@tianhai/pi-workflow-kit 0.18.1 → 1.0.0

package/docs/plans/completed/2026-04-15-bash-guard-implementation.md

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-# Bash Guard Implementation Plan
-
-Based on `docs/plans/2026-04-15-bash-guard-design.md`.
-
-## Task 1 — Add `isSafeCommand()` to workflow-guard.ts [new feature, checkpoint: test]
-
-**File:** `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-
-- Add `isSafeCommand` as a named export (so tests can import it directly)
-- Copy `DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS` and `SAFE_PATTERNS` from [plan-mode utils.ts](https://github.com/badlogic/pi-mono/blob/main/packages/coding-agent/examples/extensions/plan-mode/utils.ts) as-is
-- Copy the `isSafeCommand()` logic as-is
-
-```ts
-// Destructive commands blocked in brainstorm/plan phases
-const DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS = [
-	/\brm\b/i,
-	/\brmdir\b/i,
-	/\bmv\b/i,
-	/\bcp\b/i,
-	/\bmkdir\b/i,
-	/\btouch\b/i,
-	/\bchmod\b/i,
-	/\bchown\b/i,
-	/\bchgrp\b/i,
-	/\bln\b/i,
-	/\btee\b/i,
-	/\btruncate\b/i,
-	/\bdd\b/i,
-	/\bshred\b/i,
-	/(^|[^<])>(?!>)/,
-	/>>/,
-	/\bnpm\s+(install|uninstall|update|ci|link|publish)/i,
-	/\byarn\s+(add|remove|install|publish)/i,
-	/\bpnpm\s+(add|remove|install|publish)/i,
-	/\bpip\s+(install|uninstall)/i,
-	/\bapt(-get)?\s+(install|remove|purge|update|upgrade)/i,
-	/\bbrew\s+(install|uninstall|upgrade)/i,
-	/\bgit\s+(add|commit|push|pull|merge|rebase|reset|checkout|branch\s+-[dD]|stash|cherry-pick|revert|tag|init|clone)/i,
-	/\bsudo\b/i,
-	/\bsu\b/i,
-	/\bkill\b/i,
-	/\bpkill\b/i,
-	/\bkillall\b/i,
-	/\breboot\b/i,
-	/\bshutdown\b/i,
-	/\bsystemctl\s+(start|stop|restart|enable|disable)/i,
-	/\bservice\s+\S+\s+(start|stop|restart)/i,
-	/\b(vim?|nano|emacs|code|subl)\b/i,
-];
-
-const SAFE_PATTERNS = [
-	/^\s*cat\b/,
-	/^\s*head\b/,
-	/^\s*tail\b/,
-	/^\s*less\b/,
-	/^\s*more\b/,
-	/^\s*grep\b/,
-	/^\s*find\b/,
-	/^\s*ls\b/,
-	/^\s*pwd\b/,
-	/^\s*echo\b/,
-	/^\s*printf\b/,
-	/^\s*wc\b/,
-	/^\s*sort\b/,
-	/^\s*uniq\b/,
-	/^\s*diff\b/,
-	/^\s*file\b/,
-	/^\s*stat\b/,
-	/^\s*du\b/,
-	/^\s*df\b/,
-	/^\s*tree\b/,
-	/^\s*which\b/,
-	/^\s*whereis\b/,
-	/^\s*type\b/,
-	/^\s*env\b/,
-	/^\s*printenv\b/,
-	/^\s*uname\b/,
-	/^\s*whoami\b/,
-	/^\s*id\b/,
-	/^\s*date\b/,
-	/^\s*cal\b/,
-	/^\s*uptime\b/,
-	/^\s*ps\b/,
-	/^\s*top\b/,
-	/^\s*htop\b/,
-	/^\s*free\b/,
-	/^\s*git\s+(status|log|diff|show|branch|remote|config\s+--get)/i,
-	/^\s*git\s+ls-/i,
-	/^\s*npm\s+(list|ls|view|info|search|outdated|audit)/i,
-	/^\s*yarn\s+(list|info|why|audit)/i,
-	/^\s*node\s+--version/i,
-	/^\s*python\s+--version/i,
-	/^\s*curl\s/i,
-	/^\s*wget\s+-O\s*-/i,
-	/^\s*jq\b/,
-	/^\s*sed\s+-n/i,
-	/^\s*awk\b/,
-	/^\s*rg\b/,
-	/^\s*fd\b/,
-	/^\s*bat\b/,
-	/^\s*eza\b/,
-];
-
-export function isSafeCommand(command: string): boolean {
-	const isDestructive = DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(command));
-	const isSafe = SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(command));
-	return !isDestructive && isSafe;
-}
-```
-
-- Write failing tests in `tests/workflow-guard.test.ts` for `isSafeCommand`:
-
-```ts
-import { isSafeCommand } from "../extensions/workflow-guard";
-
-describe("isSafeCommand", () => {
-	it("allows safe read-only commands", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("cat file.ts")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("grep -r 'foo' src/")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git status")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git log --oneline -5")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("npm list")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("ls -la")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("curl https://example.com")).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks destructive commands", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("rm -rf node_modules")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("touch newfile.ts")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("mv old.ts new.ts")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("mkdir src/components")).