@thurinlabs/identity-kit 1.3.7 → 1.4.0

package/README.md

@@ -185,7 +185,9 @@ const keyInfo = await parsePgpKey(armoredKey)
 // → { fingerprint, userIDs, algorithm, created, expires, notations, subkeys } | null
 
 const verification = await verifyAttestation({ pgpPublicKey, pgpSignature, fingerprint, ethAddress })
-// → { verified: boolean, reason?: string }
+// → { verified, kind, at?, revocationReason?, signingKey?, expiresAt?, algorithm?, reason? }
+//   kind: 'verified' | 'expired' | 'signing-key-expired' | 'revoked' | 'compromised'
+//       | 'signing-key-revoked' | 'unsupported' | 'bad-signature'   (1.4.0)
 
 // Prepare a key for publishing: drop every user ID that contains an email address.
 const stripped = await stripEmailUserIDs(armoredKey)
@@ -194,7 +196,30 @@ const stripped = await stripEmailUserIDs(armoredKey)
 await hasEmailUserID(armoredKey) // → true if any user ID contains an @
 ```
 
-**Published identity.** An attestation stores the armored key on-chain, permanently and publicly. Since 0.9.0 the intended shape is a key whose only user ID is a non-email one (any name — `thurin` is the suggestion), carrying the `proof@thurin.id` notations. `stripEmailUserIDs` produces that from a normal export; the stripped key still verifies (`verifyAttestation` needs at least one self-certified user ID, so a key with none is rejected) and keeps the notations on the user ID it retains. Proofs are then read from the on-chain key, never from a keyserver.
+**Published identity.** An attestation stores the armored key on-chain, permanently and publicly. Since 0.9.0 the intended shape is a key whose only user ID is a non-email one (usually the name already on the key, without the email), carrying the `proof@thurin.id` notations. `stripEmailUserIDs` produces that from a normal export; the stripped key still verifies (`verifyAttestation` needs at least one self-certified user ID, so a key with none is rejected) and keeps the notations on the user ID it retains. Proofs are then read from the on-chain key, never from a keyserver.
+
+### Why a claim does or doesn't count (1.4.0)
+
+`verifyAttestation` returns a `kind` along with `verified`, so a page can say why in plain words instead of showing a library error. Checked in this order: the key revoked (`compromised` when the owner's reason was compromise), the key expired, the signing subkey revoked, the signing subkey expired; then an algorithm openpgp.js refuses (`unsupported`, e.g. DSA); anything else is `bad-signature`. `at` is the date that goes with it. A verified result carries `expiresAt`: the earlier of the key's and the signing subkey's expiry.
+
+```ts
+import { claimCheckText, expiresSoon, expiresSoonText, claimFates, claimFateText, CLAIM_CHECK_LABEL } from '@thurinlabs/identity-kit'
+
+claimCheckText(verification)
+// → { kind: 'expired', label: 'key expired',
+//     sentence: 'The key on this claim expired on Mar 5, 2029, so the claim no longer counts.',
+//     fix: 'Extend the key, then Update key. No new signature needed.' }   // `fix` is for the owner
+
+const soon = expiresSoon(verification)           // within 30 days → { days, at } | null
+if (soon) expiresSoonText(soon)                  // 'Key expires in 12 days (Mar 6, 2027).'
+
+// Revoked or replaced: reattest revokes and attests in one transaction, so a claim revoked the
+// same second a newer one was created was replaced by it.
+const fates = claimFates(attestations)           // Map<index, { state: 'active' | 'revoked' | 'replaced', at?, by? }>
+claimFateText(fates.get(1)!)                     // 'Replaced by claim #2 on Oct 3, 2026.'
+```
+
+Dates are formatted in UTC ("Mar 5, 2029") so every viewer sees the same day; pass your own formatter as the second argument.
 
 Nothing in the kit talks to a keyserver: keys come from the registry, and `thurin keyserver` / keys.thurin.id serve them over HKP for gpg.
 
@@ -336,7 +361,7 @@ The card talks directly to Ethereum and each proof platform — no intermediary,
 
 ## Key algorithms
 
-Any curve openpgp.js can compute is accepted: Ed25519, Cv25519, NIST P-256/384/521, brainpool, RSA, and **secp256k1**. openpgp.js rejects secp256k1 by default because RFC 9580 does not list it; identity-kit removes secp256k1 from `rejectCurves` and leaves the rest of the list alone, since that one entry is a compatibility rule, not a security one (1.3.2; earlier versions cleared the whole set). A secp256k1 PGP key doubles as an Ethereum key (the address is derived from the same public point), so anything that can sign with the PGP key can sign Ethereum transactions: hold such a key if you like, but do not fund its derived address. In Node, openpgp.js needs the `eckey-utils` package for this curve; identity-kit depends on it, so `npm install` brings it in. The browser build needs nothing extra.
+Any curve openpgp.js can compute is accepted: Ed25519, Cv25519, NIST P-256/384/521, brainpool, RSA (2048 bits and up), and **secp256k1**. DSA and short RSA keys are refused by openpgp.js as too weak; since 1.4.0 such a claim reports `kind: 'unsupported'`. openpgp.js rejects secp256k1 by default because RFC 9580 does not list it; identity-kit removes secp256k1 from `rejectCurves` and leaves the rest of the list alone, since that one entry is a compatibility rule, not a security one (1.3.2; earlier versions cleared the whole set). A secp256k1 PGP key doubles as an Ethereum key (the address is derived from the same public point), so anything that can sign with the PGP key can sign Ethereum transactions: hold such a key if you like, but do not fund its derived address. In Node, openpgp.js needs the `eckey-utils` package for this curve; identity-kit depends on it, so `npm install` brings it in. The browser build needs nothing extra.
 
 ## Migrating from 0.9.x
 

package/dist/{chunk-OIE72R6J.cjs → chunk-M2OJDB7I.cjs}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {value: true}); function _interopRequireWildcard(obj) { if (obj && obj.__esModule) { return obj; } else { var newObj = {}; if (obj != null) { for (var key in obj) { if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key)) { newObj[key] = obj[key]; } } } newObj.default = obj; return newObj; } } function _nullishCoalesce(lhs, rhsFn) { if (lhs != null) { return lhs; } else { return rhsFn(); } } function _optionalChain(ops) { let lastAccessLHS = undefined; let value = ops[0]; let i = 1; while (i < ops.length) { const op = ops[i]; const fn = ops[i + 1]; i += 2; if ((op === 'optionalAccess' || op === 'optionalCall') && value == null) { return undefined; } if (op === 'access' || op === 'optionalAccess') { lastAccessLHS = value; value = fn(value); } else if (op === 'call' || op === 'optionalCall') { value = fn((...args) => value.call(lastAccessLHS, ...args)); lastAccessLHS = undefined; } } return value; }// src/core/abi.ts
+"use strict";Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {value: true}); function _interopRequireWildcard(obj) { if (obj && obj.__esModule) { return obj; } else { var newObj = {}; if (obj != null) { for (var key in obj) { if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key)) { newObj[key] = obj[key]; } } } newObj.default = obj; return newObj; } } function _nullishCoalesce(lhs, rhsFn) { if (lhs != null) { return lhs; } else { return rhsFn(); } } async function _asyncNullishCoalesce(lhs, rhsFn) { if (lhs != null) { return lhs; } else { return await rhsFn(); } } function _optionalChain(ops) { let lastAccessLHS = undefined; let value = ops[0]; let i = 1; while (i < ops.length) { const op = ops[i]; const fn = ops[i + 1]; i += 2; if ((op === 'optionalAccess' || op === 'optionalCall') && value == null) { return undefined; } if (op === 'access' || op === 'optionalAccess') { lastAccessLHS = value; value = fn(value); } else if (op === 'call' || op === 'optionalCall') { value = fn((...args) => value.call(lastAccessLHS, ...args)); lastAccessLHS = undefined; } } return value; } async function _asyncOptionalChain(ops) { let lastAccessLHS = undefined; let value = ops[0]; let i = 1; while (i < ops.length) { const op = ops[i]; const fn = ops[i + 1]; i += 2; if ((op === 'optionalAccess' || op === 'optionalCall') && value == null) { return undefined; } if (op === 'access' || op === 'optionalAccess') { lastAccessLHS = value; value = await fn(value); } else if (op === 'call' || op === 'optionalCall') { value = await fn((...args) => value.call(lastAccessLHS, ...args)); lastAccessLHS = undefined; } } return value; }// src/core/abi.ts
 var REGISTRY_ABI = [
   {
     "type": "function",
@@ -1392,6 +1392,61 @@ async function verifyClearsigned({ armoredKey, clearsigned }) {
     return { verified: false, reason: err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Verification failed", text: "" };
   }
 }
+var REVOCATION_REASON = {
+  // 0 = "no reason specified", gpg's default: say nothing rather than "(reason: no reason given)"
+  1: "replaced by a newer key",
+  2: "compromised",
+  3: "no longer used",
+  32: "a user ID is no longer valid"
+};
+var iso = (d) => d instanceof Date ? d.toISOString() : typeof d === "number" && Number.isFinite(d) ? new Date(d).toISOString() : null;
+function revocationOf(sigs) {
+  const sig = [..._nullishCoalesce(sigs, () => ( []))].sort((a, b) => (_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([b, 'access', _13 => _13.created, 'optionalAccess', _14 => _14.getTime, 'optionalCall', _15 => _15()]), () => ( 0))) - (_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([a, 'access', _16 => _16.created, 'optionalAccess', _17 => _17.getTime, 'optionalCall', _18 => _18()]), () => ( 0))))[0];
+  const flag = _nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([sig, 'optionalAccess', _19 => _19.reasonForRevocationFlag]), () => ( null));
+  return {
+    at: iso(_optionalChain([sig, 'optionalAccess', _20 => _20.created])),
+    compromised: flag === 2,
+    revocationReason: _optionalChain([sig, 'optionalAccess', _21 => _21.reasonForRevocationString]) || (flag !== null ? _nullishCoalesce(REVOCATION_REASON[flag], () => ( null)) : null)
+  };
+}
+async function keyLife(openpgp, key, clearsigned, config) {
+  const now = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
+  let issuer = null;
+  try {
+    issuer = await _asyncNullishCoalesce(await _asyncOptionalChain([(await openpgp.readCleartextMessage({ cleartextMessage: clearsigned })), 'access', async _22 => _22.signature, 'access', async _23 => _23.packets, 'access', async _24 => _24[0], 'optionalAccess', async _25 => _25.issuerKeyID]), async () => ( null));
+  } catch (e4) {
+  }
+  const signer = issuer && !key.getKeyID().equals(issuer) ? _nullishCoalesce(key.subkeys.find((s) => s.getKeyID().equals(issuer)), () => ( null)) : key;
+  const signingKey = signer ? signer.getFingerprint().toUpperCase() : null;
+  const safe = async (f, fallback) => {
+    try {
+      return await f();
+    } catch (e5) {
+      return fallback;
+    }
+  };
+  const keyRevoked = await safe(() => key.isRevoked(void 0, void 0, now, config), false);
+  const keyExp = await safe(() => key.getExpirationTime(void 0, config), null);
+  const isSub = signer && signer !== key;
+  const subRevoked = isSub ? await safe(() => signer.isRevoked(null, key.keyPacket, now, config), false) : false;
+  const subExp = isSub ? await safe(() => signer.getExpirationTime(null, config), null) : null;
+  const finite = (d) => d instanceof Date && Number.isFinite(d.getTime()) ? d : null;
+  const kExp = finite(keyExp), sExp = finite(subExp);
+  let problem = null;
+  if (keyRevoked) {
+    const r = revocationOf(key.revocationSignatures);
+    problem = { kind: r.compromised ? "compromised" : "revoked", at: r.at, revocationReason: r.revocationReason };
+  } else if (kExp && kExp <= now) {
+    problem = { kind: "expired", at: kExp.toISOString() };
+  } else if (subRevoked) {
+    const r = revocationOf(signer.revocationSignatures);
+    problem = { kind: r.compromised ? "compromised" : "signing-key-revoked", at: r.at, revocationReason: r.revocationReason };
+  } else if (sExp && sExp <= now) {
+    problem = { kind: "signing-key-expired", at: sExp.toISOString() };
+  }
+  const earliest = [kExp, sExp].filter(Boolean).sort((a, b) => a - b)[0];
+  return { problem, signingKey, expiresAt: earliest ? earliest.toISOString() : null, algorithm: algorithmName(_nullishCoalesce(signer, () => ( key))) };
+}
 async function verifyAttestation({
   pgpPublicKey,
   pgpSignature,
@@ -1400,24 +1455,31 @@ async function verifyAttestation({
 }) {
   try {
     if (!pgpPublicKey || !pgpSignature) {
-      return { verified: false, reason: "Missing PGP data" };
+      return { verified: false, reason: "Missing PGP data", kind: "bad-signature" };
     }
     const openpgp = await Promise.resolve().then(() => _interopRequireWildcard(require("openpgp")));
     const { readKey } = openpgp;
     const publicKey = await readKey({ armoredKey: pgpPublicKey });
     const keyFingerprint = publicKey.getFingerprint().toUpperCase();
     if (keyFingerprint !== fingerprint.toUpperCase()) {
-      return { verified: false, reason: "Key fingerprint mismatch" };
+      return { verified: false, reason: "Key fingerprint mismatch", kind: "bad-signature" };
     }
+    const life = await keyLife(openpgp, publicKey, pgpSignature, pgpConfig(openpgp));
     const v = await verifyClearsigned({ armoredKey: pgpPublicKey, clearsigned: pgpSignature });
-    if (!v.verified) return { verified: false, reason: v.reason };
+    if (!v.verified) {
+      if (life.problem) return { verified: false, reason: v.reason, signingKey: life.signingKey, ...life.problem };
+      if (/too weak|reject|unsupported|not supported|unknown (curve|algorithm)/i.test(v.reason || "")) {
+        return { verified: false, reason: v.reason, kind: "unsupported", algorithm: life.algorithm, signingKey: life.signingKey };
+      }
+      return { verified: false, reason: v.reason, kind: "bad-signature", signingKey: life.signingKey };
+    }
     const signedText = v.text;
     if (!signedText.toLowerCase().includes(ethAddress.toLowerCase())) {
-      return { verified: false, reason: "Signed message does not contain ETH address" };
+      return { verified: false, reason: "Signed message does not contain ETH address", kind: "bad-signature", signingKey: life.signingKey };
     }
-    return { verified: true };
-  } catch (e4) {
-    return { verified: false, reason: "Signature verification failed" };
+    return { verified: true, kind: "verified", signingKey: life.signingKey, expiresAt: life.expiresAt };
+  } catch (e6) {
+    return { verified: false, reason: "Signature verification failed", kind: "bad-signature" };
   }
 }
 var EMAIL_UID = /@/;
@@ -1428,7 +1490,7 @@ async function stripEmailUserIDs(armoredKey) {
     const kept = [];
     const removed = [];
     const users = key.users.filter((u) => {
-      const uid = _optionalChain([u, 'access', _13 => _13.userID, 'optionalAccess', _14 => _14.userID]);
+      const uid = _optionalChain([u, 'access', _26 => _26.userID, 'optionalAccess', _27 => _27.userID]);
       if (!uid) return false;
       if (EMAIL_UID.test(uid)) {
         removed.push(uid);
@@ -1440,7 +1502,7 @@ async function stripEmailUserIDs(armoredKey) {
     if (users.length === 0) return null;
     key.users = users;
     return { armored: key.armor(), kept, removed };
-  } catch (e5) {
+  } catch (e7) {
     return null;
   }
 }
@@ -1448,8 +1510,8 @@ async function hasEmailUserID(armoredKey) {
   try {
     const { readKey } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => _interopRequireWildcard(require("openpgp")));
     const key = await readKey({ armoredKey });
-    return key.users.some((u) => EMAIL_UID.test(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([u, 'access', _15 => _15.userID, 'optionalAccess', _16 => _16.userID]), () => ( ""))));
-  } catch (e6) {
+    return key.users.some((u) => EMAIL_UID.test(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([u, 'access', _28 => _28.userID, 'optionalAccess', _29 => _29.userID]), () => ( ""))));
+  } catch (e8) {
     return false;
   }
 }
@@ -1480,7 +1542,7 @@ async function fetchEFPGraph(address) {
       top8 = (top8Data.following || []).map((f) => f.data);
     }
     return { followers, following, top8, hasEfp: !!listId || followers > 0 };
-  } catch (e7) {
+  } catch (e9) {
     return null;
   }
 }
@@ -1577,7 +1639,7 @@ async function verifyGitHub(proof, fingerprint) {
     const resp = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/gists/${proof.gistId}`);
     if (!resp.ok) return { verified: false, reason: `GitHub API returned ${resp.status}` };
     const data = await resp.json();
-    if (_optionalChain([data, 'access', _17 => _17.owner, 'optionalAccess', _18 => _18.login, 'optionalAccess', _19 => _19.toLowerCase, 'call', _20 => _20()]) !== proof.user.toLowerCase()) {
+    if (_optionalChain([data, 'access', _30 => _30.owner, 'optionalAccess', _31 => _31.login, 'optionalAccess', _32 => _32.toLowerCase, 'call', _33 => _33()]) !== proof.user.toLowerCase()) {
       return { verified: false, reason: "Gist owner does not match claimed user" };
     }
     for (const file of Object.values(data.files || {})) {
@@ -1597,7 +1659,7 @@ async function verifyGitHubRepo(proof, fingerprint) {
     );
     if (!resp.ok) return { verified: false, reason: `GitHub API returned ${resp.status}` };
     const data = await resp.json();
-    if (_optionalChain([data, 'access', _21 => _21.owner, 'optionalAccess', _22 => _22.login, 'optionalAccess', _23 => _23.toLowerCase, 'call', _24 => _24()]) !== proof.user.toLowerCase()) {
+    if (_optionalChain([data, 'access', _34 => _34.owner, 'optionalAccess', _35 => _35.login, 'optionalAccess', _36 => _36.toLowerCase, 'call', _37 => _37()]) !== proof.user.toLowerCase()) {
       return { verified: false, reason: "Repository owner does not match claimed account" };
     }
     if (data.description && containsFingerprint(data.description, fingerprint)) {
@@ -1651,7 +1713,7 @@ async function verifyFarcaster(proof, fingerprint, opts = {}) {
       const data = await resp.json();
       for (const msg of data.messages || []) {
         if (msg.hash && msg.hash.startsWith(proof.castHash)) {
-          const text = _optionalChain([msg, 'access', _25 => _25.data, 'optionalAccess', _26 => _26.castAddBody, 'optionalAccess', _27 => _27.text]) || "";
+          const text = _optionalChain([msg, 'access', _38 => _38.data, 'optionalAccess', _39 => _39.castAddBody, 'optionalAccess', _40 => _40.text]) || "";
           if (containsFingerprint(text, fingerprint)) {
             return { verified: true };
           }
@@ -1766,19 +1828,19 @@ async function nftAvatarImage(tokenUri, tokenId, fetchFn = fetch) {
           meta = await res.json();
           break;
         }
-      } catch (e8) {
+      } catch (e10) {
       }
     }
     if (!meta) return null;
   }
-  return avatarUrl(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([meta, 'optionalAccess', _28 => _28.image]), () => ( _optionalChain([meta, 'optionalAccess', _29 => _29.image_url]))));
+  return avatarUrl(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([meta, 'optionalAccess', _41 => _41.image]), () => ( _optionalChain([meta, 'optionalAccess', _42 => _42.image_url]))));
 }
 
 // src/core/ensHint.ts
 var _ens = require('viem/ens');
 var ENS_HINT_KEY = "id.thurin";
 function ensHintFor(record, verifiedFingerprint) {
-  const raw = _nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([record, 'optionalAccess', _30 => _30.trim, 'call', _31 => _31()]), () => ( ""));
+  const raw = _nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([record, 'optionalAccess', _43 => _43.trim, 'call', _44 => _44()]), () => ( ""));
   const expected = verifiedFingerprint ? normalizeFingerprint(verifiedFingerprint) : null;
   if (!raw) return { key: ENS_HINT_KEY, state: "unset", record: null, fingerprint: null, expected };
   const fingerprint = normalizeFingerprint(raw);
@@ -1947,12 +2009,12 @@ function decodeRecord(hex) {
 }
 function parsePointer(text) {
   const p = JSON.parse(text);
-  if (_optionalChain([p, 'optionalAccess', _32 => _32.v]) !== 1 || !Array.isArray(p.releases)) throw new Error("Not a v1 thurin.pointer record");
+  if (_optionalChain([p, 'optionalAccess', _45 => _45.v]) !== 1 || !Array.isArray(p.releases)) throw new Error("Not a v1 thurin.pointer record");
   return p;
 }
 function addPointer(existing, entry) {
   if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(entry.sha256)) throw new Error("sha256 must be 64 hex characters");
-  const releases = [entry, ...(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([existing, 'optionalAccess', _33 => _33.releases]), () => ( []))).filter((r) => r.name !== entry.name)];
+  const releases = [entry, ...(_nullishCoalesce(_optionalChain([existing, 'optionalAccess', _46 => _46.releases]), () => ( []))).filter((r) => r.name !== entry.name)];
   const dropped = [];
   const record = { v: 1, releases };
   while (new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(record)).length > MAX_RECORD_BYTES && releases.length > 1) dropped.push(releases.pop());
@@ -1986,14 +2048,14 @@ async function parseRecord(kind, text, opts = {}) {
     case "thurin.affiliation": {
       try {
         const j = JSON.parse(t);
-        if (_optionalChain([j, 'optionalAccess', _34 => _34.v]) !== 1 || typeof j.with !== "string" || !j.with) return invalid('Not a v1 affiliation: expected {"v":1,"with":"<address or name>"}');
+        if (_optionalChain([j, 'optionalAccess', _47 => _47.v]) !== 1 || typeof j.with !== "string" || !j.with) return invalid('Not a v1 affiliation: expected {"v":1,"with":"<address or name>"}');
         return { ...base, valid: true, data: { type: "affiliation", with: j.with, role: typeof j.role === "string" ? j.role : null } };
-      } catch (e9) {
+      } catch (e11) {
         return invalid("Not JSON");
       }
     }
     case "thurin.canary": {
-      const date = _optionalChain([t, 'access', _35 => _35.match, 'call', _36 => _36(ISO_DATE), 'optionalAccess', _37 => _37[1]]);
+      const date = _optionalChain([t, 'access', _48 => _48.match, 'call', _49 => _49(ISO_DATE), 'optionalAccess', _50 => _50[1]]);
       if (!date) return invalid("No date in the statement");
       const clearsigned = t.startsWith("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----");
       let statement = clearsigned ? (_nullishCoalesce(t.split(/\r?\n\r?\n/)[1], () => ( ""))).split("-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----")[0].trim() : t;
@@ -2013,7 +2075,7 @@ async function parseRecord(kind, text, opts = {}) {
       try {
         const { readMessage } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => _interopRequireWildcard(require("openpgp")));
         recipients = (await readMessage({ armoredMessage: t })).getEncryptionKeyIDs().length;
-      } catch (e10) {
+      } catch (e12) {
         return invalid("PGP message does not parse");
       }
       return { ...base, valid: true, data: { type: "encrypted", recipients } };
@@ -2021,7 +2083,7 @@ async function parseRecord(kind, text, opts = {}) {
     case "thurin.pointer": {
       try {
         return { ...base, valid: true, data: { type: "pointer", releases: parsePointer(t).releases } };
-      } catch (e11) {
+      } catch (e13) {
         return invalid("Not a v1 pointer record");
       }
     }
@@ -2039,6 +2101,102 @@ async function fetchRecords(client, registry, abi, owner, index, kinds = IDENTIT
   return out;
 }
 
+// src/core/claimStatus.ts
+var CLAIM_CHECK_LABEL = {
+  verified: "pgp verified",
+  expired: "key expired",
+  "signing-key-expired": "signing key expired",
+  revoked: "key revoked",
+  compromised: "key compromised",
+  "signing-key-revoked": "signing key revoked",
+  unsupported: "not supported",
+  "bad-signature": "doesn't verify"
+};
+function formatClaimDate(isoOrSeconds) {
+  if (isoOrSeconds === null || isoOrSeconds === void 0) return "an unknown date";
+  const d = typeof isoOrSeconds === "number" ? new Date(isoOrSeconds * 1e3) : new Date(isoOrSeconds);
+  if (Number.isNaN(d.getTime())) return "an unknown date";
+  return d.toLocaleDateString("en-US", { month: "short", day: "numeric", year: "numeric", timeZone: "UTC" });
+}
+function shortFingerprint(fpr) {
+  if (!fpr) return "unknown";
+  const f = fpr.toUpperCase();
+  return `${f.slice(0, 4)} ${f.slice(4, 8)} \u2026`;
+}
+function claimCheckText(v, formatDate = formatClaimDate) {
+  const kind = _nullishCoalesce(v.kind, () => ( (v.verified ? "verified" : "bad-signature")));
+  const at = formatDate(v.at);
+  const t = (sentence, fix = null) => ({ kind, label: CLAIM_CHECK_LABEL[kind], sentence, fix });
+  switch (kind) {
+    case "verified":
+      return t("The key signed a line naming this address, and the signature checks out.");
+    case "expired":
+      return t(
+        `The key on this claim expired on ${at}, so the claim no longer counts.`,
+        "Extend the key, then Update key. No new signature needed."
+      );
+    case "signing-key-expired":
+      return t(
+        `The subkey that signed this claim (${shortFingerprint(v.signingKey)}) expired on ${at}.`,
+        "Extend that subkey, then Update key."
+      );
+    case "revoked":
+      return t(
+        `Its owner revoked this PGP key on ${at}${v.revocationReason ? ` (reason: ${v.revocationReason})` : ""}. The claim no longer counts.`,
+        "Revoke this claim and attest your new key."
+      );
+    case "compromised":
+      return t(
+        `Its owner revoked this PGP key on ${at} as compromised. Don't trust anything it signed after that date.`,
+        "Revoke this claim and attest a new key."
+      );
+    case "signing-key-revoked":
+      return t(
+        `The subkey that signed this claim was revoked on ${at}.`,
+        "Replace the claim with a signature from a current key."
+      );
+    case "unsupported":
+      return t(`This key uses an algorithm Thurin doesn't check${v.algorithm ? ` (${v.algorithm})` : ""}. The claim is on-chain, but no lookup will vouch for it.`);
+    case "bad-signature":
+    default:
+      return t("The signature stored with this claim doesn't match its key, so nothing from this claim is shown.");
+  }
+}
+function expiresSoon(v, now = Date.now(), withinDays = 30) {
+  if (!_optionalChain([v, 'optionalAccess', _51 => _51.verified]) || !v.expiresAt) return null;
+  const ms = new Date(v.expiresAt).getTime() - now;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(ms) || ms < 0 || ms > withinDays * 864e5) return null;
+  return { days: Math.floor(ms / 864e5), at: v.expiresAt };
+}
+function expiresSoonText(soon, formatDate = formatClaimDate) {
+  const when = soon.days === 0 ? "today" : soon.days === 1 ? "in 1 day" : `in ${soon.days} days`;
+  return `Key expires ${when} (${formatDate(soon.at)}).`;
+}
+function claimFates(claims) {
+  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const c of claims) {
+    if (!c.revokedAt) {
+      out.set(c.index, { state: "active" });
+      continue;
+    }
+    const successor = claims.filter((n) => n.index > c.index && n.createdAt === c.revokedAt).sort((a, b) => a.index - b.index)[0];
+    out.set(c.index, successor ? { state: "replaced", at: c.revokedAt, by: successor.index } : { state: "revoked", at: c.revokedAt });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function claimFateText(fate, formatDate = (s) => formatClaimDate(s)) {
+  if (fate.state === "revoked") return `Revoked by its owner on ${formatDate(fate.at)}.`;
+  if (fate.state === "replaced") return `Replaced by claim #${fate.by} on ${formatDate(fate.at)}.`;
+  return null;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
 
 
 
@@ -2103,5 +2261,5 @@ async function fetchRecords(client, registry, abi, owner, index, kinds = IDENTIT
 
 
 
-exports.REGISTRY_ABI = REGISTRY_ABI; exports.REGISTRY_ADDRESS = REGISTRY_ADDRESS; exports.NETWORKS = NETWORKS; exports.isNetworkName = isNetworkName; exports.getRegistry = getRegistry; exports.chainFor = chainFor; exports.needsRpcProbe = needsRpcProbe; exports.identityErrorKind = identityErrorKind; exports.IDENTITY_ERROR_TEXT = IDENTITY_ERROR_TEXT; exports.normalizeFingerprint = normalizeFingerprint; exports.fingerprintToBytes = fingerprintToBytes; exports.bytesToFingerprint = bytesToFingerprint; exports.fingerprintHash = fingerprintHash; exports.keyIdOf = keyIdOf; exports.keyIdToBytes = keyIdToBytes; exports.parsePgpKey = parsePgpKey; exports.verifyClearsigned = verifyClearsigned; exports.verifyAttestation = verifyAttestation; exports.stripEmailUserIDs = stripEmailUserIDs; exports.hasEmailUserID = hasEmailUserID; exports.fetchEFPGraph = fetchEFPGraph; exports.identifyProof = identifyProof; exports.displayUrl = displayUrl; exports.proofHref = proofHref; exports.proofSecondaryHref = proofSecondaryHref; exports.FARCASTER_HUB = FARCASTER_HUB; exports.verifyProof = verifyProof; exports.IPFS_GATEWAYS = IPFS_GATEWAYS; exports.IPFS_GATEWAY = IPFS_GATEWAY; exports.ARWEAVE_GATEWAY = ARWEAVE_GATEWAY; exports.avatarUrl = avatarUrl; exports.avatarFallbacks = avatarFallbacks; exports.parseNftAvatar = parseNftAvatar; exports.NFT_AVATAR_ABI = NFT_AVATAR_ABI; exports.nftAvatarImage = nftAvatarImage; exports.ENS_HINT_KEY = ENS_HINT_KEY; exports.ensHintFor = ensHintFor; exports.ensHintValue = ensHintValue; exports.ENS_TEXT_RESOLVER_ABI = ENS_TEXT_RESOLVER_ABI; exports.ensHintWrite = ensHintWrite; exports.fetchEnsHint = fetchEnsHint; exports.EIP712_NAME = EIP712_NAME; exports.EIP712_VERSION = EIP712_VERSION; exports.registryDomain = registryDomain; exports.AUTHORIZATION_TYPES = AUTHORIZATION_TYPES; exports.attestTypedData = attestTypedData; exports.reattestTypedData = reattestTypedData; exports.updateKeyTypedData = updateKeyTypedData; exports.revokeTypedData = revokeTypedData; exports.setRecordTypedData = setRecordTypedData; exports.authorizationDigest = authorizationDigest; exports.recordKind = recordKind; exports.MAX_RECORD_BYTES = MAX_RECORD_BYTES; exports.kindName = kindName; exports.KNOWN_KINDS = KNOWN_KINDS; exports.IDENTITY_KINDS = IDENTITY_KINDS; exports.encodeRecord = encodeRecord; exports.decodeRecord = decodeRecord; exports.parsePointer = parsePointer; exports.addPointer = addPointer; exports.renderPointer = renderPointer; exports.parseRecord = parseRecord; exports.fetchRecords = fetchRecords;
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OIE72R6J.cjs.map
+exports.REGISTRY_ABI = REGISTRY_ABI; exports.REGISTRY_ADDRESS = REGISTRY_ADDRESS; exports.NETWORKS = NETWORKS; exports.isNetworkName = isNetworkName; exports.getRegistry = getRegistry; exports.chainFor = chainFor; exports.needsRpcProbe = needsRpcProbe; exports.identityErrorKind = identityErrorKind; exports.IDENTITY_ERROR_TEXT = IDENTITY_ERROR_TEXT; exports.normalizeFingerprint = normalizeFingerprint; exports.fingerprintToBytes = fingerprintToBytes; exports.bytesToFingerprint = bytesToFingerprint; exports.fingerprintHash = fingerprintHash; exports.keyIdOf = keyIdOf; exports.keyIdToBytes = keyIdToBytes; exports.parsePgpKey = parsePgpKey; exports.verifyClearsigned = verifyClearsigned; exports.verifyAttestation = verifyAttestation; exports.stripEmailUserIDs = stripEmailUserIDs; exports.hasEmailUserID = hasEmailUserID; exports.fetchEFPGraph = fetchEFPGraph; exports.identifyProof = identifyProof; exports.displayUrl = displayUrl; exports.proofHref = proofHref; exports.proofSecondaryHref = proofSecondaryHref; exports.FARCASTER_HUB = FARCASTER_HUB; exports.verifyProof = verifyProof; exports.IPFS_GATEWAYS = IPFS_GATEWAYS; exports.IPFS_GATEWAY = IPFS_GATEWAY; exports.ARWEAVE_GATEWAY = ARWEAVE_GATEWAY; exports.avatarUrl = avatarUrl; exports.avatarFallbacks = avatarFallbacks; exports.parseNftAvatar = parseNftAvatar; exports.NFT_AVATAR_ABI = NFT_AVATAR_ABI; exports.nftAvatarImage = nftAvatarImage; exports.ENS_HINT_KEY = ENS_HINT_KEY; exports.ensHintFor = ensHintFor; exports.ensHintValue = ensHintValue; exports.ENS_TEXT_RESOLVER_ABI = ENS_TEXT_RESOLVER_ABI; exports.ensHintWrite = ensHintWrite; exports.fetchEnsHint = fetchEnsHint; exports.EIP712_NAME = EIP712_NAME; exports.EIP712_VERSION = EIP712_VERSION; exports.registryDomain = registryDomain; exports.AUTHORIZATION_TYPES = AUTHORIZATION_TYPES; exports.attestTypedData = attestTypedData; exports.reattestTypedData = reattestTypedData; exports.updateKeyTypedData = updateKeyTypedData; exports.revokeTypedData = revokeTypedData; exports.setRecordTypedData = setRecordTypedData; exports.authorizationDigest = authorizationDigest; exports.recordKind = recordKind; exports.MAX_RECORD_BYTES = MAX_RECORD_BYTES; exports.kindName = kindName; exports.KNOWN_KINDS = KNOWN_KINDS; exports.IDENTITY_KINDS = IDENTITY_KINDS; exports.encodeRecord = encodeRecord; exports.decodeRecord = decodeRecord; exports.parsePointer = parsePointer; exports.addPointer = addPointer; exports.renderPointer = renderPointer; exports.parseRecord = parseRecord; exports.fetchRecords = fetchRecords; exports.CLAIM_CHECK_LABEL = CLAIM_CHECK_LABEL; exports.formatClaimDate = formatClaimDate; exports.claimCheckText = claimCheckText; exports.expiresSoon = expiresSoon; exports.expiresSoonText = expiresSoonText; exports.claimFates = claimFates; exports.claimFateText = claimFateText;
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-M2OJDB7I.cjs.map