@the-librarian/cli 1.20.1 → 1.21.1

package/dist/server/up.js

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-// `librarian server up` — build + run the all-in-one container.
+// `librarian server up` — pull a stable release (or build a source ref) and run
+// the all-in-one container.
 //
-// This is the loop-closer: on a fresh Docker host it clones the monorepo at the
-// resolved release tag, builds `the-librarian:<tag>`, mints the master key +
-// agent token into a 0600 deploy env-file, runs the all-in-one container with
-// `docker run --env-file` (ADR 0008 P4 — secrets off argv), waits for it to
-// report healthy, surfaces the CLI-MINTED master key ONCE, and prints the MCP
-// URL + dashboard URL + the agent token ready to paste into `librarian install`.
+// This is the loop-closer: on a fresh Docker host it resolves and validates the
+// stable release image (or clones/builds an arbitrary `--ref`), mints the master
+// key + agent token into a 0600 deploy env-file, creates and starts the
+// all-in-one container with `docker create --env-file` (ADR 0008 P4 — secrets
+// off argv), waits for it to
+// report healthy, surfaces the CLI-MINTED master key ONCE, and prints the MCP URL
+// + dashboard URL + the agent token ready to paste into `librarian install`.
 //
 // ADR 0008 P3: there is no admin token. The admin tRPC API is served only on the
 // trusted internal listener (off the network), so `server up` neither reads back
@@ -34,7 +36,7 @@
 //
 // Security (AGENTS.md): the agent token, master key, and optional bootstrap
 // claim secret ride ONLY in the 0600 deploy env-file fed to
-// `docker run --env-file` (ADR 0008 P4) — never inline on argv. `--env-file`
+// `docker create --env-file` (ADR 0008 P4) — never inline on argv. `--env-file`
 // keeps them off the process argv (and out of any
 // argv-echoing error); it does NOT hide them from `docker inspect .Config.Env`
 // (docker expands the file client-side into the same env list) — that's an
@@ -51,15 +53,18 @@ import { readEnvFile, writeEnvFile } from "../env.js";
 import { librarianDir } from "../paths.js";
 import { fetchLatestVersion } from "../status.js";
 import { enableBoot } from "./boot.js";
-import { writeDeployState } from "./deploy-state.js";
+import { deployStatePath, readDeployState, writeDeployState, } from "./deploy-state.js";
+import { CANONICAL_IMAGE_NAME, prepareRegistryImage, isReleasedVersionRef, selectDeploymentTarget, shortImageDigest, } from "./deployment-image.js";
 import { run, stream, which } from "./docker.js";
-import { preflight } from "./preflight.js";
+import { dockerPreflight, sourcePreflight } from "./preflight.js";
 import { redactSecrets } from "./redact.js";
+import { CANONICAL_SOURCE_REPOSITORY, isCanonicalSourceRemote, redactGitDiagnostics, } from "./source-repository.js";
+import { acquireUpdateLock, updateLockPath } from "./update-lock.js";
 // Re-exported from its shared home so existing importers (`update.ts`) keep
 // working; new code should import from `./redact.js` directly.
 export { redactSecrets } from "./redact.js";
 /** The repository the deploy dir clones (same repo the latest-tag fetch targets). */
-export const REPO_URL = "https://github.com/code-ministry-ltd/the-librarian";
+export const REPO_URL = CANONICAL_SOURCE_REPOSITORY;
 /** The container name every `server` command operates on (single instance per host). */
 export const CONTAINER_NAME = "the-librarian";
 /** The named data volume default (`--data-volume` overrides). The volume is sacred. */
@@ -118,10 +123,45 @@ export const SAVE_KEY_WARNING = "SAVE THIS KEY — excluded from backups";
  * the client `~/.librarian/env` (env.ts). 0600, by construction.
  */
 export const DEPLOY_ENV_FILE = "deploy.env";
+/** Prefix for invocation-private credentials used while a candidate starts. */
+export const STAGED_DEPLOY_ENV_FILE = "deploy.env.next";
 /** `<deployDir>/deploy.env` — the 0600 deploy env-file path within a deploy dir. */
 export function deployEnvFilePath(deployDir) {
     return path.join(deployDir, DEPLOY_ENV_FILE);
 }
+/** An invocation-private staged env path, promoted only after health succeeds. */
+export function stagedDeployEnvFilePath(deployDir, invocationId) {
+    if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(invocationId)) {
+        throw new UpError("Could not create a safe invocation ID for the staged deploy env-file.");
+    }
+    return path.join(deployDir, `${STAGED_DEPLOY_ENV_FILE}-${invocationId}`);
+}
+const realStagedEnvIdMinter = () => randomBytes(12).toString("hex");
+let stagedEnvIdMinter = realStagedEnvIdMinter;
+/** Inject the non-secret staged-file suffix (tests only). */
+export function setStagedEnvIdMinter(next) {
+    stagedEnvIdMinter = next;
+}
+export function resetStagedEnvIdMinter() {
+    stagedEnvIdMinter = realStagedEnvIdMinter;
+}
+const realFinalizationRenamer = (source, destination) => fs.renameSync(source, destination);
+let finalizationRenamer = realFinalizationRenamer;
+/** Inject the two final promotion operations (tests force the second to fail). */
+export function setFinalizationRenamer(next) {
+    finalizationRenamer = next;
+}
+export function resetFinalizationRenamer() {
+    finalizationRenamer = realFinalizationRenamer;
+}
+let finalizationRestorer = restoreFile;
+/** Inject prior-file restoration failures (tests only). */
+export function setFinalizationRestorer(next) {
+    finalizationRestorer = next;
+}
+export function resetFinalizationRestorer() {
+    finalizationRestorer = restoreFile;
+}
 const realSleep = (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
 let sleepImpl = realSleep;
 /** Override the health-poll sleep (tests inject a no-op so polling is instant). */
@@ -175,6 +215,15 @@ export class UpError extends Error {
         this.name = "UpError";
     }
 }
+/** Deployment-file promotion failed; tells update whether exact prior bytes were restored. */
+export class DeploymentFinalizationError extends UpError {
+    priorFilesRestored;
+    constructor(message, priorFilesRestored) {
+        super(message);
+        this.priorFilesRestored = priorFilesRestored;
+        this.name = "DeploymentFinalizationError";
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Construct the `docker run` argv (everything after `docker`). The SINGLE place
  * the run vector is assembled.
@@ -193,14 +242,14 @@ export class UpError extends Error {
  * {@link writeDeployEnvFile}), not on this argv.
  */
 export function buildRunArgs(input) {
-    const { host, dataVolume, dashboardPort, dataDir, runAsUser, tag, envFile } = input;
+    const { host, dataVolume, dashboardPort, dataDir, runAsUser, restartPolicy = "unless-stopped", imageRef, envFile, } = input;
     const args = [
         "run",
         "-d",
         "--name",
         CONTAINER_NAME,
         "--restart",
-        "unless-stopped",
+        restartPolicy,
         // Publish the dashboard on the chosen HOST port; the container always listens
         // on 3000 internally (image PORT=3000), so only the left side varies.
         "-p",
@@ -217,17 +266,13 @@ export function buildRunArgs(input) {
     // and writable by — the operator, not the image's default user.
     if (runAsUser)
         args.push("--user", runAsUser);
-    args.push(`${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag}`);
+    args.push(imageRef);
     return args;
 }
-/**
- * Resolve a user-supplied `--data-dir` to an absolute host path, creating it if
- * absent. Absolute because docker treats a RELATIVE `-v` source as a volume name.
- */
-function resolveHostDataDir(input) {
-    const abs = path.resolve(input);
-    fs.mkdirSync(abs, { recursive: true });
-    return abs;
+/** Build the detached candidate configuration without starting it. */
+export function buildCreateArgs(input) {
+    const runArgs = buildRunArgs(input);
+    return ["create", ...runArgs.slice(2)];
 }
 /**
  * The `uid:gid` that owns a path — the user the container runs as for a
@@ -250,7 +295,7 @@ export function dirOwner(dir) {
  * raw value is safe; we reject a value with a newline (it would corrupt the file
  * / smuggle a second var) rather than emit a malformed file.
  */
-export function writeDeployEnvFile(deployDir, input) {
+function writeDeployEnvFileAt(file, input) {
     const secretKey = input.secretKey?.trim() ?? "";
     const bootstrapClaimSecret = input.bootstrapClaimSecret ?? "";
     for (const [name, value] of [
@@ -263,7 +308,7 @@ export function writeDeployEnvFile(deployDir, input) {
         }
     }
     validateBootstrapClaimSecret(bootstrapClaimSecret);
-    fs.mkdirSync(deployDir, { recursive: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
     const lines = [`LIBRARIAN_AGENT_TOKEN=${input.agentToken}`];
     // Omit the key line entirely when absent (update's read-back-failed path) — the
     // server then resolves it from /data/secret.key, preserving encrypted secrets.
@@ -276,13 +321,18 @@ export function writeDeployEnvFile(deployDir, input) {
     if (input.host === LOCALHOST) {
         lines.push("LIBRARIAN_ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true");
     }
-    const file = deployEnvFilePath(deployDir);
     fs.writeFileSync(file, `${lines.join("\n")}\n`, { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 });
     // writeFileSync only applies `mode` on create; chmod unconditionally so a
     // pre-existing looser file is tightened (env.ts discipline).
     fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600);
     return file;
 }
+export function writeDeployEnvFile(deployDir, input) {
+    return writeDeployEnvFileAt(deployEnvFilePath(deployDir), input);
+}
+export function writeStagedDeployEnvFile(deployDir, input) {
+    return writeDeployEnvFileAt(stagedDeployEnvFilePath(deployDir, stagedEnvIdMinter()), input);
+}
 /**
  * Parse an existing deploy env-file into a `KEY=VALUE` record, or `{}` when absent.
  * `up` uses this to REUSE the master key and optional bootstrap-claim secret
@@ -325,8 +375,14 @@ export async function runUp(options, deps) {
     // Progress to stderr (the stdout result carries the master key) so a long `up`
     // shows where it is + what remains, instead of a blank line.
     const log = deps.log ?? ((line) => void process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`));
-    // 1) Preflight: docker (daemon reachable) + git, or a teaching error.
-    await preflight(deps.platform ? { platform: deps.platform } : {});
+    // 1) Select before preflight: stable releases need Docker only; arbitrary refs
+    // keep the source path's Docker + Git contract.
+    const target = selectDeploymentTarget(options.ref);
+    const preflightOptions = deps.platform ? { platform: deps.platform } : {};
+    if (target.imageSource === "registry")
+        await dockerPreflight(preflightOptions);
+    else
+        await sourcePreflight(preflightOptions);
     // 2) Resolve the bind host (default loopback; Tailscale offer; `0.0.0.0`
     //    ask-first). May throw `UpError` if the user declines a `0.0.0.0` bind —
     //    BEFORE any clone/build/run, so a declined exposure leaves nothing behind.
@@ -350,89 +406,242 @@ export async function runUp(options, deps) {
     if (options.dataDir && options.dataVolume) {
         throw new UpError("Pass either --data-dir (a host directory) or --data-volume (a Docker volume), not both.");
     }
-    const dataDir = options.dataDir ? resolveHostDataDir(options.dataDir) : undefined;
-    const runAsUser = dataDir ? dirOwner(dataDir) : undefined;
-    // 3) Resolve the ref (default = latest release tag), then the deploy dir.