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks file-writing bash patterns", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("echo 'hello' > file.ts")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("cat config > backup.txt")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("echo 'log' >> output.log")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("tee output.txt")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("sed -i 's/old/new/g' file.ts")).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks git mutations but allows read-only git", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git add .")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git commit -m 'msg'")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git push")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git checkout -b feature")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git status")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git log --oneline")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("git diff")).toBe(true);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks editors", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("vim file.ts")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("nano file.ts")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("code .")).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks sudo", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("sudo apt install foo")).toBe(false);
-	});
-
-	it("blocks npm installs but allows read-only npm", () => {
-		expect(isSafeCommand("npm install lodash")).toBe(false);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("npm list")).toBe(true);
-		expect(isSafeCommand("npm audit")).toBe(true);
-	});
-});
-```
-
-- Run: `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-- Verify: all new `isSafeCommand` tests fail (function doesn't exist yet)
-- Implement `isSafeCommand()` in `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-- Run: `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-- Verify: all tests pass
-- `git add -A && git commit -m "feat: add isSafeCommand bash guard to workflow-guard"`
-
-## Task 2 — Wire bash guard into tool_call handler [modifying tested code]
-
-**File:** `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-
-Replace the tool_call guard from:
-```ts
-if (event.toolName !== "write" && event.toolName !== "edit") return;
-```
-
-To:
-```ts
-if (event.toolName === "bash") {
-	const command = (event.input as { command?: string }).command ?? "";
-	if (!isSafeCommand(command)) {
-		if (ctx.hasUI) {
-			ctx.ui.notify(
-				`Blocked bash command during ${phase} phase: ${command}`,
-				"warning",
-			);
-		}
-		return {
-			block: true,
-			reason: `⚠️ ${phase.toUpperCase()} PHASE: Bash command blocked (not allowlisted). Only read-only commands are permitted during brainstorming and planning.\nCommand: ${command}`,
-		};
-	}
-	return;
-}
-
-if (event.toolName !== "write" && event.toolName !== "edit") return;
-```
-
-- Run: `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-- Verify: existing tests pass (the "should allow bash" test needs updating — see Task 3)
-- `git add -A && git commit -m "feat: wire bash guard into tool_call handler"`
-
-## Task 3 — Update existing test for new bash behavior [modifying tested code]
-
-**File:** `tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-
-The test `"should allow bash regardless of phase"` is now incorrect — bash with unsafe commands should be blocked. Update it:
-
-```ts
-it("should block unsafe bash during brainstorm (safe bash tested via isSafeCommand)", () => {
-	// The tool_call handler now guards bash via isSafeCommand.
-	// Direct testing of safe/unsafe commands is in the isSafeCommand describe block.
