@tightknitai/block-kitchen 0.8.4 → 0.8.6

package/README.md

@@ -116,8 +116,11 @@ export function MyBuilderPage() {
 | `showPaletteSearch` | `boolean` | no | Whether the palette renders the quick-search input above the section list. Defaults to `true`. Set `false` for compact palettes (e.g. when you've passed a small custom `palette`) where scanning by eye is faster than typing. |
 | `paletteSearchPlaceholder` | `string` | no | Placeholder text for the palette search input. Defaults to `'Search blocks…'`. Useful for localization. |
 | `allowedSurfaces` | `PreviewSurface[]` | no | Allowlist of preview surfaces (`'message'`, `'modal'`, `'app_home'`). Defaults to `['message']` — surface dropdown is hidden when only one surface is allowed. The first entry is the initial selection. |
-| `showThemeControl` | `boolean` | no | Defaults to `true`. When `false`, the theme is locked to `'light'`. |
-| `defaultPreviewTheme` | `'light' \| 'dark'` | no | Pass the host app's current theme so the preview opens matched to the consuming app's appearance. |
+| `showThemeControl` | `boolean` | no | Defaults to `true`. When `false`, the toolbar's light/dark toggle is hidden and the theme stays at `defaultPreviewTheme`. Ignored when `previewTheme` is set (a controlled theme always hides the toggle). |
+| `defaultPreviewTheme` | `'light' \| 'dark'` | no | Initial (uncontrolled) preview theme. Pass the host app's current theme so the preview opens matched to the consuming app's appearance. Ignored when `previewTheme` is provided. |
+| `previewTheme` | `'light' \| 'dark'` | no | Controlled preview theme. When set, the preview renders in this theme, follows it reactively, and the toolbar's light/dark toggle is hidden so the host app fully owns the theme. Leave unset to keep the preview uncontrolled (seeded from `defaultPreviewTheme`, toggle shown). |
+| `sendButtonLabel` | `string` | no | Label and accessible name for the toolbar's Send button (which opens the send dialog). Defaults to `'Send'`. Use it to signal that a configuration step follows, e.g. `'Send to channel…'`. |
+| `confirmSendLabel` | `string` | no | Label for the send dialog's final confirm button. Defaults to `'Send'` (shows `'Sending…'` while in flight). |
 | `theme` | `BrandTheme \| BrandPreset` | no | Branding tokens applied to the builder chrome (toolbar, palette, popovers, dialogs). Accepts a `Partial<BrandTokens>` map and optional `light`/`dark` overrides. See [Styling](#styling) below. |
 
 ## Customizing the palette
@@ -222,7 +225,7 @@ const brand: BrandTheme = {
 - `tokens` applies in both light and dark contexts.
 - `light` and `dark` override per mode; the dark variant kicks in under a standard `.dark` ancestor class (next-themes default).
 - Color tokens take HSL component strings (`"262 83% 58%"`), matching the underlying CSS variable contract; `radius` takes a CSS length.
-- Scope is the builder chrome only. The embedded Slack preview keeps its native Slack styling regardless of `theme`; use `defaultPreviewTheme` for the preview's light/dark toggle.
+- Scope is the builder chrome only. The embedded Slack preview keeps its native Slack styling regardless of `theme`; use `previewTheme` (controlled) or `defaultPreviewTheme` (uncontrolled) for the preview's light/dark appearance.
 
 The lower-level CSS-variable contract above keeps working; the `theme` prop simply layers on top of it.
