHash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(0, hashIdx) : targetHref;\n  const hash = hashIdx >= 0 ? targetHref.slice(hashIdx) : '';\n\n  // Split target into path and existing query\n  const qIdx = hrefWithoutHash.indexOf('?');\n  const targetPath = qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(0, qIdx) : hrefWithoutHash;\n  const targetParams = new URLSearchParams(qIdx >= 0 ? hrefWithoutHash.slice(qIdx + 1) : '');\n\n  // Collect params to preserve (that aren't already in the target)\n  const merged = new URLSearchParams(targetParams);\n  for (const [key, value] of currentParams) {\n    // Only preserve if: (a) not already in target, and (b) included in preserve list\n    if (!targetParams.has(key)) {\n      if (preserve === true || preserve.includes(key)) {\n        merged.append(key, value);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const qs = merged.toString();\n  const pathWithQuery = qs ? `${targetPath}?${qs}` : targetPath;\n  return pathWithQuery + hash;\n}\n","/**\n * Shared href/URL validation for all navigation sinks.\n *\n * Used by <Link>, useRouter().push/replace, and redirectExternal().\n * Single source of truth for dangerous-scheme detection — prevents\n * control-character smuggling that bypasses naive regex checks.\n *\n * See design/13-security.md §\"Link scheme injection\" (test #9)\n * and design/07-routing.md §\"<Link> Scheme Validation\".\n */\n\n/**\n * All C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) that browsers strip during\n * URL preprocessing. Browsers and `new URL()` strip the full C0 range,\n * not just tab/LF/CR — so we must match that behavior to prevent\n * bypass vectors like `\\x00javascript:alert(1)`.\n */\n// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: must match all C0 controls to prevent bypass\nconst CONTROL_CHARS_RE = /[\\x00-\\x1f]/g;\n\nconst DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = new Set(['javascript:', 'data:', 'vbscript:']);\n\n/**\n * Strip C0 control chars and leading whitespace, then extract the scheme.\n * Returns the lowercase scheme (e.g. \"javascript:\") or null if no scheme.\n */\nfunction extractScheme(href: string): string | null {\n  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart();\n  const match = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:)/i.exec(cleaned);\n  return match ? match[1].toLowerCase() : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an href for navigation sinks (<Link>, useRouter, etc.).\n *\n * Rejects dangerous schemes (javascript:, data:, vbscript:) even when\n * control characters are embedded to bypass naive regex checks.\n * Also rejects protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com).\n *\n * Throws on rejection. Safe hrefs pass through silently.\n */\nexport function validateNavigationHref(href: string): void {\n  // Normalize for validation: strip C0 controls, trim, then replace backslashes\n  // with forward slashes. Browsers normalize \\ → / during URL resolution, so\n  // \"/\\evil.com\" becomes \"//evil.com\" (protocol-relative open redirect).\n  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart().replaceAll('\\\\', '/');\n\n  // Protocol-relative URLs can redirect to attacker-controlled origins\n  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Navigation received a protocol-relative or backslash-prefixed URL: \"${href}\". ` +\n        'Use an absolute URL with an explicit scheme or a relative path.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  const scheme = extractScheme(href);\n  if (scheme && DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Navigation received a dangerous href: \"${href}\". ` +\n        'javascript:, data:, and vbscript: URLs are not allowed.'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if an href is internal (same-origin navigation) or external.\n *\n * Strips control characters before checking so that \"java\\tscript:\" is\n * correctly identified as having a scheme (and thus not internal).\n */\nexport function isInternalHref(href: string): boolean {\n  const cleaned = href.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart().replaceAll('\\\\', '/');\n\n  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) return false;\n  if (cleaned.startsWith('/') || cleaned.startsWith('#') || cleaned.startsWith('?')) return true;\n\n  const scheme = extractScheme(href);\n  if (scheme) return false;\n\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Pattern matching absolute URLs: any scheme (http:, javascript:, …) or protocol-relative // */\nconst ABSOLUTE_URL_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z\\d+\\-.]*:|\\/\\/)/;\n\n/**\n * Assert that a redirect target is a relative path — rejects absolute and\n * protocol-relative URLs. 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Got absolute URL: \"${path}\". ` +\n        'Use redirectExternal(url, allowList) for external redirects.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: must match C0 controls\n  if (/[\\x00-\\x1f]/.test(path)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `redirect() received a path containing control characters (U+0000–U+001F). ` +\n        'Sanitize user input before passing it to redirect().'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nconst SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);\n\n/**\n * Validate and canonicalize an external redirect URL.\n *\n * Requires http: or https: scheme and checks origin against an allow-list.\n * Returns the parsed canonical URL string (from URL.href) to prevent\n * raw user input from reaching the Location header.\n *\n * @throws On invalid URL, dangerous scheme, or origin not in allow-list.\n */\nexport function validateExternalRedirectUrl(url: string, allowList: string[]): string {\n  // Strip control chars before parsing to prevent scheme smuggling\n  const cleaned = url.replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '').trimStart();\n\n  if (cleaned.startsWith('//')) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `redirectExternal() received a protocol-relative URL: \"${url}\". ` +\n        'Use an absolute URL with http: or https: scheme.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(cleaned);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`redirectExternal() received an invalid URL: \"${url}\"`);\n  }\n\n  if (!SAFE_REDIRECT_SCHEMES.has(parsed.protocol)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `redirectExternal() received a non-http(s) URL: \"${url}\". ` +\n        'Only http: and https: schemes are allowed for external redirects.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!allowList.includes(parsed.origin)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `redirectExternal() target \"${parsed.origin}\" is not in the allow-list. ` +\n        `Allowed: [${allowList.join(', ')}]`\n    );\n  }\n\n  return parsed.href;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqBA,SAAgB,2BACd,YACA,eACA,UACQ;CACR,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,gBAAgB,aAAa;CACvD,IAAI,cAAc,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO;CAIrC,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,GAAG;CACtC,MAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI;CACtE,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI;CAGxD,MAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAQ,GAAG;CACxC,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI;CAChE,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,gBAAgB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;CAGzF,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB,YAAY;CAC/C,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,eAEzB,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,GAAG;MACnB,aAAa,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,GAC5C,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK;CAAA;CAK9B,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS;CAE3B,QADsB,KAAK,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,cAC5B;AACzB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;ACpCA,IAAM,mBAAmB;AAEzB,IAAM,oCAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;CAAC;CAAe;CAAS;AAAW,CAAC;;;;;AAMvE,SAAS,cAAc,MAA6B;CAClD,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;CAC7D,MAAM,QAAQ,yBAAyB,KAAK,OAAO;CACnD,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI;AAC1C;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,uBAAuB,MAAoB;CAOzD,IAHgB,KAAK,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,GAG5E,CAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,GACzB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,uEAAuE,KAAK,mEAE9E;CAGF,MAAM,SAAS,cAAc,IAAI;CACjC,IAAI,UAAU,kBAAkB,IAAI,MAAM,GACxC,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,0CAA0C,KAAK,2DAEjD;AAEJ;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,eAAe,MAAuB;CACpD,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG;CAEnF,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO;CACrC,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO;CAG1F,IADe,cAAc,IACzB,GAAQ,OAAO;CAEnB,OAAO;AACT;;AAGA,IAAM,kBAAkB;;;;;;;;;;;AAYxB,SAAgB,2BAA2B,MAAoB;CAC7D,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG;CAEnF,IAAI,gBAAgB,KAAK,OAAO,GAC9B,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,6DAA6D,KAAK,gEAEpE;CAIF,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI,GACzB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,gIAEF;AAEJ;AAEA,IAAM,wCAAwB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC;;;;;;;;;;AAWzD,SAAgB,4BAA4B,KAAa,WAA6B;CAEpF,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;CAE5D,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,GACzB,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,yDAAyD,IAAI,oDAE/D;CAGF,IAAI;CACJ,IAAI;EACF,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;CAC1B,QAAQ;EACN,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,gDAAgD,IAAI,EAAE;CACxE;CAEA,IAAI,CAAC,sBAAsB,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,GAC5C,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,mDAAmD,IAAI,qEAEzD;CAGF,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,MAAM,GACnC,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,8BAA8B,OAAO,OAAO,wCAC7B,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,EACtC;CAGF,OAAO,OAAO;AAChB"}