-	// This just confirms bash is no longer blanket-allowed.
-	expect(isSafeCommand("rm -rf /")).toBe(false);
-});
-```
-
-- Run: `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-- Verify: all tests pass
-- `git add -A && git commit -m "test: update bash guard test for new blocking behavior"`

package/docs/plans/completed/2026-04-21-workflow-guard-safe-commands-design.md

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-# Workflow Guard: Safe Commands Expansion
-
-**Date:** 2026-04-21
-**Status:** Draft
-
-## Problem
-
-The workflow guard blocks several read-only bash commands that are genuinely needed during brainstorm and plan phases. Two specific user reports:
-
-1. `cd /path && git remote -v 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls` — blocked due to `cd` not being allowlisted and `2>/dev/null` caught by the stdout-redirect pattern.
-2. `gh pr view 1564 --json ... 2>/dev/null || echo "gh failed"` — blocked because `gh` is not allowlisted at all.
-
-Additionally, `git status --short` is blocked because the safe regex only allows `git status` without flags.
-
-## Design
-
-### 1. Harmless redirect stripping
-
-Add a `stripHarmlessRedirects(cmd)` helper that removes `2>/dev/null` and `2>&1` before pattern matching. These are purely cosmetic (suppress stderr noise) and have no side effects.
-
-```ts
-function stripHarmlessRedirects(cmd: string): string {
-  return cmd.replace(/\s*2\s*>\s*(\/dev\/null|&1)\b/g, "");
-}
-```
-
-Apply it inside `isSafeCommand` on each sub-command before checking DESTRUCTIVE and SAFE patterns. This fixes `2>/dev/null` without loosening the redirect catch (which still blocks real writes).
-
-### 2. New SAFE_PATTERNS entries
-
-| Pattern | Rationale |
-|---------|-----------|
-| `/^\s*cd\b/` | Directory navigation — zero side effects |
-| `/^\s*gh\s+pr\s+(view\|list\|diff\|checks\|status)\b/i` | Read-only PR inspection |
-| `/^\s*gh\s+issue\s+(view\|list)\b/i` | Read-only issue inspection |
-| `/^\s*gh\s+repo\s+(view\|fork\|list)\b/i` | Read-only repo metadata |
-| `/^\s*gh\s+release\s+(view\|list\|download)\b/i` | Read-only release inspection |
-| `/^\s*gh\s+run\s+(view\|list)\b/i` | Read-only CI run inspection |
-| `/^\s*git\s+blame\b/` | Read-only file annotation |
-| `/^\s*git\s+shortlog\b/` | Read-only commit summary |
-| `/^\s*git\s+stash\s+list\b/i` | Read-only stash listing |
-| `/^\s*git\s+tag\s+(-l\|--list)\b/i` | Read-only tag listing |
-| `/^\s*git\s+describe\b/` | Read-only version info |
-
-### 3. Fix: `git status` flag handling
-
-Current regex `/^\s*git\s+(status|log|...)/i` doesn't allow common flags like `--short`, `--oneline`, `--format=...`. Refine all git safe patterns to optionally accept trailing flags and args:
-
-```ts
-/^\s*git\s+status\b/i,
-/^\s*git\s+log\b/i,
-/^\s*git\s+diff\b/i,
-/^\s*git\s+show\b/i,
-/^\s*git\s+blame\b/i,
-// etc.
-```
-
-The existing patterns already anchor to `^\s*git\s+<subcommand>` — the issue was that `git status --short` didn't match because some patterns had more restrictive anchoring. Reviewing the code: the patterns use `\b` word boundaries which should allow flags. The actual issue with `git status --short && git log --oneline -5` is that the `git log --oneline -5` part is safe, but `git status --short` — let me verify: `/^\s*git\s+(status|log|diff|show|branch|remote|config\s+--get)/i` — `git status` has a `\b` after the group? No, there's no trailing `\b`. So `git status --short` **should** match since the pattern doesn't require end-of-string. The real blocker for that compound command was the `&&` splitting — `git log --oneline -5` — `-5` shouldn't be an issue either.
-
-**Conclusion on item 3:** The `git status --short` case was a false alarm caused by compound command parsing combined with the `2>/dev/null` redirect in the user's actual commands, not a pattern bug. No change needed here beyond the redirect fix.
-
-### 4. What we're NOT adding (YAGNI)
-
-- `sed -i` (in-place editing) — correctly destructive
-- `gh pr create/merge/close` — write operations
-- `curl -o file` (output to file) — the redirect catch blocks this
-- `cut`, `tr`, `column`, `base64` — rarely needed; can add later on demand
-- `gh api` — too broad; can be used for mutations. Require specific subcommands.
-
-## Data flow
-
-No new data flow. The changes are purely additive to the pattern-matching logic in `isSafeCommand`.
-
-## Error handling
-
-No new error paths. The existing block-and-warn behavior remains unchanged.
-
-## Testing
-
-Manual verification with the exact commands that were blocked:
-
-1. `cd /some/path && git remote -v 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls` → allowed
-2. `gh pr view 1564 --repo owner/repo --json title,body,files 2>/dev/null || echo "gh failed"` → allowed
-3. `git stash list` → allowed
-4. `git tag -l` → allowed
-5. `rm -rf /` → still blocked ✓
-6. `git push origin main` → still blocked ✓
-
-## Tests
-
-Add the following test cases to the existing `tests/workflow-guard.test.ts` `isSafeCommand` describe block:
-
-### New: `cd` navigation
-```ts
-it("allows cd", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("cd /some/path")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("cd src && ls")).toBe(true);
-});
-```
-
-### New: GitHub CLI read-only subcommands
-```ts
-it("allows gh read-only subcommands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 --json title,body")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr list --repo owner/repo")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr diff 1564")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue view 42")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue list --label bug")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh repo view owner/repo")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh run view 12345")).toBe(true);
-});
-
-it("blocks gh write subcommands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr create --title 'fix'")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr merge 1564")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue close 42")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh release create v1.0")).toBe(false);
-});
-```
-
-### New: Git read-only subcommands
-```ts
-it("allows git read-only subcommands (new additions)", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git blame src/index.ts")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git shortlog -sn")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash list")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git tag -l")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git tag --list 'v*'")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git describe --tags")).toBe(true);
-});
-
-it("still blocks git stash mutations", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash push -m 'wip'")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash pop")).toBe(false);
-});
-```
-
-### New: Harmless stderr redirect stripping
-```ts
-it("allows 2>/dev/null on safe commands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git remote -v 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("npm list 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-});
-
-it("allows 2>&1 on safe commands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("git log 2>&1")).toBe(true);
-});
-
-it("still blocks stdout redirects even with stderr redirect present", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("echo 'hello' > file.ts 2>/dev/null")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("cat config > backup.txt 2>/dev/null")).toBe(false);
-});
-```
-
-### New: Compound commands from real user scenarios
-```ts
-it("allows the exact user-reported blocked commands", () => {
-	// Scenario 1: directory navigation + git remote + ls
-	expect(isSafeCommand("cd /Users/u/partying/pt-room && git remote -v 2>/dev/null; echo '---'; ls")).toBe(true);
-	// Scenario 2: gh pr view with fallback
-	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 --repo olachat/pt-partying --json title,body,files,additions,deletions 2>/dev/null || echo 'gh failed'")).toBe(true);
-});
-```
-
-## Summary
-
-| Change | Location | Size |
-|--------|----------|------|
-| Add `stripHarmlessRedirects()` | Above `isSafeCommand` | ~3 lines |
-| Call it in `isSafeCommand` loop body | Inside `isSafeCommand` | 1 line changed |
-| Add 10 new SAFE_PATTERNS entries | `SAFE_PATTERNS` array | ~10 lines |

package/docs/plans/completed/2026-04-21-workflow-guard-safe-commands-implementation.md

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-# Workflow Guard: Safe Commands Expansion — Implementation Plan
-
-**Design:** `docs/plans/2026-04-21-workflow-guard-safe-commands-design.md`
-**Date:** 2026-04-21
-
----
-
-## Task 1: Add `stripHarmlessRedirects` helper and wire it into `isSafeCommand`
-
-**Scenario:** Modifying tested code
-**File:** `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-
-1. Run existing tests to confirm baseline:
-   ```bash
-   npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts
-   ```
-   Expected: all pass.
