@terminal3/t3n-sdk 5.29.0 → 5.31.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+import { T3nError, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, ContractResponseSchema, Environment } from '@terminal3/t3n-client';
+export { AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractDescriptorDocument, ContractKind, ContractResponseError, ContractResponseSchema, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DescribeContractParams, DescribeContractResult, DescribeFunctionParams, DescribeFunctionResult, DiscoverOptions, Environment, FunctionDescriptorEntry, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, HandshakeError, InvokeError, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListedContract, NODE_URLS, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionStateError, StatelessCredential, StringEncoding, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TOKEN_DECIMALS, WasmError, WhoamiResult, WireBlock, WireEncodingError, _b64uEncode, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, compactDidFromBytes, decodeWasmErrorMessage, discoverCheckDelegation, discoverDescribeContract, discoverDescribeFunction, discoverListContracts, discoverWhoami, extractWasmError, formatTokens, invoke, parseContractResponse, requestToWire, toBaseUnits } from '@terminal3/t3n-client';
+
 /**
  * WASM Component Interface - Mirrors the WIT specification exactly
  *
@@ -918,216 +921,12 @@ interface T3nClientConfig {
      * Without this, a network attacker with their own TDX VM can hand the
      * SDK a forged-but-valid attestation for a key it controls and read
      * every session. It is a required field precisely so no caller can
-     * omit it by accident — bypassing verification must be a visible,
+     * omit it by accident — skipping verification must be a visible,
      * grep-able choice.
      */
     trustAnchor: TrustAnchorOrUnsafe;
 }
 
-/**
- * Error classes for T3n SDK
- */
-/**
- * Base error class for T3n SDK errors
- */
-declare class T3nError extends Error {
-    readonly code?: string | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, code?: string | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown when the {@link T3nClientConfig} handed to the
- * {@link T3nClient} constructor is invalid — a required field is
- * missing or malformed. Thrown eagerly at construction so a
- * misconfiguration fails fast with a named, grep-able error instead
- * of crashing deep in the handshake.
- *
- * The `field` names the offending config key so callers can branch or
- * log with full fidelity rather than parsing the message.
- */
-declare class T3nConfigError extends T3nError {
-    readonly field?: string | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, field?: string | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown when session is in invalid state for operation
- */
-declare class SessionStateError extends T3nError {
-    readonly currentState: string;
-    constructor(message: string, currentState: string);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown during authentication process
- */
-declare class AuthenticationError extends T3nError {
-    readonly authMethod?: string | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, authMethod?: string | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown during handshake process
- */
-declare class HandshakeError extends T3nError {
-    constructor(message: string);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown when a session-authenticated SDK client detects that the
- * caller-owned session is no longer usable and the caller must
- * re-authenticate before the call can succeed.
- *
- * Unlike {@link OrgDataClient} (which owns its ETH-secret-driven session
- * and silently rebuilds it on expiry), {@link SessionOrgDataClient} is
- * handed a caller-owned `T3nClient` whose session is bound to an
- * interactive flow (typically SIWE). The SDK can't re-authenticate
- * non-interactively, so on the same wire patterns that the
- * self-owned client recovers from, the session-bound client translates
- * the underlying error into this class and rethrows. The original error
- * is preserved on the native ES2022 `cause` property.
- *
- * Callers branch on `instanceof SessionExpiredError` to route the user
- * to a re-auth UX (e.g. SIWE modal / login redirect) rather than
- * parsing the message of a raw {@link RpcError}.
- */
-declare class SessionExpiredError extends T3nError {
-    constructor(cause: unknown);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown during RPC communication.
- *
- * `message` is the human-readable error (preferring the server's
- * `error.data.detail` when present, with the request id appended in
- * `[<id>]` form so a UI that only surfaces `.message` still gives an
- * operator something to grep). The structured fields below preserve
- * the same info for callers that want to render or log them
- * separately — e.g. a toast that shows `detail` but surfaces
- * `requestId` in a "copy for support" affordance.
- */
-declare class RpcError extends T3nError {
-    readonly rpcMethod?: string | undefined;
-    readonly httpStatus?: number | undefined;
-    /** Server-attached detail (JSON-RPC `error.data.detail`). User-facing kinds
-     *  carry the specific reason here; internal kinds omit it. */
-    readonly detail?: string | undefined;
-    /** Per-request correlation id (JSON-RPC `error.data.request_id`). */
-    readonly requestId?: string | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, rpcMethod?: string | undefined, httpStatus?: number | undefined, 
-    /** Server-attached detail (JSON-RPC `error.data.detail`). User-facing kinds
-     *  carry the specific reason here; internal kinds omit it. */
-    detail?: string | undefined, 
-    /** Per-request correlation id (JSON-RPC `error.data.request_id`). */
-    requestId?: string | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown when an OTP send is throttled by the node.
- *
- * The email-OTP login flow's `InitEmailOtp` step refuses a send when a
- * still-valid code was issued within the resend cooldown
- * (`reason: "cooldown_active"`) or the rolling per-recipient send cap is
- * exhausted (`reason: "send_cap_exceeded"`). Previously a cooldown-
- * suppressed resend returned a silent success, leaving a user who never
- * received the first code at a dead end; this typed error lets the app
- * render a "you just requested a code — retry in {retryAfterSecs}s"
- * affordance instead.
- *
- * Recognised from the node's stable
- * `OtpRateLimited (reason=…, retry_after_secs=…)` wire token (pinned by a
- * server-side test). Subclass of {@link RpcError} so callers that catch
- * the parent still see `httpStatus`/`requestId`; callers that want the
- * typed surface `instanceof OtpRateLimitedError` to read `reason` and
- * `retryAfterSecs`.
- *
- * Retryable after `retryAfterSecs` (caller-side back-off).
- */
-declare class OtpRateLimitedError extends RpcError {
-    /** Stable reason code: `"cooldown_active"` or `"send_cap_exceeded"`. */
-    readonly reason: string;
-    /** Seconds to wait before retrying the send (parsed from `retry_after_secs=`). */
-    readonly retryAfterSecs: number;
-    constructor(message: string, 
-    /** Stable reason code: `"cooldown_active"` or `"send_cap_exceeded"`. */
-    reason: string, 
-    /** Seconds to wait before retrying the send (parsed from `retry_after_secs=`). */
-    retryAfterSecs: number, rpcMethod?: string, requestId?: string);
-}
-/**
- * Error thrown when WASM operations fail
- */
-declare class WasmError extends T3nError {
-    readonly operation?: string | undefined;
-    readonly payload?: unknown | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, operation?: string | undefined, payload?: unknown | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Decode WASM error message from comma-separated byte array format
- * WASM errors often come as "83,101,114,100,101..." which represents ASCII bytes
- *
- * @param errorMessage - The error message string that may contain comma-separated bytes
- * @returns Decoded error message if it was encoded, otherwise original message
- */
-declare function decodeWasmErrorMessage(errorMessage: string): string;
-/**
- * Extract and decode error from WASM ComponentError
- *
- * @param error - The error object from WASM
- * @returns Decoded error message
- */
-declare function extractWasmError(error: unknown): string;
-
-/**
- * Contract response decoding for {@link T3nClient.execute}.
- *
- * ## On-wire shape
- *
- * Trinity contracts are declared as `result<list<u8>, string>` in WIT and
- * return JSON-encoded bytes. The server-side pipeline is:
- *
- * 1. The contract's returned bytes are deserialized into a JSON `Value`
- *    (the contract's decoded return value).
- * 2. The host wraps that value in an internal `ContractResponse` struct
- *    for bookkeeping — it carries an extracted `otp_state` alongside the
- *    response.
- * 3. The host then unwraps the struct, discarding the `otp_state` field
- *    and returning only the inner `Value` across the executor boundary.
- * 4. That plain `Value` is serialised through the session channel.
- *
- * The client therefore receives the contract's **decoded JSON value
- * directly** — no `{response, otp_state}` envelope, despite what the
- * struct name suggests. `parseContractResponse` reflects that reality:
- * it does a typed `JSON.parse` with optional schema validation, nothing
- * more. OTP flows read their `otp_status` / OTP fields directly off the
- * contract's response body; there is no separate envelope field for them
- * on this path.
- */
-
-/**
- * Minimal validator interface. Any library that exposes `.parse(value) -> T`
- * (zod, valibot, superstruct, custom) is compatible.
- */
-interface ContractResponseSchema<T> {
-    parse(value: unknown): T;
-}
-/**
- * Thrown when the response string from {@link T3nClient.execute} cannot
- * be parsed as JSON.
- *
- * Schema-validation failures are NOT wrapped — they surface as whatever
- * error the caller's validator throws, preserving the rich diagnostics
- * those libraries already provide.
- */
-declare class ContractResponseError extends T3nError {
-    readonly raw?: string | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, raw?: string | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Parse the JSON-encoded response returned by {@link T3nClient.execute}
- * into a typed value.
- *
- * @param raw - the string returned by {@link T3nClient.execute}
- * @param schema - optional validator applied to the parsed value
- * @returns the decoded response, typed as `T`
- * @throws {ContractResponseError} when `raw` is not valid JSON
- * @throws whatever the schema throws on validation failure (e.g. `ZodError`)
- */
-declare function parseContractResponse<T = unknown>(raw: string, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): T;
-
 /**
  * Delegated agents and the T3N OAuth connections that act as them. Wire types
  * and strict decoders for the functions the `T3nClient` wrappers dispatch:
@@ -2795,205 +2594,6 @@ interface ActivityExportFile {
     csv: string;
 }
 
-/**
- * Contract-discovery wire shapes.
- *
- * Field-for-field mirrors of the node's `contracts.list` and `delegation.check`
- * JSON-RPC responses (`service::contract_discovery::{ListedContract,
- * ListContractsResponse}` and `service::grant_check::{GrantRef,
- * GrantCheckResponse}`). Both methods are session-authenticated plaintext reads
- * dispatched over `/api/rpc` — the same posture as `token.get-usage` — so the
- * SDK wrappers return the parsed `result` object directly.
- */
-/** The navigable starting points of the discovery funnel. */
-type ListContractsScope = "core" | "org" | "self";
-/** Params for `contracts.list` (every field optional; `{}` lists core). */
-interface ListContractsParams {
-    /** `"core"` (default) | `"org"` | `"self"`. */
-    scope?: ListContractsScope;
-    /** Target org DID (required for scope `"org"`). */
-    org_did?: string;
-    /** The member the agent acts for (required for scope `"org"` / `"self"`). */
-    pii_did?: string;
-    /** Page offset (defaults to 0 server-side). */
-    offset?: number;
-    /** Page size (defaults + clamped server-side). */
-    limit?: number;
-}
-/** Contract kind — `"core"` platform system contract, `"tenant"` z-space. */
-type ContractKind = "core" | "tenant";
-/** One contract as presented by `contracts.list`. */
-interface ListedContract {
-    /** Canonical name: `tee:<name>` for core, `z:<tid>:<tail>` for tenant. */
-    name: string;
-    kind: ContractKind;
-    /** Current registered version; `null` when the contract is not registered. */
-    version: string | null;
-    /** Descriptor summary, or empty when no descriptor is published. */
-    summary: string;
-    /** Descriptor tags, or empty. */
-    tags: string[];
-    /** Owning DID: the org DID (org mode) or the member's own DID (self mode). */
-    owner_org_did?: string;
-    /**
-     * Human-facing short name: the trailing segment of `name` (`payroll` from
-     * `z:<tid>:payroll`, `user` from `tee:user`). Present this to people instead
-     * of the full canonical `name`, which remains the dispatch key.
-     */
-    short_name: string;
-}
-/** Response body for `contracts.list`. */
-interface ListContractsResult {
-    scope: string;
-    contracts: ListedContract[];
-    next_offset: number | null;
-}
-/**
- * Which standing grant a satisfied/missing entry refers to — the stable,
- * caller-facing values. Reads are normalised to these two, so switch logic on
- * them stays exhaustive.
- */
-type DelegationGrantKind = "member_delegation" | "org_delegation";
-/** Params for `delegation.check` (the generic capability read). */
-interface GrantCheckParams {
-    /** The target contract whose requirements are checked. */
-    contract: string;
-    /** The member the agent wants to act for (the subject). */
-    pii_did: string;
-    /** Functions the intended action needs. */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Org-data scopes the intended action needs. */
-    scopes: string[];
-}
-/** One grant requirement — satisfied or missing. */
-interface DelegationGrantRef {
-    grant: DelegationGrantKind;
-    /** The target contract's canonical name. */
-    contract: string;
-    functions: string[];
-    scopes: string[];
-}
-/**
- * Response for `delegation.check`: the `member_delegation ∩ org_delegation` verdict.
- *
- * `disclosed` is `true` only when the agent is registered under `pii_did`, so
- * org-side status was safe to disclose; `false` yields the uniform,
- * non-disclosive verdict (`authorised:false, satisfied:[], missing:[]`) that is
- * byte-invariant to the requested capability (R5 anti-enumeration).
- */
-interface GrantCheckResult {
-    authorised: boolean;
-    disclosed: boolean;
-    satisfied: DelegationGrantRef[];
-    missing: DelegationGrantRef[];
-}
-/** Response for the `whoami` operation: who the key resolves to, and where. */
-interface WhoamiResult {
-    /** The DID the relayed api key resolves to. */
-    did: string;
-    /**
-     * The org DIDs the agent itself belongs to (its own agent-keyed membership),
-     * or `[]` when it belongs to none. Each is a valid `org_did` for
-     * `contracts.list` scope `"org"`, so this is the seed for browsing the agent's
-     * own orgs.
-     */
-    organisations: string[];
-    /**
-     * The agent's owning / managing DID — usually the org that created it. `null`
-     * for a missing record (agents created without a hosted card or agent URI have
-     * no registry record), a record with no owner link, or a malformed record
-     * (decode failure is logged at `WARN`, never a silent authority downgrade); a
-     * snapshot read failure is surfaced as an error, not reported as `null`. The
-     * owner link is mutable and may have changed since creation, so treat this as
-     * best-effort, not an authority.
-     */
-    owner: string | null;
-}
-/** Params for the `describe.contract` operation. */
-interface DescribeContractParams {
-    /**
-     * Registry name: `tee:<name>/contracts` (core) or `z:<tid>:<tail>` (tenant).
-     * The bare core form `contracts.list` presents (`tee:<name>` / `y:<name>`) is
-     * also accepted — the node maps it onto the `/contracts` registry key — so a
-     * `ListedContract.name` feeds straight in.
-     */
-    contract: string;
-    /** Explicit version; omitted resolves the current registered version. */
-    version?: string;
-}
-/** Params for the `describe.function` operation. */
-interface DescribeFunctionParams {
-    /**
-     * Registry name: `tee:<name>/contracts` (core) or `z:<tid>:<tail>` (tenant).
-     * The bare core form `contracts.list` presents (`tee:<name>` / `y:<name>`) is
-     * also accepted — the node maps it onto the `/contracts` registry key.
-     */
-    contract: string;
-    /** The single function to project from the contract's descriptor. */
-    function: string;
-    /** Explicit version; omitted resolves the current registered version. */
-    version?: string;
-}
-/**
- * One function's descriptor entry — the `describe.function` result and the
- * element type of a {@link ContractDescriptorDocument}'s `functions` array.
- *
- * Left open-ended: the descriptor document's full schema (argument schema,
- * wire projection, auth requirements) is owned by the contract descriptor
- * registry and served verbatim by the node. The named fields are the ones the
- * node's descriptor path always presents.
- */
-interface FunctionDescriptorEntry {
-    /** Contract function name (e.g. `compute-payroll`). */
-    name: string;
-    summary?: string;
-    /** Whether the function mutates state. */
-    mutates?: boolean;
-    [key: string]: unknown;
-}
-/**
- * The node's descriptor document for a contract — the `descriptor` field of a
- * {@link DescribeContractResult}. Open-ended for the same reason as
- * {@link FunctionDescriptorEntry}: the node returns the registry's descriptor
- * document verbatim.
- */
-interface ContractDescriptorDocument {
-    name?: string;
-    version?: string;
-    summary?: string;
-    tags?: string[];
-    functions?: FunctionDescriptorEntry[];
-    [key: string]: unknown;
-}
-/**
- * Result of the `describe.contract` operation. The node wraps the descriptor
- * document with the resolved dispatch `version`, so an authorised describe hands
- * back the exact `scriptVersion` an {@link invoke} call needs alongside the
- * schema. Returned only on the authorised path; a gate miss or unknown contract
- * yields the uniform non-disclosive error, never this wrapper.
- */
-interface DescribeContractResult {
-    /** The canonical registry name, echoed from the request. */
-    contract: string;
-    /** The resolved dispatch version — pass as `scriptVersion` to `invoke`. */
-    version: string;
-    /** The contract's full descriptor document. */
-    descriptor: ContractDescriptorDocument;
-}
-/**
- * Result of the `describe.function` operation: the resolved dispatch `version`
- * paired with the single projected function entry. Same authorised-path-only
- * guarantee as {@link DescribeContractResult}.
- */
-interface DescribeFunctionResult {
-    /** The canonical registry name, echoed from the request. */
-    contract: string;
-    /** The resolved dispatch version — pass as `scriptVersion` to `invoke`. */
-    version: string;
-    /** The single projected function's descriptor entry. */
-    descriptor: FunctionDescriptorEntry;
-}
-
 /**
  * T3n Client - Main SDK class
  *
@@ -3102,7 +2702,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     /**
      * OIDC two-step authentication with session-binding nonce.
      *
-     * Bypasses the WASM client state machine and makes two encrypted
+     * Skips the WASM client state machine and makes two encrypted
      * RPC calls directly:
      * 1. `InitOidcAuth { provider }` → server generates nonce → returns
      *    `ProvideNonce { nonce }`.
@@ -3113,7 +2713,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     private authenticateOidc;
     /**
      * Parse a `Finish { did }` reply shared by the manual (non-WASM) auth flows
-     * that bypass the client state machine (interactive OIDC, keyless workload).
+     * that skip the client state machine (interactive OIDC, keyless workload).
      *
      * Validates the `oidc_auth_action` tag before reading `did`: a decodable but
      * non-`Finish` reply is reported as such rather than silently misread as a
@@ -3137,7 +2737,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      *    the token and mints/resolves the DID `oidc:<iss>:<sub>` →
      *    returns `Finish { did }`.
      *
-     * Bypasses the WASM client state machine (mirrors `authenticateOidc` /
+     * Skips the WASM client state machine (mirrors `authenticateOidc` /
      * `authenticateEmailOtp`); the `SubmitWorkloadToken` action tag is
      * matched server-side.
      */
@@ -3145,7 +2745,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     /**
      * Email-OTP two-step authentication.
      *
-     * Symmetric with {@link authenticateOidc}: bypasses the WASM client
+     * Symmetric with {@link authenticateOidc}: skips the WASM client
      * state machine and makes two encrypted RPC calls directly:
      * 1. `InitEmailOtp { email }` → node sends a one-time code → returns
      *    an `OtpSent` ack.
@@ -4165,7 +3765,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      *
      * The KYC webhook orphan-attestation flow stays here: when
      * `requireExistingUser` is set, the contract identifies the user
-     * by DID (vendorData) instead of email and the gate is bypassed.
+     * by DID (vendorData) instead of email and the email gate does not apply.
      *
      * @throws {UserUpsertError} when the contract returns a typed
      *   error (`email_not_verified`, `legacy_field`, `user_not_found`).
@@ -4521,250 +4121,6 @@ declare function createRandomHandler(): GuestToHostHandler;
  */
 declare function createDefaultHandlers(baseUrl: string, trustAnchor: TrustAnchorOrUnsafe): GuestToHostHandlers;
 
-/**
- * Stateless agent auth: an API key or an OAuth bearer.
- *
- * `invoke` posts once to `POST /api/invoke` — an HTTPS-only
- * endpoint (see the HTTPS-guard note below) that authenticates an agent by
- * one {@link StatelessCredential}: an org agent's opaque API key
- * (`X-T3N-Api-Key: t3n_key_<...>`) or a delegated agent's OAuth access token
- * (`Authorization: Bearer <token>`), and executes a
- * `z:` contract as that agent in the SAME request. Unlike
- * {@link T3nClient.execute}, there is **no** ML-KEM handshake, **no**
- * `Session-Id`, and **no** session state: the node derives the acting agent
- * DID from the relayed key per-call (`resolve_stateless_credential`
- * driving the session contract's `api_key` action), then runs the same
- * execute pipeline `action.execute` runs after `check_authentication`
- * (`ActionService::execute_as_did`), and returns the contract's decoded
- * result as a plain `Json(result)` body — NOT a JSON-RPC envelope.
- *
- * Because the response is the bare decoded value (no `{jsonrpc,result,id}`
- * wrapper to unwrap), decoding reuses {@link parseContractResponse} — the
- * exact same JSON.parse + optional-schema path {@link T3nClient.executeAndDecode}
- * uses for the session `execute` RPC — so callers get identical typed /
- * schema-validated decoding on either path.
- *
- * This module intentionally does NOT import {@link T3nClient}, the WASM
- * component loader, or any handshake/session machinery — `invoke` is
- * a single fetch, nothing else.
- *
- * ### Keyed discovery transports
- * Alongside `invoke` (which acts), this module exports the keyed **discovery**
- * reads — {@link discoverWhoami}, {@link discoverListContracts},
- * {@link discoverCheckDelegation}, {@link discoverDescribeContract},
- * {@link discoverDescribeFunction}. They are the api-key counterpart of the
- * session `T3nClient.listContracts` / `checkDelegation` reads: each POSTs a
- * `{ method, params }` envelope to the node's `POST /api/discover` with the
- * same `X-T3N-Api-Key` header, HTTPS guard, timeout, and key-safe error
- * hygiene as `invoke`, and returns the node's raw JSON result. The session
- * `T3nClient` methods are untouched — these live beside `invoke`, off the
- * session client, so the relay reads never open a session. Every transport
- * shares the {@link postKeyed} core, so there is one implementation of the
- * secure-transport + secret-hygiene rules below, not two.
- *
- * ### HTTPS guard
- * The API key is a long-lived bearer credential relayed in a plain header,
- * so `invoke` refuses to send it over an insecure transport: `baseUrl`
- * must be `https:`, unless the host is a local-dev loopback
- * (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`), in which case plain `http:` is
- * allowed. The check runs before any network activity — an insecure
- * `baseUrl` never gets as far as a `fetch` call.
- *
- * ### Error hygiene
- * Every error `invoke` throws is a fixed, generic
- * {@link InvokeError} message — the response body text, the
- * underlying network error's message, and the api key are never
- * interpolated into it. This is defense in depth against a server (or a
- * malicious intermediary) that echoes the key or other secrets back in an
- * error body: whatever comes back over the wire on a non-2xx response is
- * discarded, not surfaced. The timeout timer also stays armed until the
- * response body has been fully read (or has itself timed out) — see
- * {@link invoke}'s implementation — so a connection that delivers
- * headers and then stalls on the body still respects `timeoutMs`.
- */
-
-/**
- * Wire body for `POST /api/invoke` — mirrors the server's
- * server-side `ExecuteActionRequest`, the same shape
- * `T3nClient`'s `execute*` wrappers build for the session `action.execute`
- * RPC. Field names are load-bearing: the server deserialises strictly into
- * `contract_id` / `contract_version` / `function_name` (see
- * `T3nClient.executeSystemContract`'s doc comment) — `contract` / `version`
- * / `function` produce a 400.
- */
-interface InvokeRequest {
-    contract_id: string;
-    contract_version: string;
-    function_name: string;
-    /** Delegated-call target member; omitted for a self (non-delegated) call. */
-    pii_did?: string;
-    input?: unknown;
-}
-/**
- * The credential `/api/invoke` and `/api/discover` resolve, exactly one of:
- *
- * - `apiKey`: an org agent's opaque API key (`t3n_key_<...>`), sent as
- *   `X-T3N-Api-Key`;
- * - `bearer`: a delegated agent's OAuth access token, sent as
- *   `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
- *
- * The node resolves either on the same routes (its `stateless_credential`
- * action tries the bearer first). Relayed verbatim, never logged and never
- * interpolated into any error this module throws.
- */
-type StatelessCredential = {
-    apiKey: string;
-    bearer?: never;
-} | {
-    bearer: string;
-    apiKey?: never;
-};
-/** Options for {@link invoke}. */
-type InvokeOptions = StatelessCredential & {
-    /**
-     * RPC base URL of the T3n node, e.g. `https://node.example.com`. Must be
-     * `https:` unless the host is a local-dev loopback (`localhost` /
-     * `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`) — see the module doc comment's HTTPS-guard note.
-     */
-    baseUrl: string;
-    /** The wire request to execute, built to the {@link InvokeRequest} shape. */
-    request: InvokeRequest;
-    /** Fetch timeout in ms. Defaults to 30s, matching {@link HttpTransport}. */
-    timeoutMs?: number;
-};
-/**
- * Thrown when `POST /api/invoke` fails at the transport or HTTP
- * layer (network failure, timeout, non-2xx status). Contract-level errors
- * the node returns as a 2xx JSON error value are NOT wrapped here — they
- * flow through {@link parseContractResponse}'s normal return, same as the
- * session `execute` path.
- *
- * The message is always one of a small set of fixed, generic strings — it
- * NEVER contains the raw api key, the response body text, or the
- * underlying network error's message: a server (or a
- * misbehaving intermediary) that echoes the key or other secrets back in
- * an error body must not be able to leak them through this error's
- * message.
- */
-declare class InvokeError extends T3nError {
-    readonly status?: number | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, status?: number | undefined);
-}
-/**
- * Execute a `z:` contract as an agent, authenticating with an API key or an
- * OAuth bearer ({@link StatelessCredential}) — one request, no handshake, no
- * session.
- *
- * @param opts - baseUrl, apiKey, and the wire request to execute
- * @param schema - optional validator applied to the decoded result (e.g. a
- *   zod schema); anything exposing `.parse(value)` is accepted, same as
- *   {@link T3nClient.executeAndDecode}
- * @returns the contract's decoded result, typed as `T`
- * @throws {InvokeError} if `baseUrl` is insecure, on a network
- *   failure/timeout, or on a non-2xx response
- * @throws {ContractResponseError} if the node returns a 2xx with a body
- *   that is not valid JSON
- */
-declare function invoke<T = unknown>(opts: InvokeOptions, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): Promise<T>;
-/**
- * Transport options shared by the keyed discovery reads. Mirrors the transport
- * half of {@link InvokeOptions} (no `request`; the operation params are the
- * second argument of each read). Same HTTPS + secret-hygiene rules as `invoke`.
- */
-type DiscoverOptions = StatelessCredential & {
-    /**
-     * RPC base URL of the T3n node, e.g. `https://node.example.com`. Must be
-     * `https:` unless the host is a local-dev loopback — see
-     * {@link InvokeOptions.baseUrl}.
-     */
-    baseUrl: string;
-    /** Fetch timeout in ms. Defaults to 30s, matching {@link invoke}. */
-    timeoutMs?: number;
-};
-/**
- * `whoami` — resolve the DID the relayed credential maps to. The node never
- * trusts a caller-supplied DID; this is the relay's sole DID source.
- *
- * @throws {InvokeError} if `baseUrl` is insecure, on a network failure/timeout,
- *   or on a non-2xx response
- */
-declare function discoverWhoami(opts: DiscoverOptions): Promise<WhoamiResult>;
-/**
- * `contracts.list` — the keyed counterpart of {@link T3nClient.listContracts}.
- * Absent `params` (`{}`) lists the curated `core` contracts; `org` / `self`
- * scopes are discovery-grant gated server-side (R5 non-disclosive empty page).
- *
- * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
- */
-declare function discoverListContracts(opts: DiscoverOptions, params?: ListContractsParams): Promise<ListContractsResult>;
-/**
- * `delegation.check` — the keyed counterpart of
- * {@link T3nClient.checkDelegation}. Returns the `member_delegation ∩ org_delegation`
- * verdict for the acting agent (as itself, or for `params.pii_did`).
- *
- * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
- */
-declare function discoverCheckDelegation(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: GrantCheckParams): Promise<GrantCheckResult>;
-/**
- * `describe.contract` — the authority-gated keyed describe read. Returns
- * `{ contract, version, descriptor }`: the resolved dispatch `version` (the
- * `scriptVersion` an {@link invoke} call needs) alongside the contract's full
- * descriptor document. Unlike the session/stdio public descriptor GET, the relay
- * path is membership-gated on the contract's owning org and returns a uniform
- * non-disclosive error for both "not found" and "not authorised"
- * (anti-enumeration).
- *
- * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
- */
-declare function discoverDescribeContract(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: DescribeContractParams): Promise<DescribeContractResult>;
-/**
- * `describe.function` — the authority-gated keyed describe read for a single
- * function. Returns `{ contract, version, descriptor }` with `descriptor` the
- * projected function entry. Same gating as {@link discoverDescribeContract}.
- *
- * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
- */
-declare function discoverDescribeFunction(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: DescribeFunctionParams): Promise<DescribeFunctionResult>;
-
-/**
- * Token fixed-point units (USDT-style 6 decimals).
- *
- * As of `tee:*` metering v2, every token amount on the wire —
- * {@link BalanceRow}'s `available`/`reserved`, {@link UsageEntry.amount},
- * and `total_supply` — is denominated in **base units**, where
- * `1 T3N token = `{@link BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN}` base units`. The node
- * meters the *actual* fractional cost of each operation (pro-rata by
- * bytes / byte-seconds / fuel) down to `1e-6` token, so amounts are
- * raw integers in base units, NOT whole tokens.
- *
- * The wire fields are left as raw base units (no silent rescaling — that
- * would lose precision for large balances and surprise callers doing
- * arithmetic). Use {@link formatTokens} to render a human "tokens"
- * string and {@link toBaseUnits} to convert a token figure back.
- *
- * ⚠️ Breaking vs. the pre-decimals SDK: a balance that used to read `5`
- * (whole tokens) now reads `5_000_000` (base units). Multiply existing
- * display code through {@link formatTokens}.
- */
-/** Decimal places in a T3N token (fixed; mirrors the node constant). */
-declare const TOKEN_DECIMALS = 6;
-/** Base units per whole T3N token — `10 ** TOKEN_DECIMALS`. */
-declare const BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN = 1000000;
-/**
- * Render a base-unit amount as a human-readable token string, e.g.
- * `25_920_000 → "25.92"`, `1_000_000 → "1"`, `4768 → "0.004768"`.
- *
- * Trailing-zero fraction digits are trimmed; an integer amount renders
- * with no decimal point. Accepts `number` or `bigint`; for balances
- * above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` prefer passing a `bigint`.
- */
-declare function formatTokens(baseUnits: number | bigint): string;
-/**
- * Convert a whole-or-fractional token figure to base units (rounded to
- * the nearest base unit). E.g. `25.92 → 25_920_000`, `1 → 1_000_000`.
- */
-declare function toBaseUnits(tokens: number): number;
-
 /**
  * OrgDataClient — typed wrapper over the existing authenticated
  * `/api/rpc` + `action.execute` pipeline.
@@ -5110,7 +4466,7 @@ interface OrgDataClientOptions extends ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions {
      * Extra headers added to every `/api/rpc` request the internal
      * `T3nClient` makes. Mirrors `T3nClientConfig.headers` — needed when
      * the node sits behind an edge policy that gates `/api/rpc` on a
-     * header (e.g. the staging Cloud Armor bypass token).
+     * header (e.g. an access token the edge requires).
      */
     headers?: Record<string, string>;
     /**
@@ -5118,7 +4474,7 @@ interface OrgDataClientOptions extends ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions {
      * attestation check (SP-003). Mirrors `T3nClientConfig.trustAnchor`:
      * either a pinned {@link TrustAnchor} or the explicit
      * `{ unsafe_trust_server: true }` opt-out. Required (no silent default)
-     * so bypassing verification is always a visible, grep-able choice —
+     * so skipping verification is always a visible, grep-able choice —
      * an authenticated ETH-key caller is still MITM-able on the ML-KEM key.
      * Signed trust-anchor manifests are not published yet, so most callers
      * pass `{ unsafe_trust_server: true }` today.
@@ -5277,8 +4633,8 @@ declare class OrgDataClient {
      * (`admin`|`member`) (org-admin only). A human is a member absent from the
      * agent registry — the exact complement of {@link listAgents}.
      *
-     * No profile PII (name/email) is returned; the roster is DID + role only
-     * (AI-175). The response carries at most `limit` members plus an optional
+     * No profile PII (name/email) is returned; the roster is DID + role only.
+     * The response carries at most `limit` members plus an optional
      * `next_cursor`; to enumerate every member, pass the returned `next_cursor`
      * back as `cursor` until it is absent.
      */
@@ -5626,14 +4982,13 @@ declare class SessionOrgDataClient {
 declare function createOrgDataClientFromSession(t3n: T3nClient, baseUrl: string): SessionOrgDataClient;
 
 /**
- * Payroll request shapes + shared encoding utilities.
+ * Payroll request shapes.
  *
  * Envelope-free authorisation removed the per-call delegation
  * credential and envelope entirely: authority is now the standing on-chain
  * `member_delegation` ∩ `org_delegation` intersection the host re-reads every call, and
  * every payroll call emits the plain Direct wire variant (`{ request }`).
- * What remains here is the request body shape, its canonical defaults, and
- * the base64url / DID helpers callers still need.
+ * What remains here is the request body shape and its canonical defaults.
  *
  * Wire conventions retained from the contract:
  *   - `batch_cap_cents` is emitted as a **JSON string** so JS Number
@@ -5676,62 +5031,6 @@ interface PayrollRunRequest {
 type ComputePayrollRequest = Omit<PayrollRunRequest, "cycle_id">;
 /** Default for `individual_disbursement_threshold_cents` — SGD 15,000. */
 declare const DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS = 1500000n;
-declare function b64uEncode(input: Uint8Array): string;
-/**
- * Encode raw bytes to base64url-no-pad (RFC 4648 §5 with padding dropped).
- * The encoding the wire uses for binary fields.
- */
-declare function b64uEncodeBytes(input: Uint8Array): string;
-/**
- * Decode a base64url-no-pad string. Strict — rejects standard-alphabet
- * `+` / `/` and any padding `=`.
- */
-declare function b64uDecodeStrict(input: string): Uint8Array;
-/** @internal — preserved alias for in-tree callers. Prefer
- *  {@link b64uEncodeBytes} / {@link b64uDecodeStrict}. */
-declare const _b64uEncode: typeof b64uEncode;
-/** Build a `did:t3n:<40-hex>` from raw 20 bytes. */
-declare function compactDidFromBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
-
-/** Closed-vocabulary serialisation annotations for a contract function's body. */
-interface WireBlock {
-    /**
-     * Field paths whose values are emitted as decimal strings. A path ending in
-     * `.*` applies to every value of the named object/array (e.g.
-     * `historical_baselines.*`).
-     */
-    u64_as_string?: string[];
-    /**
-     * Byte fields carried as typed strings. The value is passed through when it
-     * is already a string; a byte input (`Uint8Array` or a `number[]` of octets)
-     * is encoded per its kind.
-     */
-    string_encoded?: Record<string, StringEncoding>;
-}
-/** The closed set of `string_encoded` field kinds. */
-type StringEncoding = "did" | "address" | "hash";
-/**
- * Raised when a `wire` block asks for a projection the closed vocabulary cannot
- * express — an unrepresentable value for a declared field. It signals a
- * descriptor↔contract mismatch on the author's side, so callers surface it as a
- * terminal `unsupported_wire_encoding` rather than retrying.
- */
-declare class WireEncodingError extends T3nError {
-    readonly field: string;
-    readonly encoding?: StringEncoding | undefined;
-    constructor(message: string, field: string, encoding?: StringEncoding | undefined);
-}
-type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
-/**
- * Project `args` into the plain-args body a z-space contract deserialises,
- * applying the descriptor's `wire` annotations. Returns a new object; `args` is
- * never mutated. With no `wire` block the body is returned unchanged (the
- * JSON-plain path).
- *
- * @throws {WireEncodingError} when a declared field holds a value the
- *   vocabulary cannot express.
- */
-declare function requestToWire(args: JsonRecord, wire?: WireBlock): JsonRecord;
 
 /**
  * SessionUsageReportClient — typed wrapper over the authenticated
@@ -5947,16 +5246,6 @@ declare function isObject(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown>;
  */
 declare function assertShape<T>(value: unknown, guard: (v: unknown) => v is T, where: string): T;
 
-type Environment = "sandbox" | "testnet" | "production";
-declare const NODE_URLS: Record<Environment, string>;
-/**
- * Default environment for the public (@terminal3/t3n-sdk) artifact. External
- * consumers default to testnet (not production) — a safer default that the
- * interactive write-confirm and the SDK both honor. The wide/internal build
- * exports its own DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT; the public rollup alias swaps this in.
- */
-declare const DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT: Environment;
-
 /**
  * Configuration types for T3n SDK
  */
@@ -6840,5 +6129,5 @@ declare function tenantDidHex(tenantDid: string): string;
 declare function validateTail(tail: string): string;
 declare function canonicalTenantName(tenantDid: string, tail: string): string;
 
-export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, InvokeError, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, WireEncodingError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, decodeWasmErrorMessage, deriveAgentCardEntryId, detectQuoteVendor, discoverCheckDelegation, discoverDescribeContract, discoverDescribeFunction, discoverListContracts, discoverWhoami, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fanOutGrant, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchSevSnpCollateral, fetchTrustedManifest, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getContractVersion, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, invoke, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isContractAgentCountsResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractDelegation, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeDiscoverDids, mergeGrants, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseContractResponse, parseMemberDelegationDoc, readOnlyScopes, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestToWire, resolveTrustAnchor, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, sevSnpVcekUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifySevSnpReport, verifyTdxQuote };
-export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityExportFile, ActivityExportStatus, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdminActionAuth, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, AuthoriseOAuthConnectionParams, BalanceRow, BoundGrant, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ComputePayrollRequest, ConfigValidationResult, ContractAgentCountsInput, ContractAgentCountsResponse, ContractDescriptorDocument, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractKind, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, ContractSetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorResult, CreateDelegatedAgentParams, CreateHarnessAgentParams, CreatePolicyInput, CreateT3nAgentParams, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegatedAgent, DelegatedAgentKind, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DeleteDataInput, DeleteScopeInput, DescribeContractParams, DescribeContractResult, DescribeFunctionParams, DescribeFunctionResult, DescribeOAuthClientParams, DetailedContract, Did, DidKind, Direction, DiscoverOptions, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, DrainContractAgentCountsInput, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, ExportActivityLogOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, FunctionDescriptorEntry, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, GranteeInput, GrantsMergeResult, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedContract, ListedDelegatedAgent, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberDelegationDoc, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OAuthAuthorisation, OAuthClientDescription, OAuthClientKind, OAuthConnection, OAuthConnectionState, OAuthRedirectClass, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractDelegation, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgDelegationAddGrantsInput, OrgDelegationDeleteInput, OrgDelegationGetInput, OrgDelegationRemoveGrantsInput, OrgDelegationSetInput, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgRemoveGrantTarget, OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RemoveTarget, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, ScopeAccessVerb, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetDefaultQuotasOptions, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SevSnpCollateral, SevSnpVerifyResult, SignedTrustManifest, StatelessCredential, StringEncoding, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantContractUnsetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UpdateQuotasOptions, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, Validity, VcekUrlResult, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WhoamiResult, WireBlock, WireScope, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };
+export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HttpTransport, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, OrgDataClient, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, assertShape, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, deriveAgentCardEntryId, detectQuoteVendor, eth_get_address, fanOutGrant, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchSevSnpCollateral, fetchTrustedManifest, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getContractVersion, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isContractAgentCountsResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractDelegation, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeDiscoverDids, mergeGrants, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseMemberDelegationDoc, readOnlyScopes, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, resolveTrustAnchor, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, sevSnpVcekUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifySevSnpReport, verifyTdxQuote };
+export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityExportFile, ActivityExportStatus, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdminActionAuth, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, AuthoriseOAuthConnectionParams, BalanceRow, BoundGrant, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ComputePayrollRequest, ConfigValidationResult, ContractAgentCountsInput, ContractAgentCountsResponse, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractSetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorResult, CreateDelegatedAgentParams, CreateHarnessAgentParams, CreatePolicyInput, CreateT3nAgentParams, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegatedAgent, DelegatedAgentKind, DeleteDataInput, DeleteScopeInput, DescribeOAuthClientParams, DetailedContract, Did, DidKind, Direction, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, DrainContractAgentCountsInput, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, ExportActivityLogOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GranteeInput, GrantsMergeResult, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedDelegatedAgent, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberDelegationDoc, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OAuthAuthorisation, OAuthClientDescription, OAuthClientKind, OAuthConnection, OAuthConnectionState, OAuthRedirectClass, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractDelegation, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgDelegationAddGrantsInput, OrgDelegationDeleteInput, OrgDelegationGetInput, OrgDelegationRemoveGrantsInput, OrgDelegationSetInput, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgRemoveGrantTarget, OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RemoveTarget, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, ScopeAccessVerb, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetDefaultQuotasOptions, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SevSnpCollateral, SevSnpVerifyResult, SignedTrustManifest, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantContractUnsetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UpdateQuotasOptions, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, Validity, VcekUrlResult, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WireScope, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };