@theokit/sdk 4.37.2 → 4.39.0

package/dist/sandbox/linux-sandbox.d.ts

@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ export declare class LinuxSandbox extends LocalSandbox {
     /** Extracted for test visibility — delegates to the pure `wrapCommandForSandbox` (M57, single wrap SoT). */
     wrapCommand(command: string): string | null;
     /**
-     * M75 review (arquitetura, HIGH) — sem este override a classe MENTIA.
+     * M75 review (architecture, HIGH) — without this override the class LIED.
      *
-     * `LinuxSandbox` se documenta como "kernel-enforced sandbox backend", mas sobrescrevia apenas
-     * `execute`. `uploadFile` continuava o herdado de `LocalSandbox`, que escreve direto no host via
-     * `fs/promises` e aceita caminho ABSOLUTO — sem bwrap, sem seccomp, sem restrição de caminho. E
-     * `SandboxBackend.writeFile` delega a ele. O resultado era uma classe incoerente: ler, buscar e
-     * listar passavam pelo confinamento; escrever, não.
+     * `LinuxSandbox` documents itself as a "kernel-enforced sandbox backend", but it overrode only
+     * `execute`. `uploadFile` stayed the one inherited from `LocalSandbox`, which writes straight to
+     * the host via `fs/promises` and accepts an ABSOLUTE path — no bwrap, no seccomp, no path
+     * restriction. And `SandboxBackend.writeFile` delegates to it. The result was an incoherent class:
+     * reading, searching and listing went through the confinement; writing did not.
      *
-     * Rotear pelo `execute` embrulhado resolve na raiz: a escrita passa a viver sob a MESMA política
-     * do resto — se o bwrap nega o caminho, a escrita falha, como deve. O conteúdo vai por stdin (não
-     * por argv) porque argv tem limite de tamanho e conteúdo de arquivo não tem.
+     * Routing through the wrapped `execute` fixes it at the root: writes come to live under the SAME
+     * policy as everything else — if bwrap denies the path, the write fails, as it should. The content
+     * goes over stdin (not argv) because argv has a size limit and file content does not.
      */
-    uploadFile(caminho: string, conteudo: string | Buffer): Promise<void>;
+    uploadFile(path: string, content: string | Buffer): Promise<void>;
     execute(command: string, opts?: {
         timeoutMs?: number;
     }): Promise<import("./types.js").ExecuteResult>;
@@ -100,26 +100,31 @@ export interface CreateSandboxBackendOptions {
  * MISSING_BWRAP_WARNING. The durable posture lives in `resolveSandboxPosture` for the UI.
  */
 export declare function createSandboxBackend(opts: CreateSandboxBackendOptions): SandboxBackend;
-/** Reset para testes — o latch é estado de módulo e testes precisam de isolamento. */
+/** Reset for tests — the latch is module state and tests need isolation. */
 export declare function resetInteractiveWarnLatch(): void;
 export interface InteractiveWrapOptions {
     mode: SandboxMode;
-    /** `true` mantém a rede. Default `false`, igual ao `run_shell` não-interativo. */
+    /** `true` keeps the network. Default `false`, same as non-interactive `run_shell`. */
     network?: boolean;
-    /** Injetável para testes; default é a detecção real memoizada. */
+    /** Injectable for tests; defaults to the real memoized detection. */
     detect?: () => BwrapDetection;
-    /** Injetável para testes; default é `console.warn` com redação. */
+    /** Injectable for tests; defaults to `console.warn` with redaction. */
     warn?: (message: string) => void;
 }
 /**
- * A composição que o caminho interativo precisa — o par de `createSandboxBackend`.
+ * The composition the interactive path needs — the counterpart of `createSandboxBackend`.
  *
- * `createSandboxBackend` resolve isto para o caminho não-interativo devolvendo um BACKEND pronto. O
- * PTY não aceita um backend: ele é dono do spawn e só admite transformar o comando. Esta função
- * entrega a MESMA decisão na forma que o PTY aceita — `(command, cwd) => string | null`.
+ * `createSandboxBackend` solves this for the non-interactive path by returning a ready BACKEND. The
+ * PTY accepts no backend: it owns the spawn and only allows transforming the command. This function
+ * delivers the SAME decision in the shape the PTY accepts — `(command, cwd) => string | null` —
+ * ready for `new PtyInteractiveBackend({ wrapCommand: interactiveWrapCommand({ mode }) })`.
  *
- * A detecção é consultada **a cada wrap**, não congelada na construção: uma sessão interativa vive
- * por horas, e uma detecção positiva obsoleta continuaria afirmando confinamento depois de o binário
- * sumir.
+ * Detection is consulted on **every wrap**, not frozen at construction: an interactive session lives
+ * for hours, and a stale positive detection would keep asserting confinement after the binary
+ * disappeared (the `existsSync` revalidation lives inside `detectBwrapMemoized`).
+ *
+ * The two routes returning `null` are semantically different and the code does not merge them:
+ * `danger-full-access` is an explicit opt-out and does NOT warn; bwrap being unavailable is a
+ * failure and warns once.
  */
 export declare function interactiveWrapCommand(opts: InteractiveWrapOptions): (command: string, cwd: string) => string | null;

