@terminal3/t3n-sdk 4.37.1 → 4.39.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -965,130 +965,522 @@ declare class ContractResponseError extends T3nError {
 declare function parseContractResponse<T = unknown>(raw: string, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): T;
 
 /**
- * Agent-auth grants — the standing on-chain authority a user delegates to
- * an agent (envelope-free authorisation).
+ * Org-data wire types mirroring the org-data contract wire shapes.
  *
- * `AGENT_AUTH_MAP` is keyed by the *user* DID — one policy document per
- * user, global across orgs, with at most one entry per agent DID. Reads
- * (`agent-auth-get`) and writes (`agent-auth-update`) on
- * `tee:authorisations/contracts` (the policy's owning contract) are
- * **SelfOnly**: only the user, authenticated as themselves, may read or
- * write their own grants. This is the user-approval
- * proof the per-call delegation credential's `user_sig` used to carry.
- *
- * The write shape gained `scopes` + a validity window: the
- * agent's delegated org-data scopes, and an optional `[valid_from_secs,
- * valid_until_secs]` window. The ≤ cap *length* check is enforced contract-
- * side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side at read time.
- *
- * The merge below is a script-level union (R59): writing a grant for one
- * `(agent_did, script_name)` preserves every other script row on that
- * agent's entry, and every other agent's entry, unchanged.
- */
-/** A single script grant in the camelCase write-request shape. */
-interface AgentAuthScriptGrant {
-    /** Contract name, or `"*"`. */
-    scriptName: string;
-    /** Optional semver requirement; `null` to match any version. */
-    versionReq?: string | null;
-    /** Functions the agent may invoke on this contract. */
+ * Plain TypeScript interfaces (no zod) — the SDK does not use a
+ * validation library for domain types; see the existing `types/` files.
+ *
+ * Each response type below is paired with a shallow runtime predicate
+ * (`isMutationResponse`, `isOrgPolicyMeta`, etc.) so the org-data client
+ * can `assertShape` the decoded payload before returning to callers.
+ * Predicates check the top-level structure only; nested elements
+ * (e.g. each `BoundGrant` inside `OrgContractDelegation.grants`) are not
+ * deeply validated — see `utils/shape.ts` for the rationale.
+ *
+ * Reference: the org-data wire contract.
+ */
+/**
+ * Validity time-box on an agent-edge grant — serialised under the JSON key
+ * `window`. Both bounds are optional unix-seconds; an omitted bound is
+ * defaulted contract-side (`valid_from_secs` → now, `valid_until_secs` → now +
+ * operator cap). Mirrors the org-data `Validity` wire shape. Absent bounds
+ * are omitted from the wire (never sent as `null`).
+ */
+interface Validity {
+    valid_from_secs?: number;
+    valid_until_secs?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * A grantee-bound capability grant — the element of BOTH grant-management
+ * surfaces: the org edge (`org-delegation-set` input / `org-delegation-get`
+ * output) and the flat delegation edge (`member-delegation-get` output /
+ * `member-delegation-update` input). Stored inline on the unified `ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS_MAP`
+ * edge record.
+ *
+ * Mirrors the org-data `BoundGrant` wire shape verbatim (snake_case, no casing
+ * transform): `grantee` followed by the flattened capability body. The org edge
+ * populates only `functions` + `scopes`; the delegation edge additionally
+ * carries the qualifiers `version_req` / `read_scopes` / `allowed_hosts` and the
+ * validity `window`. All qualifier fields are optional and omitted from the wire when
+ * absent (never sent as `null`), so an org grant simply leaves them unset.
+ */
+interface BoundGrant {
+    /** The principal (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`) this grant applies to — a user or an
+     *  agent DID. */
+    grantee: string;
+    /** Target contract id (canonical name, e.g. `"tee:z-payroll/contracts"`), or
+     *  `"*"`. On a read this echoes the queried contract. */
+    contract_id: string;
+    /** WIT function names the grantee may invoke (e.g. `"set-records"`; `["*"]`
+     *  matches all). */
     functions: string[];
-    /** Org-data scopes delegated to the agent for the contract functions to
-     *  read on its behalf. */
-    scopes?: string[];
-    /** Direct-read scopes the agent may enumerate itself, via whichever read
-     *  function the contract exposes for direct enumeration. A strict subset of
-     *  `scopes` (enforced contract-side). */
-    readScopes?: string[];
-    /** Optional validity-window start (unix seconds). */
-    validFromSecs?: number | null;
-    /** NEW: optional validity-window end (unix seconds). */
-    validUntilSecs?: number | null;
-    /** Egress hosts the agent may reach for this contract. */
-    allowedHosts: string[];
+    /** Data scope paths the grantee may access (e.g. `"example/records"`). */
+    scopes: string[];
+    /** Agent edge only: optional semver requirement; omitted matches any version. */
+    version_req?: string;
+    /** Agent edge only: direct-read scopes the grantee may enumerate itself — a
+     *  subset of `scopes` (enforced contract-side). */
+    read_scopes?: string[];
+    /** Agent edge only: egress hosts the grantee may reach for this contract. */
+    allowed_hosts?: string[];
+    /** Agent edge only: optional validity time-box. */
+    window?: Validity;
 }
-/** One agent's entry in the write-request shape. */
-interface AgentAuthEntry {
-    agentDid: string;
-    scripts: AgentAuthScriptGrant[];
+/**
+ * Policy record for an organisation's data tier.
+ *
+ * Mirrors the org-data policy-meta wire shape.
+ */
+interface OrgPolicyMeta {
+    /** DIDs (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`) of users authorised to manage policy and read data. */
+    admins: string[];
+    /** Maximum number of admins allowed for this org. */
+    max_admins: number;
+    /** Unix timestamp (secs) when the policy was first created. */
+    created_at_secs: number;
+    /** Unix timestamp (secs) of the most recent policy update. */
+    updated_at_secs: number;
+    /**
+     * Per-org ceiling on delegation-credential validity (seconds).
+     *
+     * Absent when no org-level cap is set — the contract omits the field
+     * (never serialises null) and the cluster-wide
+     * `delegation.max_credential_validity_secs` governs instead. When set,
+     * the effective cap is `min(max_credential_validity_secs, cluster_ceiling)`.
+     */
+    max_credential_validity_secs?: number;
 }
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgPolicyMeta}. */
+declare function isOrgPolicyMeta(value: unknown): value is OrgPolicyMeta;
 /**
- * The full agent-auth policy document in the camelCase write shape:
- * the per-agent grants plus the document-level discovery grants.
+ * Effective org policy view returned by `org-policy-view`.
  *
- * `discoverDids` (contract wire: `discover_dids`) is the
- * list of DIDs the user lets their registered agents *enumerate the
- * contracts of* via `listContracts`: an org DID grants org-mode discovery,
- * the user's own DID grants self-mode discovery. It lives at document
- * level — not on a script grant — because discovery must surface contracts
- * the agent cannot yet call. The node's discovery gate additionally
- * requires the calling agent to be named in `agents` (subject binding), so
- * an unregistered agent discovers nothing regardless of this list.
+ * Readable by any authenticated session (non-sensitive metadata).
+ * Returns the **effective** credential validity cap:
+ * `min(org.max_credential_validity_secs, cluster_ceiling)`, equal to the
+ * cluster ceiling when the org has not set a per-org cap. The contract
+ * always returns a value (or errors) — the field is never null.
+ */
+interface OrgPolicyView {
+    /**
+     * Effective delegation-credential validity cap in seconds:
+     * `min(org value, cluster ceiling)`, equal to the cluster ceiling when the
+     * org has not set a per-org cap. Always present — mirrors the contract's
+     * `PolicyViewResponse.effective_validity_secs` (org-data `org-policy-view`).
+     */
+    effective_validity_secs: number;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgPolicyView}. */
+declare function isOrgPolicyView(value: unknown): value is OrgPolicyView;
+/**
+ * Caller-scoped admin status returned by `org-am-i-admin`.
+ *
+ * Reports only whether the **calling** session's DID is in the org's admin
+ * list — never the roster itself (contrast {@link OrgPolicyMeta}, returned by
+ * the admin-gated `org-policy-get`). Readable by any authenticated session.
+ * Mirrors the org-data `AmIAdminResponse` wire shape.
+ */
+interface OrgAdminStatus {
+    /** Whether the calling session is an admin of the queried org. */
+    is_admin: boolean;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgAdminStatus}. */
+declare function isOrgAdminStatus(value: unknown): value is OrgAdminStatus;
+/**
+ * Standard response returned by all policy write and data mutation operations.
+ *
+ * Mirrors the org-data `MutationResponse` wire shape.
+ */
+interface MutationResponse {
+    /**
+     * `"created"`, `"updated"`, `"deleted"`, or — for the agent-card mutations —
+     * `"published"` / `"unpublished"`.
+     */
+    status: string;
+    /** Hex-encoded entry ID; present on data write/delete operations. */
+    entry_id?: string;
+    /** Whether the target key existed before deletion; present on single-entry deletes. */
+    deleted?: boolean;
+    /** Number of entries removed; present on `org-data-delete-scope`. */
+    deleted_entries?: number;
+    tx_hash: string | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Shallow runtime guard for {@link MutationResponse}.
+ *
+ * Only the always-present fields are checked — `status` is mandatory on
+ * every mutation; `tx_hash` is non-optional but nullable. The optional
+ * fields (`entry_id`, `deleted`, `deleted_entries`) are not validated
+ * because their presence depends on which mutation ran.
+ */
+declare function isMutationResponse(value: unknown): value is MutationResponse;
+/**
+ * Response type alias for org-writers-get.
