@tightknitai/block-kitchen 0.10.12 → 0.10.14

package/README.md

@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ Helpers and send-flow primitives also exported:
 
 ```ts
 import {
-  toSlackBlocks,           // scrubs unsafe URLs + retrieval-only fields before sending
+  toSlackBlocks,           // scrubs unsafe URLs + retrieval-only / renderer-only fields before sending
   encodeBlocksToString,    // base64url-encode a blocks array (for URL state)
   decodeBlocksFromString,
   defaultPalette,          // the built-in palette — spread to customize

package/dist/helpers.cjs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 var SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?|ircs?|mailto|tel|sms|xmpp)$/i;
 var SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;
 var SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX = /^data:image\/(?:png|jpeg|jpg|gif|webp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)(?:;[a-z0-9-]+(?:=[^,;]*)?)*,/i;
+var SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;
 function getScheme(value) {
   const trimmed = value.replace(/^\s+/, "");
   const colon = trimmed.indexOf(":");
@@ -53,16 +54,54 @@ function isSafeImageSrc(value) {
   }
   return SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);
 }
+function isSafeEmbedSrc(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (value.length === 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  const scheme = getScheme(value);
+  if (scheme === null) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);
+}
 function sanitizeHref(value) {
   return isSafeHref(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
 }
 function sanitizeImageSrc(value) {
   return isSafeImageSrc(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
 }
+function sanitizeEmbedSrc(value) {
+  return isSafeEmbedSrc(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
+}
 
 // src/lib/sanitize-blocks.ts
-var HREF_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["url"]);
-var IMAGE_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["image_url"]);
+var EMBED_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["video_url"]);
+var URL_KEY = /(^|_)(url|uri|link|href|src)$/;
+var MAYBE_URL_KEY = /url|uri|link|href|src/i;
+var IMAGE_KEY_HINT = /image|thumb|icon|avatar|logo|photo|picture/;
+var PROP_BAG_KEY = /(^|_)props$/;
+function normalizeKey(key) {
+  return key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1_$2").toLowerCase();
+}
+function isRendererPropBag(key) {
+  return PROP_BAG_KEY.test(normalizeKey(key));
+}
+function classifyUrlKey(key) {
+  if (!MAYBE_URL_KEY.test(key)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeKey(key);
+  if (EMBED_KEYS.has(normalized)) {
+    return "embed";
+  }
+  if (!URL_KEY.test(normalized)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return IMAGE_KEY_HINT.test(normalized) ? "image" : "href";
+}
 var RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([
   // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.
   ["image", /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["image_width", "image_height", "image_bytes", "fallback", "is_animated"])],
@@ -90,7 +129,7 @@ function sanitizeValue(value) {
   const dropKeys = typeof src.type === "string" ? RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS.get(src.type) : void 0;
   let copy = null;
   for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {
-    if (dropKeys?.has(key)) {
+    if (dropKeys?.has(key) || isRendererPropBag(key)) {
       copy ??= { ...src };
       delete copy[key];
       continue;
@@ -98,10 +137,13 @@ function sanitizeValue(value) {
     const original = src[key];
     let next = original;
     if (typeof original === "string") {
-      if (HREF_KEYS.has(key)) {
+      const kind = classifyUrlKey(key);
+      if (kind === "href") {
         next = sanitizeHref(original);
-      } else if (IMAGE_KEYS.has(key)) {
+      } else if (kind === "image") {
         next = sanitizeImageSrc(original);
+      } else if (kind === "embed") {
+        next = sanitizeEmbedSrc(original);
       }
     } else if (typeof original === "object" && original !== null) {
       next = sanitizeValue(original);

package/dist/helpers.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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/^(https?|ircs?|mailto|tel|sms|xmpp)$/i;\n\n/**\n * Schemes safe to use as an `<img src>` source. We allow `data:image/*`\n * because Slack itself emits inline images that way for some emoji and\n * file thumbnails; everything else (e.g. `data:text/html`, `data:image/svg+xml`\n * — which can carry script in some contexts) is rejected.\n */\nconst SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;\n// Allow `data:image/<safe-mime>` followed by any sequence of media-type\n// parameters. Each parameter is `;<name>` or `;<name>=<value>` (RFC 2397\n// allows the bare `;base64` token, which has no `=`). The comma\n// terminates the parameter list and starts the payload.\nconst SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX =\n  /^data:image\\/(?:png|jpeg|jpg|gif|webp|avif|x-icon|vnd\\.microsoft\\.icon)(?:;[a-z0-9-]+(?:=[^,;]*)?)*,/i;\n\n/**\n * Splits a URL into its scheme prefix and tail without invoking the\n * `URL` constructor (which throws on relative URLs and varies in how\n * it normalizes whitespace and unicode). Matches react-markdown's\n * approach: look for the first `:`, `?`, `#`, or `/`; if `:` comes\n * first, that prefix is the scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the lowercase scheme if the URL is absolute, or `null` if relative\n */\nfunction getScheme(value: string): string | null {\n  // Strip leading whitespace so `\\tjavascript:` and ` javascript:`\n  // still resolve to the `javascript` scheme; browsers ignore leading\n  // whitespace when following an href, so the sanitizer must too.\n  const trimmed = value.replace(/^\\s+/, '');\n  const colon = trimmed.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon === -1) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const slash = trimmed.indexOf('/');\n  const question = trimmed.indexOf('?');\n  const hash = trimmed.indexOf('#');\n  // If any of `/`, `?`, `#` appears before the `:`, then the `:` is\n  // inside the path/query/fragment, not a scheme delimiter — treat the\n  // URL as relative.\n  if ((slash !== -1 && slash < colon) || (question !== -1 && question < colon) || (hash !== -1 && hash < colon)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return trimmed.slice(0, colon).toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<a href>` target.\n * Accepts:\n *  - absolute URLs whose scheme is in the safe-link allowlist\n *    (`http`, `https`, `ircs?`, `mailto`, `tel`, `sms`, `xmpp`).\n *  - relative URLs (no scheme).\n *  - empty string (caller decides whether to render).\n *\n * Rejects `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `about:`,\n * and any other unrecognized scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as a link\n */\nexport function isSafeHref(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` carries an explicit, safe URL scheme\n * (e.g. `https://example.com`, `mailto:a@b.com`).\n *\n * Used to gate the TipTap link extension's autolinker. TipTap's default\n * `shouldAutoLink` links any token containing a dot whose host isn't a\n * bare IPv4 — so `2.xyz`, `report.zip`, or `logo.png` all become links\n * just because the suffix happens to be a real gTLD. Requiring an\n * explicit scheme means only URLs the user actually typed as links\n * (`https://…`) auto-link; bare host-like text stays plain text, and\n * deliberate links can still be added via the link button or by typing\n * the scheme. Schemes outside the safe-link allowlist are rejected here\n * too, so an unsafe scheme can never be auto-linked.\n * @param value - the candidate URL (the linkifier's matched token text)\n * @returns true when the value has an explicit, allowlisted scheme\n */\nexport function hasExplicitSafeScheme(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return getScheme(value) !== null && isSafeHref(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<img src>`.\n * Accepts http(s), relative URLs, empty string, and `data:image/*`\n * URLs whose MIME subtype is in a tight allowlist. 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Used to strip dangerous\n * URI schemes (e.g. `javascript:`) from `url`, `image_url`, and\n * rich-text link `url` fields before a Block Kit payload reaches a\n * renderer or is handed back to the consumer.\n *\n * Allocates a new object whenever a child is rewritten; otherwise\n * returns the input unchanged so unaffected payloads are reference-stable.\n *\n * Defensive against prototype-polluted shapes: copies are made via\n * `Object.assign({}, ...)` over own enumerable keys returned by\n * `Object.keys`, which skips inherited properties.\n */\nconst HREF_KEYS = new Set(['url']);\nconst IMAGE_KEYS = new Set(['image_url']);\n\n/**\n * Read-only metadata Slack attaches when a message is *retrieved* via the\n * API, but rejects on *send*, keyed by the `type` of the object it appears\n * on. Blocks loaded from an existing message carry these; drop them only\n * from the matching object type — some are common field names (`fallback`)\n * that are valid elsewhere — so a round-tripped payload stays send-valid\n * without over-scrubbing. Add an entry to extend this to other block types.\n */\nconst RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = new Map<string, Set<string>>([\n  // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.\n  ['image', new Set(['image_width', 'image_height', 'image_bytes', 'fallback', 'is_animated'])],\n  // Slack renders the chart server-side and attaches the rendered previews on\n  // retrieval; sending them back is rejected as `unknown property 'preview_images'`.\n  ['data_visualization', new Set(['preview_images'])]\n]);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize all known URL-bearing string fields inside a\n * Slack Block Kit payload fragment. 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Every URL/image-url is routed through\n * the allowlist in `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips\n * through the builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to\n * a downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n *\n * Header `level` is passed through: it is a real Slack field (an integer\n * 1-4, see https://docs.slack.dev/reference/block-kit/blocks/header-block),\n * not a builder-only extension. Earlier versions stripped it here, which\n * silently dropped the heading level from every sent message. Out-of-range\n * values are left intact so they surface as validation errors rather than\n * being quietly discarded.\n *\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with retrieval-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => sanitizeBlock(block));\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. Block\n * Kit JSON in practice is well under 100 KB; we cap at 1 MiB of encoded\n * input so a pathologically large URL hash cannot freeze the tab in\n * `atob` + `JSON.parse` before the validator gets a look. Encoded\n * (base64url) is ~33% larger than the binary, so this bounds the decoded\n * JSON at roughly 768 KiB.\n */\nconst MAX_ENCODED_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Encodes a block list to a base64url string suitable for use as a URL\n * search param. The consumer chooses where to put it (search param, hash,\n * localStorage, etc).\n * Returns an empty string for an empty list so the consumer can omit the\n * param entirely.\n * @param blocks - the blocks to encode\n * @returns base64url-encoded JSON, or '' if blocks is empty\n */\nexport function encodeBlocksToString(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): string {\n  if (blocks.length === 0) {\n    return '';\n  }\n  const json = JSON.stringify(blocks);\n  const utf8Bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json);\n  const chars = new Array<string>(utf8Bytes.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < utf8Bytes.length; i++) {\n    chars[i] = String.fromCharCode(utf8Bytes[i]);\n  }\n  return toBase64Url(btoa(chars.join('')));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes a string produced by {@link encodeBlocksToString} back to a\n * block list. 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We allow `data:image/*`\n * because Slack itself emits inline images that way for some emoji and\n * file thumbnails; everything else (e.g. `data:text/html`, `data:image/svg+xml`\n * — which can carry script in some contexts) is rejected.\n */\nconst SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;\n// Allow `data:image/<safe-mime>` followed by any sequence of media-type\n// parameters. Each parameter is `;<name>` or `;<name>=<value>` (RFC 2397\n// allows the bare `;base64` token, which has no `=`). The comma\n// terminates the parameter list and starts the payload.\nconst SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX =\n  /^data:image\\/(?:png|jpeg|jpg|gif|webp|avif|x-icon|vnd\\.microsoft\\.icon)(?:;[a-z0-9-]+(?:=[^,;]*)?)*,/i;\n\n/**\n * Schemes safe to use as the source of a nested browsing context or an\n * auto-loaded subresource — `<iframe src>` (the video block's\n * `video_url`), `<embed src>`, `<object data>`, `<source src>`.\n *\n * Same schemes as {@link SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS}, but kept separate\n * because the surrounding predicate is the narrowest of the three in\n * this file and the two policies must be free to diverge: a frame\n * source is fetched and rendered with no click, so it admits neither\n * the `data:image/*` payloads an `<img>` may carry, the relative URLs\n * both other predicates pass through, nor the `mailto`/`tel`/`sms`/\n * `xmpp`/`irc` schemes that are harmless in a link the user chooses to\n * follow.\n */\nconst SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;\n\n/**\n * Splits a URL into its scheme prefix and tail without invoking the\n * `URL` constructor (which throws on relative URLs and varies in how\n * it normalizes whitespace and unicode). Matches react-markdown's\n * approach: look for the first `:`, `?`, `#`, or `/`; if `:` comes\n * first, that prefix is the scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the lowercase scheme if the URL is absolute, or `null` if relative\n */\nfunction getScheme(value: string): string | null {\n  // Strip leading whitespace so `\\tjavascript:` and ` javascript:`\n  // still resolve to the `javascript` scheme; browsers ignore leading\n  // whitespace when following an href, so the sanitizer must too.\n  const trimmed = value.replace(/^\\s+/, '');\n  const colon = trimmed.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon === -1) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const slash = trimmed.indexOf('/');\n  const question = trimmed.indexOf('?');\n  const hash = trimmed.indexOf('#');\n  // If any of `/`, `?`, `#` appears before the `:`, then the `:` is\n  // inside the path/query/fragment, not a scheme delimiter — treat the\n  // URL as relative.\n  if ((slash !== -1 && slash < colon) || (question !== -1 && question < colon) || (hash !== -1 && hash < colon)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return trimmed.slice(0, colon).toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<a href>` target.\n * Accepts:\n *  - absolute URLs whose scheme is in the safe-link allowlist\n *    (`http`, `https`, `ircs?`, `mailto`, `tel`, `sms`, `xmpp`).\n *  - relative URLs (no scheme).\n *  - empty string (caller decides whether to render).\n *\n * Rejects `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `about:`,\n * and any other unrecognized scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as a link\n */\nexport function isSafeHref(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` carries an explicit, safe URL scheme\n * (e.g. `https://example.com`, `mailto:a@b.com`).\n *\n * Used to gate the TipTap link extension's autolinker. TipTap's default\n * `shouldAutoLink` links any token containing a dot whose host isn't a\n * bare IPv4 — so `2.xyz`, `report.zip`, or `logo.png` all become links\n * just because the suffix happens to be a real gTLD. Requiring an\n * explicit scheme means only URLs the user actually typed as links\n * (`https://…`) auto-link; bare host-like text stays plain text, and\n * deliberate links can still be added via the link button or by typing\n * the scheme. Schemes outside the safe-link allowlist are rejected here\n * too, so an unsafe scheme can never be auto-linked.\n * @param value - the candidate URL (the linkifier's matched token text)\n * @returns true when the value has an explicit, allowlisted scheme\n */\nexport function hasExplicitSafeScheme(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return getScheme(value) !== null && isSafeHref(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<img src>`.\n * Accepts http(s), relative URLs, empty string, and `data:image/*`\n * URLs whose MIME subtype is in a tight allowlist. Rejects\n * `data:image/svg+xml` (can carry script) and everything else.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as an image\n */\nexport function isSafeImageSrc(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  if (scheme === 'data') {\n    return SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX.test(value);\n  }\n  return SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<iframe src>` or any\n * other attribute that makes the browser load a document/subresource on\n * its own (`<embed src>`, `<object data>`, `<source src>`).\n *\n * Accepts http(s) and the empty string (an empty `src` loads\n * `about:blank` per the HTML spec, so the caller may leave it in place).\n * Everything else is rejected, including two cases the link and image\n * predicates accept:\n *  - `data:` of any media type. `data:text/html,<script>…</script>` in a\n *    frame renders and executes in an opaque origin on every React\n *    version — the variant of this bug that no React runtime guard stops.\n *  - scheme-less (relative) URLs. A relative frame source points at a\n *    page of the embedding app itself, which is a UI-redress vector\n *    rather than a legitimate embed; Slack requires `video_url` to be an\n *    https URL on one of the app's configured unfurl domains.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to load as a frame or subresource\n */\nexport function isSafeEmbedSrc(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeHref}, otherwise an empty\n * string. Use at render time / payload boundaries so an unsafe URL\n * never reaches the DOM as an `href` attribute.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeHref(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeHref(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeImageSrc}, otherwise an\n * empty string. Use at render time / payload boundaries.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeImageSrc(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeImageSrc(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeEmbedSrc}, otherwise an\n * empty string. Use at render time / payload boundaries so an unsafe URL\n * never reaches the DOM as a frame or subresource source.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeEmbedSrc(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeEmbedSrc(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n","/**\n * Recursively walks an unknown value and rewrites every URL-bearing\n * string field via the matching sanitizer. Used to strip dangerous URI\n * schemes (e.g. `javascript:`, `data:text/html`) from `url`,\n * `image_url`, `video_url`, rich-text link `url` and friends before a\n * Block Kit payload reaches a renderer or is handed back to the consumer.\n * Also drops the fields no Slack payload should carry: the read-only\n * metadata Slack attaches on retrieval, and the prop bags the renderer\n * would spread verbatim onto a DOM element (see {@link PROP_BAG_KEY}).\n *\n * Allocates a new object whenever a child is rewritten; otherwise\n * returns the input unchanged so unaffected payloads are reference-stable.\n *\n * Defensive against prototype-polluted shapes: copies are made via\n * `Object.assign({}, ...)` over own enumerable keys returned by\n * `Object.keys`, which skips inherited properties.\n */\n\nimport type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeEmbedSrc, sanitizeHref, sanitizeImageSrc } from './url-safety';\n\n/**\n * Which allowlist applies to a URL-bearing field, by where its value\n * ends up in the DOM: an `<a href>`, an `<img src>`, or a frame /\n * subresource source such as `<iframe src>`.\n */\ntype UrlKind = 'href' | 'image' | 'embed';\n\n/**\n * Fields whose value the renderer puts in a nested browsing context.\n * `slack-blocks-to-jsx` renders the video block's `video_url` into\n * `<iframe src>`, which loads without a click — so these get the\n * http(s)-only allowlist rather than the link one.\n */\nconst EMBED_KEYS = new Set(['video_url']);\n\n/**\n * Key names whose value is a URL. Matched on the last `_`-delimited\n * segment so a field added by Slack later (`title_url`,\n * `provider_icon_url`, `author_link`, …) is covered on arrival.\n *\n * This is deliberately a name *shape* rather than an exact-match list:\n * two rounds of URL-sanitizer hardening each shipped with a\n * hand-maintained key set, and each silently missed a field Slack had\n * added. Over-matching is cheap — a key that looks like a URL but holds\n * something else keeps its value, because a string with no recognized\n * scheme is treated as a relative URL and passed through untouched.\n */\nconst URL_KEY = /(^|_)(url|uri|link|href|src)$/;\n\n/** Cheap pre-filter so the classifier's regexes skip ordinary keys. */\nconst MAYBE_URL_KEY = /url|uri|link|href|src/i;\n\n/**\n * Name fragments that mark a URL field as an image source. Image\n * sources are allowed to carry a `data:image/<safe-mime>` payload —\n * Slack emits those for some emoji and file thumbnails — which the\n * link allowlist rejects.\n */\nconst IMAGE_KEY_HINT = /image|thumb|icon|avatar|logo|photo|picture/;\n\n/**\n * Key names whose value the renderer spreads verbatim onto a DOM\n * element. `slack-blocks-to-jsx` reads `iframeProps` off the video block\n * and spreads it onto the `<iframe>` *after* its own `src`, so a payload\n * can override the frame source, add `srcdoc` (an inline document that\n * executes in the embedding app's origin on every React version), or\n * loosen `sandbox` / `allow`. None of that is a Slack field — Slack\n * rejects an unknown property on send — so the whole bag is dropped, at\n * the preview boundary and in `toSlackBlocks` alike. Matched on the last\n * `_`-delimited segment for the same reason URL keys are (see\n * {@link URL_KEY}): a renderer upgrade that adds `imgProps` or\n * `linkProps` is covered on arrival rather than after the next report.\n */\nconst PROP_BAG_KEY = /(^|_)props$/;\n\n/**\n * Folds camelCase to snake_case and lowercases, so a consumer payload\n * that isn't strict Slack JSON (`videoUrl`, `iframeProps`) classifies\n * the same way as its snake_case form.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns the normalized key\n */\nfunction normalizeKey(key: string): string {\n  return key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, '$1_$2').toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `key` names a prop bag the renderer would spread\n * onto a DOM element, so the key and its value must be dropped. See\n * {@link PROP_BAG_KEY}.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns whether the key is a renderer-only prop bag\n */\nfunction isRendererPropBag(key: string): boolean {\n  return PROP_BAG_KEY.test(normalizeKey(key));\n}\n\n/**\n * Classifies a payload key by the kind of URL it carries, or `null`\n * when the key holds no URL at all.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns which allowlist applies, or `null` to leave the value alone\n */\nfunction classifyUrlKey(key: string): UrlKind | null {\n  if (!MAYBE_URL_KEY.test(key)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const normalized = normalizeKey(key);\n  if (EMBED_KEYS.has(normalized)) {\n    return 'embed';\n  }\n  if (!URL_KEY.test(normalized)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return IMAGE_KEY_HINT.test(normalized) ? 'image' : 'href';\n}\n\n/**\n * Read-only metadata Slack attaches when a message is *retrieved* via the\n * API, but rejects on *send*, keyed by the `type` of the object it appears\n * on. Blocks loaded from an existing message carry these; drop them only\n * from the matching object type — some are common field names (`fallback`)\n * that are valid elsewhere — so a round-tripped payload stays send-valid\n * without over-scrubbing. Add an entry to extend this to other block types.\n */\nconst RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = new Map<string, Set<string>>([\n  // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.\n  ['image', new Set(['image_width', 'image_height', 'image_bytes', 'fallback', 'is_animated'])],\n  // Slack renders the chart server-side and attaches the rendered previews on\n  // retrieval; sending them back is rejected as `unknown property 'preview_images'`.\n  ['data_visualization', new Set(['preview_images'])]\n]);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize every URL-bearing string field inside a Slack\n * Block Kit payload fragment. Returns a value with the same structural\n * shape, where any field whose name reads as a URL has been replaced by\n * the safe variant (`''` if the original scheme was unsafe for the kind\n * of URL that field carries — see {@link classifyUrlKey}), and where the\n * retrieval-only and renderer-only keys have been dropped.\n * @param value - any payload fragment (object, array, primitive)\n * @returns the sanitized payload fragment\n */\nfunction sanitizeValue(value: unknown): unknown {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {\n    return value;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    let changed = false;\n    const out = new Array(value.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n      const next = sanitizeValue(value[i]);\n      if (next !== value[i]) {\n        changed = true;\n      }\n      out[i] = next;\n    }\n    return changed ? out : value;\n  }\n  const src = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const dropKeys = typeof src.type === 'string' ? RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS.get(src.type) : undefined;\n  let copy: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;\n  for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {\n    if (dropKeys?.has(key) || isRendererPropBag(key)) {\n      copy ??= { ...src };\n      delete copy[key];\n      continue;\n    }\n    const original = src[key];\n    let next: unknown = original;\n    if (typeof original === 'string') {\n      const kind = classifyUrlKey(key);\n      if (kind === 'href') {\n        next = sanitizeHref(original);\n      } else if (kind === 'image') {\n        next = sanitizeImageSrc(original);\n      } else if (kind === 'embed') {\n        next = sanitizeEmbedSrc(original);\n      }\n    } else if (typeof original === 'object' && original !== null) {\n      next = sanitizeValue(original);\n    }\n    if (next !== original) {\n      if (!copy) {\n        copy = { ...src };\n      }\n      copy[key] = next;\n    }\n  }\n  return copy ?? src;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize a single Block Kit block, scrubbing dangerous URI schemes\n * from every URL-bearing field anywhere in the payload tree (`url`,\n * `image_url`, `video_url`, `thumbnail_url`, `title_url`, …) and dropping\n * the renderer-only prop bags (`iframeProps`) a payload could use to\n * reach the DOM around that scrub.\n * @param block - the block payload to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized block (same reference if nothing changed)\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlock<T extends SupportedBlock>(block: T): T {\n  return sanitizeValue(block) as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize an array of Block Kit blocks. See {@link sanitizeBlock}.\n * @param blocks - the block payloads to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized blocks\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  let changed = false;\n  const out = new Array<SupportedBlock>(blocks.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < blocks.length; i++) {\n    const next = sanitizeBlock(blocks[i]);\n    if (next !== blocks[i]) {\n      changed = true;\n    }\n    out[i] = next;\n  }\n  return changed ? out : blocks;\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeBlock } from './sanitize-blocks';\n\n/**\n * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from\n * every URL-bearing field, drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches on\n * retrieval but rejects on send, and drop the renderer-only prop bags\n * (`iframeProps`) that `slack-blocks-to-jsx` would spread onto the DOM\n * and Slack rejects as unknown properties. Every URL is routed through\n * the allowlist in `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips\n * through the builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to\n * a downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n *\n * Header `level` is passed through: it is a real Slack field (an integer\n * 1-4, see https://docs.slack.dev/reference/block-kit/blocks/header-block),\n * not a builder-only extension. Earlier versions stripped it here, which\n * silently dropped the heading level from every sent message. Out-of-range\n * values are left intact so they surface as validation errors rather than\n * being quietly discarded.\n *\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with retrieval-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => sanitizeBlock(block));\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. Block\n * Kit JSON in practice is well under 100 KB; we cap at 1 MiB of encoded\n * input so a pathologically large URL hash cannot freeze the tab in\n * `atob` + `JSON.parse` before the validator gets a look. Encoded\n * (base64url) is ~33% larger than the binary, so this bounds the decoded\n * JSON at roughly 768 KiB.\n */\nconst MAX_ENCODED_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Encodes a block list to a base64url string suitable for use as a URL\n * search param. The consumer chooses where to put it (search param, hash,\n * localStorage, etc).\n * Returns an empty string for an empty list so the consumer can omit the\n * param entirely.\n * @param blocks - the blocks to encode\n * @returns base64url-encoded JSON, or '' if blocks is empty\n */\nexport function encodeBlocksToString(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): string {\n  if (blocks.length === 0) {\n    return '';\n  }\n  const json = JSON.stringify(blocks);\n  const utf8Bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json);\n  const chars = new Array<string>(utf8Bytes.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < utf8Bytes.length; i++) {\n    chars[i] = String.fromCharCode(utf8Bytes[i]);\n  }\n  return toBase64Url(btoa(chars.join('')));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes a string produced by {@link encodeBlocksToString} back to a\n * block list. Returns null on any decode/parse error.\n * @param encoded - the encoded string\n * @returns decoded blocks, or null if input is empty/invalid\n */\nexport function decodeBlocksFromString(encoded: string | undefined | null): SupportedBlock[] | null {\n  if (!encoded) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  if (encoded.length > MAX_ENCODED_BYTES) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  try {\n    const binary = atob(fromBase64Url(encoded));\n    const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n      bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n    }\n    const json = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(json);\n    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      return null;\n    }\n    return parsed as SupportedBlock[];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a standard base64 string to base64url (URL-safe alphabet, no padding).\n * @param b64 - standard base64-encoded string\n * @returns the base64url-encoded equivalent\n */\nfunction toBase64Url(b64: string): string {\n  return b64.replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a base64url string back to standard base64 with padding restored.\n * @param b64url - base64url-encoded string\n * @returns the standard base64 equivalent\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(b64url: string): string {\n  const b64 = b64url.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padLen = (4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4;\n  return b64 + '='.repeat(padLen);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/helpers.d.cts

@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ import 'react';
 import 'slack-web-api-client';
 
 /**
- * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from any
- * `url`/`image_url` fields and drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches
- * on retrieval but rejects on send. Every URL/image-url is routed through
+ * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from
+ * every URL-bearing field, drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches on
+ * retrieval but rejects on send, and drop the renderer-only prop bags
+ * (`iframeProps`) that `slack-blocks-to-jsx` would spread onto the DOM
+ * and Slack rejects as unknown properties. Every URL is routed through
  * the allowlist in `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips
  * through the builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to
  * a downstream consumer or to the Slack API.

package/dist/helpers.d.ts

@@ -4,9 +4,11 @@ import 'react';
 import 'slack-web-api-client';
 
 /**
- * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from any
- * `url`/`image_url` fields and drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches
- * on retrieval but rejects on send. Every URL/image-url is routed through
+ * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from
+ * every URL-bearing field, drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches on
+ * retrieval but rejects on send, and drop the renderer-only prop bags
+ * (`iframeProps`) that `slack-blocks-to-jsx` would spread onto the DOM
+ * and Slack rejects as unknown properties. Every URL is routed through
  * the allowlist in `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips
  * through the builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to
  * a downstream consumer or to the Slack API.

package/dist/helpers.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 var SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?|ircs?|mailto|tel|sms|xmpp)$/i;
 var SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;
 var SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX = /^data:image\/(?:png|jpeg|jpg|gif|webp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)(?:;[a-z0-9-]+(?:=[^,;]*)?)*,/i;
+var SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS = /^(https?)$/i;
 function getScheme(value) {
   const trimmed = value.replace(/^\s+/, "");
   const colon = trimmed.indexOf(":");
@@ -51,16 +52,54 @@ function isSafeImageSrc(value) {
   }
   return SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);
 }
+function isSafeEmbedSrc(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (value.length === 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  const scheme = getScheme(value);
+  if (scheme === null) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);
+}
 function sanitizeHref(value) {
   return isSafeHref(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
 }
 function sanitizeImageSrc(value) {
   return isSafeImageSrc(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
 }
+function sanitizeEmbedSrc(value) {
+  return isSafeEmbedSrc(value) ? value ?? "" : "";
+}
 
 // src/lib/sanitize-blocks.ts
-var HREF_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["url"]);
-var IMAGE_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["image_url"]);
+var EMBED_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["video_url"]);
+var URL_KEY = /(^|_)(url|uri|link|href|src)$/;
+var MAYBE_URL_KEY = /url|uri|link|href|src/i;
+var IMAGE_KEY_HINT = /image|thumb|icon|avatar|logo|photo|picture/;
+var PROP_BAG_KEY = /(^|_)props$/;
+function normalizeKey(key) {
+  return key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1_$2").toLowerCase();
+}
+function isRendererPropBag(key) {
+  return PROP_BAG_KEY.test(normalizeKey(key));
+}
+function classifyUrlKey(key) {
+  if (!MAYBE_URL_KEY.test(key)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const normalized = normalizeKey(key);
+  if (EMBED_KEYS.has(normalized)) {
+    return "embed";
+  }
+  if (!URL_KEY.test(normalized)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return IMAGE_KEY_HINT.test(normalized) ? "image" : "href";
+}
 var RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([
   // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.
   ["image", /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["image_width", "image_height", "image_bytes", "fallback", "is_animated"])],
@@ -88,7 +127,7 @@ function sanitizeValue(value) {
   const dropKeys = typeof src.type === "string" ? RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS.get(src.type) : void 0;
   let copy = null;
   for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {
-    if (dropKeys?.has(key)) {
+    if (dropKeys?.has(key) || isRendererPropBag(key)) {
       copy ??= { ...src };
       delete copy[key];
       continue;
@@ -96,10 +135,13 @@ function sanitizeValue(value) {
     const original = src[key];
     let next = original;
     if (typeof original === "string") {
-      if (HREF_KEYS.has(key)) {
+      const kind = classifyUrlKey(key);
+      if (kind === "href") {
         next = sanitizeHref(original);
-      } else if (IMAGE_KEYS.has(key)) {
+      } else if (kind === "image") {
         next = sanitizeImageSrc(original);
+      } else if (kind === "embed") {
+        next = sanitizeEmbedSrc(original);
       }
     } else if (typeof original === "object" && original !== null) {
       next = sanitizeValue(original);

package/dist/helpers.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Matches react-markdown's\n * approach: look for the first `:`, `?`, `#`, or `/`; if `:` comes\n * first, that prefix is the scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the lowercase scheme if the URL is absolute, or `null` if relative\n */\nfunction getScheme(value: string): string | null {\n  // Strip leading whitespace so `\\tjavascript:` and ` javascript:`\n  // still resolve to the `javascript` scheme; browsers ignore leading\n  // whitespace when following an href, so the sanitizer must too.\n  const trimmed = value.replace(/^\\s+/, '');\n  const colon = trimmed.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon === -1) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const slash = trimmed.indexOf('/');\n  const question = trimmed.indexOf('?');\n  const hash = trimmed.indexOf('#');\n  // If any of `/`, `?`, `#` appears before the `:`, then the `:` is\n  // inside the path/query/fragment, not a scheme delimiter — treat the\n  // URL as relative.\n  if ((slash !== -1 && slash < colon) || (question !== -1 && question < colon) || (hash !== -1 && hash < colon)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return trimmed.slice(0, colon).toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<a href>` target.\n * Accepts:\n *  - absolute URLs whose scheme is in the safe-link allowlist\n *    (`http`, `https`, `ircs?`, `mailto`, `tel`, `sms`, `xmpp`).\n *  - relative URLs (no scheme).\n *  - empty string (caller decides whether to render).\n *\n * Rejects `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `about:`,\n * and any other unrecognized scheme.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as a link\n */\nexport function isSafeHref(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return SAFE_LINK_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` carries an explicit, safe URL scheme\n * (e.g. `https://example.com`, `mailto:a@b.com`).\n *\n * Used to gate the TipTap link extension's autolinker. TipTap's default\n * `shouldAutoLink` links any token containing a dot whose host isn't a\n * bare IPv4 — so `2.xyz`, `report.zip`, or `logo.png` all become links\n * just because the suffix happens to be a real gTLD. Requiring an\n * explicit scheme means only URLs the user actually typed as links\n * (`https://…`) auto-link; bare host-like text stays plain text, and\n * deliberate links can still be added via the link button or by typing\n * the scheme. Schemes outside the safe-link allowlist are rejected here\n * too, so an unsafe scheme can never be auto-linked.\n * @param value - the candidate URL (the linkifier's matched token text)\n * @returns true when the value has an explicit, allowlisted scheme\n */\nexport function hasExplicitSafeScheme(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return getScheme(value) !== null && isSafeHref(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<img src>`.\n * Accepts http(s), relative URLs, empty string, and `data:image/*`\n * URLs whose MIME subtype is in a tight allowlist. 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Blocks loaded from an existing message carry these; drop them only\n * from the matching object type — some are common field names (`fallback`)\n * that are valid elsewhere — so a round-tripped payload stays send-valid\n * without over-scrubbing. Add an entry to extend this to other block types.\n */\nconst RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = new Map<string, Set<string>>([\n  // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.\n  ['image', new Set(['image_width', 'image_height', 'image_bytes', 'fallback', 'is_animated'])],\n  // Slack renders the chart server-side and attaches the rendered previews on\n  // retrieval; sending them back is rejected as `unknown property 'preview_images'`.\n  ['data_visualization', new Set(['preview_images'])]\n]);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize all known URL-bearing string fields inside a\n * Slack Block Kit payload fragment. 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Schemes outside the safe-link allowlist are rejected here\n * too, so an unsafe scheme can never be auto-linked.\n * @param value - the candidate URL (the linkifier's matched token text)\n * @returns true when the value has an explicit, allowlisted scheme\n */\nexport function hasExplicitSafeScheme(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return getScheme(value) !== null && isSafeHref(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<img src>`.\n * Accepts http(s), relative URLs, empty string, and `data:image/*`\n * URLs whose MIME subtype is in a tight allowlist. Rejects\n * `data:image/svg+xml` (can carry script) and everything else.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to render as an image\n */\nexport function isSafeImageSrc(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  if (scheme === 'data') {\n    return SAFE_IMAGE_DATA_PREFIX.test(value);\n  }\n  return SAFE_IMAGE_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `value` is safe to use as an `<iframe src>` or any\n * other attribute that makes the browser load a document/subresource on\n * its own (`<embed src>`, `<object data>`, `<source src>`).\n *\n * Accepts http(s) and the empty string (an empty `src` loads\n * `about:blank` per the HTML spec, so the caller may leave it in place).\n * Everything else is rejected, including two cases the link and image\n * predicates accept:\n *  - `data:` of any media type. `data:text/html,<script>…</script>` in a\n *    frame renders and executes in an opaque origin on every React\n *    version — the variant of this bug that no React runtime guard stops.\n *  - scheme-less (relative) URLs. A relative frame source points at a\n *    page of the embedding app itself, which is a UI-redress vector\n *    rather than a legitimate embed; Slack requires `video_url` to be an\n *    https URL on one of the app's configured unfurl domains.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns true when the URL is safe to load as a frame or subresource\n */\nexport function isSafeEmbedSrc(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (value.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  const scheme = getScheme(value);\n  if (scheme === null) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return SAFE_EMBED_PROTOCOLS.test(scheme);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeHref}, otherwise an empty\n * string. Use at render time / payload boundaries so an unsafe URL\n * never reaches the DOM as an `href` attribute.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeHref(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeHref(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeImageSrc}, otherwise an\n * empty string. Use at render time / payload boundaries.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeImageSrc(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeImageSrc(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns `value` if it passes {@link isSafeEmbedSrc}, otherwise an\n * empty string. Use at render time / payload boundaries so an unsafe URL\n * never reaches the DOM as a frame or subresource source.\n * @param value - the candidate URL\n * @returns the URL if safe, or `''`\n */\nexport function sanitizeEmbedSrc(value: string | null | undefined): string {\n  return isSafeEmbedSrc(value) ? (value ?? '') : '';\n}\n","/**\n * Recursively walks an unknown value and rewrites every URL-bearing\n * string field via the matching sanitizer. Used to strip dangerous URI\n * schemes (e.g. `javascript:`, `data:text/html`) from `url`,\n * `image_url`, `video_url`, rich-text link `url` and friends before a\n * Block Kit payload reaches a renderer or is handed back to the consumer.\n * Also drops the fields no Slack payload should carry: the read-only\n * metadata Slack attaches on retrieval, and the prop bags the renderer\n * would spread verbatim onto a DOM element (see {@link PROP_BAG_KEY}).\n *\n * Allocates a new object whenever a child is rewritten; otherwise\n * returns the input unchanged so unaffected payloads are reference-stable.\n *\n * Defensive against prototype-polluted shapes: copies are made via\n * `Object.assign({}, ...)` over own enumerable keys returned by\n * `Object.keys`, which skips inherited properties.\n */\n\nimport type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeEmbedSrc, sanitizeHref, sanitizeImageSrc } from './url-safety';\n\n/**\n * Which allowlist applies to a URL-bearing field, by where its value\n * ends up in the DOM: an `<a href>`, an `<img src>`, or a frame /\n * subresource source such as `<iframe src>`.\n */\ntype UrlKind = 'href' | 'image' | 'embed';\n\n/**\n * Fields whose value the renderer puts in a nested browsing context.\n * `slack-blocks-to-jsx` renders the video block's `video_url` into\n * `<iframe src>`, which loads without a click — so these get the\n * http(s)-only allowlist rather than the link one.\n */\nconst EMBED_KEYS = new Set(['video_url']);\n\n/**\n * Key names whose value is a URL. Matched on the last `_`-delimited\n * segment so a field added by Slack later (`title_url`,\n * `provider_icon_url`, `author_link`, …) is covered on arrival.\n *\n * This is deliberately a name *shape* rather than an exact-match list:\n * two rounds of URL-sanitizer hardening each shipped with a\n * hand-maintained key set, and each silently missed a field Slack had\n * added. Over-matching is cheap — a key that looks like a URL but holds\n * something else keeps its value, because a string with no recognized\n * scheme is treated as a relative URL and passed through untouched.\n */\nconst URL_KEY = /(^|_)(url|uri|link|href|src)$/;\n\n/** Cheap pre-filter so the classifier's regexes skip ordinary keys. */\nconst MAYBE_URL_KEY = /url|uri|link|href|src/i;\n\n/**\n * Name fragments that mark a URL field as an image source. Image\n * sources are allowed to carry a `data:image/<safe-mime>` payload —\n * Slack emits those for some emoji and file thumbnails — which the\n * link allowlist rejects.\n */\nconst IMAGE_KEY_HINT = /image|thumb|icon|avatar|logo|photo|picture/;\n\n/**\n * Key names whose value the renderer spreads verbatim onto a DOM\n * element. `slack-blocks-to-jsx` reads `iframeProps` off the video block\n * and spreads it onto the `<iframe>` *after* its own `src`, so a payload\n * can override the frame source, add `srcdoc` (an inline document that\n * executes in the embedding app's origin on every React version), or\n * loosen `sandbox` / `allow`. None of that is a Slack field — Slack\n * rejects an unknown property on send — so the whole bag is dropped, at\n * the preview boundary and in `toSlackBlocks` alike. Matched on the last\n * `_`-delimited segment for the same reason URL keys are (see\n * {@link URL_KEY}): a renderer upgrade that adds `imgProps` or\n * `linkProps` is covered on arrival rather than after the next report.\n */\nconst PROP_BAG_KEY = /(^|_)props$/;\n\n/**\n * Folds camelCase to snake_case and lowercases, so a consumer payload\n * that isn't strict Slack JSON (`videoUrl`, `iframeProps`) classifies\n * the same way as its snake_case form.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns the normalized key\n */\nfunction normalizeKey(key: string): string {\n  return key.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, '$1_$2').toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `key` names a prop bag the renderer would spread\n * onto a DOM element, so the key and its value must be dropped. See\n * {@link PROP_BAG_KEY}.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns whether the key is a renderer-only prop bag\n */\nfunction isRendererPropBag(key: string): boolean {\n  return PROP_BAG_KEY.test(normalizeKey(key));\n}\n\n/**\n * Classifies a payload key by the kind of URL it carries, or `null`\n * when the key holds no URL at all.\n * @param key - the payload object's key\n * @returns which allowlist applies, or `null` to leave the value alone\n */\nfunction classifyUrlKey(key: string): UrlKind | null {\n  if (!MAYBE_URL_KEY.test(key)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const normalized = normalizeKey(key);\n  if (EMBED_KEYS.has(normalized)) {\n    return 'embed';\n  }\n  if (!URL_KEY.test(normalized)) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return IMAGE_KEY_HINT.test(normalized) ? 'image' : 'href';\n}\n\n/**\n * Read-only metadata Slack attaches when a message is *retrieved* via the\n * API, but rejects on *send*, keyed by the `type` of the object it appears\n * on. Blocks loaded from an existing message carry these; drop them only\n * from the matching object type — some are common field names (`fallback`)\n * that are valid elsewhere — so a round-tripped payload stays send-valid\n * without over-scrubbing. Add an entry to extend this to other block types.\n */\nconst RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS = new Map<string, Set<string>>([\n  // Covers both the image block and the image element — both `type: 'image'`.\n  ['image', new Set(['image_width', 'image_height', 'image_bytes', 'fallback', 'is_animated'])],\n  // Slack renders the chart server-side and attaches the rendered previews on\n  // retrieval; sending them back is rejected as `unknown property 'preview_images'`.\n  ['data_visualization', new Set(['preview_images'])]\n]);\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitize every URL-bearing string field inside a Slack\n * Block Kit payload fragment. Returns a value with the same structural\n * shape, where any field whose name reads as a URL has been replaced by\n * the safe variant (`''` if the original scheme was unsafe for the kind\n * of URL that field carries — see {@link classifyUrlKey}), and where the\n * retrieval-only and renderer-only keys have been dropped.\n * @param value - any payload fragment (object, array, primitive)\n * @returns the sanitized payload fragment\n */\nfunction sanitizeValue(value: unknown): unknown {\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {\n    return value;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    let changed = false;\n    const out = new Array(value.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n      const next = sanitizeValue(value[i]);\n      if (next !== value[i]) {\n        changed = true;\n      }\n      out[i] = next;\n    }\n    return changed ? out : value;\n  }\n  const src = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const dropKeys = typeof src.type === 'string' ? RETRIEVAL_ONLY_KEYS.get(src.type) : undefined;\n  let copy: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;\n  for (const key of Object.keys(src)) {\n    if (dropKeys?.has(key) || isRendererPropBag(key)) {\n      copy ??= { ...src };\n      delete copy[key];\n      continue;\n    }\n    const original = src[key];\n    let next: unknown = original;\n    if (typeof original === 'string') {\n      const kind = classifyUrlKey(key);\n      if (kind === 'href') {\n        next = sanitizeHref(original);\n      } else if (kind === 'image') {\n        next = sanitizeImageSrc(original);\n      } else if (kind === 'embed') {\n        next = sanitizeEmbedSrc(original);\n      }\n    } else if (typeof original === 'object' && original !== null) {\n      next = sanitizeValue(original);\n    }\n    if (next !== original) {\n      if (!copy) {\n        copy = { ...src };\n      }\n      copy[key] = next;\n    }\n  }\n  return copy ?? src;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize a single Block Kit block, scrubbing dangerous URI schemes\n * from every URL-bearing field anywhere in the payload tree (`url`,\n * `image_url`, `video_url`, `thumbnail_url`, `title_url`, …) and dropping\n * the renderer-only prop bags (`iframeProps`) a payload could use to\n * reach the DOM around that scrub.\n * @param block - the block payload to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized block (same reference if nothing changed)\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlock<T extends SupportedBlock>(block: T): T {\n  return sanitizeValue(block) as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize an array of Block Kit blocks. See {@link sanitizeBlock}.\n * @param blocks - the block payloads to sanitize\n * @returns the sanitized blocks\n */\nexport function sanitizeBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  let changed = false;\n  const out = new Array<SupportedBlock>(blocks.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < blocks.length; i++) {\n    const next = sanitizeBlock(blocks[i]);\n    if (next !== blocks[i]) {\n      changed = true;\n    }\n    out[i] = next;\n  }\n  return changed ? out : blocks;\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\nimport { sanitizeBlock } from './sanitize-blocks';\n\n/**\n * Prepare blocks for the Slack API: scrub dangerous URI schemes from\n * every URL-bearing field, drop the read-only metadata Slack attaches on\n * retrieval but rejects on send, and drop the renderer-only prop bags\n * (`iframeProps`) that `slack-blocks-to-jsx` would spread onto the DOM\n * and Slack rejects as unknown properties. Every URL is routed through\n * the allowlist in `lib/url-safety.ts` so a payload that round-trips\n * through the builder cannot carry `javascript:`/`data:text/html` URIs to\n * a downstream consumer or to the Slack API.\n *\n * Header `level` is passed through: it is a real Slack field (an integer\n * 1-4, see https://docs.slack.dev/reference/block-kit/blocks/header-block),\n * not a builder-only extension. Earlier versions stripped it here, which\n * silently dropped the heading level from every sent message. Out-of-range\n * values are left intact so they surface as validation errors rather than\n * being quietly discarded.\n *\n * @param blocks - the working draft blocks\n * @returns blocks with retrieval-only fields removed and URLs scrubbed\n */\nexport function toSlackBlocks(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): SupportedBlock[] {\n  return blocks.map((block) => sanitizeBlock(block));\n}\n","import type { SupportedBlock } from '../types';\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on the encoded string length we accept on decode. Block\n * Kit JSON in practice is well under 100 KB; we cap at 1 MiB of encoded\n * input so a pathologically large URL hash cannot freeze the tab in\n * `atob` + `JSON.parse` before the validator gets a look. Encoded\n * (base64url) is ~33% larger than the binary, so this bounds the decoded\n * JSON at roughly 768 KiB.\n */\nconst MAX_ENCODED_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Encodes a block list to a base64url string suitable for use as a URL\n * search param. The consumer chooses where to put it (search param, hash,\n * localStorage, etc).\n * Returns an empty string for an empty list so the consumer can omit the\n * param entirely.\n * @param blocks - the blocks to encode\n * @returns base64url-encoded JSON, or '' if blocks is empty\n */\nexport function encodeBlocksToString(blocks: SupportedBlock[]): string {\n  if (blocks.length === 0) {\n    return '';\n  }\n  const json = JSON.stringify(blocks);\n  const utf8Bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json);\n  const chars = new Array<string>(utf8Bytes.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < utf8Bytes.length; i++) {\n    chars[i] = String.fromCharCode(utf8Bytes[i]);\n  }\n  return toBase64Url(btoa(chars.join('')));\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes a string produced by {@link encodeBlocksToString} back to a\n * block list. Returns null on any decode/parse error.\n * @param encoded - the encoded string\n * @returns decoded blocks, or null if input is empty/invalid\n */\nexport function decodeBlocksFromString(encoded: string | undefined | null): SupportedBlock[] | null {\n  if (!encoded) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  if (encoded.length > MAX_ENCODED_BYTES) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  try {\n    const binary = atob(fromBase64Url(encoded));\n    const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n      bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n    }\n    const json = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(json);\n    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      return null;\n    }\n    return parsed as SupportedBlock[];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a standard base64 string to base64url (URL-safe alphabet, no padding).\n * @param b64 - standard base64-encoded string\n * @returns the base64url-encoded equivalent\n */\nfunction toBase64Url(b64: string): string {\n  return b64.replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Converts a base64url string back to standard base64 with padding restored.\n * @param b64url - base64url-encoded string\n * @returns the standard base64 equivalent\n */\nfunction fromBase64Url(b64url: string): string {\n  const b64 = b64url.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padLen = (4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4;\n  return b64 + '='.repeat(padLen);\n}\n"]}