package/dist/server/auth/index.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Always include a PKCE verifier — PKCE-aware\n    // providers (Google OIDC) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub\n    // OAuth 2.0) discard it. 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Please retry sign-in.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Verify state matches query param (CSRF defense per RFC 6749 §10.12)\n    const queryState = url.searchParams.get(\"state\");\n    if (!queryState || queryState !== tx.state) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_state_mismatch\",\n        \"OAuth state mismatch. Possible CSRF attempt or stale callback.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Provider-specific callback handling (token exchange + userinfo fetch)\n    const result = await provider.handleCallback(req, tx);\n\n    // Invoke onSignIn callback if defined to derive session shape\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile: result.profile, provider: result.providerName });\n    } else {\n      // No onSignIn — pass the raw profile as session (consumers must type their own TSession)\n      sessionData = result.profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    // EC-10 (v1.1) — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation: rotate session ID BEFORE creating new session\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      // rotateSession may no-op if no pre-existing session — non-fatal\n    }\n\n    // Create session cookie\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n\n    // Clear transaction cookie\n    clearTransaction(res);\n\n    return { session: sessionData, returnTo: tx.returnTo };\n  }\n\n  async function signIn<TProfile>(\n    profile: TProfile,\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<TSession> {\n    // Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow, directly derive + persist session\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile, provider: providerName });\n    } else {\n      sessionData = profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      /* no-op if no pre-existing session */\n    }\n\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n    return sessionData;\n  }\n\n  async function signOut(res: ServerResponse): Promise<void> {\n    // Read current session before destroying (so onSignOut can see it)\n    let sessionData: TSession | null = null;\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      // We don't have req here per AuthOrchestrator contract; onSignOut receives null\n      // when no pre-existing session is available. Apps that need session-aware\n      // signOut should use the manual session.destroySession + custom logic.\n      sessionData = null;\n    }\n\n    opts.session.destroySession(res);\n\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      await opts.onSignOut(sessionData);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null> {\n    return opts.session.getSession(req);\n  }\n\n  return { startSignIn, finishSignIn, signIn, signOut, getSession };\n}\n\n/** SE36 — `Auth.create` replaces `defineAuth` (ADR 0015). @public */\nexport class Auth {\n  private constructor() {}\n  static create<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n    return defineAuth(opts);\n  }\n}\n"]}
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[]) {\n    if (!provider.name || !PROVIDER_NAME_RE.test(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"invalid_provider_name\",\n        `Provider name must match ${PROVIDER_NAME_RE} (got: '${provider.name}')`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (providersMap.has(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"duplicate_provider_name\",\n        `Duplicate provider name: '${provider.name}'`,\n      );\n    }\n    providersMap.set(provider.name, provider);\n  }\n\n  const txSecret = txCookieSecret(opts);\n\n  function requireProvider(name: string): AuthProvider<unknown, string> {\n    const p = providersMap.get(name);\n    if (!p) throw new AuthProviderNotFoundError(name);\n    return p;\n  }\n\n  async function startSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    startOpts?: { returnTo?: string },\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-2 (v1.1) — validate returnTo same-origin\n    const baseUrl = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const safeReturnTo = validateReturnTo(startOpts?.returnTo, baseUrl);\n\n    // Generate transaction. Always include a PKCE verifier — PKCE-aware\n    // providers (Google OIDC) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub\n    // OAuth 2.0) discard it. Generating unconditionally simplifies the\n    // provider contract: every tx is PKCE-ready.\n    const state = randomState();\n    const pkceVerifier = generatePkceVerifier();\n    const tx = newTransaction({\n      state,\n      pkceVerifier,\n      returnTo: safeReturnTo === \"/\" ? undefined : safeReturnTo,\n    });\n\n    // Persist transaction cookie via headers (since we return Response, need Set-Cookie header manually)\n    const authUrl = await provider.createAuthorizationURL(tx);\n\n    // Build response with Set-Cookie + redirect\n    const headers = new Headers();\n    headers.set(\"Location\", authUrl.toString());\n    const { encodeTransaction } = await import(\"./oauth-transaction-store.js\");\n    const encodedTx = await encodeTransaction(tx, txSecret);\n    headers.set(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      `theo_oauth_tx=${encodedTx}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age=600`,\n    );\n\n    return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers });\n  }\n\n  // biome-ignore lint/complexity/noExcessiveCognitiveComplexity: OAuth callback handler must validate 6 distinct error conditions sequentially (provider error / state / tx fetch / PKCE / code exchange / session) — extracting helpers fragments the linear control flow without clarifying intent (per EC-1 v1.1 absorbed)\n  async function finishSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<{ session: TSession; returnTo?: string }> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-1 (v1.1) — OAuth provider error response (user declined consent) check BEFORE code-exchange\n    const url = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const errorParam = url.searchParams.get(\"error\");\n    if (errorParam) {\n      const errorDescription = url.searchParams.get(\"error_description\") ?? undefined;\n      if (errorParam === \"access_denied\") {\n        throw new AuthCancelledError(errorDescription);\n      }\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_provider_error\",\n        `Provider returned error: ${errorParam}${errorDescription ? ` (${errorDescription})` : \"\"}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Read + validate transaction cookie\n    const tx = await getTransaction(req, txSecret);\n    if (!tx) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_transaction_expired\",\n        \"OAuth transaction cookie missing or expired (>10min). Please retry sign-in.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Verify state matches query param (CSRF defense per RFC 6749 §10.12)\n    const queryState = url.searchParams.get(\"state\");\n    if (!queryState || queryState !== tx.state) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_state_mismatch\",\n        \"OAuth state mismatch. Possible CSRF attempt or stale callback.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Provider-specific callback handling (token exchange + userinfo fetch)\n    const result = await provider.handleCallback(req, tx);\n\n    // Invoke onSignIn callback if defined to derive session shape\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile: result.profile, provider: result.providerName });\n    } else {\n      // No onSignIn — pass the raw profile as session (consumers must type their own TSession)\n      sessionData = result.profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    // EC-10 (v1.1) — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation: rotate session ID BEFORE creating new session\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      // rotateSession may no-op if no pre-existing session — non-fatal\n    }\n\n    // Create session cookie\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n\n    // Clear transaction cookie\n    clearTransaction(res);\n\n    return { session: sessionData, returnTo: tx.returnTo };\n  }\n\n  async function signIn<TProfile>(\n    profile: TProfile,\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<TSession> {\n    // Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow, directly derive + persist session\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile, provider: providerName });\n    } else {\n      sessionData = profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      /* no-op if no pre-existing session */\n    }\n\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n    return sessionData;\n  }\n\n  async function signOut(res: ServerResponse): Promise<void> {\n    // Read current session before destroying (so onSignOut can see it)\n    let sessionData: TSession | null = null;\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      // We don't have req here per AuthOrchestrator contract; onSignOut receives null\n      // when no pre-existing session is available. Apps that need session-aware\n      // signOut should use the manual session.destroySession + custom logic.\n      sessionData = null;\n    }\n\n    opts.session.destroySession(res);\n\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      await opts.onSignOut(sessionData);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null> {\n    return opts.session.getSession(req);\n  }\n\n  return { startSignIn, finishSignIn, signIn, signOut, getSession };\n}\n\n/** SE36 — `Auth.create` replaces `defineAuth` (ADR 0015). @public */\nexport class Auth {\n  private constructor() {}\n  static create<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n    return defineAuth(opts);\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/auth/index.d.cts

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ declare class AuthCancelledError extends AuthCallbackError {
 }
 
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Caminho C Hybrid per G11)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Path C Hybrid per G11)
  *
  * Plan: g11-auth-architecture-implementation v1.4 (sha256 4d381020...)
  * Blueprint: g11-auth-architecture-decision v1.1 (SHIPPABLE 97.9)
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ interface AuthProvider<TProfile, TName extends string = string> {
     handleCallback(req: IncomingMessage, tx: OAuthTransaction): Promise<AuthResult<TProfile, TName>>;
 }
 /**
- * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Caminho C (Hybrid).
- * `providers` optional: empty = Caminho A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
+ * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Path C (Hybrid).
+ * `providers` optional: empty = Path A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
  * `onSignIn` invoked after provider callback success; returns TSession to persist.
  */
 interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
  * - startSignIn: returns Response.redirect to provider authorization URL with state cookie
  * - finishSignIn: handles provider callback; verifies state; calls onSignIn; rotates session ID
  *   (OWASP A07:2021 per EC-10); creates session cookie; clears transaction cookie
- * - signIn: Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
+ * - signIn: Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
  * - signOut: destroys session cookie + invokes onSignOut callback
  * - getSession: read-only passthrough to session.getSession
  */
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ declare class AuthSecretTooShortError extends Error {
 }
 
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Caminho C Hybrid)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Path C Hybrid)
  *
- * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Caminho C signatures.
+ * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Path C signatures.
  * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.
  */
 

package/dist/server/auth/index.d.ts

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ declare class AuthCancelledError extends AuthCallbackError {
 }
 
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Caminho C Hybrid per G11)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Path C Hybrid per G11)
  *
  * Plan: g11-auth-architecture-implementation v1.4 (sha256 4d381020...)
  * Blueprint: g11-auth-architecture-decision v1.1 (SHIPPABLE 97.9)
@@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ interface AuthProvider<TProfile, TName extends string = string> {
     handleCallback(req: IncomingMessage, tx: OAuthTransaction): Promise<AuthResult<TProfile, TName>>;
 }
 /**
- * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Caminho C (Hybrid).
- * `providers` optional: empty = Caminho A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
+ * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Path C (Hybrid).
+ * `providers` optional: empty = Path A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
  * `onSignIn` invoked after provider callback success; returns TSession to persist.
  */
 interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
  * - startSignIn: returns Response.redirect to provider authorization URL with state cookie
  * - finishSignIn: handles provider callback; verifies state; calls onSignIn; rotates session ID
  *   (OWASP A07:2021 per EC-10); creates session cookie; clears transaction cookie
- * - signIn: Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
+ * - signIn: Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
  * - signOut: destroys session cookie + invokes onSignOut callback
  * - getSession: read-only passthrough to session.getSession
  */
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ declare class AuthSecretTooShortError extends Error {
 }
 
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Caminho C Hybrid)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Path C Hybrid)
  *
- * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Caminho C signatures.
+ * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Path C signatures.
  * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.
  */
 

package/dist/server/auth/index.js.map

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returnTo.trim();\n\n  // Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com) are dangerous — browser would resolve to current protocol\n  if (trimmed.startsWith(\"//\")) {\n    return \"/\";\n  }\n\n  // Try absolute URL parsing first\n  if (URL.canParse(trimmed)) {\n    const parsed = new URL(trimmed);\n    if (parsed.origin === baseUrl.origin) {\n      // Same-origin absolute URL — return the pathname+search+hash portion (drop origin)\n      return parsed.pathname + parsed.search + parsed.hash;\n    }\n    // Cross-origin — reject\n    return \"/\";\n  }\n\n  // Not parseable as absolute. Must start with '/' to be a valid relative path\n  if (trimmed.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n    return trimmed;\n  }\n\n  // Anything else (e.g., \"javascript:alert\", \"data:...\" that wasn't parseable, or bare strings) → default\n  return \"/\";\n}\n","/**\n * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Caminho C Hybrid)\n *\n * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Caminho C signatures.\n * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.\n */\n\nimport { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from \"node:http\";\nimport {\n  AuthCallbackError,\n  AuthCancelledError,\n  AuthConfigError,\n  AuthProviderNotFoundError,\n} from \"./errors.js\";\nimport { clearTransaction, getTransaction, newTransaction } from \"./oauth-transaction-store.js\";\nimport type { AuthOrchestrator, AuthProvider, DefineAuthOptions } from \"./types.js\";\nimport { validateReturnTo } from \"./validate-return-to.js\";\n\nconst PROVIDER_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;\n\nfunction randomState(): string {\n  const bytes = webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(24));\n  return Buffer.from(bytes).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a PKCE code_verifier per RFC 7636 §4.1 — 43..128 chars from the\n * unreserved set [A-Z][a-z][0-9]-._~ (base64url is a strict subset).\n *\n * 32 random bytes → 43 base64url chars satisfies the minimum. Provided by\n * the orchestrator so every transaction carries one; PKCE-aware providers\n * (Google) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub) discard it.\n */\nfunction generatePkceVerifier(): string {\n  const bytes = webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));\n  return Buffer.from(bytes).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\nfunction txCookieSecret<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): string {\n  // For T1.2 minimal impl, derive a per-session-manager secret from the\n  // SessionManager identity. Production T2+ may refactor to share the\n  // SessionManager's actual secret rotation chain via a `getCookieSecret()` method.\n  // Falls back to TX_FALLBACK_SECRET when not available — apps should override.\n  const sess = opts.session as unknown as { secret?: string | string[] };\n  if (sess.secret) {\n    if (Array.isArray(sess.secret)) {\n      const first = sess.secret[0];\n      if (first) return first;\n    } else {\n      return sess.secret;\n    }\n  }\n  // Defensive fallback. Apps without SessionManager.secret pattern should\n  // explicitly pass an env-backed secret OR rely on this dev-only fallback\n  // (will fail in production scrutiny — flagged by future audit).\n  return process.env.THEOKIT_OAUTH_TX_SECRET ?? \"DEV_ONLY_INSECURE_OAUTH_TX_SECRET_REPLACE_IN_PROD\";\n}\n\nfunction defineAuth<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n  // Validate config at define-time (per blueprint Q5 invariants)\n  if (!opts.session) {\n    throw new AuthConfigError(\"missing_session\", \"defineAuth({ session }) is required\");\n  }\n\n  const providersMap = new Map<string, AuthProvider<unknown, string>>();\n  for (const provider of opts.providers ?? []) {\n    if (!provider.name || !PROVIDER_NAME_RE.test(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"invalid_provider_name\",\n        `Provider name must match ${PROVIDER_NAME_RE} (got: '${provider.name}')`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (providersMap.has(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"duplicate_provider_name\",\n        `Duplicate provider name: '${provider.name}'`,\n      );\n    }\n    providersMap.set(provider.name, provider);\n  }\n\n  const txSecret = txCookieSecret(opts);\n\n  function requireProvider(name: string): AuthProvider<unknown, string> {\n    const p = providersMap.get(name);\n    if (!p) throw new AuthProviderNotFoundError(name);\n    return p;\n  }\n\n  async function startSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    startOpts?: { returnTo?: string },\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-2 (v1.1) — validate returnTo same-origin\n    const baseUrl = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const safeReturnTo = validateReturnTo(startOpts?.returnTo, baseUrl);\n\n    // Generate transaction. Always include a PKCE verifier — PKCE-aware\n    // providers (Google OIDC) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub\n    // OAuth 2.0) discard it. Generating unconditionally simplifies the\n    // provider contract: every tx is PKCE-ready.\n    const state = randomState();\n    const pkceVerifier = generatePkceVerifier();\n    const tx = newTransaction({\n      state,\n      pkceVerifier,\n      returnTo: safeReturnTo === \"/\" ? undefined : safeReturnTo,\n    });\n\n    // Persist transaction cookie via headers (since we return Response, need Set-Cookie header manually)\n    const authUrl = await provider.createAuthorizationURL(tx);\n\n    // Build response with Set-Cookie + redirect\n    const headers = new Headers();\n    headers.set(\"Location\", authUrl.toString());\n    const { encodeTransaction } = await import(\"./oauth-transaction-store.js\");\n    const encodedTx = await encodeTransaction(tx, txSecret);\n    headers.set(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      `theo_oauth_tx=${encodedTx}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age=600`,\n    );\n\n    return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers });\n  }\n\n  // biome-ignore lint/complexity/noExcessiveCognitiveComplexity: OAuth callback handler must validate 6 distinct error conditions sequentially (provider error / state / tx fetch / PKCE / code exchange / session) — extracting helpers fragments the linear control flow without clarifying intent (per EC-1 v1.1 absorbed)\n  async function finishSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<{ session: TSession; returnTo?: string }> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-1 (v1.1) — OAuth provider error response (user declined consent) check BEFORE code-exchange\n    const url = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const errorParam = url.searchParams.get(\"error\");\n    if (errorParam) {\n      const errorDescription = url.searchParams.get(\"error_description\") ?? undefined;\n      if (errorParam === \"access_denied\") {\n        throw new AuthCancelledError(errorDescription);\n      }\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_provider_error\",\n        `Provider returned error: ${errorParam}${errorDescription ? ` (${errorDescription})` : \"\"}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Read + validate transaction cookie\n    const tx = await getTransaction(req, txSecret);\n    if (!tx) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_transaction_expired\",\n        \"OAuth transaction cookie missing or expired (>10min). Please retry sign-in.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Verify state matches query param (CSRF defense per RFC 6749 §10.12)\n    const queryState = url.searchParams.get(\"state\");\n    if (!queryState || queryState !== tx.state) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_state_mismatch\",\n        \"OAuth state mismatch. Possible CSRF attempt or stale callback.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Provider-specific callback handling (token exchange + userinfo fetch)\n    const result = await provider.handleCallback(req, tx);\n\n    // Invoke onSignIn callback if defined to derive session shape\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile: result.profile, provider: result.providerName });\n    } else {\n      // No onSignIn — pass the raw profile as session (consumers must type their own TSession)\n      sessionData = result.profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    // EC-10 (v1.1) — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation: rotate session ID BEFORE creating new session\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      // rotateSession may no-op if no pre-existing session — non-fatal\n    }\n\n    // Create session cookie\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n\n    // Clear transaction cookie\n    clearTransaction(res);\n\n    return { session: sessionData, returnTo: tx.returnTo };\n  }\n\n  async function signIn<TProfile>(\n    profile: TProfile,\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<TSession> {\n    // Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow, directly derive + persist session\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile, provider: providerName });\n    } else {\n      sessionData = profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      /* no-op if no pre-existing session */\n    }\n\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n    return sessionData;\n  }\n\n  async function signOut(res: ServerResponse): Promise<void> {\n    // Read current session before destroying (so onSignOut can see it)\n    let sessionData: TSession | null = null;\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      // We don't have req here per AuthOrchestrator contract; onSignOut receives null\n      // when no pre-existing session is available. Apps that need session-aware\n      // signOut should use the manual session.destroySession + custom logic.\n      sessionData = null;\n    }\n\n    opts.session.destroySession(res);\n\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      await opts.onSignOut(sessionData);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null> {\n    return opts.session.getSession(req);\n  }\n\n  return { startSignIn, finishSignIn, signIn, signOut, getSession };\n}\n\n/** SE36 — `Auth.create` replaces `defineAuth` (ADR 0015). @public */\nexport class Auth {\n  private constructor() {}\n  static create<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n    return defineAuth(opts);\n  }\n}\n"]}
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* @theokit/sdk/server/auth — same-origin returnTo validator\n *\n * Per v1.1 EC-2 MUST FIX — OWASP A01:2021 open-redirect mitigation.\n *\n * Without this check, attacker craft `/login?returnTo=https://evil.com` would\n * cause post-login redirect to attacker domain with authenticated session cookie.\n *\n * Rules:\n *   - undefined/empty returnTo → default '/'\n *   - protocol-relative `//evil.com` → default '/' (URL parser would resolve to baseUrl protocol)\n *   - absolute URL with origin ≠ baseUrl.origin → default '/' (cross-origin redirect)\n *   - absolute URL with origin === baseUrl.origin → keep (same-origin allowed)\n *   - relative path starting with '/' → keep (same-app navigation)\n *   - relative path not starting with '/' → default '/' (defensive)\n */\nexport function validateReturnTo(returnTo: string | undefined, baseUrl: URL): string {\n  if (!returnTo || typeof returnTo !== \"string\" || returnTo.trim() === \"\") {\n    return \"/\";\n  }\n\n  const trimmed = returnTo.trim();\n\n  // Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com) are dangerous — browser would resolve to current protocol\n  if (trimmed.startsWith(\"//\")) {\n    return \"/\";\n  }\n\n  // Try absolute URL parsing first\n  if (URL.canParse(trimmed)) {\n    const parsed = new URL(trimmed);\n    if (parsed.origin === baseUrl.origin) {\n      // Same-origin absolute URL — return the pathname+search+hash portion (drop origin)\n      return parsed.pathname + parsed.search + parsed.hash;\n    }\n    // Cross-origin — reject\n    return \"/\";\n  }\n\n  // Not parseable as absolute. Must start with '/' to be a valid relative path\n  if (trimmed.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n    return trimmed;\n  }\n\n  // Anything else (e.g., \"javascript:alert\", \"data:...\" that wasn't parseable, or bare strings) → default\n  return \"/\";\n}\n","/**\n * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Path C Hybrid)\n *\n * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Path C signatures.\n * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.\n */\n\nimport { webcrypto } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from \"node:http\";\nimport {\n  AuthCallbackError,\n  AuthCancelledError,\n  AuthConfigError,\n  AuthProviderNotFoundError,\n} from \"./errors.js\";\nimport { clearTransaction, getTransaction, newTransaction } from \"./oauth-transaction-store.js\";\nimport type { AuthOrchestrator, AuthProvider, DefineAuthOptions } from \"./types.js\";\nimport { validateReturnTo } from \"./validate-return-to.js\";\n\nconst PROVIDER_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9-]{1,32}$/;\n\nfunction randomState(): string {\n  const bytes = webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(24));\n  return Buffer.from(bytes).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a PKCE code_verifier per RFC 7636 §4.1 — 43..128 chars from the\n * unreserved set [A-Z][a-z][0-9]-._~ (base64url is a strict subset).\n *\n * 32 random bytes → 43 base64url chars satisfies the minimum. Provided by\n * the orchestrator so every transaction carries one; PKCE-aware providers\n * (Google) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub) discard it.\n */\nfunction generatePkceVerifier(): string {\n  const bytes = webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));\n  return Buffer.from(bytes).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\nfunction txCookieSecret<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): string {\n  // For T1.2 minimal impl, derive a per-session-manager secret from the\n  // SessionManager identity. Production T2+ may refactor to share the\n  // SessionManager's actual secret rotation chain via a `getCookieSecret()` method.\n  // Falls back to TX_FALLBACK_SECRET when not available — apps should override.\n  const sess = opts.session as unknown as { secret?: string | string[] };\n  if (sess.secret) {\n    if (Array.isArray(sess.secret)) {\n      const first = sess.secret[0];\n      if (first) return first;\n    } else {\n      return sess.secret;\n    }\n  }\n  // Defensive fallback. Apps without SessionManager.secret pattern should\n  // explicitly pass an env-backed secret OR rely on this dev-only fallback\n  // (will fail in production scrutiny — flagged by future audit).\n  return process.env.THEOKIT_OAUTH_TX_SECRET ?? \"DEV_ONLY_INSECURE_OAUTH_TX_SECRET_REPLACE_IN_PROD\";\n}\n\nfunction defineAuth<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n  // Validate config at define-time (per blueprint Q5 invariants)\n  if (!opts.session) {\n    throw new AuthConfigError(\"missing_session\", \"defineAuth({ session }) is required\");\n  }\n\n  const providersMap = new Map<string, AuthProvider<unknown, string>>();\n  for (const provider of opts.providers ?? []) {\n    if (!provider.name || !PROVIDER_NAME_RE.test(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"invalid_provider_name\",\n        `Provider name must match ${PROVIDER_NAME_RE} (got: '${provider.name}')`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (providersMap.has(provider.name)) {\n      throw new AuthConfigError(\n        \"duplicate_provider_name\",\n        `Duplicate provider name: '${provider.name}'`,\n      );\n    }\n    providersMap.set(provider.name, provider);\n  }\n\n  const txSecret = txCookieSecret(opts);\n\n  function requireProvider(name: string): AuthProvider<unknown, string> {\n    const p = providersMap.get(name);\n    if (!p) throw new AuthProviderNotFoundError(name);\n    return p;\n  }\n\n  async function startSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    startOpts?: { returnTo?: string },\n  ): Promise<Response> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-2 (v1.1) — validate returnTo same-origin\n    const baseUrl = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const safeReturnTo = validateReturnTo(startOpts?.returnTo, baseUrl);\n\n    // Generate transaction. Always include a PKCE verifier — PKCE-aware\n    // providers (Google OIDC) consume it; PKCE-ignorant providers (GitHub\n    // OAuth 2.0) discard it. Generating unconditionally simplifies the\n    // provider contract: every tx is PKCE-ready.\n    const state = randomState();\n    const pkceVerifier = generatePkceVerifier();\n    const tx = newTransaction({\n      state,\n      pkceVerifier,\n      returnTo: safeReturnTo === \"/\" ? undefined : safeReturnTo,\n    });\n\n    // Persist transaction cookie via headers (since we return Response, need Set-Cookie header manually)\n    const authUrl = await provider.createAuthorizationURL(tx);\n\n    // Build response with Set-Cookie + redirect\n    const headers = new Headers();\n    headers.set(\"Location\", authUrl.toString());\n    const { encodeTransaction } = await import(\"./oauth-transaction-store.js\");\n    const encodedTx = await encodeTransaction(tx, txSecret);\n    headers.set(\n      \"Set-Cookie\",\n      `theo_oauth_tx=${encodedTx}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Path=/; Max-Age=600`,\n    );\n\n    return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers });\n  }\n\n  // biome-ignore lint/complexity/noExcessiveCognitiveComplexity: OAuth callback handler must validate 6 distinct error conditions sequentially (provider error / state / tx fetch / PKCE / code exchange / session) — extracting helpers fragments the linear control flow without clarifying intent (per EC-1 v1.1 absorbed)\n  async function finishSignIn(\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<{ session: TSession; returnTo?: string }> {\n    const provider = requireProvider(providerName);\n\n    // EC-1 (v1.1) — OAuth provider error response (user declined consent) check BEFORE code-exchange\n    const url = new URL(`http://${req.headers.host ?? \"localhost\"}${req.url ?? \"/\"}`);\n    const errorParam = url.searchParams.get(\"error\");\n    if (errorParam) {\n      const errorDescription = url.searchParams.get(\"error_description\") ?? undefined;\n      if (errorParam === \"access_denied\") {\n        throw new AuthCancelledError(errorDescription);\n      }\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_provider_error\",\n        `Provider returned error: ${errorParam}${errorDescription ? ` (${errorDescription})` : \"\"}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Read + validate transaction cookie\n    const tx = await getTransaction(req, txSecret);\n    if (!tx) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_transaction_expired\",\n        \"OAuth transaction cookie missing or expired (>10min). Please retry sign-in.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Verify state matches query param (CSRF defense per RFC 6749 §10.12)\n    const queryState = url.searchParams.get(\"state\");\n    if (!queryState || queryState !== tx.state) {\n      throw new AuthCallbackError(\n        \"oauth_state_mismatch\",\n        \"OAuth state mismatch. Possible CSRF attempt or stale callback.\",\n      );\n    }\n\n    // Provider-specific callback handling (token exchange + userinfo fetch)\n    const result = await provider.handleCallback(req, tx);\n\n    // Invoke onSignIn callback if defined to derive session shape\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile: result.profile, provider: result.providerName });\n    } else {\n      // No onSignIn — pass the raw profile as session (consumers must type their own TSession)\n      sessionData = result.profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    // EC-10 (v1.1) — OWASP A07:2021 session fixation mitigation: rotate session ID BEFORE creating new session\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      // rotateSession may no-op if no pre-existing session — non-fatal\n    }\n\n    // Create session cookie\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n\n    // Clear transaction cookie\n    clearTransaction(res);\n\n    return { session: sessionData, returnTo: tx.returnTo };\n  }\n\n  async function signIn<TProfile>(\n    profile: TProfile,\n    providerName: string,\n    req: IncomingMessage,\n    res: ServerResponse,\n  ): Promise<TSession> {\n    // Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow, directly derive + persist session\n    let sessionData: TSession;\n    if (opts.onSignIn) {\n      sessionData = await opts.onSignIn({ profile, provider: providerName });\n    } else {\n      sessionData = profile as unknown as TSession;\n    }\n\n    try {\n      await opts.session.rotateSession(req, res);\n    } catch {\n      /* no-op if no pre-existing session */\n    }\n\n    await opts.session.createSession(res, sessionData);\n    return sessionData;\n  }\n\n  async function signOut(res: ServerResponse): Promise<void> {\n    // Read current session before destroying (so onSignOut can see it)\n    let sessionData: TSession | null = null;\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      // We don't have req here per AuthOrchestrator contract; onSignOut receives null\n      // when no pre-existing session is available. Apps that need session-aware\n      // signOut should use the manual session.destroySession + custom logic.\n      sessionData = null;\n    }\n\n    opts.session.destroySession(res);\n\n    if (opts.onSignOut) {\n      await opts.onSignOut(sessionData);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function getSession(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<TSession | null> {\n    return opts.session.getSession(req);\n  }\n\n  return { startSignIn, finishSignIn, signIn, signOut, getSession };\n}\n\n/** SE36 — `Auth.create` replaces `defineAuth` (ADR 0015). @public */\nexport class Auth {\n  private constructor() {}\n  static create<TSession>(opts: DefineAuthOptions<TSession>): AuthOrchestrator<TSession> {\n    return defineAuth(opts);\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/auth/orchestrator.d.cts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Caminho C Hybrid)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Path C Hybrid)
  *
- * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Caminho C signatures.
+ * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Path C signatures.
  * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.
  */
 import type { AuthOrchestrator, DefineAuthOptions } from "./types.js";

package/dist/server/auth/orchestrator.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Caminho C Hybrid)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — defineAuth orchestrator runtime (Path C Hybrid)
  *
- * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Caminho C signatures.
+ * Plan T1.2 implementation per blueprint Q5 § Path C signatures.
  * Composes existing primitives + the v1.1 EC-1/EC-2/EC-10 fixes.
  */
 import type { AuthOrchestrator, DefineAuthOptions } from "./types.js";

package/dist/server/auth/types.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Caminho C Hybrid per G11)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Path C Hybrid per G11)
  *
  * Plan: g11-auth-architecture-implementation v1.4 (sha256 4d381020...)
  * Blueprint: g11-auth-architecture-decision v1.1 (SHIPPABLE 97.9)
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ export interface AuthProvider<TProfile, TName extends string = string> {
     handleCallback(req: IncomingMessage, tx: OAuthTransaction): Promise<AuthResult<TProfile, TName>>;
 }
 /**
- * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Caminho C (Hybrid).
- * `providers` optional: empty = Caminho A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
+ * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Path C (Hybrid).
+ * `providers` optional: empty = Path A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
  * `onSignIn` invoked after provider callback success; returns TSession to persist.
  */
 export interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ export interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
  * - startSignIn: returns Response.redirect to provider authorization URL with state cookie
  * - finishSignIn: handles provider callback; verifies state; calls onSignIn; rotates session ID
  *   (OWASP A07:2021 per EC-10); creates session cookie; clears transaction cookie
- * - signIn: Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
+ * - signIn: Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
  * - signOut: destroys session cookie + invokes onSignOut callback
  * - getSession: read-only passthrough to session.getSession
  */

package/dist/server/auth/types.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Caminho C Hybrid per G11)
+ * @theokit/sdk/server/auth — orchestrator types (Path C Hybrid per G11)
  *
  * Plan: g11-auth-architecture-implementation v1.4 (sha256 4d381020...)
  * Blueprint: g11-auth-architecture-decision v1.1 (SHIPPABLE 97.9)
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ export interface AuthProvider<TProfile, TName extends string = string> {
     handleCallback(req: IncomingMessage, tx: OAuthTransaction): Promise<AuthResult<TProfile, TName>>;
 }
 /**
- * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Caminho C (Hybrid).
- * `providers` optional: empty = Caminho A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
+ * `defineAuth(opts)` configuration shape — Path C (Hybrid).
+ * `providers` optional: empty = Path A escape hatch (manual signIn only).
  * `onSignIn` invoked after provider callback success; returns TSession to persist.
  */
 export interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ export interface DefineAuthOptions<TSession> {
  * - startSignIn: returns Response.redirect to provider authorization URL with state cookie
  * - finishSignIn: handles provider callback; verifies state; calls onSignIn; rotates session ID
  *   (OWASP A07:2021 per EC-10); creates session cookie; clears transaction cookie
- * - signIn: Caminho A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
+ * - signIn: Path A escape hatch — skip OAuth flow; directly persist session from external profile
  * - signOut: destroys session cookie + invokes onSignOut callback
  * - getSession: read-only passthrough to session.getSession
  */

package/dist/server/errors-envelope.cjs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 'use strict';
 
-var chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs = require('../chunk-MHCKWQR3.cjs');
-require('../chunk-LTCOPATU.cjs');
+var chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs = require('../chunk-IHFNRNTJ.cjs');
+require('../chunk-BCQ3E2ZG.cjs');
 
 // src/server/errors-envelope.ts
 var NAME_TO_CODE = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ function toEnvelope(value) {
 }
 function buildMeta(name, err) {
   const meta = { sdkErrorName: name };
-  if (err instanceof chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.TheokitAgentError && err.metadata !== void 0) {
+  if (err instanceof chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.TheokitAgentError && err.metadata !== void 0) {
     meta.provider = err.metadata.provider;
     meta.endpoint = err.metadata.endpoint;
     if (err.metadata.statusCode !== void 0) {
@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ function buildMeta(name, err) {
   return meta;
 }
 function buildExt(err) {
-  if (err instanceof chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.RateLimitError && err.metadata?.retryAfter !== void 0) {
+  if (err instanceof chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.RateLimitError && err.metadata?.retryAfter !== void 0) {
     return {
       retryable: true,
       retryAfterMs: err.metadata.retryAfter * 1e3
     };
   }
-  if (err instanceof chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.CredentialPoolExhaustedError && err.nextRetryAt !== void 0) {
+  if (err instanceof chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.CredentialPoolExhaustedError && err.nextRetryAt !== void 0) {
     const delayMs = Math.max(0, err.nextRetryAt - Date.now());
     return {
       retryable: true,
@@ -63,22 +63,22 @@ function buildExt(err) {
   return void 0;
 }
 var CODE_TO_RECONSTRUCTOR = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([
-  ["UNAUTHORIZED", (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.AuthenticationError(env.message)],
+  ["UNAUTHORIZED", (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.AuthenticationError(env.message)],
   [
     "RATE_LIMITED",
-    (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.RateLimitError(env.message, env.cause !== void 0 ? { cause: env.cause } : {})
+    (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.RateLimitError(env.message, env.cause !== void 0 ? { cause: env.cause } : {})
   ],
-  ["PROVIDER_KEY_MISSING", (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.ConfigurationError(env.message)],
-  ["SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.NetworkError(env.message)],
-  ["GATEWAY_TIMEOUT", (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.NetworkError(env.message)],
+  ["PROVIDER_KEY_MISSING", (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.ConfigurationError(env.message)],
+  ["SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE", (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.NetworkError(env.message)],
+  ["GATEWAY_TIMEOUT", (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.NetworkError(env.message)],
   [
     "AGENT_RUN_ERROR",
-    (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.AgentRunError(env.message, {
+    (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.AgentRunError(env.message, {
       code: "unknown",
       ...env.cause !== void 0 ? { cause: env.cause } : {}
     })
   ],
-  ["INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR", (env) => new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.UnknownAgentError(env.message)]
+  ["INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR", (env) => new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.UnknownAgentError(env.message)]
   // BUDGET_EXCEEDED + CREDENTIAL_POOL_EXHAUSTED reconstructors require
   // domain-specific args (budgetName, provider) that the envelope doesn't
   // always carry. Fall back to UnknownAgentError when those fields are
@@ -88,12 +88,12 @@ var CODE_TO_RECONSTRUCTOR = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([
 function fromEnvelope(env) {
   const reconstructor = CODE_TO_RECONSTRUCTOR.get(env.code);
   if (reconstructor) return reconstructor(env);
-  return new chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.UnknownAgentError(env.message);
+  return new chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.UnknownAgentError(env.message);
 }
 
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "MemoryAdapterError", {
   enumerable: true,
-  get: function () { return chunkMHCKWQR3_cjs.MemoryAdapterError; }
+  get: function () { return chunkIHFNRNTJ_cjs.MemoryAdapterError; }
 });
 exports.fromEnvelope = fromEnvelope;
 exports.toEnvelope = toEnvelope;

package/dist/server/errors-envelope.d.cts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { T as TheokitAgentError } from '../errors-DyVbXdR4.cjs';
-export { M as MemoryAdapterError } from '../errors-DyVbXdR4.cjs';
-import '../run-CwEJtLPE.cjs';
+import { T as TheokitAgentError } from '../errors-DMY-gLSK.cjs';
+export { M as MemoryAdapterError } from '../errors-DMY-gLSK.cjs';
+import '../run-i2-fUohR.cjs';
 import 'zod';
 
 /**

package/dist/server/errors-envelope.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { T as TheokitAgentError } from '../errors-Cua4WC9H.js';
-export { M as MemoryAdapterError } from '../errors-Cua4WC9H.js';
-import '../run-CwEJtLPE.js';
+import { T as TheokitAgentError } from '../errors-DjBQ4Tn8.js';
+export { M as MemoryAdapterError } from '../errors-DjBQ4Tn8.js';
+import '../run-i2-fUohR.js';
 import 'zod';
 
 /**

package/dist/server/errors-envelope.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { TheokitAgentError, RateLimitError, CredentialPoolExhaustedError, UnknownAgentError, AuthenticationError, ConfigurationError, NetworkError, AgentRunError } from '../chunk-CD73YHEH.js';
-export { MemoryAdapterError } from '../chunk-CD73YHEH.js';
-import '../chunk-TAPQWDW2.js';
+import { TheokitAgentError, RateLimitError, CredentialPoolExhaustedError, UnknownAgentError, AuthenticationError, ConfigurationError, NetworkError, AgentRunError } from '../chunk-SG5ZWT6C.js';
+export { MemoryAdapterError } from '../chunk-SG5ZWT6C.js';
+import '../chunk-IVSD7L22.js';
 
 // src/server/errors-envelope.ts
 var NAME_TO_CODE = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map([

package/dist/session-transcript-3B52DKTG.js

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+export { SessionTranscript, defaultBaseDir, encodeProjectDir, expandTilde, readTranscript, reconstructMessages, safeSessionId, transcriptPath, transcriptRoot, writeTranscript } from './chunk-JRLXEYR4.js';
+import './chunk-KX7JV5KM.js';
+import './chunk-IVSD7L22.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-transcript-3B52DKTG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-transcript-3B52DKTG.js.map

package/dist/{session-transcript-6WKLYIN4.js.map → session-transcript-3B52DKTG.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"session-transcript-6WKLYIN4.js"}
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"session-transcript-3B52DKTG.js"}

package/dist/session-transcript-H7NUFXXM.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+'use strict';
+
+var chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs = require('./chunk-Z2CUEBXV.cjs');
+require('./chunk-DGLLVCNB.cjs');
+require('./chunk-BCQ3E2ZG.cjs');
+
+
+
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "SessionTranscript", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.SessionTranscript; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "defaultBaseDir", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.defaultBaseDir; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "encodeProjectDir", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.encodeProjectDir; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "expandTilde", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.expandTilde; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "readTranscript", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.readTranscript; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "reconstructMessages", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.reconstructMessages; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "safeSessionId", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.safeSessionId; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "transcriptPath", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.transcriptPath; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "transcriptRoot", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.transcriptRoot; }
+});
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "writeTranscript", {
+  enumerable: true,
+  get: function () { return chunkZ2CUEBXV_cjs.writeTranscript; }
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-transcript-H7NUFXXM.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-transcript-H7NUFXXM.cjs.map

package/dist/{session-transcript-EAKR4D2W.cjs.map → session-transcript-H7NUFXXM.cjs.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"session-transcript-EAKR4D2W.cjs"}
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"session-transcript-H7NUFXXM.cjs"}