@terminal3/t3n-sdk 5.15.2 → 5.17.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1148,6 +1148,46 @@ interface Validity {
     valid_from_secs?: number;
     valid_until_secs?: number;
 }
+/**
+ * A verb a grantee holds on a {@link WireScope} path. Mirrors the org-data
+ * `Access` wire enum (lowercase). **Only `"read"` is enforced** — `"write"` and
+ * `"delete"` are declared-only; nothing in the node checks them yet. Do not
+ * treat granting or withholding either as a security boundary.
+ */
+type ScopeAccessVerb = "read" | "write" | "delete";
+/**
+ * One scoped data-path entry in a grant's `scopes` list — the unified shape
+ * replacing the retired pair of parallel string lists (`scopes` +
+ * `read_scopes`) where the verb was implied by which list a path appeared in.
+ * Mirrors the org-data `WireScopeGroup` wire shape.
+ */
+interface WireScope {
+    /** Data scope path the grantee may access (e.g. `"example/records"`). */
+    path: string;
+    /** Verbs the grantee holds on `path`. Must be non-empty. */
+    access: ScopeAccessVerb[];
+}
+/**
+ * Build a read-only {@link WireScope} list from bare paths — the common case,
+ * since `"read"` is the only enforced verb. Mirrors the node integration
+ * test harness's own `read_only_scopes` convention.
+ */
+declare function readOnlyScopes(paths: string[]): WireScope[];
+/**
+ * Fan a legacy multi-function grant intent out into one row per function,
+ * each sharing `base` verbatim. `base` is whatever the caller already built
+ * (grantee, scopes, and any qualifiers it chose to include) minus `function`;
+ * this only adds the mechanical per-function loop so every call site fans out
+ * identically instead of re-deriving the shape.
+ *
+ * Rows that need to vary a field PER function (e.g. a direct-read function
+ * carrying a narrower scope than its siblings — see `grantZPayrollAgent`)
+ * build their own `.map()` instead; this helper is for the common case where
+ * every fanned-out row is identical apart from `function`.
+ */
+declare function fanOutGrant<T extends {
+    function: string;
+}>(base: Omit<T, "function">, functions: string[]): T[];
 /**
  * A grantee-bound capability grant — the element of BOTH grant-management
  * surfaces: the org edge (`org-delegation-set` input / `org-delegation-get`
@@ -1157,10 +1197,16 @@ interface Validity {
  *
  * Mirrors the org-data `BoundGrant` wire shape verbatim (snake_case, no casing
  * transform): `grantee` followed by the flattened capability body. The org edge
- * populates only `functions` + `scopes`; the delegation edge additionally
- * carries the qualifiers `version_req` / `read_scopes` / `allowed_hosts` and the
- * validity `window`. All qualifier fields are optional and omitted from the wire when
+ * populates only `function` + `scopes`; the delegation edge additionally
+ * carries the qualifiers `version_req` / `allowed_hosts` and the validity
+ * `window`. All qualifier fields are optional and omitted from the wire when
  * absent (never sent as `null`), so an org grant simply leaves them unset.
+ *
+ * **One function per grant**: a client authorising a grantee on several
+ * functions posts several rows, each carrying the full `scopes` that function
+ * needs — there is no more multi-function fan-out on the wire. The contract
+ * keeps at most one grant per `(grantee, contract_id, function)`; a later row
+ * with the same triple replaces the earlier one.