+ *
+ * The wire body is `{ writers: string[] }` where each entry is
+ * `did:t3n:<40-hex>`.
  */
-interface AgentAuthPolicy {
-    agents: AgentAuthEntry[];
-    discoverDids: string[];
+interface OrgWriters {
+    writers: string[];
 }
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgWriters}. */
+declare function isOrgWriters(value: unknown): value is OrgWriters;
 /**
- * Parse a full `agent-auth-get` response (the stored snake_case policy
- * document) into the camelCase write shape, including the document-level
- * `discover_dids`. A `null` / absent response is the empty policy.
+ * Response type alias for org-delegation-get.
+ *
+ * The wire body echoes the `contract_id` alongside the grant list.
  */
-declare function parseAgentAuthPolicy(response: unknown): AgentAuthPolicy;
-/** Extract the `agents` array from an `agent-auth-get` response. */
-declare function parseAgentAuthGet(response: unknown): AgentAuthEntry[];
-interface AgentAuthMergeResult {
-    /** Full merged `agents` list, ready for `agent-auth-update`. */
-    agents: AgentAuthEntry[];
-    /** `"<agentDid> → <scriptName>"` rows preserved from the existing policy. */
+interface OrgContractDelegation {
+    contract_id: string;
+    grants: BoundGrant[];
+}
+/**
+ * Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgContractDelegation}.
+ *
+ * Validates the immediate envelope (`contract_id: string`, `grants:
+ * array`) without recursing into each `BoundGrant`. The Rust contract
+ * is the source of truth for grant element shape; widening the predicate
+ * here would create maintenance churn against benign field additions.
+ */
+declare function isOrgContractDelegation(value: unknown): value is OrgContractDelegation;
+/**
+ * One grant inside a role: a capability body (functions + scopes, without the
+ * grantee, which is bound at assignment time) plus the target contract.
+ * Mirrors the org-data `RoleGrant` wire shape.
+ */
+interface RoleGrant {
+    /** Target contract (canonical name, e.g. `"tee:z-payroll/contracts"`). */
+    contract_id: string;
+    /** WIT function names this grant confers. */
+    functions: string[];
+    /** Data scope paths this grant confers (canonicalised lowercase). */
+    scopes: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * A role: a named bundle of grants and/or composed sub-roles.
+ * Mirrors the org-data `RoleDefinition` wire shape.
+ */
+interface RoleDefinition {
+    /** Org-unique role identifier (slug; function-name grammar). */
+    role_id: string;
+    /** Human-facing label. */
+    label: string;
+    /** Composite: other role ids in the same org whose grants this role confers. */
+    includes: string[];
+    /** Grants this role confers directly. */
+    grants: RoleGrant[];
+}
+/**
+ * The roles assigned to one grantee within one org.
+ * Mirrors the org-data `RoleAssignments` wire shape.
+ */
+interface RoleAssignments {
+    /** Assigned role ids. */
+    roles: string[];
+}
+/** Response for `org-role-get`; `role` is `null` when the id is unknown. */
+interface RoleGetResponse {
+    role: RoleDefinition | null;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link RoleGetResponse}. */
+declare function isRoleGetResponse(value: unknown): value is RoleGetResponse;
+/**
+ * One org-owned agent's outbound host allow-list for a single contract.
+ *
+ * Egress only — it carries no data scopes by construction, so it can never be
+ * a second path to org data (that stays with `org-delegation-set`).
+ */
+interface AgentEgressEntry {
+    contract_id: string;
+    /** Bare lowercase hostnames, matched exactly by the node. */
+    allowed_hosts: string[];
+    /** WIT functions covered; `["*"]` means all of them. */
+    functions: string[];
+    /** Present only when the allow-list is pinned to a version range. */
+    version_req?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Response for `org-agent-egress-get`; `egress` is `null` when the agent holds
+ * no egress entry for the requested contract.
+ */
+interface AgentEgressGetResponse {
+    egress: AgentEgressEntry | null;
+}
+/** Runtime guard for {@link AgentEgressGetResponse}. */
+declare function isAgentEgressGetResponse(value: unknown): value is AgentEgressGetResponse;
+/** Response for `org-role-assignments-get`. */
+interface RoleAssignmentsResponse {
+    /** Echoed back so callers don't need to track which request this answers. */
+    grantee_did: string;
+    /** The grantee's assigned role ids (empty when none). */
+    roles: string[];
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link RoleAssignmentsResponse}. */
+declare function isRoleAssignmentsResponse(value: unknown): value is RoleAssignmentsResponse;
+/**
+ * Input for `listAgents` — the org plus optional pagination. Omit both `cursor`
+ * and `limit` for the first page at the default limit; pass a previous
+ * response's `next_cursor` back as `cursor` to fetch the following page.
+ */
+interface ListAgentsInput {
+    orgDid: string;
+    /** Opaque cursor from a previous response's `next_cursor`. */
+    cursor?: string;
+    /** Maximum agents to return in this page. */
+    limit?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * One org-owned agent in a {@link ListAgentsResponse}: the agent's DID, its
+ * display name, and the number of distinct contracts it can access via a direct
+ * grant. Mirrors the org-data `AgentSummary` wire shape. The name comes from the
+ * agent's private card (falling back to the DID), so the FE no longer needs to
+ * fetch each `public:agent_cards` entry to render the roster.
+ */
+interface AgentSummary {
+    /** The agent's DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
+    did: string;
+    /** The agent's display name, from its private card (DID when unavailable). */
+    name: string;
+    /** Count of distinct contracts the agent holds a direct grant on. */
+    contract_count: number;
+}
+/** Response for `org-data-list-agents`. */
+interface ListAgentsResponse {
+    /** One PAGE of the org's org-owned agents, sorted by DID. */
+    agents: AgentSummary[];
+    /** Opaque cursor for the next page; absent on the last page. */
+    next_cursor?: string;
+}
+/** A human member's org role. The closed wire domain of {@link HumanMember}. */
+type MemberRole = "admin" | "member";
+/**
+ * Input for `listHumanMembers` — the org plus optional pagination. Omit both
+ * `cursor` and `limit` for the first page at the default limit; pass a previous
+ * response's `next_cursor` back as `cursor` to fetch the following page.
+ */
+interface ListHumanMembersInput {
+    orgDid: string;
+    /** Opaque cursor from a previous response's `next_cursor`. */
+    cursor?: string;
+    /** Maximum members to return in this page. */
+    limit?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * One direct human member: DID plus org role. No profile PII (name/email are
+ * out of scope and owned by `tee:user`). Mirrors the org-data `HumanMember`
+ * wire shape.
+ */
+interface HumanMember {
+    /** The member's DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
+    did: string;
+    /** The member's org role. */
+    role: MemberRole;
+}
+/** Response for `org-data-list-human-members`. */
+interface ListHumanMembersResponse {
+    /** One PAGE of the org's direct human members, sorted by DID. */
+    members: HumanMember[];
+    /** Opaque cursor for the next page; absent on the last page. */
+    next_cursor?: string;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link ListHumanMembersResponse}. */
+declare function isListHumanMembersResponse(value: unknown): value is ListHumanMembersResponse;
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link ListAgentsResponse}. */
+declare function isListAgentsResponse(value: unknown): value is ListAgentsResponse;
+/** Response for `org-data-list`. */
+interface DataListResponse {
+    /** Hex-encoded entry IDs for this page. */
+    entry_ids: string[];
+    /** Offset to pass for the next page. `null` when this is the last page. */
+    next_offset: number | null;
+    /** Total number of entries in the scope (across all pages). */
+    total: number;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link DataListResponse}. */
+declare function isDataListResponse(value: unknown): value is DataListResponse;
+/** Secret shape discriminator (mirrors the contract `SecretKind`). */
+type SecretKind = "single_value" | "json";
+/** Metadata common to every {@link SecretView} entry. */
+interface SecretViewBase {
+    /** Secret name (the `(org, name)` key tail). */
+    name: string;
+    /** Monotonic version, bumped on each value rotation and ACL edit. */
+    version: number;
+    /** Unix seconds of the most recent write. */
+    updated_at_secs: number;
+}
+/**
+ * The redacted per-secret summary `org-secret-list` returns — a discriminated
+ * union on `kind`. The value is NEVER present: a single-value exposes only its
+ * last four characters and a json secret only its sorted top-level field names.
+ */
+type SecretView = (SecretViewBase & {
+    kind: "single_value";
+    /** Last four characters of the value (whole value when ≤ 4 chars). */
+    last4: string;
+}) | (SecretViewBase & {
+    kind: "json";
+    /** Sorted top-level object field names (keys only, no values). */
+    field_names: string[];
+});
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretView}. */
+declare function isSecretView(value: unknown): value is SecretView;
+/**
+ * Full secret record returned by `org-secret-get` — the value IS included
+ * (the deliberate read-back path the READ axis exists for), along with all
+ * three ACLs.
+ */
+interface SecretRecord {
+    name: string;
+    kind: SecretKind;
+    /** The value as text: the scalar for a single-value, canonical JSON object for a json secret. */
+    value: string;
+    version: number;
+    /** READ axis — DIDs allowed to read the value back. */
+    reader_dids: string[];
+    /** READ axis — role ids allowed to read the value back. */
+    reader_roles: string[];
+    /** MANAGE axis — DIDs allowed to rotate the value. */
+    manager_dids: string[];
+    /** MANAGE axis — role ids allowed to rotate the value. */
+    manager_roles: string[];
+    /** USE axis — canonical contract ids allowed to have the value injected. */
+    contract_allowlist: string[];
+    created_at_secs: number;
+    updated_at_secs: number;
+    /** DID of the caller who last wrote the record. */
+    updated_by: string;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretRecord}. */
+declare function isSecretRecord(value: unknown): value is SecretRecord;
+/** Response for `org-secret-list`: redacted per-kind views, no values. */
+interface SecretListResponse {
+    secrets: SecretView[];
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretListResponse}. */
+declare function isSecretListResponse(value: unknown): value is SecretListResponse;
+/** Response for `org-data-get`. */
+interface DataGetResponse {
+    entry_id: string;
+    /** Hex-encoded raw payload bytes. */
+    payload_hex: string;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link DataGetResponse}. */
+declare function isDataGetResponse(value: unknown): value is DataGetResponse;
+/**
+ * Return shape of `agentCardGet` — composed client-side from the generic
+ * `org-data-get` read of the card's entry (there is no card-specific read
+ * operation on the contract). To check whether a public copy exists, probe
+ * the anonymous `GET /api/agent-card/{did}` endpoint.
+ */
+interface AgentCardResponse {
+    /** The agent whose card this is (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
+    agent_did: string;
+    /** The stored card JSON body, verbatim. */
+    card: string;
+}
+/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link AgentCardResponse}. */
+declare function isAgentCardResponse(value: unknown): value is AgentCardResponse;
+/**
+ * Legacy direct-route org-data envelope shape retained for compatibility.
+ *
+ * This mirrors the removed `/api/user-contract/execute` body format from
+ * the transitional transport. New callers should use `OrgDataClient`,
+ * which now dispatches through authenticated `/api/rpc` +
+ * `action.execute` instead.
+ */
+interface OrgDataActionWire {
+    nonce: string;
+    user_did: string;
+    authenticator_id: string;
+    contract_id: string;
+    function: string;
+    args_hash: string;
+    expires_at_secs: number;
+    signature: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Delegation grants — the standing on-chain authority a member delegates to
+ * a delegatee (envelope-free authorisation).
+ *
+ * The document is one flat list of {@link BoundGrant} rows plus the
+ * document-level discovery grants: `{ grants, discover_dids }`. Each grant's
+ * `grantee` is the delegatee DID it authorises, so there is no per-delegatee
+ * grouping — a member's whole delegation surface is the single `grants` array.
+ * Reads (`member-delegation-get`) and writes (`member-delegation-update`) on
+ * `tee:authorisations/contracts` (the policy's owning contract) are
+ * **SelfOnly**: only the member, authenticated as themselves, may read or write
+ * their own grants. This is the user-approval proof the per-call delegation
+ * credential's `user_sig` used to carry.
+ *
+ * A grant carries `functions`, the agent's delegated org-data `scopes`, the
+ * direct-enumerable `read_scopes`, egress `allowed_hosts`, an optional semver
+ * `version_req`, and an optional validity `window`. The ≤ cap *length* check is
+ * enforced contract-side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side at read
+ * time.
+ *
+ * The SDK is a literal snake_case mirror of the wire: {@link BoundGrant} IS the
+ * wire grant shape, so reads and writes pass through untouched — there is no
+ * casing transform. The only glue here is the read-merge-write helper
+ * ({@link mergeGrants}) that lets a single-grant write preserve every other row
+ * (the contract has no per-field merge; the document IS the new state).
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The full delegation policy document — the shape of BOTH the `member-delegation-get`
+ * output and the `member-delegation-update` input (they are identical). A flat list of
+ * grant rows plus the document-level discovery grants; mirrors the contract
+ * `MemberDelegationDoc` wire shape verbatim (snake_case).
+ *
+ * `discover_dids` is the list of DIDs the member lets their registered agents
+ * *enumerate the contracts of* via `listContracts`: an org DID grants org-mode
+ * discovery, the member's own DID grants self-mode discovery. It lives at
+ * document level — not on a grant — because discovery must surface contracts the
+ * agent cannot yet call. The node's discovery gate additionally requires the
+ * calling agent to be the `grantee` of at least one grant (subject binding), so
+ * an unregistered agent discovers nothing regardless of this list.
+ *
+ * The document IS the new state on a write: an empty `grants` list revokes all
+ * delegated access, and an empty `discover_dids` persists an empty
+ * discovery-grant list (there is no per-field merge). Use {@link mergeGrants} /
+ * {@link mergeDiscoverDids} to read-merge-write a single grant without dropping
+ * the rest.
+ */
+interface MemberDelegationDoc {
+    /** Every standing delegation-edge grant, each keyed by its `grantee` DID. */
+    grants: BoundGrant[];
+    /** Document-level discovery grants (`did:t3n:<40-hex>` entries). */
+    discover_dids: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Decode a `member-delegation-get` response into a {@link MemberDelegationDoc}. The wire is
+ * already snake_case, so grant rows pass through unchanged — this only defaults
+ * a `null` / absent response (the empty policy) and a missing field to an empty
+ * list. NOT a casing transform.
+ */
+declare function parseMemberDelegationDoc(response: unknown): MemberDelegationDoc;
+interface GrantsMergeResult {
+    /** Full merged grant list, ready for `member-delegation-update`. */
+    grants: BoundGrant[];
+    /** `"<grantee> → <contract_id>"` rows preserved from the existing policy. */
     preservedRows: string[];
 }
-/** Input to the full-document write {@link T3nClient.agentAuthUpdate}. The
- *  document IS the new state: an empty `agents` list revokes all agent
- *  access, and an omitted / empty `discoverDids` persists an empty
- *  discovery-grant list (the contract has no per-field merge). Mirrors the
- *  contract `AgentAuthPolicy`. */
-interface AgentAuthUpdateInput {
-    agents: AgentAuthEntry[];
-    /** Document-level discovery grants — see {@link AgentAuthPolicy}. */
-    discoverDids?: string[];
-}
-/**
- * Serialise a camelCase policy document to the contract's canonical
- * snake_case `agent-auth-update` wire (`agent_did` / `script_name` /
- * `version_req` / `read_scopes` / `valid_from_secs` / `valid_until_secs` /
- * `allowed_hosts` / `discover_dids`), so neither write path relies on the
- * contract's compatibility aliases. Absent optionals are omitted (never
- * sent as `null`); empty `scopes` / `read_scopes` are omitted (the
- * contract defaults both to empty). `functions` and `allowed_hosts` are
- * always emitted — the contract requires explicit functions (`["*"]` =
- * all) and reads an absent `allowed_hosts` as deny-all egress. The
- * document-level `discover_dids` (strictly snake_case — the contract
- * defines no camelCase alias for it) is emitted only when non-empty; the
- * contract defaults an absent list to empty.
- */
-declare function toAgentAuthUpdateWire(agents: AgentAuthEntry[], discoverDids?: string[]): {
-    agents: Array<{
-        agent_did: string;
-        scripts: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
-    }>;
-    discover_dids?: string[];
-};
 /**
- * Order-preserving deduplicating union of discovery-grant DID lists —
- * the read-merge-write counterpart of {@link mergeAgentAuthEntries} for
- * the document-level `discoverDids` (the contract rejects duplicate
- * entries, so the union must dedupe).
+ * Merge new grant rows into the existing flat list with `(grantee, contract_id)`
+ * union semantics: an existing row whose `(grantee, contract_id)` matches a new
+ * row is replaced; every other existing row is preserved (and reported in
+ * `preservedRows` as an audit aid). New rows for a `(grantee, contract_id)` not
+ * already present are appended.
  */
-declare function mergeDiscoverDids(existing: string[], additions: string[]): string[];
+declare function mergeGrants(existing: BoundGrant[], additions: BoundGrant[]): GrantsMergeResult;
 /**
- * Merge new agent entries into the existing policy with script-level union
- * semantics: for an agent DID present on both sides, script rows whose
- * `scriptName` is not being written are preserved; rows with a matching
- * `scriptName` are replaced by the new grant. Entries for other agent DIDs
- * pass through unchanged.
+ * Order-preserving deduplicating union of discovery-grant DID lists — the
+ * read-merge-write counterpart of {@link mergeGrants} for the document-level
+ * `discover_dids` (the contract rejects duplicate entries, so the union must
+ * dedupe).
  */
-declare function mergeAgentAuthEntries(existing: AgentAuthEntry[], newEntries: AgentAuthEntry[]): AgentAuthMergeResult;
+declare function mergeDiscoverDids(existing: string[], additions: string[]): string[];
 
 /**
  * KYC types for the `tee:user/contracts::kyc-status` short-poll
@@ -1638,7 +2030,7 @@ interface AuditPage {
  * Request shape for {@link T3nClient.getAuditEvents} — all fields
  * optional. Omit `pii_did` to read your own trail (all actors); set it to
  * another user's DID to read, as a delegated agent, the events you
- * performed for them — admitted only while that user's agent-auth grant
+ * performed for them — admitted only while that user's delegation grant
  * to you is live. `cursor` is the `next_cursor` from a prior page.
  */
 interface GetAuditEventsOptions {
@@ -1816,7 +2208,7 @@ interface ListContractsResult {
     next_offset: number | null;
 }
 /** Which standing grant a satisfied/missing entry refers to. */
-type DelegationGrantKind = "agent_auth" | "user_grant";
+type DelegationGrantKind = "member_delegation" | "org_delegation";
 /** Params for `delegation.check` (the generic capability read). */
 interface GrantCheckParams {
     /** The target contract whose requirements are checked. */
@@ -1833,22 +2225,128 @@ interface DelegationGrantRef {
     grant: DelegationGrantKind;
     /** The target contract's canonical name. */
     contract: string;
-    functions: string[];
-    scopes: string[];
+    functions: string[];
+    scopes: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Response for `delegation.check`: the `member_delegation ∩ org_delegation` verdict.
+ *
+ * `disclosed` is `true` only when the agent is registered under `pii_did`, so
+ * org-side status was safe to disclose; `false` yields the uniform,
+ * non-disclosive verdict (`authorised:false, satisfied:[], missing:[]`) that is
+ * byte-invariant to the requested capability (R5 anti-enumeration).
+ */
+interface GrantCheckResult {
+    authorised: boolean;
+    disclosed: boolean;
+    satisfied: DelegationGrantRef[];
+    missing: DelegationGrantRef[];
+}
+/** Response for the `whoami` operation: who the key resolves to, and where. */
+interface WhoamiResult {
+    /** The DID the relayed api key resolves to. */
+    did: string;
+    /**
+     * The org DIDs the agent itself belongs to (its own agent-keyed membership),
+     * or `[]` when it belongs to none. Each is a valid `org_did` for
+     * `contracts.list` scope `"org"`, so this is the seed for browsing the agent's
+     * own orgs.
+     */
+    organisations: string[];
+    /**
+     * The agent's owning / managing DID — usually the org that created it. `null`
+     * for a missing record (agents created without a hosted card or agent URI have
+     * no registry record), a record with no owner link, or a malformed record
+     * (decode failure is logged at `WARN`, never a silent authority downgrade); a
+     * snapshot read failure is surfaced as an error, not reported as `null`. The
+     * owner link is mutable and may have changed since creation, so treat this as
+     * best-effort, not an authority.
+     */
+    owner: string | null;
+}
+/** Params for the `describe.contract` operation. */
+interface DescribeContractParams {
+    /**
+     * Registry name: `tee:<name>/contracts` (core) or `z:<tid>:<tail>` (tenant).
+     * The bare core form `contracts.list` presents (`tee:<name>` / `y:<name>`) is
+     * also accepted — the node maps it onto the `/contracts` registry key — so a
+     * `ListedContract.name` feeds straight in.
+     */
+    contract: string;
+    /** Explicit version; omitted resolves the current registered version. */
+    version?: string;
+}
+/** Params for the `describe.function` operation. */
+interface DescribeFunctionParams {
+    /**
+     * Registry name: `tee:<name>/contracts` (core) or `z:<tid>:<tail>` (tenant).
+     * The bare core form `contracts.list` presents (`tee:<name>` / `y:<name>`) is
+     * also accepted — the node maps it onto the `/contracts` registry key.
+     */
+    contract: string;
+    /** The single function to project from the contract's descriptor. */
+    function: string;
+    /** Explicit version; omitted resolves the current registered version. */
+    version?: string;
 }
 /**
- * Response for `delegation.check`: the `agent_auth ∩ UserGrant` verdict.
+ * One function's descriptor entry — the `describe.function` result and the
+ * element type of a {@link ContractDescriptorDocument}'s `functions` array.
  *
- * `disclosed` is `true` only when the agent is registered under `pii_did`, so
- * org-side status was safe to disclose; `false` yields the uniform,
- * non-disclosive verdict (`authorised:false, satisfied:[], missing:[]`) that is
- * byte-invariant to the requested capability (R5 anti-enumeration).
+ * Left open-ended: the descriptor document's full schema (argument schema,
+ * wire projection, auth requirements) is owned by the contract descriptor
+ * registry and served verbatim by the node. The named fields are the ones the
+ * node's descriptor path always presents.
  */
-interface GrantCheckResult {
-    authorised: boolean;
-    disclosed: boolean;
-    satisfied: DelegationGrantRef[];
-    missing: DelegationGrantRef[];
+interface FunctionDescriptorEntry {
+    /** Contract function name (e.g. `compute-payroll`). */
+    name: string;
+    summary?: string;
+    /** Whether the function mutates state. */
+    mutates?: boolean;
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * The node's descriptor document for a contract — the `descriptor` field of a
+ * {@link DescribeContractResult}. Open-ended for the same reason as
+ * {@link FunctionDescriptorEntry}: the node returns the registry's descriptor
+ * document verbatim.
+ */
+interface ContractDescriptorDocument {
+    name?: string;
+    version?: string;
+    summary?: string;
+    tags?: string[];
+    functions?: FunctionDescriptorEntry[];
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of the `describe.contract` operation. The node wraps the descriptor
+ * document with the resolved dispatch `version`, so an authorised describe hands
+ * back the exact `scriptVersion` an {@link invoke} call needs alongside the
+ * schema. Returned only on the authorised path; a gate miss or unknown contract
+ * yields the uniform non-disclosive error, never this wrapper.
+ */
+interface DescribeContractResult {
+    /** The canonical registry name, echoed from the request. */
+    contract: string;
+    /** The resolved dispatch version — pass as `scriptVersion` to `invoke`. */
+    version: string;
+    /** The contract's full descriptor document. */
+    descriptor: ContractDescriptorDocument;
+}
+/**
+ * Result of the `describe.function` operation: the resolved dispatch `version`
+ * paired with the single projected function entry. Same authorised-path-only
+ * guarantee as {@link DescribeContractResult}.
+ */
+interface DescribeFunctionResult {
+    /** The canonical registry name, echoed from the request. */
+    contract: string;
+    /** The resolved dispatch version — pass as `scriptVersion` to `invoke`. */
+    version: string;
+    /** The single projected function's descriptor entry. */
+    descriptor: FunctionDescriptorEntry;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1867,8 +2365,8 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     /**
      * Resolved node base URL. Snapshotted in the constructor so the
      * typed contract wrappers (`kycStatus`, `getSelfEthAddress`, …)
-     * can call `getScriptVersion()` against the same host the
-     * transport talks to. Used only by the `script_version: "latest"`
+     * can call `getContractVersion()` against the same host the
+     * transport talks to. Used only by the `contract_version: "latest"`
      * resolution path in {@link executeUserContract}.
      */
     private readonly effectiveBaseUrl;
@@ -2067,7 +2565,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * Generic capability check (`delegation.check`) — the
      * node-backed source for the MCP `checkDelegation` funnel tool.
      *
-     * Returns the `agent_auth ∩ UserGrant` verdict for `(agent, contract,
+     * Returns the `member_delegation ∩ org_delegation` verdict for `(agent, contract,
      * pii_did)`: whether the acting agent (resolved from the session) holds the
      * standing grants that `contract`'s `functions` / `scopes` need for member
      * `pii_did`. The org half is vacuous for no-org (Individual-owned) targets,
@@ -2084,7 +2582,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * the caller's own audit trail (every actor). With a `pii_did` set to
      * another user's DID, returns — as a delegated agent — the events the
      * caller performed for that user; admitted ONLY while that user's
-     * `agent-auth` grant to the caller is live (revocable). `cursor` is the
+     * `delegation` grant to the caller is live (revocable). `cursor` is the
      * `next_cursor` from a prior page; `limit` clamps server-side.
      *
      * Unlike {@link getUsage}, this runs the SAME session-payload
@@ -2161,7 +2659,7 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * credits.
      *
      * The returned DID is the org identifier the org-data and payroll
-     * surfaces expect (e.g. `OrgDataClient.setGrants({ orgDid, … })`).
+     * surfaces expect (e.g. `OrgDataClient.setDelegation({ orgDid, … })`).
      *
      * @param name - human-readable organisation name (1..=128 bytes)
      * @returns the new organisation's DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`)
@@ -2305,14 +2803,14 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * 1. `user-remove-organisation-attribution` — drop the membership edge
      *    (org-admin gated; idempotent on an already-absent membership). The host
      *    membership gate makes the detach effective immediately.
-     * 2. `org-remove-member-grants` — sweep the member from the org's
-     *    per-contract `UserGrant` lists, so the capability does not silently
+     * 2. `org-remove-member-delegation` — sweep the member from the org's
+     *    per-contract `BoundGrant` lists, so the capability does not silently
      *    reactivate if the member later rejoins.
      *
-     * The member's `agent_auth` delegations are self-scoped (`AGENT_AUTH_MAP` is a
-     * per-user document an admin cannot reach), so this cannot sweep them; the host
-     * membership gate denies them regardless, and the member's own session can run
-     * {@link revokeAgentAuthForOrg} for full cleanup.
+     * The member's delegations are self-scoped (the delegation edge in
+     * `ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS_MAP` is a per-user document an admin cannot reach), so this
+     * cannot sweep them; the host membership gate denies them regardless, and the
+     * member's own session can run {@link revokeMemberDelegationForOrg} for full cleanup.
      *
      * @param orgDid - the organisation
      * @param userDid - the member to detach
@@ -2326,9 +2824,9 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      *    target — the contract's self-leave branch (`caller == target`) admits it
      *    without org-admin rights. The host membership gate makes the detach
      *    effective immediately.
-     * 2. `org-remove-member-grants` — sweep the caller's own grants for the org
+     * 2. `org-remove-member-delegation` — sweep the caller's own grants for the org
      *    (the self-revocation branch, `caller == member`).
-     * 3. `agent-auth-revoke-org` — drop the caller's own org-scoped agent
+     * 3. `member-delegation-revoke-org` — drop the caller's own org-scoped
      *    delegations.
      *
      * Steps 2–3 leave no stale capability rows that would reactivate on a rejoin.
@@ -2337,40 +2835,42 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      */
     leaveOrganisation(orgDid: string): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Revoke the caller's own agent delegations scoped to one org
-     * (detach-cascade `agent_auth` half). Dispatches
-     * `agent-auth-revoke-org` on `tee:user/contracts` (**SelfOnly**): every
-     * `ScriptGrant` targeting a `z:<orgTid>:*` contract is removed from the
-     * caller's own agent-auth document.
+     * Revoke the caller's own delegations scoped to one org (detach-cascade
+     * `delegation` half). Dispatches `member-delegation-revoke-org` on
+     * `tee:user/contracts` (**SelfOnly**): every delegation-edge grant targeting a
+     * `z:<orgTid>:*` contract is removed from the caller's own delegation
+     * document.
      *
      * @param orgTid - the org's z-space tenant id (`did:t3n:<hex>` or bare
      *   40-hex) — i.e. the `<tid>` in the org's `z:<tid>:…` contract names
      */
-    revokeAgentAuthForOrg(orgTid: string): Promise<void>;
+    revokeMemberDelegationForOrg(orgTid: string): Promise<void>;
     /**
-     * Read the authenticated user's own agent-auth policy — the standing
-     * grants delegated to agents. Dispatches `agent-auth-get` on
+     * Read the authenticated user's own delegation policy — the standing
+     * grants delegated to agents. Dispatches `member-delegation-get` on
      * `tee:authorisations/contracts` (the policy's owning contract), which is
      * **SelfOnly**, so this always returns the caller's own
-     * `AGENT_AUTH_MAP[self]` document.
+     * delegation edge in `ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS_MAP`.
      *
-     * @returns the full policy document (normalised to the camelCase write
-     *   shape): the per-agent `agents` entries plus the document-level
-     *   `discoverDids` discovery grants
+     * @returns the full policy document as the flat snake_case wire shape: the
+     *   `grants` list (each row's `grantee` is the authorised delegatee DID) plus
+     *   the document-level `discover_dids` discovery grants
      * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or the contract refuses
      */
-    getAgentAuth(): Promise<AgentAuthPolicy>;
+    getMemberDelegation(): Promise<MemberDelegationDoc>;
     /**
-     * Authorise an agent for one contract on the caller's own behalf
+     * Authorise a delegatee for one contract on the caller's own behalf
      * (envelope-free authorisation). Read-merge-writes the
-     * caller's `AGENT_AUTH_MAP[self]` document via `agent-auth-update`
-     * (**SelfOnly**) with script-level union semantics, so other contracts'
-     * grants for this or any agent survive untouched.
+     * caller's delegation edge in `ROLE_ASSIGNMENTS_MAP` via `member-delegation-update`
+     * (**SelfOnly**) with `(grantee, contract_id)` union semantics, so other
+     * contracts' grants for this or any delegatee survive untouched.
      *
-     * Carries the new `scopes` + validity fields: the delegated
-     * org-data scopes and an optional `[validFromSecs, validUntilSecs]`
-     * window. The ≤ cap *length* check is enforced contract-side at write
-     * time; the expiry gate is host-side at read time.
+     * The grant is the flat wire {@link BoundGrant}: its `grantee` is the delegatee
+     * DID being authorised, and it carries `functions`, the delegated org-data
+     * `scopes`, direct-read `read_scopes`, egress `allowed_hosts`, an optional
+     * semver `version_req`, and an optional validity `window`. The ≤ cap *length*
+     * check is enforced contract-side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side
+     * at read time.
      *
      * This is the write surface `getDelegationInstructions` produces the
      * parameters for. The caller MUST be the delegating user, authenticated as
@@ -2382,38 +2882,38 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      * standing discovery), and any `options.discoverDids` are unioned in
      * (order-preserving, deduplicated).
      *
-     * @param agentDid - the agent DID being authorised
-     * @param grant - the single script grant to set (contract, functions,
-     *   scopes, validity, egress hosts)
+     * @param grant - the single grant to set — a {@link BoundGrant} whose
+     *   `grantee` is the delegatee DID being authorised (contract_id, functions,
+     *   scopes, window, egress hosts)
      * @param options - optional `discoverDids` to union into the document's
      *   discovery grants (org DIDs for org-mode `listContracts`, the caller's
      *   own DID for self mode)
-     * @returns the script rows preserved from the existing policy (audit aid)
+     * @returns the grant rows preserved from the existing policy (audit aid)
      * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or the contract refuses
      */
-    updateAgentAuth(agentDid: string, grant: AgentAuthScriptGrant, options?: {
+    updateMemberDelegation(grant: BoundGrant, options?: {
         discoverDids?: string[];
     }): Promise<{
         preservedRows: string[];
     }>;
     /**
      * Build the canonical `ExecuteActionRequest` shape the server
-     * expects (`script_name`, `script_version`, `function_name`, `input`,
+     * expects (`contract_id`, `contract_version`, `function_name`, `input`,
      * optional `pii_did`) and dispatch it through {@link execute}.
      *
      * Two pieces of glue live here that every typed user-contract
      * wrapper would otherwise duplicate:
      *
      * 1. **Field naming.** The server deserialises strictly into
-     *    `script_name` / `script_version` / `function_name` —
+     *    `contract_id` / `contract_version` / `function_name` —
      *    sending `contract` / `version` / `function` produces
      *    `Invalid action request: missing field …` 400s. Centralising
      *    the names here means every wrapper agrees with the server.
-     * 2. **`"latest"` resolution.** `script_version` is `SemVer` on
+     * 2. **`"latest"` resolution.** `contract_version` is `SemVer` on
      *    the server, so a literal `"latest"` cannot be parsed. We
      *    fetch the registered current version via
      *    `GET /api/contracts/current?name=…` (cached per script name
-     *    in `getScriptVersion`) and forward the resolved
+     *    in `getContractVersion`) and forward the resolved
      *    `MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH` string.
      *
      * Wrappers that need PII delegation can extend this helper
@@ -2423,8 +2923,8 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     private executeUserContract;
     /**
      * Same glue as {@link executeUserContract}, parameterised over the
-     * target system contract — the agent-auth wrappers dispatch on
-     * `tee:authorisations/contracts` (the authorisation policy's owning
+     * target system contract — the delegation wrappers dispatch on
+     * `tee:authorisations/contracts` (the delegation policy's owning
      * contract) while the rest of the user-contract surface stays on
      * `tee:user/contracts`.
      */
@@ -2678,25 +3178,24 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      */
     submitUserInput(input: SubmitUserInputArgs): Promise<SubmitUserInputResult>;
     /**
-     * Replace this user's agent-authorisation policy (`tee:user/contracts` →
-     * `agent-auth-update`). The supplied document IS the new state: an empty
-     * `agents` array revokes all agent access, and an omitted `discoverDids`
+     * Replace this user's delegation policy (`tee:authorisations/contracts`
+     * → `member-delegation-update`). The supplied document IS the new state: an empty
+     * `grants` array revokes all delegated access, and an empty `discover_dids`
      * persists an empty discovery-grant list. This is the full-document
-     * write — use {@link T3nClient.updateAgentAuth} for the single-grant
+     * write — use {@link T3nClient.updateMemberDelegation} for the single-grant
      * read-merge-write that preserves other contracts' grants and the
      * standing discovery grants.
      *
-     * Typed wrapper over the raw contract call: callers pass camelCase input;
-     * the SDK emits the canonical snake_case wire via
-     * {@link toAgentAuthUpdateWire} (carrying `scopes` / `read_scopes` /
-     * validity alongside `functions` / `allowed_hosts`, plus the
-     * document-level `discover_dids`), so it does not rely on the contract's
-     * compatibility aliases.
+     * The {@link MemberDelegationDoc} IS the snake_case wire shape — grant rows are
+     * {@link BoundGrant} verbatim — so the document passes straight through with
+     * no casing transform. Absent per-grant qualifiers (`version_req` /
+     * `read_scopes` / `allowed_hosts` / `window`) are simply unset on the object
+     * and so omitted from the JSON.
      *
      * @throws {RpcError} if the contract rejects the policy (validation failure,
-     *   too many agents/grants).
+     *   too many delegatees/grants).
      */
-    agentAuthUpdate(input: AgentAuthUpdateInput): Promise<void>;
+    memberDelegationUpdate(input: MemberDelegationDoc): Promise<void>;
     /**
      * Convenience helper: run the explicit OTP roundtrip and submit
      * the slim user-upsert in one call.
@@ -2993,7 +3492,21 @@ declare function createDefaultHandlers(baseUrl: string, trustAnchor: TrustAnchor
  * component loader, or any handshake/session machinery — `invoke` is
  * a single fetch, nothing else.
  *
- * ### HTTPS guard (CodeRabbit T2)
+ * ### Keyed discovery transports
+ * Alongside `invoke` (which acts), this module exports the keyed **discovery**
+ * reads — {@link discoverWhoami}, {@link discoverListContracts},
+ * {@link discoverCheckDelegation}, {@link discoverDescribeContract},
+ * {@link discoverDescribeFunction}. They are the api-key counterpart of the
+ * session `T3nClient.listContracts` / `checkDelegation` reads: each POSTs a
+ * `{ method, params }` envelope to the node's `POST /api/discover` with the
+ * same `X-T3N-Api-Key` header, HTTPS guard, timeout, and key-safe error
+ * hygiene as `invoke`, and returns the node's raw JSON result. The session
+ * `T3nClient` methods are untouched — these live beside `invoke`, off the
+ * session client, so the relay reads never open a session. Every transport
+ * shares the {@link postKeyed} core, so there is one implementation of the
+ * secure-transport + secret-hygiene rules below, not two.
+ *
+ * ### HTTPS guard
  * The API key is a long-lived bearer credential relayed in a plain header,
  * so `invoke` refuses to send it over an insecure transport: `baseUrl`
  * must be `https:`, unless the host is a local-dev loopback
@@ -3001,7 +3514,7 @@ declare function createDefaultHandlers(baseUrl: string, trustAnchor: TrustAnchor
  * allowed. The check runs before any network activity — an insecure
  * `baseUrl` never gets as far as a `fetch` call.
  *
- * ### Error hygiene (CodeRabbit T3/T4/T5)
+ * ### Error hygiene
  * Every error `invoke` throws is a fixed, generic
  * {@link InvokeError} message — the response body text, the
  * underlying network error's message, and the api key are never
@@ -3019,13 +3532,13 @@ declare function createDefaultHandlers(baseUrl: string, trustAnchor: TrustAnchor
  * server-side `ExecuteActionRequest`, the same shape
  * `T3nClient`'s `execute*` wrappers build for the session `action.execute`
  * RPC. Field names are load-bearing: the server deserialises strictly into
- * `script_name` / `script_version` / `function_name` (see
+ * `contract_id` / `contract_version` / `function_name` (see
  * `T3nClient.executeSystemContract`'s doc comment) — `contract` / `version`
  * / `function` produce a 400.
  */
 interface InvokeRequest {
-    script_name: string;
-    script_version: string;
+    contract_id: string;
+    contract_version: string;
     function_name: string;
     /** Delegated-call target member; omitted for a self (non-delegated) call. */
     pii_did?: string;
@@ -3060,7 +3573,7 @@ interface InvokeOptions {
  *
  * The message is always one of a small set of fixed, generic strings — it
  * NEVER contains the raw api key, the response body text, or the
- * underlying network error's message (CodeRabbit T4/T5): a server (or a
+ * underlying network error's message: a server (or a
  * misbehaving intermediary) that echoes the key or other secrets back in
  * an error body must not be able to leak them through this error's
  * message.
@@ -3070,461 +3583,124 @@ declare class InvokeError extends T3nError {
     constructor(message: string, status?: number | undefined);
 }
 /**
- * Execute a `z:` contract as an org agent, authenticating with an opaque
- * API key — one request, no handshake, no session.
- *
- * @param opts - baseUrl, apiKey, and the wire request to execute
- * @param schema - optional validator applied to the decoded result (e.g. a
- *   zod schema); anything exposing `.parse(value)` is accepted, same as
- *   {@link T3nClient.executeAndDecode}
- * @returns the contract's decoded result, typed as `T`
- * @throws {InvokeError} if `baseUrl` is insecure, on a network
- *   failure/timeout, or on a non-2xx response
- * @throws {ContractResponseError} if the node returns a 2xx with a body
- *   that is not valid JSON
- */
-declare function invoke<T = unknown>(opts: InvokeOptions, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): Promise<T>;
-
-/**
- * Token fixed-point units (USDT-style 6 decimals).
- *
- * As of `tee:*` metering v2, every token amount on the wire —
- * {@link BalanceRow}'s `available`/`reserved`, {@link UsageEntry.amount},
- * and `total_supply` — is denominated in **base units**, where
- * `1 T3N token = `{@link BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN}` base units`. The node
- * meters the *actual* fractional cost of each operation (pro-rata by
- * bytes / byte-seconds / fuel) down to `1e-6` token, so amounts are
- * raw integers in base units, NOT whole tokens.
- *
- * The wire fields are left as raw base units (no silent rescaling — that
- * would lose precision for large balances and surprise callers doing
- * arithmetic). Use {@link formatTokens} to render a human "tokens"
- * string and {@link toBaseUnits} to convert a token figure back.
- *
- * ⚠️ Breaking vs. the pre-decimals SDK: a balance that used to read `5`
- * (whole tokens) now reads `5_000_000` (base units). Multiply existing
- * display code through {@link formatTokens}.
- */
-/** Decimal places in a T3N token (fixed; mirrors the node constant). */
-declare const TOKEN_DECIMALS = 6;
-/** Base units per whole T3N token — `10 ** TOKEN_DECIMALS`. */
-declare const BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN = 1000000;
-/**
- * Render a base-unit amount as a human-readable token string, e.g.
- * `25_920_000 → "25.92"`, `1_000_000 → "1"`, `4768 → "0.004768"`.
- *
- * Trailing-zero fraction digits are trimmed; an integer amount renders
- * with no decimal point. Accepts `number` or `bigint`; for balances
- * above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` prefer passing a `bigint`.
- */
-declare function formatTokens(baseUnits: number | bigint): string;
-/**
- * Convert a whole-or-fractional token figure to base units (rounded to
- * the nearest base unit). E.g. `25.92 → 25_920_000`, `1 → 1_000_000`.
- */
-declare function toBaseUnits(tokens: number): number;
-
-/**
- * Org-data wire types mirroring the org-data contract wire shapes.
- *
- * Plain TypeScript interfaces (no zod) — the SDK does not use a
- * validation library for domain types; see the existing `types/` files.
- *
- * Each response type below is paired with a shallow runtime predicate
- * (`isMutationResponse`, `isOrgPolicyMeta`, etc.) so the org-data client
- * can `assertShape` the decoded payload before returning to callers.
- * Predicates check the top-level structure only; nested elements
- * (e.g. each `UserGrant` inside `OrgContractGrants.grants`) are not
- * deeply validated — see `utils/shape.ts` for the rationale.
- *
- * Reference: the org-data wire contract.
- */
-/**
- * Capability grant stored under `ORG_CONTRACT_GRANTS_MAP`.
- *
- * Mirrors the org-data `UserGrant` wire shape.
- */
-interface UserGrant {
-    /** The user this grant applies to (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
-    user_did: string;
-    /** WIT function names the user may invoke (e.g. `"set-records"`). */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Data scope paths the user may access (e.g. `"example/records"`). */
-    scopes: string[];
-}
-/**
- * Policy record for an organisation's data tier.
- *
- * Mirrors the org-data policy-meta wire shape.
- */
-interface OrgPolicyMeta {
-    /** DIDs (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`) of users authorised to manage policy and read data. */
-    admins: string[];
-    /** Maximum number of admins allowed for this org. */
-    max_admins: number;
-    /** Unix timestamp (secs) when the policy was first created. */
-    created_at_secs: number;
-    /** Unix timestamp (secs) of the most recent policy update. */
-    updated_at_secs: number;
-    /**
-     * Per-org ceiling on delegation-credential validity (seconds).
-     *
-     * Absent when no org-level cap is set — the contract omits the field
-     * (never serialises null) and the cluster-wide
-     * `delegation.max_credential_validity_secs` governs instead. When set,
-     * the effective cap is `min(max_credential_validity_secs, cluster_ceiling)`.
-     */
-    max_credential_validity_secs?: number;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgPolicyMeta}. */
-declare function isOrgPolicyMeta(value: unknown): value is OrgPolicyMeta;
-/**
- * Effective org policy view returned by `org-policy-view`.
- *
- * Readable by any authenticated session (non-sensitive metadata).
- * Returns the **effective** credential validity cap:
- * `min(org.max_credential_validity_secs, cluster_ceiling)`, equal to the
- * cluster ceiling when the org has not set a per-org cap. The contract
- * always returns a value (or errors) — the field is never null.
- */
-interface OrgPolicyView {
-    /**
-     * Effective delegation-credential validity cap in seconds:
-     * `min(org value, cluster ceiling)`, equal to the cluster ceiling when the
-     * org has not set a per-org cap. Always present — mirrors the contract's
-     * `PolicyViewResponse.effective_validity_secs` (org-data `org-policy-view`).
-     */
-    effective_validity_secs: number;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgPolicyView}. */
-declare function isOrgPolicyView(value: unknown): value is OrgPolicyView;
-/**
- * Caller-scoped admin status returned by `org-am-i-admin`.
- *
- * Reports only whether the **calling** session's DID is in the org's admin
- * list — never the roster itself (contrast {@link OrgPolicyMeta}, returned by
- * the admin-gated `org-policy-get`). Readable by any authenticated session.
- * Mirrors the org-data `AmIAdminResponse` wire shape.
- */
-interface OrgAdminStatus {
-    /** Whether the calling session is an admin of the queried org. */
-    is_admin: boolean;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgAdminStatus}. */
-declare function isOrgAdminStatus(value: unknown): value is OrgAdminStatus;
-/**
- * Standard response returned by all policy write and data mutation operations.
- *
- * Mirrors the org-data `MutationResponse` wire shape.
- */
-interface MutationResponse {
-    /**
-     * `"created"`, `"updated"`, `"deleted"`, or — for the agent-card mutations —
-     * `"published"` / `"unpublished"`.
-     */
-    status: string;
-    /** Hex-encoded entry ID; present on data write/delete operations. */
-    entry_id?: string;
-    /** Whether the target key existed before deletion; present on single-entry deletes. */
-    deleted?: boolean;
-    /** Number of entries removed; present on `org-data-delete-scope`. */
-    deleted_entries?: number;
-    tx_hash: string | null;
-}
-/**
- * Shallow runtime guard for {@link MutationResponse}.
- *
- * Only the always-present fields are checked — `status` is mandatory on
- * every mutation; `tx_hash` is non-optional but nullable. The optional
- * fields (`entry_id`, `deleted`, `deleted_entries`) are not validated
- * because their presence depends on which mutation ran.
- */
-declare function isMutationResponse(value: unknown): value is MutationResponse;
-/**
- * Response type alias for org-writers-get.
- *
- * The wire body is `{ writers: string[] }` where each entry is
- * `did:t3n:<40-hex>`.
- */
-interface OrgWriters {
-    writers: string[];
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgWriters}. */
-declare function isOrgWriters(value: unknown): value is OrgWriters;
-/**
- * Response type alias for org-grants-get.
- *
- * The wire body echoes the `contract_id` alongside the grant list.
- */
-interface OrgContractGrants {
-    contract_id: string;
-    grants: UserGrant[];
-}
-/**
- * Shallow runtime guard for {@link OrgContractGrants}.
- *
- * Validates the immediate envelope (`contract_id: string`, `grants:
- * array`) without recursing into each `UserGrant`. The Rust contract
- * is the source of truth for grant element shape; widening the predicate
- * here would create maintenance churn against benign field additions.
- */
-declare function isOrgContractGrants(value: unknown): value is OrgContractGrants;
-/**
- * One grant inside a role: a {@link UserGrant} body (without the
- * grantee, which is bound at assignment time) plus the target contract.
- * Mirrors the org-data `RoleGrant` wire shape.
- */
-interface RoleGrant {
-    /** Target contract (canonical name, e.g. `"tee:z-payroll/contracts"`). */
-    contract_id: string;
-    /** WIT function names this grant confers. */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Data scope paths this grant confers (canonicalised lowercase). */
-    scopes: string[];
-}
-/**
- * A role: a named bundle of grants and/or composed sub-roles.
- * Mirrors the org-data `RoleDefinition` wire shape.
- */
-interface RoleDefinition {
-    /** Org-unique role identifier (slug; function-name grammar). */
-    role_id: string;
-    /** Human-facing label. */
-    label: string;
-    /** Composite: other role ids in the same org whose grants this role confers. */
-    includes: string[];
-    /** Grants this role confers directly. */
-    grants: RoleGrant[];
-}
-/**
- * The roles assigned to one grantee within one org.
- * Mirrors the org-data `RoleAssignments` wire shape.
- */
-interface RoleAssignments {
-    /** Assigned role ids. */
-    roles: string[];
-}
-/** Response for `org-role-get`; `role` is `null` when the id is unknown. */
-interface RoleGetResponse {
-    role: RoleDefinition | null;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link RoleGetResponse}. */
-declare function isRoleGetResponse(value: unknown): value is RoleGetResponse;
-/**
- * One org-owned agent's outbound host allow-list for a single contract.
+ * Execute a `z:` contract as an org agent, authenticating with an opaque
+ * API key — one request, no handshake, no session.
  *
- * Egress only — it carries no data scopes by construction, so it can never be
- * a second path to org data (that stays with `org-policy-set-grants`).
+ * @param opts - baseUrl, apiKey, and the wire request to execute
+ * @param schema - optional validator applied to the decoded result (e.g. a
+ *   zod schema); anything exposing `.parse(value)` is accepted, same as
+ *   {@link T3nClient.executeAndDecode}
+ * @returns the contract's decoded result, typed as `T`
+ * @throws {InvokeError} if `baseUrl` is insecure, on a network
+ *   failure/timeout, or on a non-2xx response
+ * @throws {ContractResponseError} if the node returns a 2xx with a body
+ *   that is not valid JSON
  */
-interface AgentEgressEntry {
-    contract_id: string;
-    /** Bare lowercase hostnames, matched exactly by the node. */
-    allowed_hosts: string[];
-    /** WIT functions covered; `["*"]` means all of them. */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Present only when the allow-list is pinned to a version range. */
-    version_req?: string;
-}
+declare function invoke<T = unknown>(opts: InvokeOptions, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): Promise<T>;
 /**
- * Response for `org-agent-egress-get`; `egress` is `null` when the agent holds
- * no egress entry for the requested contract.
+ * Transport options shared by the keyed discovery reads. Mirrors the transport
+ * half of {@link InvokeOptions} (no `request`; the operation params are the
+ * second argument of each read). Same HTTPS + secret-hygiene rules as `invoke`.
  */
-interface AgentEgressGetResponse {
-    egress: AgentEgressEntry | null;
-}
-/** Runtime guard for {@link AgentEgressGetResponse}. */
-declare function isAgentEgressGetResponse(value: unknown): value is AgentEgressGetResponse;
-/** Response for `org-role-assignments-get`. */
-interface RoleAssignmentsResponse {
-    /** Echoed back so callers don't need to track which request this answers. */
-    grantee_did: string;
-    /** The grantee's assigned role ids (empty when none). */
-    roles: string[];
+interface DiscoverOptions {
+    /**
+     * RPC base URL of the T3n node, e.g. `https://node.example.com`. Must be
+     * `https:` unless the host is a local-dev loopback — see
+     * {@link InvokeOptions.baseUrl}.
+     */
+    baseUrl: string;
+    /**
+     * The agent's opaque API key (`t3n_key_<...>`), relayed verbatim in the
+     * `X-T3N-Api-Key` header. Never logged and never interpolated into any
+     * error this module throws.
+     */
+    apiKey: string;
+    /** Fetch timeout in ms. Defaults to 30s, matching {@link invoke}. */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
 }
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link RoleAssignmentsResponse}. */
-declare function isRoleAssignmentsResponse(value: unknown): value is RoleAssignmentsResponse;
 /**
- * Input for `listAgents` — the org plus optional pagination. Omit both `cursor`
- * and `limit` for the first page at the default limit; pass a previous
- * response's `next_cursor` back as `cursor` to fetch the following page.
+ * `whoami` — resolve the DID the relayed key maps to. The node never
+ * trusts a caller-supplied DID; this is the relay's sole DID source.
+ *
+ * @throws {InvokeError} if `baseUrl` is insecure, on a network failure/timeout,
+ *   or on a non-2xx response
  */
-interface ListAgentsInput {
-    orgDid: string;
-    /** Opaque cursor from a previous response's `next_cursor`. */
-    cursor?: string;
-    /** Maximum agents to return in this page. */
-    limit?: number;
-}
+declare function discoverWhoami(opts: DiscoverOptions): Promise<WhoamiResult>;
 /**
- * One org-owned agent in a {@link ListAgentsResponse}: the agent's DID, its
- * display name, and the number of distinct contracts it can access via a direct
- * grant. Mirrors the org-data `AgentSummary` wire shape. The name comes from the
- * agent's private card (falling back to the DID), so the FE no longer needs to
- * fetch each `public:agent_cards` entry to render the roster.
+ * `contracts.list` — the keyed counterpart of {@link T3nClient.listContracts}.
+ * Absent `params` (`{}`) lists the curated `core` contracts; `org` / `self`
+ * scopes are discovery-grant gated server-side (R5 non-disclosive empty page).
+ *
+ * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
  */
-interface AgentSummary {
-    /** The agent's DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
-    did: string;
-    /** The agent's display name, from its private card (DID when unavailable). */
-    name: string;
-    /** Count of distinct contracts the agent holds a direct grant on. */
-    contract_count: number;
-}
-/** Response for `org-data-list-agents`. */
-interface ListAgentsResponse {
-    /** One PAGE of the org's org-owned agents, sorted by DID. */
-    agents: AgentSummary[];
-    /** Opaque cursor for the next page; absent on the last page. */
-    next_cursor?: string;
-}
-/** A human member's org role. The closed wire domain of {@link HumanMember}. */
-type MemberRole = "admin" | "member";
+declare function discoverListContracts(opts: DiscoverOptions, params?: ListContractsParams): Promise<ListContractsResult>;
 /**
- * Input for `listHumanMembers` — the org plus optional pagination. Omit both
- * `cursor` and `limit` for the first page at the default limit; pass a previous
- * response's `next_cursor` back as `cursor` to fetch the following page.
+ * `delegation.check` — the keyed counterpart of
+ * {@link T3nClient.checkDelegation}. Returns the `member_delegation ∩ org_delegation`
+ * verdict for the acting agent (as itself, or for `params.pii_did`).
+ *
+ * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
  */
-interface ListHumanMembersInput {
-    orgDid: string;
-    /** Opaque cursor from a previous response's `next_cursor`. */
-    cursor?: string;
-    /** Maximum members to return in this page. */
-    limit?: number;
-}
+declare function discoverCheckDelegation(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: GrantCheckParams): Promise<GrantCheckResult>;
 /**
- * One direct human member: DID plus org role. No profile PII (name/email are
- * out of scope and owned by `tee:user`). Mirrors the org-data `HumanMember`
- * wire shape.
+ * `describe.contract` — the authority-gated keyed describe read. Returns
+ * `{ contract, version, descriptor }`: the resolved dispatch `version` (the
+ * `scriptVersion` an {@link invoke} call needs) alongside the contract's full
+ * descriptor document. Unlike the session/stdio public descriptor GET, the relay
+ * path is membership-gated on the contract's owning org and returns a uniform
+ * non-disclosive error for both "not found" and "not authorised"
+ * (anti-enumeration).