 

package/dist/helpers.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* URL-scheme allowlists used as a defense-in-depth layer against\n * DOM-XSS via user-supplied URLs that flow into `<a href>` and `<img src>`\n * in the preview (rendered by `slack-blocks-to-jsx`, which does not\n * filter URI schemes itself) or in the builder's own chrome (e.g. the\n * \"Sign in with Slack\" link in `SendDialog`).\n *\n * `format: \"uri\"` on the validator schema (AJV / ajv-formats) accepts\n * any RFC-3986 URI including `javascript:` and `data:`, so the validator\n * cannot be relied on for this purpose.\n *\n * Mirrors react-markdown 9's `defaultUrlTransform` approach: parse the\n * scheme, allow the safe set, and treat anything without a recognized\n * scheme as a relative URL (preserved as-is).\n */\n\n/**\n * Schemes safe to use as an `<a href>` target.\n * Mirrors react-markdown's `safeProtocol` set (`https?|ircs?|mailto|xmpp`)\n * plus `tel` and `sms` (Slack's documented link types).\n */\nconst SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS = 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Matches react-markdown's\n * approach: look for the first `:`, `?`, `#`, or `/`; if `:` comes\n * first, that prefix is the scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the lowercase scheme if the URL is absolute, or `null` if relative\n */\nfunction getScheme(value: string): string | null {\n  // Strip leading whitespace so `\\tjavascript:` and ` javascript:`\n  // still resolve to the `javascript` scheme; browsers ignore leading\n  // whitespace when following an href, so the sanitizer must too.\n  const trimmed = value.replace(/^\\s+/, '');\n  const colon = trimmed.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon === -1) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const slash = trimmed.indexOf('/');\n  const question = trimmed.indexOf('?');\n  const hash = trimmed.indexOf('#');\n  // If any of `/`, `?`, `#` appears before the `:`, then the `:` is\n  // inside the path/query/fragment, not a scheme delimiter — treat the\n  // URL as relative.\n  if ((slash !== -1 && slash < colon) || (question !== -1 && question < colon) || (hash !== -1 && hash < colon)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return trimmed.slice(0, colon).toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<a href>` target.\n * Accepts:\n *  - absolute URLs whose scheme is in the safe-link allowlist\n *    (`http`, `https`, `ircs?`, `mailto`, `tel`, `sms`, `xmpp`).\n *  - relative URLs (no scheme).\n *  - empty string (caller decides whether to render).\n *\n * Rejects `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `about:`,\n * and any other unrecognized scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as a link\n */\nexport function isSafeHref(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<img src>`.\n * Accepts http(s), relative URLs, empty string, and `data:image/*`\n * URLs whose MIME subtype is in a tight allowlist. 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Used to strip dangerous\n * URI schemes (e.g. `javascript:`) from `url`, `image_url`, and\n * rich-text link `url` fields before a Block Kit payload reaches a\n * renderer or is handed back to the consumer.\n *\n * Allocates a new object whenever a child is rewritten; otherwise\n * returns the input unchanged so unaffected payloads are reference-stable.\n *\n * Defensive against prototype-polluted shapes: copies are made via\n * `Object.assign({}, ...)` over own enumerable keys returned by\n * `Object.keys`, which skips inherited properties.\n */\nconst HREF_KEYS = new Set(['url']);\nconst IMAGE_KEYS = new Set(['image_url']);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize all known URL-bearing string fields inside a\n * Slack Block Kit payload fragment. 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Currently removes the cosmetic `level`\n * field from header blocks (a builder-only extension Slack would\n * reject) and routes every URL/image-url through the allowlist in\n * `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips through the\n * builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to a\n * downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with builder-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => {\n    const safe = sanitizeBlock(block);\n    if (safe.type === 'header' && 'level' in safe) {\n      const { level: _omit, ...rest } = safe;\n      return rest as SupportedBlock;\n    }\n    return safe;\n  });\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. 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Currently removes the cosmetic `level`\n * field from header blocks (a builder-only extension Slack would\n * reject) and routes every URL/image-url through the allowlist in\n * `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips through the\n * builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to a\n * downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with builder-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => {\n    const safe = sanitizeBlock(block);\n    if (safe.type === 'header' && 'level' in safe) {\n      const { level: _omit, ...rest } = safe;\n      return rest as SupportedBlock;\n    }\n    return safe;\n  });\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. Block\n * Kit JSON in practice is well under 100 KB; we cap at 1 MiB of encoded\n * input so a pathologically large URL hash cannot freeze the tab in\n * `atob` + `JSON.parse` before the validator gets a look. Encoded\n * (base64url) is ~33% larger than the binary, so this bounds the decoded\n * JSON at roughly 768 KiB.