-    log("[1/5] Resolving the latest release…");
-    const tag = await resolveRef(options.ref);
-    log(`[2/5] Preparing the deploy directory at ${deployDir} (cloning the repository)…`);
-    await prepareDeployDir(deployDir, tag);
-    const existingDeployEnv = readDeployEnvFile(deployDir);
-    const bootstrapClaimSecret = suppliedBootstrapClaimSecret === undefined
-        ? existingDeployEnv.LIBRARIAN_BOOTSTRAP_CLAIM_SECRET
-        : suppliedBootstrapClaimSecret || undefined;
-    validateBootstrapClaimSecret(bootstrapClaimSecret ?? "");
-    // 4) Mint the secrets the CLI owns (the loop-closer). Both are CSPRNG and
-    //    NEVER logged: the agent token, and — ADR 0008 P4 — the master key. The
-    //    CLI minting the master key (env wins in core's `env → file → generate`)
-    //    is what keeps it OFF `/data/secret.key`. They ride only in the 0600
-    //    deploy env-file fed to `--env-file`, never inline on argv.
-    //    The MASTER KEY must NOT be re-minted on a re-run — that orphans every
-    //    secret encrypted under the previous key. If the deploy env-file already
-    //    carries one, REUSE it; only a first deploy (no existing key) mints +
-    //    surfaces a new one. (Mirrors `update`'s preserve-don't-mint rule.)
-    const agentToken = minter();
-    const existingKey = existingDeployEnv.LIBRARIAN_SECRET_KEY?.trim() || undefined;
-    const masterKey = existingKey ?? mintSecretKey();
-    const mintedKey = existingKey === undefined;
-    const envFile = writeDeployEnvFile(deployDir, {
-        agentToken,
-        secretKey: masterKey,
-        bootstrapClaimSecret,
-        host,
-    });
-    // 5) Build the image, then run the container (secrets via `--env-file`).
-    log(`[3/5] Building the image ${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag} — the slow step: pulling the base ` +
-        `image, installing dependencies, and downloading the embeddings model. Expect several ` +
-        `minutes on a first run; live build output follows.`);
-    await build(deployDir, tag);
-    log("[4/5] Starting the container…");
-    await dockerRun(buildRunArgs({ host, dataVolume, dashboardPort, dataDir, runAsUser, tag, envFile }), deployDir);
-    // 6+7) Wait for health. ANY failure in this post-`docker run` phase — a
-    //      timeout/unhealthy report or an exception from `docker inspect`/`sleep`
-    //      — MUST force-remove the container so no half-up state is left behind
-    //      (spec §11). `waitForHealthy` already rolls back on its own
-    //      timeout/unhealthy path; this guard catches the throwing cases it
-    //      can't (the second `rm -f` is best-effort + idempotent).
-    //
-    //      ADR 0008 P4: the master key is no longer READ BACK from the container
-    //      (`docker exec cat /data/secret.key`) — the CLI minted it and supplied
-    //      it via env, so the server never writes that file. We surface the
-    //      key we minted.
-    log("[5/5] Waiting for the server to become healthy…");
+    // Resolve without creating yet: a registry pull/metadata failure must leave no
+    // new host material. Source behavior still creates it before clone/build.
+    const dataDir = options.dataDir ? path.resolve(options.dataDir) : undefined;
+    if (target.imageSource === "source" && dataDir)
+        fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
+    // 3) Resolve the ref, then prepare either the immutable registry image or the
+    // source checkout/build. Stable failures never fall back to source.
+    if (target.imageSource === "registry") {
+        log(target.ref
+            ? `[1/5] Selecting exact published release ${target.ref}…`
+            : "[1/5] Resolving the latest published release…");
+    }
+    else {
+        log(`[1/5] Selecting source ref ${target.ref}…`);
+    }
+    const tag = target.imageSource === "registry"
+        ? await resolveRegistryRef(target.ref)
+        : await resolveRef(target.ref);
+    // The shared deployment lock lives inside deployDir. An initial source clone
+    // must therefore happen before acquiring it; otherwise the lockfile itself
+    // makes the clone target non-empty. Existing managed clones are prepared
+    // under the lock below, alongside the rest of the deployment transaction.
+    const sourceNeedsInitialPreparation = target.imageSource === "source" && !(await pathExists(path.join(deployDir, ".git")));
+    if (sourceNeedsInitialPreparation) {
+        log(`[2/5] Preparing the source checkout at ${deployDir} (cloning the repository)…`);
+        await prepareDeployDir(deployDir, tag);
+    }
+    // `server up` and every update path share one host-level critical section.
+    // From the first container inspect through env/state finalization, no loser
+    // may observe or mutate the winner's deployment files or candidate.
+    const deploymentLockPath = updateLockPath({ home: deps.home, dir: options.dir });
+    const deploymentLock = acquireUpdateLock(deploymentLockPath);
+    if (!deploymentLock) {
+        throw new UpError(`Another server deployment is already in progress (lock: ${deploymentLockPath}). ` +
+            "Wait for it to finish, then re-run `librarian server up`.");
+    }
+    let lockReleased = false;
+    const releaseDeploymentLock = () => {
+        if (lockReleased)
+            return;
+        lockReleased = true;
+        deploymentLock.release();
+    };
+    let completedDeployment;
     try {
-        await waitForHealthy(options);
-        log("✓ The server is healthy.");
+        const existingDeployEnv = readDeployEnvFile(deployDir);
+        const bootstrapClaimSecret = suppliedBootstrapClaimSecret === undefined
+            ? existingDeployEnv.LIBRARIAN_BOOTSTRAP_CLAIM_SECRET
+            : suppliedBootstrapClaimSecret || undefined;
+        validateBootstrapClaimSecret(bootstrapClaimSecret ?? "");
+        const existingContainer = await inspectContainerPresence();
+        if (existingContainer.exists) {
+            if (target.imageSource !== "registry")
+                throw existingContainerError([]);
+            const existingState = readDeployState(deployDir);
+            const drift = registryDeploymentDrift(deployDir, tag, existingState, existingContainer.container, {
+                host,
+                dataVolume,
+                dataDir,
+                dashboardPort,
+                bootstrapClaimSecret,
+            });
+            if (drift.length > 0)
+                throw existingContainerError(drift);
+            if (existingState?.imageSource !== "registry") {
+                throw existingContainerError(["persisted deployment state"]);
+            }
+            log("✓ The requested release is already running and healthy.");
+            releaseDeploymentLock();
+            return alreadyRunningOutput(`published ${tag} (${shortImageDigest(existingState.imageDigest)})`, host, dashboardPort, await enableBootOutput(options, deps));
+        }
+        let registryImage;
+        if (target.imageSource === "registry") {
+            log(`[2/5] Pulling and validating ${tag} from the release registry…`);
+            registryImage = await prepareRegistryImage(tag, (chunk) => {
+                if (deps.log) {
+                    for (const line of chunk.split("\n"))
+                        if (line.length > 0)
+                            log(line);
+                }
+                else {
+                    process.stderr.write(chunk);
+                }
+            });
+        }
+        else if (!sourceNeedsInitialPreparation) {
+            log(`[2/5] Preparing the source checkout at ${deployDir} (cloning the repository)…`);
+            await prepareDeployDir(deployDir, tag);
+        }
+        if (target.imageSource === "registry" && dataDir)
+            fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
+        const runAsUser = dataDir ? dirOwner(dataDir) : undefined;
+        // 4) Source targets build locally; registry targets are already verified and
+        // run only by immutable digest. No credential material is staged until this
+        // preparation has succeeded.
+        let runImageRef;
+        if (registryImage) {
+            log(`[3/5] Release image verified at ${registryImage.imageDigest}.`);
+            runImageRef = registryImage.imageDigest;
+        }
+        else {
+            log(`[3/5] Building source image ${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag} — the slow step: pulling the base ` +
+                `image, installing dependencies, and downloading the embeddings model. Expect several ` +
+                `minutes on a first run; live build output follows.`);
+            await build(deployDir, tag);
+            runImageRef = `${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag}`;
+        }
+        // 5) Mint the secrets the CLI owns (the loop-closer). Both are CSPRNG and
+        //    NEVER logged: the agent token, and — ADR 0008 P4 — the master key. The
+        //    MASTER KEY must NOT be re-minted on a re-run — that orphans every secret
+        //    encrypted under the previous key. A candidate env-file is kept separate
+        //    from the live one until the new container reports healthy.
+        const agentToken = minter();
+        const existingKey = existingDeployEnv.LIBRARIAN_SECRET_KEY?.trim() || undefined;
+        const masterKey = existingKey ?? mintSecretKey();
+        const mintedKey = existingKey === undefined;
+        const envFile = writeStagedDeployEnvFile(deployDir, {
+            agentToken,
+            secretKey: masterKey,
+            bootstrapClaimSecret,
+            host,
+        });
+        const nextDeployState = registryImage
+            ? {
+                containerName: CONTAINER_NAME,
+                host,
+                dataVolume,
+                dataDir,
+                dashboardPort,
+                ref: tag,
+                imageTag: registryImage.imageRef,
+                imageSource: "registry",
+                imageRef: registryImage.imageRef,
+                imageDigest: registryImage.imageDigest,
+            }
+            : {
+                containerName: CONTAINER_NAME,
+                host,
+                dataVolume,
+                dataDir,
+                dashboardPort,
+                ref: tag,
+                imageTag: `${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag}`,
+                imageSource: "source",
+                imageRef: `${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag}`,
+            };
+        log("[4/5] Starting the container…");
+        const createArgs = buildCreateArgs({
+            host,
+            dataVolume,
+            dashboardPort,
+            dataDir,
+            runAsUser,
+            imageRef: runImageRef,
+            envFile,
+        });
+        let candidateId = null;
+        let healthRollbackComplete = false;
+        try {
+            const createResult = await run("docker", createArgs, { cwd: deployDir });
+            failIfNonZero("docker", createArgs, createResult);
+            const returnedId = createResult.stdout.trim();
+            if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(returnedId)) {
+                throw new UpError("Docker created the candidate container but did not return its full immutable ID. " +
+                    `Refusing unsafe cleanup by mutable name; inspect ${CONTAINER_NAME} manually before retrying.`);
+            }
+            candidateId = returnedId;
+            const startArgs = ["start", candidateId];
+            const startResult = await run("docker", startArgs, { cwd: deployDir });
+            failIfNonZero("docker", startArgs, startResult);
+            // 6+7) Wait for health. ANY failure in this post-`docker start` phase — a
+            //      timeout/unhealthy report or an exception from `docker inspect`/`sleep`
+            //      — MUST force-remove the container so no half-up state is left behind
+            //      (spec §11). `waitForHealthy` already rolls back on its own
+            //      timeout/unhealthy path; this guard catches the throwing cases it
+            //      can't. Every cleanup targets the immutable candidate ID.
+            //
+            //      ADR 0008 P4: the master key is no longer READ BACK from the container
+            //      (`docker exec cat /data/secret.key`) — the CLI minted it and supplied
+            //      it via env, so the server never writes that file. We surface the
+            //      key we minted.
+            log("[5/5] Waiting for the server to become healthy…");
+            await waitForHealthy({ ...options, containerIdentity: candidateId });
+            log("✓ The server is healthy.");
+            // Promote the non-secret deploy state and the secret-bearing env-file as
+            // one recoverable operation. A failed promotion restores both exact prior
+            // files (or their absence) before the candidate is removed.
+            finalizeDeploymentFiles(deployDir, envFile, nextDeployState);
+            candidateId = null;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (error instanceof HealthRollbackCompleteError) {
+                healthRollbackComplete = true;
+                candidateId = null;
+            }
+            if (candidateId && !healthRollbackComplete) {
+                try {
+                    await removeAttemptContainer(candidateId);
+                    candidateId = null;
+                }
+                catch (cleanupError) {
+                    removeStagedEnv(envFile);
+                    throw cleanupError;
+                }
+                if (error instanceof CleanupError) {
+                    removeStagedEnv(envFile);
+                    throw new UpError("The candidate container could not start or become healthy. The first cleanup " +
+                        "attempt failed, but a retry " +
+                        "removed the candidate container; the data volume is untouched. Fix the startup " +
+                        "cause, then re-run `librarian server up`.");
+                }
+            }
+            removeStagedEnv(envFile);
+            throw error;
+        }
+        completedDeployment = {
+            agentToken,
+            masterKey,
+            mintedKey,
+            deploymentIdentity: registryImage
+                ? `published ${tag} (${shortImageDigest(registryImage.imageDigest)})`
+                : `source ${tag}`,
+        };
     }
-    catch (error) {
-        await run("docker", ["rm", "-f", CONTAINER_NAME]).catch(() => undefined);
-        throw error;
+    finally {
+        releaseDeploymentLock();
     }
-    // 7b) Persist the NON-SECRET deploy-state so `update` can recreate the
-    //     container with the same config and `status` can report the deployed
-    //     ref reliably. This carries the bind host / data volume / ref / image
-    //     tag / container name — NEVER a token or key (deploy-state.ts whitelists
-    //     the fields). Only after a confirmed-healthy run, so the recorded state
-    //     reflects a container that actually came up.
-    writeDeployState(deployDir, {
-        containerName: CONTAINER_NAME,
-        host,
-        dataVolume,
-        dataDir,
-        dashboardPort,
-        ref: tag,
-        imageTag: `${CONTAINER_NAME}:${tag}`,
-    });
+    // A successful locked body always assigns this before releasing the lock;
+    // every failure throws through the finally above.
+    const { agentToken, masterKey, mintedKey, deploymentIdentity } = completedDeployment;
     // 8) Boot persistence (opt-in, spec §5.8). With `--enable-boot`, install +
     //    enable the systemd unit AFTER a healthy up (so the named container the
     //    unit references actually exists). On macOS this prints the deferred
     //    notice and continues — the `up` still succeeds. The unit references the
     //    EXISTING container by name and carries NO secret (boot.ts).
-    const lines = [];
-    if (options.enableBoot) {
-        const bootResult = await enableBoot(deps.platform ? { platform: deps.platform } : {});
-        lines.push(bootResult.output, "");
-    }
+    const lines = await enableBootOutput(options, deps);
     // 9) Close the loop: surface secrets/URLs + offer the local env write.
     await closeTheLoop(lines, {
         host,
@@ -440,6 +649,7 @@ export async function runUp(options, deps) {
         agentToken,
         masterKey,
         mintedKey,
+        deploymentIdentity,
         options,
         deps,
     });
@@ -559,6 +769,249 @@ async function resolveRef(ref) {
     // `fetchLatestVersion` strips the leading `v`; the tag we check out keeps it.
     return `v${latest}`;
 }
+/** Resolve an omitted stable ref and reject any non-release response fail-closed. */
+async function resolveRegistryRef(ref) {
+    if (ref !== undefined)
+        return ref;
+    const latest = await fetchLatestVersion();
+    const candidate = latest ? `v${latest}` : "";
+    if (!candidate || !isReleasedVersionRef(candidate)) {
+        throw new UpError("Could not resolve a valid latest stable release tag from GitHub. Check your network and " +
+            "GitHub availability, or pin an exact stable tag with `--ref vX.Y.Z`. Stable installs " +
+            "never fall back to a source build.");
+    }
+    return candidate;
+}
+function verifiedNotFound(result, identity = CONTAINER_NAME) {
+    const detail = `${result.stdout}\n${result.stderr}`;
+    const escapedIdentity = identity.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
+    return (new RegExp(`no such (?:object|container):?\\s*${escapedIdentity}(?:\\s|$)`, "i").test(detail) ||
+        new RegExp(`no container .*${escapedIdentity}.* found`, "i").test(detail));
+}
+/** Inspect the fixed container name without treating daemon/permission failures as absence. */
+async function inspectContainerPresence() {
+    const result = await run("docker", [
+        "container",
+        "inspect",
+        "--format",
+        "{{json .}}",
+        CONTAINER_NAME,
+    ]);
+    if (result.code !== 0) {
+        if (verifiedNotFound(result))
+            return { exists: false };
+        const detail = redactSecrets(result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim());
+        throw new UpError(`Could not inspect the existing ${CONTAINER_NAME} container` +
+            (detail ? `: ${detail}` : ".") +
+            " Fix Docker access, then re-run `librarian server up`.");
+    }
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(result.stdout);
+        if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed))
+            throw new Error();
+        return { exists: true, container: parsed };
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new UpError(`Docker returned malformed metadata for the existing ${CONTAINER_NAME} container. ` +
+            "Refusing to replace it; inspect or remove it manually, then re-run `librarian server up`.");
+    }
+}
+function envRecord(value) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(value) || !value.every((entry) => typeof entry === "string"))
+        return null;
+    const record = {};
+    for (const entry of value) {
+        const equals = entry.indexOf("=");
+        if (equals > 0)
+            record[entry.slice(0, equals)] = entry.slice(equals + 1);
+    }
+    return record;
+}
+function exactPortBinding(bindings, key, host, port) {
+    if (!bindings || typeof bindings !== "object" || Array.isArray(bindings))
+        return false;
+    const value = bindings[key];
+    return (Array.isArray(value) &&
+        value.length === 1 &&
+        value[0] !== null &&
+        typeof value[0] === "object" &&
+        !Array.isArray(value[0]) &&
+        value[0].HostIp === host &&
+        value[0].HostPort === String(port));
+}
+/** Exact live + persisted identity check performed before any registry access. */
+function registryDeploymentDrift(deployDir, ref, state, container, desired) {
+    const drift = [];
+    if (!state ||
+        state.imageSource !== "registry" ||
+        state.ref !== ref ||
+        state.imageRef !== `${CANONICAL_IMAGE_NAME}:${ref}` ||
+        state.imageTag !== `${CANONICAL_IMAGE_NAME}:${ref}` ||
+        !state.imageDigest ||
+        state.host !== desired.host ||
+        state.dataVolume !== desired.dataVolume ||
+        state.dataDir !== desired.dataDir ||
+        state.dashboardPort !== desired.dashboardPort) {
+        drift.push("persisted deployment state");
+    }
+    const digest = state?.imageSource === "registry" ? state.imageDigest : undefined;
+    if (container.State?.Health?.Status !== "healthy")
+        drift.push("health status");
+    if (!digest || container.Config?.Image !== digest)
+        drift.push("image digest");
+    const mounts = Array.isArray(container.Mounts)
+        ? container.Mounts.filter((mount) => mount !== null &&
+            typeof mount === "object" &&
+            !Array.isArray(mount) &&
+            mount.Destination === "/data")
+        : [];
+    const mount = mounts.length === 1 ? mounts[0] : undefined;
+    if (!mount ||
+        (desired.dataDir
+            ? mount.Type !== "bind" || mount.Source !== desired.dataDir
+            : mount.Type !== "volume" || mount.Name !== desired.dataVolume)) {
+        drift.push("/data mount source or type");
+    }
+    const bindings = container.HostConfig?.PortBindings;
+    if (!bindings ||
+        typeof bindings !== "object" ||
+        Array.isArray(bindings) ||
+        Object.keys(bindings).sort().join(",") !== `3000/tcp,${MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT}/tcp` ||
+        !exactPortBinding(bindings, "3000/tcp", desired.host, desired.dashboardPort) ||
+        !exactPortBinding(bindings, `${MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT}/tcp`, desired.host, MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT)) {
+        drift.push("published host or ports");
+    }
+    if (container.HostConfig?.RestartPolicy?.Name !== "unless-stopped") {
+        drift.push("restart policy");
+    }
+    let expectedUser = "node";
+    if (desired.dataDir) {
+        try {
+            expectedUser = dirOwner(desired.dataDir);
+        }
+        catch {
+            drift.push("bind-mounted data directory");
+        }
+    }
+    if (container.Config?.User !== expectedUser)
+        drift.push("container user");
+    const persistedEnv = readDeployEnvFile(deployDir);
+    const liveEnv = envRecord(container.Config?.Env);
+    const requiredRuntime = {
+        LIBRARIAN_DATA_DIR: "/data",
+        LIBRARIAN_HOST: ALL_INTERFACES,
+        LIBRARIAN_PORT: String(MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT),
+        PORT: "3000",
+    };
+    let envMatches = liveEnv !== null;
+    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(requiredRuntime)) {
+        if (liveEnv?.[name] !== value)
+            envMatches = false;
+    }
+    for (const name of [
+        "LIBRARIAN_AGENT_TOKEN",
+        "LIBRARIAN_SECRET_KEY",
+        "LIBRARIAN_BOOTSTRAP_CLAIM_SECRET",
+    ]) {
+        const expected = persistedEnv[name];
+        if ((liveEnv?.[name] || undefined) !== (expected || undefined))
+            envMatches = false;
+    }
+    if (!persistedEnv.LIBRARIAN_AGENT_TOKEN || !persistedEnv.LIBRARIAN_SECRET_KEY) {
+        envMatches = false;
+    }
+    if ((persistedEnv.LIBRARIAN_BOOTSTRAP_CLAIM_SECRET || undefined) !==
+        (desired.bootstrapClaimSecret || undefined)) {
+        envMatches = false;
+    }
+    const expectedNoAuth = desired.host === LOCALHOST ? "true" : undefined;
+    if ((liveEnv?.LIBRARIAN_ALLOW_NO_AUTH || undefined) !== expectedNoAuth)
+        envMatches = false;
+    if (!envMatches)
+        drift.push("authentication or runtime environment");
+    return drift;
+}
+async function enableBootOutput(options, deps) {
+    if (!options.enableBoot)
+        return [];
+    const bootResult = await enableBoot(deps.platform ? { platform: deps.platform } : {});
+    return [bootResult.output, ""];
+}
+function existingContainerError(drift) {
+    const detail = drift.length > 0 ? ` (${drift.join(", ")})` : "";
+    return new UpError(`The existing ${CONTAINER_NAME} container differs from the ` +
+        `requested healthy deployment${detail}. Refusing to pull, rewrite credentials, or replace ` +
+        "it. Run `librarian server down` if you intend to replace it, then retry.");
+}
+function alreadyRunningOutput(deploymentIdentity, host, dashboardPort, bootLines) {
+    const lines = [...bootLines];
+    lines.push(`The Librarian server is already running and healthy from ${deploymentIdentity}.`, "", `  MCP URL:     http://${host}:${MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT}/mcp`, `  Dashboard:   http://${host}:${dashboardPort}`);
+    return { output: lines.join("\n") };
+}
+export function removeStagedEnv(stagedEnvFile) {
+    try {
+        fs.rmSync(stagedEnvFile, { force: true });
+    }
+    catch {
+        // The primary deployment/cleanup error is more useful than a temp-file error.
+    }
+}
+function snapshotFile(file) {
+    try {
+        const stat = fs.statSync(file);
+        return { contents: fs.readFileSync(file), mode: stat.mode & 0o777 };
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error.code === "ENOENT")
+            return { contents: null };
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
+function restoreFile(file, snapshot) {
+    if (snapshot.contents === null) {
+        fs.rmSync(file, { force: true });
+        return;
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, snapshot.contents, { mode: snapshot.mode });
+    if (snapshot.mode !== undefined)
+        fs.chmodSync(file, snapshot.mode);
+}
+/** Promote env + state as one guarded unit, restoring exact prior bytes on failure. */
+export function finalizeDeploymentFiles(deployDir, stagedEnvFile, state) {
+    const liveEnvFile = deployEnvFilePath(deployDir);
+    const liveStateFile = deployStatePath(deployDir);
+    const priorEnv = snapshotFile(liveEnvFile);
+    const priorState = snapshotFile(liveStateFile);
+    const stagedStateDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(deployDir, ".deploy-state-next-"));
+    const stagedStateFile = deployStatePath(stagedStateDir);
+    try {
+        writeDeployState(stagedStateDir, state);
+        finalizationRenamer(stagedEnvFile, liveEnvFile);
+        finalizationRenamer(stagedStateFile, liveStateFile);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        try {
+            finalizationRestorer(liveEnvFile, priorEnv);
+            finalizationRestorer(liveStateFile, priorState);
+        }
+        catch (rollbackError) {
+            const detail = redactSecrets(rollbackError instanceof Error ? rollbackError.message : String(rollbackError));
+            throw new DeploymentFinalizationError(`Deployment persistence failed and prior files could not be restored${detail ? `: ${detail}` : "."} ` +
+                "The candidate container will be removed; restore deploy.env and deploy-state.json from backup before retrying.", false);
+        }
+        const detail = redactSecrets(error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error));
+        throw new DeploymentFinalizationError(`Could not finalize deployment persistence${detail ? `: ${detail}` : "."} ` +
+            "Prior deploy.env and deploy-state.json content was restored.", true);
+    }
+    finally {
+        try {
+            fs.rmSync(stagedStateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Non-secret staging residue must not override persistence/rollback truth.
+        }
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Ready the deploy dir at `tag`:
  *   - absent → `git clone <repo> <dir>` then checkout the ref;
@@ -583,24 +1036,14 @@ async function prepareDeployDir(dir, tag) {
     }
     // It's a git repo — confirm it's OUR clone before touching it.
     const originResult = await run("git", ["-C", dir, "remote", "get-url", "origin"]);
-    const origin = originResult.stdout.trim();
-    if (!sameRepo(origin, REPO_URL)) {
-        throw new UpError(`Deploy dir ${dir} is a git repo with a different remote (${origin || "none"}). ` +
+    failIfNonZero("git", ["-C", dir, "remote", "get-url", "origin"], originResult, redactGitDiagnostics);
+    if (!isCanonicalSourceRemote(originResult.stdout)) {
+        throw new UpError(`Deploy dir ${dir} is a git repo with a different remote. ` +
             "Refusing to touch a clone I didn't create — choose another path with `--dir <path>`.");
     }
     await git(["-C", dir, "fetch", "--tags", "origin"]);
     await checkoutRef(dir, tag);
 }
-/** True iff `origin` points at the same repo as `REPO_URL` (scheme/.git tolerant). */
-function sameRepo(origin, repo) {
-    const norm = (u) => u
-        .trim()
-        .replace(/\.git$/, "")
-        .replace(/\/$/, "")
-        .replace(/^git@github\.com:/, "https://github.com/")
-        .toLowerCase();
-    return norm(origin) === norm(repo);
-}
 /**
  * Build the all-in-one image from the deploy dir, STREAMING docker's output live.
  * This is the slow step (base-image pull, deps install, embeddings-model download);
@@ -628,9 +1071,20 @@ async function build(deployDir, tag) {
             "Fix the error shown above, then re-run `librarian server up`.");
     }
 }
-/** Run the container (the assembled run argv) from the deploy dir. */
-async function dockerRun(args, deployDir) {
-    await dockerInDir(args, deployDir);
+class CleanupError extends UpError {
+}
+class HealthRollbackCompleteError extends UpError {
+}
+/** Remove only the container created by this attempt, and verify the outcome. */
+async function removeAttemptContainer(candidateId) {
+    const result = await run("docker", ["rm", "-f", candidateId]);
+    if (result.code === 0 || verifiedNotFound(result, candidateId))
+        return;
+    const detail = redactSecrets(result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim());
+    throw new CleanupError(`Could not remove failed candidate container ${candidateId}` +
+        (detail ? `: ${detail}` : ".") +
+        ` The data volume was not removed. Run \`docker rm -f ${candidateId}\` manually, ` +
+        "then re-run `librarian server up`.");
 }
 /**
  * Poll `docker inspect … Health.Status` until `healthy`, bounded. On timeout or
@@ -645,6 +1099,7 @@ export async function waitForHealthy(options) {
     const attempts = options.healthAttempts ?? 60;
     const intervalMs = options.healthIntervalMs ?? 2000;
     const tail = options.logTailLines ?? 50;
+    const identity = options.containerIdentity ?? CONTAINER_NAME;
     // Track whether ANY poll yielded a non-empty status. Snap docker's confinement
     // does not emit stdout to a non-TTY pipe, so every `docker inspect` comes back
     // exit-0-but-EMPTY — health can never be read, the loop times out, and `docker
@@ -657,7 +1112,7 @@ export async function waitForHealthy(options) {
             "inspect",
             "--format",
             "{{.State.Health.Status}}",
-            CONTAINER_NAME,
+            identity,
         ]);
         if (result.code !== 0)
             allInspectsOk = false; // a failing inspect is NOT the snap signature
@@ -677,15 +1132,15 @@ export async function waitForHealthy(options) {
     // (defense-in-depth, e.g. an older image) — none of that may reach an error
     // message (spec §5.6 wants logs surfaced, just not secrets). Then roll back so
     // no half-up container survives.
-    const logs = await run("docker", ["logs", "--tail", String(tail), CONTAINER_NAME]);
-    await run("docker", ["rm", "-f", CONTAINER_NAME]);
+    const logs = await run("docker", ["logs", "--tail", String(tail), identity]);
+    await removeAttemptContainer(identity);
     // Conservative snap-docker detection: every `docker inspect` SUCCEEDED (exit 0)
     // yet returned empty output — never a single "starting"/"healthy"/"unhealthy".
     // That exit-0-but-empty shape is snap's pipe confinement; a FAILING inspect
     // (exit ≠ 0) is a different problem and falls through to the normal error below.
     // The container may well be running fine — we just can't see it through snap.
     if (!sawAnyStatus && allInspectsOk) {
-        throw new UpError(`Could not read the container's health — every \`docker inspect\` returned empty ` +
+        throw new HealthRollbackCompleteError(`Could not read the container's health — every \`docker inspect\` returned empty ` +
             `output. That is the signature of snap docker, whose confinement does not emit ` +
             `stdout to a non-TTY pipe, so \`librarian server\` cannot read health or logs (the ` +
             `container itself may be running fine). \`librarian server\` is not supported on snap ` +
@@ -694,7 +1149,7 @@ export async function waitForHealthy(options) {
             `volume is untouched).`);
     }
     const detail = redactSecrets(logs.stdout.trim() || logs.stderr.trim());
-    throw new UpError(`The server did not become healthy in time and was rolled back ` +
+    throw new HealthRollbackCompleteError(`The server did not become healthy in time and was rolled back ` +
         `(container removed; the data volume is untouched). Recent logs:\n` +
         (detail ? detail : "(no log output captured)") +
         `\n\nFix the cause above, then re-run \`librarian server up\`.`);
@@ -713,10 +1168,10 @@ export async function waitForHealthy(options) {
  * (internal listener only), so there is no admin token to mint or paste anywhere.
  */
 async function closeTheLoop(lines, ctx) {
-    const { host, dashboardPort, agentToken, masterKey, mintedKey, options, deps } = ctx;
+    const { host, dashboardPort, agentToken, masterKey, mintedKey, deploymentIdentity, options, deps, } = ctx;
     const mcpUrl = `http://${host}:${MCP_PUBLISHED_PORT}/mcp`;
     const dashboardUrl = `http://${host}:${dashboardPort}`;
-    lines.push("The Librarian server is up and healthy.", "", `  MCP URL:     ${mcpUrl}`, `  Dashboard:   ${dashboardUrl}`, `  Agent token: ${agentToken}`, "");
+    lines.push(`The Librarian server is up and healthy from ${deploymentIdentity}.`, "", `  MCP URL:     ${mcpUrl}`, `  Dashboard:   ${dashboardUrl}`, `  Agent token: ${agentToken}`, "");
     // `0.0.0.0` is a bind directive, not a connectable address — point clients at
     // the machine's real reachable IP rather than over-engineering auto-detection.
     if (host === ALL_INTERFACES) {
@@ -777,7 +1232,7 @@ function isYes(answer) {
 /** Run a `git …` command from anywhere; a non-zero exit is a teaching error. */
 async function git(args) {
     const result = await run("git", args);
-    failIfNonZero("git", args, result);
+    failIfNonZero("git", args, result, redactGitDiagnostics);
 }
 /**
  * Check out `ref` in `dir` without letting a `--…`-shaped ref inject a git
@@ -797,15 +1252,10 @@ export async function checkoutRef(dir, ref) {
         "--end-of-options",
         `${ref}^{commit}`,
     ]);
-    failIfNonZero("git", ["-C", dir, "rev-parse", ref], resolved);
+    failIfNonZero("git", ["-C", dir, "rev-parse", ref], resolved, redactGitDiagnostics);
     await git(["-C", dir, "checkout", resolved.stdout.trim()]);
 }
-/** Run a `docker …` command from the deploy dir; non-zero exit → teaching error. */
-async function dockerInDir(args, cwd) {
-    const result = await run("docker", args, { cwd });
-    failIfNonZero("docker", args, result);
-}
-function failIfNonZero(cmd, args, result) {
+function failIfNonZero(cmd, args, result, redact = redactSecrets) {
     if (result.code === 0)
         return;
     // Redact in case a failed docker/git step echoed a secret-shaped value. Post
@@ -813,7 +1263,7 @@ function failIfNonZero(cmd, args, result) {
     // NOT inline on argv — so an argv-echoing `build`/`run` failure no longer
     // carries them. We still redact defensively (e.g. a daemon that prints the
     // expanded env, or an older code path) so no 64-hex secret reaches the message.
-    const detail = redactSecrets(result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim());
+    const detail = redact(result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim());
     throw new UpError(`\`${cmd} ${args[0]}\` failed (exit ${result.code ?? "signal"})` +
         (detail ? `:\n${detail}` : ".") +
         "\n\nResolve the error above, then re-run `librarian server up`.");