  */
 interface BoundGrant {
     /** The principal (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`) this grant applies to — a user or an
@@ -1169,16 +1215,18 @@ interface BoundGrant {
     /** Target contract id (canonical name, e.g. `"tee:z-payroll/contracts"`), or
      *  `"*"`. On a read this echoes the queried contract. */
     contract_id: string;
-    /** WIT function names the grantee may invoke (e.g. `"set-records"`; `["*"]`
-     *  matches all). */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Data scope paths the grantee may access (e.g. `"example/records"`). */
-    scopes: string[];
+    /** The single WIT function this grant confers (e.g. `"set-records"`), or
+     *  `"*"` for every function on the contract (agent edge only). */
+    function: string;
+    /** Data scopes the grantee may access via `function`. */
+    scopes: WireScope[];
     /** Agent edge only: optional semver requirement; omitted matches any version. */
     version_req?: string;
-    /** Agent edge only: direct-read scopes the grantee may enumerate itself — a
-     *  subset of `scopes` (enforced contract-side). */
-    read_scopes?: string[];
+    /** Agent edge only, read-only artefact: the retired `read_scopes` cap carried
+     *  forward from a row written under the earlier multi-function-per-grant
+     *  shape. New writes never set this — express a direct-read function's
+     *  narrower scope as that function's own `scopes` instead. */
+    legacy_read_scopes?: WireScope[];
     /** Agent edge only: egress hosts the grantee may reach for this contract. */
     allowed_hosts?: string[];
     /** Agent edge only: optional validity time-box. */
@@ -1750,11 +1798,11 @@ interface OrgDataActionWire {
  * their own grants. This is the user-approval proof the per-call delegation
  * credential's `user_sig` used to carry.
  *
- * A grant carries `functions`, the agent's delegated org-data `scopes`, the
- * direct-enumerable `read_scopes`, egress `allowed_hosts`, an optional semver
- * `version_req`, and an optional validity `window`. The ≤ cap *length* check is
- * enforced contract-side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side at read
- * time.
+ * A grant carries the single `function` it confers (one function per grant
+ * row), the agent's delegated org-data `scopes`, egress `allowed_hosts`, an
+ * optional semver `version_req`, and an optional validity `window`. The ≤
+ * cap *length* check is enforced contract-side at write time; the expiry gate
+ * is host-side at read time.
  *
  * The SDK is a literal snake_case mirror of the wire: {@link BoundGrant} IS the
  * wire grant shape, so reads and writes pass through untouched — there is no
@@ -1805,15 +1853,23 @@ declare function parseMemberDelegationDoc(response: unknown): MemberDelegationDo
 interface GrantsMergeResult {
     /** Full merged grant list, ready for `member-delegation-update`. */
     grants: BoundGrant[];
-    /** `"<grantee> → <contract_id>"` rows preserved from the existing policy. */
+    /** `"<grantee> → <contract_id> (<function>)"` rows preserved from the
+     *  existing policy. */
     preservedRows: string[];
 }
 /**
- * Merge new grant rows into the existing flat list with `(grantee, contract_id)`
- * union semantics: an existing row whose `(grantee, contract_id)` matches a new
- * row is replaced; every other existing row is preserved (and reported in
- * `preservedRows` as an audit aid). New rows for a `(grantee, contract_id)` not
+ * Merge new grant rows into the existing flat list with
+ * `(grantee, contract_id, function)` union semantics: an existing row whose
+ * triple matches a new row is replaced; every other existing row is preserved
+ * (and reported in `preservedRows` as an audit aid). New rows for a triple not
  * already present are appended.
+ *
+ * The key is the full triple, not just `(grantee, contract_id)`: a legacy
+ * multi-function row now fans out into one row per function, and the
+ * contract's own uniqueness rule is "at most one grant per
+ * `(grantee, contract_id, function)`" (`DuplicateGranteeFunction`). Keying on
+ * the pair alone would make granting a second function on the same contract
+ * silently drop the first function's row instead of adding beside it.
  */
 declare function mergeGrants(existing: BoundGrant[], additions: BoundGrant[]): GrantsMergeResult;
 /**
@@ -3460,22 +3516,37 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * already exists from creation). All-or-nothing: any refusal creates
      * no agent, no record, no card.
      *
+     * `options.initialCredits` pre-funds the new agent, in the SAME
+     * transaction as creation, from the owning organisation's own T3N
+     * balance — a freshly created agent otherwise starts with zero credit
+     * and every metered action it takes fails, since metered actions bill
+     * the acting DID's own balance. Internally dispatches into
+     * `tee:admin.agent-credit-transfer` over contracts-call; the caller must
+     * still be an admin of `organisationDid` (already required for
+     * `create-agent` itself) and the org's own balance must cover the
+     * amount, or the whole call refuses and nothing is created. To instead
+     * fund an agent from your own personal balance, or any time after
+     * creation, use {@link fundAgent}.
+     *
      * @param organisationDid - the owning organisation's DID
      *   (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`); the caller must be one of its admins
      * @param name - human-readable agent name (1..=128 bytes)
-     * @param options - optional atomic registration + card hosting
+     * @param options - optional atomic registration + card hosting +
+     *   initial credit funding (`initialCredits`, in base units)
      * @returns the new agent's DID and its one-time opaque `apiKey` + `keyId`,
      *   plus `agentUri` / `cardEntryId` (the hosted PRIVATE card's entry id)
      *   when the atomic path ran
      * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or if the contract
      *   refuses (e.g. the caller is not an admin of `organisationDid`, the
-     *   name is empty / too long, or the card fails validation — in which
+     *   name is empty / too long, the card fails validation, or
+     *   `initialCredits` exceeds the org's available balance — in which
      *   case NOTHING was created)
      */
     createAgent(organisationDid: string, name: string, options?: {
         agentUri?: string;
         card?: object | string;
         defaultCard?: boolean;
+        initialCredits?: number;
     }): Promise<{
         agentDid: Did;
         apiKey: string;
@@ -3483,6 +3554,52 @@ declare class T3nClient {
         agentUri?: string;
         cardEntryId?: string;
     }>;
+    /**
+     * Fund an agent DID's T3N credit balance so it can act. A freshly
+     * created agent starts with zero credit (unless `createAgent` was called
+     * with `initialCredits`), and every metered action is billed to the
+     * agent's own DID — so an unfunded agent's first call fails.
+     * Use this to fund an agent any time after it was created (not just at
+     * creation).
+     *
+     * Dispatches `fund-agent` on `tee:organisation/contracts`, which forwards
+     * into `tee:admin.agent-credit-transfer` over contracts-call. By default
+     * the transfer comes from the CALLER'S OWN balance (self-funding) —
+     * `tee:admin` requires the caller to administer at least one organisation
+     * `agentDid` belongs to. Pass `options.fromOrg` to instead fund from an
+     * organisation's own balance — `tee:admin` then requires the caller to
+     * administer `fromOrg` AND `agentDid` to actually be a member of it.
+     *
+     * Authorisation is organisation MEMBERSHIP, not a check that `agentDid`
+     * is specifically an agent: a human member of the same organisation is
+     * an equally valid recipient (deliberate — see the WIT doc on
+     * `agent-credit-transfer` in the contracts repo). `tee:admin`
+     * independently re-verifies this before moving any credit, regardless of
+     * what this SDK call or `tee:organisation` checked — this call can never
+     * reach a DID with no membership row under an organisation the caller
+     * administers, or move more than the source's real available balance.
+     *
+     * @param agentDid - the agent to fund (`did:t3n:<40-hex>` or bare hex)
+     * @param amount - credit to transfer, in base units (see
+     *   {@link formatTokens} / {@link toBaseUnits} in `src/token/`). u128 on
+     *   the wire as a JSON number, same convention as {@link BalanceRow} —
+     *   values above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` are not currently
+     *   representable; split into multiple calls if you need to move more.
+     * @param options - `note` (recorded on the ledger's tx log — never put
+     *   secrets or PII in it, it's visible in both parties' usage feeds) and
+     *   `fromOrg` (fund from an org's balance instead of the caller's own)
+     * @returns the ledger transaction's sequence number for this transfer
+     * @throws if the session is not authenticated, if the caller does not
+     *   administer any organisation `agentDid` belongs to (or isn't an admin
+     *   of `options.fromOrg`, or `agentDid` isn't a member of `fromOrg`), or
+     *   if the source balance is insufficient
+     */
+    fundAgent(agentDid: string, amount: number, options?: {
+        note?: string;
+        fromOrg?: string;
+    }): Promise<{
+        seqNo: number;
+    }>;
     /**
      * Normalise an organisation / user DID to the bare 40-hex form the
      * `tee:organisation` contract's organisation-lifecycle exports
@@ -3643,15 +3760,21 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * Authorise a delegatee for one contract on the caller's own behalf
      * (envelope-free authorisation). Read-merge-writes the
      * caller's delegation edge in `ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS_MAP` via `member-delegation-update`
-     * (**SelfOnly**) with `(grantee, contract_id)` union semantics, so other
-     * contracts' grants for this or any delegatee survive untouched.
+     * (**SelfOnly**) with `(grantee, contract_id, function)` union semantics, so
+     * other contracts' and other functions' grants for this or any delegatee
+     * survive untouched.
      *
      * The grant is the flat wire {@link BoundGrant}: its `grantee` is the delegatee
-     * DID being authorised, and it carries `functions`, the delegated org-data
-     * `scopes`, direct-read `read_scopes`, egress `allowed_hosts`, an optional
-     * semver `version_req`, and an optional validity `window`. The ≤ cap *length*
-     * check is enforced contract-side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side
-     * at read time.
+     * DID being authorised, and it carries the single `function` it confers (one
+     * function per row), the delegated org-data `scopes`, egress
+     * `allowed_hosts`, an optional semver `version_req`, and an optional validity
+     * `window`. The ≤ cap *length* check is enforced contract-side at write time;
+     * the expiry gate is host-side at read time.
+     *
+     * Authorising a delegatee on several functions takes several rows — pass an
+     * array to write them in the same read-merge-write, rather than calling this
+     * once per function (which would race against itself: each call re-reads the
+     * document, so a second call's merge could miss the first call's write).
      *
      * This is the write surface `getDelegationInstructions` produces the
      * parameters for. The caller MUST be the delegating user, authenticated as
@@ -3663,16 +3786,16 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * standing discovery), and any `options.discoverDids` are unioned in
      * (order-preserving, deduplicated).
      *
-     * @param grant - the single grant to set — a {@link BoundGrant} whose
-     *   `grantee` is the delegatee DID being authorised (contract_id, functions,
-     *   scopes, window, egress hosts)
+     * @param grant - the grant(s) to set — one or more {@link BoundGrant} rows
+     *   whose `grantee` is the delegatee DID being authorised (contract_id,
+     *   function, scopes, window, egress hosts)
      * @param options - optional `discoverDids` to union into the document's
      *   discovery grants (org DIDs for org-mode `listContracts`, the caller's
      *   own DID for self mode)
      * @returns the grant rows preserved from the existing policy (audit aid)
      * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or the contract refuses
      */
-    updateMemberDelegation(grant: BoundGrant, options?: {
+    updateMemberDelegation(grant: BoundGrant | BoundGrant[], options?: {
         discoverDids?: string[];
     }): Promise<{
         preservedRows: string[];
@@ -6763,5 +6886,5 @@ declare function tenantDidHex(tenantDid: string): string;
 declare function validateTail(tail: string): string;
 declare function canonicalTenantName(tenantDid: string, tail: string): string;
 
-export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, InvokeError, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, WireEncodingError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, decodeWasmErrorMessage, deriveAgentCardEntryId, detectQuoteVendor, discoverCheckDelegation, discoverDescribeContract, discoverDescribeFunction, discoverListContracts, discoverWhoami, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchSevSnpCollateral, fetchTrustedManifest, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getContractVersion, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, invoke, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isContractAgentCountsResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractDelegation, isOrgContractGrants, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeAgentAuthEntries, mergeDiscoverDids, mergeGrants, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseAgentAuthGet, parseAgentAuthPolicy, parseContractResponse, parseMemberDelegationDoc, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestToWire, resolveTrustAnchor, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, sevSnpVcekUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toAgentAuthUpdateWire, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifySevSnpReport, verifyTdxQuote };
-export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityExportFile, ActivityExportStatus, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdminActionAuth, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentAuthEntry, AgentAuthMergeResult, AgentAuthPolicy, AgentAuthScriptGrant, AgentAuthUpdateInput, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, BalanceRow, BoundGrant, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ComputePayrollRequest, ConfigValidationResult, ContractAgentCountsInput, ContractAgentCountsResponse, ContractDescriptorDocument, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractKind, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, ContractSetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorResult, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DeleteDataInput, DeleteGrantsInput, DeleteScopeInput, DescribeContractParams, DescribeContractResult, DescribeFunctionParams, DescribeFunctionResult, DetailedContract, Did, DidKind, Direction, DiscoverOptions, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, DrainContractAgentCountsInput, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, ExportActivityLogOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, FunctionDescriptorEntry, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, GranteeInput, GrantsGetInput, GrantsMergeResult, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedContract, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberDelegationDoc, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractDelegation, OrgContractGrants, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgDelegationAddGrantsInput, OrgDelegationDeleteInput, OrgDelegationGetInput, OrgDelegationRemoveGrantsInput, OrgDelegationSetInput, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgRemoveGrantTarget, OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RemoveMemberGrantsInput, RemoveTarget, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetDefaultQuotasOptions, SetGrantsInput, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SevSnpCollateral, SevSnpVerifyResult, SignedTrustManifest, StringEncoding, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantContractUnsetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UpdateQuotasOptions, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserGrant, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, Validity, VcekUrlResult, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WhoamiResult, WireBlock, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };
+export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, InvokeError, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, WireEncodingError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, decodeWasmErrorMessage, deriveAgentCardEntryId, detectQuoteVendor, discoverCheckDelegation, discoverDescribeContract, discoverDescribeFunction, discoverListContracts, discoverWhoami, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fanOutGrant, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchSevSnpCollateral, fetchTrustedManifest, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getContractVersion, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, invoke, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isContractAgentCountsResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractDelegation, isOrgContractGrants, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeAgentAuthEntries, mergeDiscoverDids, mergeGrants, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseAgentAuthGet, parseAgentAuthPolicy, parseContractResponse, parseMemberDelegationDoc, readOnlyScopes, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestToWire, resolveTrustAnchor, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, sevSnpVcekUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toAgentAuthUpdateWire, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifySevSnpReport, verifyTdxQuote };
+export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityExportFile, ActivityExportStatus, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdminActionAuth, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentAuthEntry, AgentAuthMergeResult, AgentAuthPolicy, AgentAuthScriptGrant, AgentAuthUpdateInput, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, BalanceRow, BoundGrant, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ComputePayrollRequest, ConfigValidationResult, ContractAgentCountsInput, ContractAgentCountsResponse, ContractDescriptorDocument, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractKind, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, ContractSetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorInput, ContractUnsetDescriptorResult, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DeleteDataInput, DeleteGrantsInput, DeleteScopeInput, DescribeContractParams, DescribeContractResult, DescribeFunctionParams, DescribeFunctionResult, DetailedContract, Did, DidKind, Direction, DiscoverOptions, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, DrainContractAgentCountsInput, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, ExportActivityLogOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, FunctionDescriptorEntry, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, GranteeInput, GrantsGetInput, GrantsMergeResult, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedContract, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberDelegationDoc, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractDelegation, OrgContractGrants, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgDelegationAddGrantsInput, OrgDelegationDeleteInput, OrgDelegationGetInput, OrgDelegationRemoveGrantsInput, OrgDelegationSetInput, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgRemoveGrantTarget, OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RemoveMemberGrantsInput, RemoveTarget, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, ScopeAccessVerb, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetDefaultQuotasOptions, SetGrantsInput, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SevSnpCollateral, SevSnpVerifyResult, SignedTrustManifest, StringEncoding, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantContractUnsetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UpdateQuotasOptions, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserGrant, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, Validity, VcekUrlResult, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WhoamiResult, WireBlock, WireScope, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };