@theronap/cortex-mcp 0.9.44 → 0.9.46

package/lib/imessage_send.test.mjs

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-import { test, expect } from 'bun:test'
-import { decideSend, loadSendAllowlist, phoneKey } from './imessage_send.mjs'
-
-const allow = loadSendAllowlist('+18015551234, mom@example.com')
-
-test('draft-by-default: no send flag → draft, never sends (D3)', () => {
-  const d = decideSend({ recipient: '+18015551234', message: 'hi', send: false, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null })
-  expect(d.action).toBe('draft')
-})
-
-test('allowlisted recipient + send:true → send (D10)', () => {
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: '+1 (801) 555-1234', message: 'hi', send: true, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null }).action).toBe('send')
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: 'MOM@example.com', message: 'hi', send: true, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null }).action).toBe('send')
-})
-
-test('off-list recipient + send:true, no secret → BLOCKED (D10 prompt-injection guard)', () => {
-  const d = decideSend({ recipient: '+19998887777', message: 'hi', send: true, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null })
-  expect(d.action).toBe('blocked')
-})
-
-test('off-list recipient sends only with the correct out-of-band confirm secret', () => {
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: '+19998887777', message: 'hi', send: true, confirm: 'wrong', allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: 'sesame' }).action).toBe('blocked')
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: '+19998887777', message: 'hi', send: true, confirm: 'sesame', allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: 'sesame' }).action).toBe('send')
-})
-
-test('empty recipient/message is blocked', () => {
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: '', message: 'hi', send: true, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null }).action).toBe('blocked')
-  expect(decideSend({ recipient: '+18015551234', message: '  ', send: true, allowlist: allow, confirmSecret: null }).action).toBe('blocked')
-})
-
-test('phoneKey + allowlist normalization', () => {
-  expect(phoneKey('+1 (801) 555-1234')).toBe('8015551234')
-  expect(allow.has('8015551234')).toBe(true)
-  expect(allow.has('mom@example.com')).toBe(true)
-})

package/lib/redact.test.mjs

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-import { test, expect } from 'bun:test'
-import { redactSecrets } from './redact.mjs'
-
-// The 2026-06-22 finding: a Claude Code login token (sk-ant-oat01-…) was sitting inlined
-// in a Stop-hook command and could ride a transcript tail to the org. Capture must never
-// transmit a credential. These assert known secret shapes are stripped — and that ordinary
-// prose / record UUIDs are left intact (no false positives that would mangle real content).
-
-test('redacts an Anthropic OAuth (Claude Code login) token', () => {
-  const s = 'CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-ant-oat01-oyo53qZ8m_WSrYZU8rrpWrxmgtbO1T8hSOhhpicMqeZ4Ixtwzbj0qwb in the hook'
-  const out = redactSecrets(s)
-  expect(out).not.toContain('sk-ant-oat01-oyo53qZ8m')
-  expect(out).toContain('[REDACTED:anthropic-oauth]')
-})
-
-test('redacts a range of credential shapes', () => {
-  const cases = [
-    ['sk-ant-api03-' + 'a'.repeat(40), 'anthropic-key'],
-    ['sk-proj-' + 'b'.repeat(40), 'openai'],
-    ['sk-' + 'c'.repeat(40), 'openai'],
-    ['ghp_' + 'd'.repeat(36), 'github'],
-    ['github_pat_' + 'e'.repeat(30), 'github-pat'],
-    ['AKIA' + 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP', 'aws-akid'],
-    ['AIza' + 'f'.repeat(35), 'google'],
-    ['xoxb-' + '1234567890-abcdef', 'slack'],
-    ['eyJ' + 'a'.repeat(20) + '.' + 'b'.repeat(20) + '.' + 'c'.repeat(20), 'jwt'],
-  ]
-  for (const [secret, tag] of cases) {
-    const out = redactSecrets(`token: ${secret} end`)
-    expect(out).toContain(`[REDACTED:${tag}]`)
-    expect(out).not.toContain(secret)
-  }
-})
-
-test('redacts a Bearer token but keeps the scheme', () => {
-  const out = redactSecrets('Authorization: Bearer abcdef0123456789ABCDEFxyz')
-  expect(out).toBe('Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]')
-})
-
-test('redacts a PEM private key block', () => {
-  const out = redactSecrets('-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIE...\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----')
-  expect(out).toContain('[REDACTED:private-key]')
-  expect(out).not.toContain('MIIE')
-})
-
-test('leaves ordinary prose and record UUIDs untouched', () => {
-  const prose = 'Fixed the ingest latency; record 5203eacd-321b-43f7-bae2-4d6e7cae96ab landed in ~0.3s.'
-  expect(redactSecrets(prose)).toBe(prose)
-})
-
-// The 2026-07-02 finding: a grep of ~/.codex/hooks.json printed the live CORTEX_TOKEN (a bare
-// UUID — no pattern above catches those) into a transcript. The inline form is gone from hooks
-// (capture self-resolves now), but transcripts can still carry config lines from ANY tool read.
-test('redacts CORTEX_TOKEN in env-assignment and TOML/JSON forms', () => {
-  const uuid = 'ee0455d0-49bd-4141-984d-ece9311f9407'
-  const cases = [
-    `CORTEX_TOKEN=${uuid} npx -y @theronap/cortex-mcp@latest capture`,   // legacy hook command
-    `"CORTEX_TOKEN": "${uuid}"`,                                          // ~/.claude.json
-    `CORTEX_TOKEN = "${uuid}"`,                                           // config.toml
-  ]
-  for (const s of cases) {
-    const out = redactSecrets(s)
-    expect(out).toContain('[REDACTED:cortex-token]')
-    expect(out).not.toContain(uuid)
-  }
-})
-
-test('redacts generic secret-shaped env assignments', () => {
-  const out = redactSecrets('export SUPABASE_SERVICE_SECRET=abcDEF0123456789xyz && run')
-  expect(out).toBe('export SUPABASE_SERVICE_SECRET=[REDACTED:env] && run')
-  const out2 = redactSecrets('MY_API_KEY: "0123456789abcdef0123"')
-  expect(out2).toContain('[REDACTED:env]')
-})
-
-test('generic env pattern leaves short placeholders and prose intact', () => {
-  const cases = [
-    'set YOUR_TOKEN=xxx in the env',                    // short placeholder value
-    'the CORTEX_TOKEN is stored in ~/.claude.json',     // prose, no assignment value
-    'record 5203eacd-321b-43f7-bae2-4d6e7cae96ab',      // bare UUID, no key name
-  ]
-  for (const s of cases) expect(redactSecrets(s)).toBe(s)
-})
-
-test('handles empty / non-string input safely', () => {
-  expect(redactSecrets('')).toBe('')
-  expect(redactSecrets(null)).toBe(null)
-  expect(redactSecrets(undefined)).toBe(undefined)
-})

package/lib/skills.test.mjs

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, it, expect } from 'bun:test'
-import { planOrgInstall } from './skills.mjs'
-
-describe('planOrgInstall — the collision + validity gate', () => {
-  it('installs valid served skills', () => {
-    const { install, skipped } = planOrgInstall(
-      [{ name: 'deploy-runbook', body_md: '---\nname: deploy-runbook\n---\nbody' }],
-      ['cortex-log', 'cortex-context'],
-    )
-    expect(install).toEqual([{ name: 'deploy-runbook', source: '---\nname: deploy-runbook\n---\nbody' }])
-    expect(skipped).toEqual([])
-  })
-  it('bundled core skills win name collisions (org can never shadow cortex-log)', () => {
-    const { install, skipped } = planOrgInstall(
-      [{ name: 'cortex-log', body_md: 'evil override' }],
-      ['cortex-log'],
-    )
-    expect(install).toEqual([])
-    expect(skipped[0]).toMatchObject({ name: 'cortex-log' })
-  })
-  it('drops invalid names (path tricks, uppercase, empty) and empty bodies', () => {
-    const { install, skipped } = planOrgInstall(
-      [
-        { name: '../escape', body_md: 'x' },
-        { name: 'UPPER', body_md: 'x' },
-        { name: 'ok-name', body_md: '   ' },
-        { name: '', body_md: 'x' },
-        { name: 'fine', body_md: 'x' },
-      ],
-      [],
-    )
-    expect(install).toEqual([{ name: 'fine', source: 'x' }])
-    expect(skipped.length).toBe(4)
-  })
-  it('tolerates a malformed served list', () => {
-    expect(planOrgInstall(null, []).install).toEqual([])
-    expect(planOrgInstall([null, {}, { name: 'a' }], []).install).toEqual([])
-  })
-})