@theokit/sdk 3.2.0 → 3.2.2

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,31 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 3.2.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 7f57c5a: Security (#55) — a delegated subagent now inherits the parent's code-registered plugins (e.g. `PermissionPlugin`), so its inner tool calls run under the SAME argument-level permission gate. Previously the child `Agent.create` received only apiKey/model/tools, so a parent that denied `shell` with a matching-arg rule did not stop a subagent it granted `shell` to — arg-level gating silently stopped at the delegation boundary.
+- f81ac79: Fix (#58) — a run cancelled between tool iterations now reports `RunStatus: "cancelled"` instead of `"finished"`, so a caller can distinguish a cancellation from a clean completion. Previously the between-iteration abort break left the default `"finished"` status.
+- 57cfcc8: Fix (#58) — `JobQueue.cancel()` on a running job that ignores its `AbortSignal` (never settles) previously leaked its concurrency slot, deadlocking a `maxConcurrency`-bounded queue. Cancel now frees the slot immediately; `#release` is idempotent so the job's eventual settle is a no-op (no double-free).
+- bd06140: Fix (#65) — the `transform_llm_output` plugin hook now rewrites the FINAL user-visible / streamed assistant text, and fires on text-only terminal turns. Previously it ran only in the tool-call branch and folded only into internal message history, so a plugin could not scrub what the caller actually received. The transform is now applied once, up front, and flows into the emitted step, `finalText`/`result`, and message history alike.
+
+## 3.2.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- a283dd4: Security (#54) — harden child-process env scrubbing.
+
+  - The `inherit-scrubbed` denylist now also drops the highest-signal VALUE-embedded-secret conventions: connection strings that carry `user:password@` (`DATABASE_URL`, `REDIS_URL`, `MONGODB_URI`, `DB_URL`, …), plus `DSN`, `WEBHOOK`, `COOKIE`, and `CONNECTION_STRING`. Generic non-secret URLs (`PUBLIC_BASE_URL`, `API_URL`, `PGHOST`) are deliberately preserved. A denylist still cannot catch every value-embedded secret — policy `core` (allowlist) remains the fail-closed mode for untrusted children.
+  - Removed dead `validateCommand` / `SHELL_METACHARACTERS` from the sandbox base — a never-invoked "guard" that provided a false sense of protection.
+  - Added an end-to-end test proving `LocalSandbox.execute` scrubs secret-like host env vars from the real child process.
+
+- 826bca0: Security (#56) — close two residual cross-tenant active-recall cache leaks found by adversarial review.
+
+  - `@theokit/sdk-memory` (publishable) called `cache.get`/`cache.set` with no tenant context, so two callers with the same query text but different identity shared a cached recall — a cross-tenant leak for every consumer of the package. The cache read/write are now keyed by the `{namespace, userId, scope}` tenant tuple (the primitive already supported it).
+  - In `@theokit/sdk` the production caller hardcoded `namespace: "default"` and dropped `memoryContext.tenantId`, so two tenants sharing a `userId` collided on one cache entry. The caller now threads `memoryContext.tenantId` into the tenant partition (`namespace`). `sessionId` is intentionally not a key dimension — recall is cross-session by design.
+
+- 7bcc872: Security/correctness (#59) — the HTTP MCP body read (`response.json()`) was outside the abort try/catch, so a server that returned headers then stalled the body surfaced a raw `DOMException(TimeoutError)` instead of the typed `NetworkError{code:"mcp_timeout"}`. The request was still bounded (no hang), but the typed-timeout contract now holds across both the header and body phases.
+
 ## 3.2.0
 
 ### Minor Changes

package/dist/a2a/index.cjs

@@ -4743,7 +4743,14 @@ var init_env_policy = __esm({
       /[_-]PWD/i,
       /CREDENTIAL/i,
       /PRIVATE/i,
-      /_AUTH/i
+      /_AUTH/i,
+      // #54-a — value-embedded-secret conventions (no generic `*_URL` — see keep-list test).
+      /DSN/i,
+      /WEBHOOK/i,
+      /COOKIE/i,
+      /CONNECTION[_-]?STRING/i,
+      // Known DB / message-broker connection-string vars (carry `user:pass@`).
+      /(?:^|[_-])(?:DATABASE|DB|REDIS|MONGO(?:DB)?|POSTGRES(?:QL)?|MYSQL|MARIADB|AMQP|RABBITMQ|CLICKHOUSE|ELASTIC(?:SEARCH)?|CASSANDRA|COUCHDB|MEMCACHED|NATS|KAFKA)[_-]?(?:URL|URI|DSN|CONNECTION)/i
     ];
     CORE_VARS = [
       "PATH",
@@ -9498,7 +9505,10 @@ async function runAgentLoop(inputs) {
       }
       budget.consume();
       inputs.budgetTracker?.nextIteration?.();
-      if (inputs.signal?.aborted === true) break;
+      if (inputs.signal?.aborted === true) {
+        ctx.finalStatus = "cancelled";
+        break;
+      }
     }
     if (lastTurnDecision === "continue" && budget.shouldContinue() === false) {
       ctx.stoppedAtIterationLimit = true;
@@ -9683,15 +9693,15 @@ async function guardAndTransformToolResults(inputs, raw, ctx) {
 }
 async function continueOrTerminate(inputs, ctx, llmOutput) {
   if (llmOutput.errored) return "error";
-  if (llmOutput.text.length > 0) {
-    await emitAssistantTextStep(inputs, ctx, llmOutput.text);
+  const tCtx = { agentId: inputs.agentId, runId: inputs.runId };
+  const text = llmOutput.text.length > 0 ? await transformLlmOutputText(inputs, llmOutput.text, tCtx) : llmOutput.text;
+  if (text.length > 0) {
+    await emitAssistantTextStep(inputs, ctx, text);
   }
   if (llmOutput.stopReason !== "tool_use" || llmOutput.toolCalls.length === 0) {
     return finishOrReflect(inputs, ctx, llmOutput);
   }
-  const tCtx = { agentId: inputs.agentId, runId: inputs.runId };
-  const outText = await transformLlmOutputText(inputs, llmOutput.text, tCtx);
-  ctx.messages.push(buildAssistantTurn(outText, llmOutput.toolCalls));
+  ctx.messages.push(buildAssistantTurn(text, llmOutput.toolCalls));
   const rawResults = await dispatchTools(
     // SE12 — forward a read-only text projection of the transcript-so-far to tool
     // handlers via `ctx.messages` (consumed by defineSubAgent's messageFilter).
@@ -13015,7 +13025,12 @@ var init_client = __esm({
             code: "mcp_http_error"
           });
         }
-        return await response.json();
+        try {
+          return await response.json();
+        } catch (cause) {
+          if (isAbortLike(cause)) throw mcpTimeoutError(this.name, timeoutMs);
+          throw cause;
+        }
       }
     };
   }
@@ -13255,9 +13270,11 @@ function declarativeSubagentTools(agentOptions, parentTools) {
   return subAgentToolsFromDefinitions(agents2, parentTools);
 }
 function bindParentCredentials(tools, agentOptions) {
+  const parentPlugins = Array.isArray(agentOptions.plugins) ? agentOptions.plugins : void 0;
   const credentials = {
     ...agentOptions.apiKey !== void 0 ? { apiKey: agentOptions.apiKey } : {},
-    ...typeof agentOptions.model === "object" ? { model: agentOptions.model } : {}
+    ...typeof agentOptions.model === "object" ? { model: agentOptions.model } : {},
+    ...parentPlugins !== void 0 ? { plugins: parentPlugins } : {}
   };
   for (const tool of tools) inheritSubAgentCredentials(tool, credentials);
 }
@@ -15782,10 +15799,11 @@ var init_local_agent_memory = __esm({
       }
       buildTelemetryRecallArgs(telemetry) {
         const userId = typeof this.options.memoryContext?.userId === "string" ? this.options.memoryContext.userId : void 0;
+        const tenantId = typeof this.options.memoryContext?.tenantId === "string" ? this.options.memoryContext.tenantId : void 0;
         return {
           ...telemetry !== void 0 ? { telemetry } : {},
           ...userId !== void 0 ? { userId } : {},
-          namespace: "default",
+          namespace: tenantId ?? "default",
           scope: "session"
         };
       }
@@ -19119,15 +19137,19 @@ async function collectChildToolResults(run) {
 ${lines.join("\n")}
 </subagent-tool-results>`;
 }
-async function runChildAgent(spec, input, signal, maxSteps, inherited) {
-  const { Agent: Agent2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_agent(), agent_exports));
+function buildChildCreateOptions(spec, inherited) {
   const model = spec.model ? { id: spec.model } : inherited?.model;
-  const agent = await Agent2.create({
+  return {
     ...inherited?.apiKey !== void 0 ? { apiKey: inherited.apiKey } : {},
     ...model !== void 0 ? { model } : {},
+    ...inherited?.plugins !== void 0 ? { plugins: inherited.plugins } : {},
     systemPrompt: spec.instructions,
     tools: spec.tools ?? []
-  });
+  };
+}
+async function runChildAgent(spec, input, signal, maxSteps, inherited) {
+  const { Agent: Agent2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_agent(), agent_exports));
+  const agent = await Agent2.create(buildChildCreateOptions(spec, inherited));
   try {
     const sendOptions = {
       ...signal !== void 0 ? { signal } : {},