-
-2. Add `stripHarmlessRedirects` function above `isSafeCommand`:
-   ```ts
-   /** Strip stderr redirects that are purely cosmetic (no side effects). */
-   function stripHarmlessRedirects(cmd: string): string {
-   	return cmd.replace(/\s*2\s*>\s*(\/dev\/null|&1)\b/g, "");
-   }
-   ```
-
-3. Wire it into `isSafeCommand` — apply `stripHarmlessRedirects` to each part before pattern matching:
-   ```ts
-   export function isSafeCommand(command: string): boolean {
-   	const parts = splitCompoundCommand(command);
-   	return parts.every((part) => {
-   		const cleaned = stripHarmlessRedirects(part);
-   		const isDestructive = DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(cleaned));
-   		const isSafe = SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(cleaned));
-   		return !isDestructive && isSafe;
-   	});
-   }
-   ```
-
-4. Run tests:
-   ```bash
-   npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts
-   ```
-   Expected: all existing tests still pass (no behavior change yet since no new SAFE_PATTERNS).
-
-5. Commit:
-   ```bash
-   git add extensions/workflow-guard.ts
-   git commit -m "feat(workflow-guard): add stripHarmlessRedirects helper"
-   ```
-
----
-
-## Task 2: Add new SAFE_PATTERNS entries
-
-**Scenario:** Modifying tested code
-**File:** `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-
-1. Add the following entries to the `SAFE_PATTERNS` array (after the existing `gh`-related area or at end):
-
-   ```ts
-   /^\s*cd\b/,
-   /^\s*gh\s+pr\s+(view|list|diff|checks|status)\b/i,
-   /^\s*gh\s+issue\s+(view|list)\b/i,
-   /^\s*gh\s+repo\s+(view|fork|list)\b/i,
-   /^\s*gh\s+release\s+(view|list|download)\b/i,
-   /^\s*gh\s+run\s+(view|list)\b/i,
-   /^\s*git\s+blame\b/,
-   /^\s*git\s+shortlog\b/,
-   /^\s*git\s+stash\s+list\b/i,
-   /^\s*git\s+tag\s+(-l|--list)\b/i,
-   /^\s*git\s+describe\b/,
-   ```
-
-2. Run tests:
-   ```bash
-   npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts
-   ```
-   Expected: all existing tests pass.
-
-3. Commit:
-   ```bash
-   git add extensions/workflow-guard.ts
-   git commit -m "feat(workflow-guard): add safe patterns for cd, gh, and git read-only subcommands"
-   ```
-
----
-
-## Task 3: Add tests for `cd`, `gh`, git new subcommands, and redirect stripping
-
-**Scenario:** New feature (test-first)
-**File:** `tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-
-**checkpoint: test** — pause after writing failing tests, before implementation.
-
-> Note: Implementation was already done in Tasks 1–2. These tests should all pass immediately. The checkpoint label is kept for review purposes in case the user wants to verify test design.
-
-1. Add the following test blocks inside the `describe("isSafeCommand", ...)` block, after the existing tests:
-
-   ```ts
-   it("allows cd", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("cd /some/path")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("cd src && ls")).toBe(true);
-   });
-
-   it("allows gh read-only subcommands", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 --json title,body")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr list --repo owner/repo")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr diff 1564")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue view 42")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue list --label bug")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh repo view owner/repo")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh run view 12345")).toBe(true);
-   });
-
-   it("blocks gh write subcommands", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr create --title 'fix'")).toBe(false);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr merge 1564")).toBe(false);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh issue close 42")).toBe(false);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh release create v1.0")).toBe(false);
-   });
-
-   it("allows git read-only subcommands (new additions)", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git blame src/index.ts")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git shortlog -sn")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash list")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git tag -l")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git tag --list 'v*'")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git describe --tags")).toBe(true);
-   });
-
-   it("still blocks git stash mutations", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash push -m 'wip'")).toBe(false);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git stash pop")).toBe(false);
-   });
-
-   it("allows 2>/dev/null on safe commands", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git remote -v 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("npm list 2>/dev/null")).toBe(true);
-   });
-
-   it("allows 2>&1 on safe commands", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("git log 2>&1")).toBe(true);
-   });
-
-   it("still blocks stdout redirects even with stderr redirect present", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("echo 'hello' > file.ts 2>/dev/null")).toBe(false);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("cat config > backup.txt 2>/dev/null")).toBe(false);
-   });
-
-   it("allows the exact user-reported blocked commands", () => {
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("cd /Users/u/partying/pt-room && git remote -v 2>/dev/null; echo '---'; ls")).toBe(true);
-   	expect(isSafeCommand("gh pr view 1564 --repo olachat/pt-partying --json title,body,files,additions,deletions 2>/dev/null || echo 'gh failed'")).toBe(true);
-   });
-   ```
-
-2. Run tests:
-   ```bash
-   npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts
-   ```
-   Expected: all tests pass (including new ones).
-
-3. Commit:
-   ```bash
-   git add tests/workflow-guard.test.ts
-   git commit -m "test(workflow-guard): add tests for cd, gh, git read-only subcommands, and redirect stripping"
-   ```

package/docs/plans/completed/2026-04-22-go-readonly-safe-commands-implementation.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Add Go read-only commands to workflow-guard safe list
-
-## Context
-
-Go toolchain read-only commands (`go doc`, `go list`, `go version`, `go env`) are blocked during brainstorm/plan phases because they're not in `SAFE_PATTERNS`. These are purely read-only with no side effects and are commonly needed during code exploration.
-
-## Tasks
-
-### 1 — Add Go safe patterns [Modifying tested code]
-
-**File:** `extensions/workflow-guard.ts`
-
-Add four entries to `SAFE_PATTERNS`, after the `git describe` entry:
-
-```ts
-/^\s*go\s+doc\b/,
-/^\s*go\s+list\b/,
-/^\s*go\s+version\b/,
-/^\s*go\s+env\b/,
-```
-
-**Verify:** run `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts` — all existing tests should pass.
-
-**Commit:** `feat(workflow-guard): add Go read-only commands to safe list`
-
-### 2 — Add tests for Go safe commands [New feature]
-
-**File:** `tests/workflow-guard.test.ts`
-
-Add a new `it` block inside the `describe("isSafeCommand", ...)` suite:
-
-```ts
-it("allows go read-only subcommands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go doc go.opentelemetry.io/otel/label")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go doc go.opentelemetry.io/otel/codes 2>&1 | head -20")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go list -m -versions go.opentelemetry.io/otel 2>&1 | tr ' ' '\\n' | grep -E '^v1\\\\.(2[89]|[3-9][0-9])' | head -20")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go version")).toBe(true);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go env GOOS GOARCH")).toBe(true);
-});
-```
-
-Also add a `go build` block test to ensure write-oriented Go commands stay blocked:
-
-```ts
-it("blocks go write subcommands", () => {
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go build ./...")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go install golang.org/x/tools/gopls@latest")).toBe(false);
-	expect(isSafeCommand("go mod tidy")).toBe(false);
-});
-```
-
-**Verify:** run `npx vitest run tests/workflow-guard.test.ts` — all tests pass.
-
-**Commit:** `test(workflow-guard): add tests for Go read-only safe commands`