\n */\nconst MAX_ENCODED_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Encodes a block list to a base64url string suitable for use as a URL\n * search param. The consumer chooses where to put it (search param, hash,\n * localStorage, etc).\n * Returns an empty string for an empty list so the consumer can omit the\n * param entirely.\n * @param blocks - the blocks to encode\n * @returns base64url-encoded JSON, or '' if blocks is empty\n */\nexport function encodeBlocksToString(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): string {\n  if (blocks.length === 0) {\n    return '';\n  }\n  const json = JSON.stringify(blocks);\n  const utf8Bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json);\n  const chars = new Array<string>(utf8Bytes.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < utf8Bytes.length; i++) {\n    chars[i] = String.fromCharCode(utf8Bytes[i]);\n  }\n  return toBase64Url(btoa(chars.join('')));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes a string produced by {@link encodeBlocksToString} back to a\n * block list. Returns null on any decode/parse error.\n * @param encoded - the encoded string\n * @returns decoded blocks, or null if input is empty/invalid\n */\nexport function decodeBlocksFromString(encoded: string | undefined | null): SupportedBlock[] | null {\n  if (!encoded) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  if (encoded.length > MAX_ENCODED_BYTES) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  try {\n    const binary = atob(fromBase64Url(encoded));\n    const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n      bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n    }\n    const json = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(json);\n    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      return null;\n    }\n    return parsed as SupportedBlock[];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a standard base64 string to base64url (URL-safe alphabet, no padding).\n * @param b64 - standard base64-encoded string\n * @returns the base64url-encoded equivalent\n */\nfunction toBase64Url(b64: string): string {\n  return b64.replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a base64url string back to standard base64 with padding restored.\n * @param b64url - base64url-encoded string\n * @returns the standard base64 equivalent\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(b64url: string): string {\n  const b64 = b64url.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padLen = (4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4;\n  return b64 + '='.repeat(padLen);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/helpers.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { u as SupportedBlock } from './palette-Dco-CVMi.cjs';
-export { v as SupportedBlockType } from './palette-Dco-CVMi.cjs';
+import { u as SupportedBlock } from './palette-DToUE_3J.cjs';
+export { v as SupportedBlockType } from './palette-DToUE_3J.cjs';
 import 'react';
 import 'slack-web-api-client';
 

package/dist/helpers.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { u as SupportedBlock } from './palette-Dco-CVMi.js';
-export { v as SupportedBlockType } from './palette-Dco-CVMi.js';
+import { u as SupportedBlock } from './palette-DToUE_3J.js';
+export { v as SupportedBlockType } from './palette-DToUE_3J.js';
 import 'react';
 import 'slack-web-api-client';
 

package/dist/helpers.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Use at render time / payload boundaries so an unsafe URL\n * never reaches the DOM as an `href` attribute.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeHref(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeHref(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeImageSrc}, otherwise an\n * empty string. Use at render time / payload boundaries.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeImageSrc(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeImageSrc(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeHref, sanitizeImageSrc } from './url-safety';\n\n/**\n * Recursively walks an unknown value and rewrites string values at the\n * specified keys via the matching sanitizer. Used to strip dangerous\n * URI schemes (e.g. `javascript:`) from `url`, `image_url`, and\n * rich-text link `url` fields before a Block Kit payload reaches a\n * renderer or is handed back to the consumer.\n *\n * Allocates a new object whenever a child is rewritten; otherwise\n * returns the input unchanged so unaffected payloads are reference-stable.\n *\n * Defensive against prototype-polluted shapes: copies are made via\n * `Object.assign({}, ...)` over own enumerable keys returned by\n * `Object.keys`, which skips inherited properties.\n */\nconst HREF_KEYS = new Set(['url']);\nconst IMAGE_KEYS = new Set(['image_url']);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize all known URL-bearing string fields inside a\n * Slack Block Kit payload fragment. Returns a value with the same\n * structural shape, where any field whose name matches an href or\n * image-src key has been replaced by the safe variant (`''` if the\n * original scheme was unsafe).\n * @param value - any payload fragment (object, array, primitive)\n * @returns the sanitized payload fragment\n */\nfunction sanitizeValue(value: unknown): unknown {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {\n    return value;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    let changed = false;\n    const out = new Array(value.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n      const next = sanitizeValue(value[i]);\n      if (next !== value[i]) {\n        changed = true;\n      }\n      out[i] = next;\n    }\n    return changed ? out : value;\n  }\n  const src = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  let copy: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;\n  for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {\n    const original = src[key];\n    let next: unknown = original;\n    if (typeof original === 'string') {\n      if (HREF_KEYS.has(key)) {\n        next = sanitizeHref(original);\n      } else if (IMAGE_KEYS.has(key)) {\n        next = sanitizeImageSrc(original);\n      }\n    } else if (typeof original === 'object' && original !== null) {\n      next = sanitizeValue(original);\n    }\n    if (next !== original) {\n      if (!copy) {\n        copy = { ...src };\n      }\n      copy[key] = next;\n    }\n  }\n  return copy ?? src;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize a single Block Kit block, scrubbing dangerous URI schemes\n * from `url` and `image_url` fields anywhere in the payload tree.\n * @param block - the block payload to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized block (same reference if nothing changed)\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlock<T extends SupportedBlock>(block: T): T {\n  return sanitizeValue(block) as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize an array of Block Kit blocks. See {@link sanitizeBlock}.\n * @param blocks - the block payloads to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized blocks\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  let changed = false;\n  const out = new Array<SupportedBlock>(blocks.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < blocks.length; i++) {\n    const next = sanitizeBlock(blocks[i]);\n    if (next !== blocks[i]) {\n      changed = true;\n    }\n    out[i] = next;\n  }\n  return changed ? out : blocks;\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeBlock } from './sanitize-blocks';\n\n/**\n * Strip builder-only fields from blocks so they conform to Slack's\n * Block Kit schema, and scrub dangerous URI schemes from any\n * `url`/`image_url` fields. Currently removes the cosmetic `level`\n * field from header blocks (a builder-only extension Slack would\n * reject) and routes every URL/image-url through the allowlist in\n * `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips through the\n * builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to a\n * downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with builder-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => {\n    const safe = sanitizeBlock(block);\n    if (safe.type === 'header' && 'level' in safe) {\n      const { level: _omit, ...rest } = safe;\n      return rest as SupportedBlock;\n    }\n    return safe;\n  });\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. Block\n * Kit JSON in practice is well under 100 KB; we cap at 1 MiB of encoded\n * input so a pathologically large URL hash cannot freeze the tab in\n * `atob` + `JSON.parse` before the validator gets a look. Encoded\n * (base64url) is ~33% larger than the binary, so this bounds the decoded\n * JSON at roughly 768 KiB.\n */\nconst MAX_ENCODED_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Encodes a block list to a base64url string suitable for use as a URL\n * search param. The consumer chooses where to put it (search param, hash,\n * localStorage, etc).\n * Returns an empty string for an empty list so the consumer can omit the\n * param entirely.\n * @param blocks - the blocks to encode\n * @returns base64url-encoded JSON, or '' if blocks is empty\n */\nexport function encodeBlocksToString(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): string {\n  if (blocks.length === 0) {\n    return '';\n  }\n  const json = JSON.stringify(blocks);\n  const utf8Bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json);\n  const chars = new Array<string>(utf8Bytes.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < utf8Bytes.length; i++) {\n    chars[i] = String.fromCharCode(utf8Bytes[i]);\n  }\n  return toBase64Url(btoa(chars.join('')));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes a string produced by {@link encodeBlocksToString} back to a\n * block list. Returns null on any decode/parse error.\n * @param encoded - the encoded string\n * @returns decoded blocks, or null if input is empty/invalid\n */\nexport function decodeBlocksFromString(encoded: string | undefined | null): SupportedBlock[] | null {\n  if (!encoded) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  if (encoded.length > MAX_ENCODED_BYTES) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  try {\n    const binary = atob(fromBase64Url(encoded));\n    const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n      bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n    }\n    const json = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(json);\n    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      return null;\n    }\n    return parsed as SupportedBlock[];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a standard base64 string to base64url (URL-safe alphabet, no padding).\n * @param b64 - standard base64-encoded string\n * @returns the base64url-encoded equivalent\n */\nfunction toBase64Url(b64: string): string {\n  return b64.replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a base64url string back to standard base64 with padding restored.\n * @param b64url - base64url-encoded string\n * @returns the standard base64 equivalent\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(b64url: string): string {\n  const b64 = b64url.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padLen = (4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4;\n  return b64 + '='.repeat(padLen);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -1670,6 +1670,12 @@ function isSafeHref(value) {
   }
   return SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);
 }
+function hasExplicitSafeScheme(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return getScheme(value) !== null && isSafeHref(value);
+}
 function isSafeImageSrc(value) {
   if (value === null || value === void 0) {
     return false;
@@ -2268,6 +2274,18 @@ function IssuesSheet({
     ] })
   ] }) });
 }
+
+// src/lib/parse-blocks-input.ts
+var BLOCKS_INPUT_SHAPE_ERROR = "Expected an array of blocks, or an object with a `blocks` array.";
+function unwrapBlocksInput(parsed) {
+  if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+    return parsed;
+  }
+  if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && Array.isArray(parsed.blocks)) {
+    return parsed.blocks;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 var MAX_JSON_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
 function JsonDrawer({
   open,
@@ -2306,14 +2324,15 @@ function JsonDrawer({
       setValidationErrors([]);
       return;
     }
-    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-      setParseError("Top-level value must be an array of blocks.");
+    const blocks2 = unwrapBlocksInput(parsed);
+    if (!blocks2) {
+      setParseError(BLOCKS_INPUT_SHAPE_ERROR);
       setValidationErrors([]);
       return;
     }
     setParseError(null);
-    onApply(parsed);
-    const result = slackBlockKitValidator.validateBlockKit(parsed, {
+    onApply(blocks2);
+    const result = slackBlockKitValidator.validateBlockKit(blocks2, {
       target: "blocks",
       surface: "message"
     });
@@ -2691,6 +2710,7 @@ function SendDialog({
   loadChannels,
   loadSendAsUserStatus,
   onSend,
+  confirmSendLabel = "Send",
   errorCount,
   onShowIssues
 }) {
@@ -2864,7 +2884,7 @@ function SendDialog({
           type: "button",
           onClick: handleSubmit,
           disabled: status.kind === "sending" || !channelId || blocks.length === 0 || errorCount > 0,
-          children: status.kind === "sending" ? "Sending\u2026" : "Send"
+          children: status.kind === "sending" ? "Sending\u2026" : confirmSendLabel
         }
       )
     ] })
@@ -5402,6 +5422,17 @@ function blockElementToPM(el, resolveEmoji) {
   }
   return null;
 }
+function pushTextWithHardBreaks(out, text, marks) {
+  const segments = text.split("\n");
+  segments.forEach((segment, i) => {
+    if (i > 0) {
+      out.push({ type: "hardBreak" });
+    }
+    if (segment) {
+      out.push({ type: "text", text: segment, marks });
+    }
+  });
+}
 function inlinesToPM(inlines, resolveEmoji) {
   const out = [];
   for (const inline of inlines) {
@@ -5409,8 +5440,7 @@ function inlinesToPM(inlines, resolveEmoji) {
       if (!inline.text) {
         continue;
       }
-      const marks = styleToMarks(inline.style);
-      out.push({ type: "text", text: inline.text, marks });
+      pushTextWithHardBreaks(out, inline.text, styleToMarks(inline.style));
     } else if (inline.type === "emoji") {
       const attrs = resolveEmoji(inline);
       if (!attrs.name) {
@@ -5547,6 +5577,10 @@ function proseMirrorInlinesToRichTextElements(nodes) {
       out.push(emoji);
       continue;
     }
+    if (node.type === "hardBreak") {
+      out.push({ type: "text", text: "\n" });
+      continue;
+    }
     if (node.type !== "text" || !node.text) {
       continue;
     }
@@ -6234,6 +6268,43 @@ function LossyBanner({ reasons }) {
     ] })
   ] });
 }
+var RICH_TEXT_INPUT_RULE_ALLOWLIST = ["bold", "italic", "strike", "code"];
+function buildRichTextExtensions() {
+  return [
+    StarterKit__default.default.configure({
+      heading: false,
+      horizontalRule: false,
+      // StarterKit bundles its own Link extension (enabled by default),
+      // which would register a second, unconfigured `link` mark and a
+      // duplicate autolinker alongside the hardened one we add below.
+      // Disable it so our single, security-configured Link is the only
+      // link extension in the schema.
+      link: false
+    }),
+    EmojiNode,
+    Link__default.default.configure({
+      openOnClick: false,
+      autolink: true,
+      defaultProtocol: "https",
+      // Pin TipTap's link allowlist to the same set as our shared
+      // `isSafeHref` helper. The upstream default also includes
+      // ftp/cid/callto which we don't expect inside Slack content.
+      protocols: ["http", "https", "mailto", "tel", "sms", "xmpp"],
+      // Belt-and-suspenders: even if a downstream contributor widens
+      // `protocols` later, our isSafeHref guard rejects everything
+      // outside the safe-link set. setLink and toggleLink both gate
+      // on this hook before applying the mark.
+      isAllowedUri: (url) => isSafeHref(url),
+      // Only auto-link tokens that carry an explicit, safe scheme. TipTap's
+      // default would link any `host.tld` (e.g. `2.xyz`, `report.zip`,
+      // `logo.png`) because the suffix is a real gTLD, which is wrong for
+      // free-form Slack message text. Deliberate links can still be added
+      // via the link button.
+      shouldAutoLink: hasExplicitSafeScheme,
+      HTMLAttributes: { rel: "noreferrer noopener", target: "_blank" }
+    })
+  ];
+}
 function RichTextWysiwygEditor({ block, onChange }) {
   const lastEmittedRef = React.useRef(null);
   const { byName: customByName } = useCustomEmojis();
@@ -6259,28 +6330,8 @@ function RichTextWysiwygEditor({ block, onChange }) {
     [onChange]
   );
   const editor = react.useEditor({
-    extensions: [
-      StarterKit__default.default.configure({
-        heading: false,
-        horizontalRule: false
-      }),
-      EmojiNode,
-      Link__default.default.configure({
-        openOnClick: false,
-        autolink: true,
-        defaultProtocol: "https",
-        // Pin TipTap's link allowlist to the same set as our shared
-        // `isSafeHref` helper. The upstream default also includes
-        // ftp/cid/callto which we don't expect inside Slack content.
-        protocols: ["http", "https", "mailto", "tel", "sms", "xmpp"],
-        // Belt-and-suspenders: even if a downstream contributor widens
-        // `protocols` later, our isSafeHref guard rejects everything
-        // outside the safe-link set. setLink and toggleLink both gate
-        // on this hook before applying the mark.
-        isAllowedUri: (url) => isSafeHref(url),
-        HTMLAttributes: { rel: "noreferrer noopener", target: "_blank" }
-      })
-    ],
+    extensions: buildRichTextExtensions(),
+    enableInputRules: RICH_TEXT_INPUT_RULE_ALLOWLIST,
     content: richTextToProseMirror(block, resolveEmoji),
     editorProps: {
       attributes: {
@@ -7907,7 +7958,8 @@ function Toolbar2({
   allowedSurfaces,
   showThemeControl = true,
   docsLink,
-  errorCount
+  errorCount,
+  sendButtonLabel = "Send"
 }) {
   const activeTheme = THEME_OPTIONS.find((t) => t.value === previewTheme) ?? THEME_OPTIONS[0];
   const activeSurface = SURFACE_OPTIONS.find((s) => s.value === previewSurface) ?? SURFACE_OPTIONS[0];
@@ -7997,7 +8049,7 @@ function Toolbar2({
           variant: "ghost",
           size: "sm",
           onClick: onOpenIssues,
-          className: "text-destructive hover:text-destructive",
+          className: "border border-red-200! bg-red-50 text-red-700 hover:bg-red-100 hover:text-red-700",
           "aria-label": `${errorCount} ${errorCount === 1 ? "issue" : "issues"}`,
           children: [
             /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsx(lucideReact.AlertTriangle, { className: "h-3.5 w-3.5" }),
@@ -8090,9 +8142,9 @@ function Toolbar2({
           ) : null
         ] }) })
       ] }),
-      /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsxs(Button, { type: "button", size: "sm", onClick: onOpenSend, disabled: !canSend, "aria-label": "Send", children: [
+      /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsxs(Button, { type: "button", size: "sm", onClick: onOpenSend, disabled: !canSend, "aria-label": sendButtonLabel, children: [
         /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsx(lucideReact.Send, { className: "h-3.5 w-3.5" }),
-        /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsx("span", { className: "hidden sm:inline", children: "Send" })
+        /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsx("span", { className: "hidden sm:inline", children: sendButtonLabel })
       ] })
     ] })
   ] });
@@ -8218,6 +8270,9 @@ function BlockKitchen(props) {
     showThemeControl = true,
     docsLink,
     defaultPreviewTheme = "light",
+    previewTheme: controlledPreviewTheme,
+    sendButtonLabel,
+    confirmSendLabel,
     theme
   } = props;
   const paletteSections = React.useMemo(() => {
@@ -8245,7 +8300,9 @@ function BlockKitchen(props) {
   const [issuesOpen, setIssuesOpen] = React.useState(false);
   const [paletteOpen, setPaletteOpen] = React.useState(false);
   const [openBlockId, setOpenBlockId] = React.useState(null);
-  const [previewTheme, setPreviewTheme] = React.useState(defaultPreviewTheme);
+  const [uncontrolledPreviewTheme, setUncontrolledPreviewTheme] = React.useState(defaultPreviewTheme);
+  const isPreviewThemeControlled = controlledPreviewTheme !== void 0;
+  const previewTheme = controlledPreviewTheme ?? uncontrolledPreviewTheme;
   const [previewSurface, setPreviewSurface] = React.useState(allowedSurfaces[0]);
   const [activePaletteVariantId, setActivePaletteVariantId] = React.useState(null);
   const isMobile = useIsMobile();
@@ -8327,12 +8384,13 @@ function BlockKitchen(props) {
               canClear: blocks.length > 0,
               errorCount: validation.total,
               previewTheme,
-              onPreviewThemeChange: setPreviewTheme,
+              onPreviewThemeChange: setUncontrolledPreviewTheme,
               previewSurface,
               onPreviewSurfaceChange: setPreviewSurface,
               allowedSurfaces,
-              showThemeControl,
-              docsLink
+              showThemeControl: isPreviewThemeControlled ? false : showThemeControl,
+              docsLink,
+              sendButtonLabel
             }
           ),
           /* @__PURE__ */ jsxRuntime.jsxs("div", { className: "flex min-h-0 flex-1 items-stretch", children: [
@@ -8408,6 +8466,7 @@ function BlockKitchen(props) {
             loadChannels,
             loadSendAsUserStatus,
             onSend,
+            confirmSendLabel,
             errorCount: validation.total,
             onShowIssues: () => {
               setSendOpen(false);