+ *
+ * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
  */
-interface HumanMember {
-    /** The member's DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
-    did: string;
-    /** The member's org role. */
-    role: MemberRole;
-}
-/** Response for `org-data-list-human-members`. */
-interface ListHumanMembersResponse {
-    /** One PAGE of the org's direct human members, sorted by DID. */
-    members: HumanMember[];
-    /** Opaque cursor for the next page; absent on the last page. */
-    next_cursor?: string;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link ListHumanMembersResponse}. */
-declare function isListHumanMembersResponse(value: unknown): value is ListHumanMembersResponse;
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link ListAgentsResponse}. */
-declare function isListAgentsResponse(value: unknown): value is ListAgentsResponse;
-/** Response for `org-data-list`. */
-interface DataListResponse {
-    /** Hex-encoded entry IDs for this page. */
-    entry_ids: string[];
-    /** Offset to pass for the next page. `null` when this is the last page. */
-    next_offset: number | null;
-    /** Total number of entries in the scope (across all pages). */
-    total: number;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link DataListResponse}. */
-declare function isDataListResponse(value: unknown): value is DataListResponse;
-/** Secret shape discriminator (mirrors the contract `SecretKind`). */
-type SecretKind = "single_value" | "json";
-/** Metadata common to every {@link SecretView} entry. */
-interface SecretViewBase {
-    /** Secret name (the `(org, name)` key tail). */
-    name: string;
-    /** Monotonic version, bumped on each value rotation and ACL edit. */
-    version: number;
-    /** Unix seconds of the most recent write. */
-    updated_at_secs: number;
-}
+declare function discoverDescribeContract(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: DescribeContractParams): Promise<DescribeContractResult>;
 /**
- * The redacted per-secret summary `org-secret-list` returns — a discriminated
- * union on `kind`. The value is NEVER present: a single-value exposes only its
- * last four characters and a json secret only its sorted top-level field names.
+ * `describe.function` — the authority-gated keyed describe read for a single
+ * function. Returns `{ contract, version, descriptor }` with `descriptor` the
+ * projected function entry. Same gating as {@link discoverDescribeContract}.
+ *
+ * @throws {InvokeError} — see {@link discoverWhoami}
  */
-type SecretView = (SecretViewBase & {
-    kind: "single_value";
-    /** Last four characters of the value (whole value when ≤ 4 chars). */
-    last4: string;
-}) | (SecretViewBase & {
-    kind: "json";
-    /** Sorted top-level object field names (keys only, no values). */
-    field_names: string[];
-});
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretView}. */
-declare function isSecretView(value: unknown): value is SecretView;
+declare function discoverDescribeFunction(opts: DiscoverOptions, params: DescribeFunctionParams): Promise<DescribeFunctionResult>;
+
 /**
- * Full secret record returned by `org-secret-get` — the value IS included
- * (the deliberate read-back path the READ axis exists for), along with all
- * three ACLs.
+ * Token fixed-point units (USDT-style 6 decimals).
+ *
+ * As of `tee:*` metering v2, every token amount on the wire —
+ * {@link BalanceRow}'s `available`/`reserved`, {@link UsageEntry.amount},
+ * and `total_supply` — is denominated in **base units**, where
+ * `1 T3N token = `{@link BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN}` base units`. The node
+ * meters the *actual* fractional cost of each operation (pro-rata by
+ * bytes / byte-seconds / fuel) down to `1e-6` token, so amounts are
+ * raw integers in base units, NOT whole tokens.
+ *
+ * The wire fields are left as raw base units (no silent rescaling — that
+ * would lose precision for large balances and surprise callers doing
+ * arithmetic). Use {@link formatTokens} to render a human "tokens"
+ * string and {@link toBaseUnits} to convert a token figure back.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ Breaking vs. the pre-decimals SDK: a balance that used to read `5`
+ * (whole tokens) now reads `5_000_000` (base units). Multiply existing
+ * display code through {@link formatTokens}.
  */
-interface SecretRecord {
-    name: string;
-    kind: SecretKind;
-    /** The value as text: the scalar for a single-value, canonical JSON object for a json secret. */
-    value: string;
-    version: number;
-    /** READ axis — DIDs allowed to read the value back. */
-    reader_dids: string[];
-    /** READ axis — role ids allowed to read the value back. */
-    reader_roles: string[];
-    /** MANAGE axis — DIDs allowed to rotate the value. */
-    manager_dids: string[];
-    /** MANAGE axis — role ids allowed to rotate the value. */
-    manager_roles: string[];
-    /** USE axis — canonical contract ids allowed to have the value injected. */
-    contract_allowlist: string[];
-    created_at_secs: number;
-    updated_at_secs: number;
-    /** DID of the caller who last wrote the record. */
-    updated_by: string;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretRecord}. */
-declare function isSecretRecord(value: unknown): value is SecretRecord;
-/** Response for `org-secret-list`: redacted per-kind views, no values. */
-interface SecretListResponse {
-    secrets: SecretView[];
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link SecretListResponse}. */
-declare function isSecretListResponse(value: unknown): value is SecretListResponse;
-/** Response for `org-data-get`. */
-interface DataGetResponse {
-    entry_id: string;
-    /** Hex-encoded raw payload bytes. */
-    payload_hex: string;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link DataGetResponse}. */
-declare function isDataGetResponse(value: unknown): value is DataGetResponse;
+/** Decimal places in a T3N token (fixed; mirrors the node constant). */
+declare const TOKEN_DECIMALS = 6;
+/** Base units per whole T3N token — `10 ** TOKEN_DECIMALS`. */
+declare const BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN = 1000000;
 /**
- * Return shape of `agentCardGet` — composed client-side from the generic
- * `org-data-get` read of the card's entry (there is no card-specific read
- * operation on the contract). To check whether a public copy exists, probe
- * the anonymous `GET /api/agent-card/{did}` endpoint.
+ * Render a base-unit amount as a human-readable token string, e.g.
+ * `25_920_000 → "25.92"`, `1_000_000 → "1"`, `4768 → "0.004768"`.
+ *
+ * Trailing-zero fraction digits are trimmed; an integer amount renders
+ * with no decimal point. Accepts `number` or `bigint`; for balances
+ * above `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` prefer passing a `bigint`.
  */
-interface AgentCardResponse {
-    /** The agent whose card this is (`did:t3n:<40-hex>`). */
-    agent_did: string;
-    /** The stored card JSON body, verbatim. */
-    card: string;
-}
-/** Shallow runtime guard for {@link AgentCardResponse}. */
-declare function isAgentCardResponse(value: unknown): value is AgentCardResponse;
+declare function formatTokens(baseUnits: number | bigint): string;
 /**
- * Legacy direct-route org-data envelope shape retained for compatibility.
- *
- * This mirrors the removed `/api/user-contract/execute` body format from
- * the transitional transport. New callers should use `OrgDataClient`,
- * which now dispatches through authenticated `/api/rpc` +
- * `action.execute` instead.
+ * Convert a whole-or-fractional token figure to base units (rounded to
+ * the nearest base unit). E.g. `25.92 → 25_920_000`, `1 → 1_000_000`.
  */
-interface OrgDataActionWire {
-    nonce: string;
-    user_did: string;
-    authenticator_id: string;
-    contract_id: string;
-    function: string;
-    args_hash: string;
-    expires_at_secs: number;
-    signature: string;
-}
+declare function toBaseUnits(tokens: number): number;
 
 /**
  * OrgDataClient — typed wrapper over the existing authenticated
@@ -3597,12 +3773,19 @@ interface SetWritersInput {
     scope: string;
     writers: string[];
 }
-interface SetGrantsInput {
+/**
+ * A grant to set via {@link OrgDataClient.setDelegation}. The per-grant
+ * `contract_id` is injected by the SDK from the request `contractId` (the
+ * contract sets it server-side regardless), so callers omit it — a read-back
+ * {@link BoundGrant}, which carries `contract_id`, is still assignable.
+ */
+type SetGrantInput = Omit<BoundGrant, "contract_id">;
+interface OrgDelegationSetInput {
     orgDid: string;
     contractId: string;
-    grants: UserGrant[];
+    grants: SetGrantInput[];
 }
-interface DeleteGrantsInput {
+interface OrgDelegationDeleteInput {
     orgDid: string;
     contractId: string;
 }
@@ -3611,9 +3794,9 @@ interface DeleteGrantsInput {
  * while executing one of the org's contracts (org-admin only).
  *
  * Egress ONLY — this confers no data authority. An agent needs BOTH this and a
- * {@link OrgDataClient.setGrants} entry naming its own DID to do useful work:
- * `setGrants` authorises the org data it may read, this authorises the hosts it
- * may dial. No human `agent_auth` row is involved in either.
+ * {@link OrgDataClient.setDelegation} entry naming its own DID to do useful work:
+ * `setDelegation` authorises the org data it may read, this authorises the hosts it
+ * may dial. No human delegation row is involved in either.
  *
  * Hosts are matched EXACTLY (lowercased). A scheme, port, path, or `*` wildcard
  * is rejected rather than stored as an entry that could never match.
@@ -3745,7 +3928,7 @@ interface DeleteScopeInput {
 interface PurgeOrgInput {
     orgDid: string;
 }
-interface RemoveMemberGrantsInput {
+interface OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput {
     orgDid: string;
     /** DID (`did:t3n:<40-hex>` or bare hex) to drop from every grant list. */
     memberDid: string;
@@ -3757,7 +3940,7 @@ interface WritersGetInput {
     orgDid: string;
     scope: string;
 }
-interface GrantsGetInput {
+interface OrgDelegationGetInput {
     orgDid: string;
     contractId: string;
 }
@@ -3894,22 +4077,22 @@ declare class OrgDataClient {
     /** Delete a secret entirely (org-admin only). */
     secretDelete(input: SecretNameInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
-     * Full replacement of the user-grant list for a contract.
+     * Full replacement of the org's grant list for a contract.
      *
      * Passing an empty list removes the entry.
      */
-    setGrants(input: SetGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    setDelegation(input: OrgDelegationSetInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
      * Delete the grant entry for a contract entirely.
      */
-    deleteGrants(input: DeleteGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    deleteDelegation(input: OrgDelegationDeleteInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
      * Grant or replace the outbound host allow-list an org-owned agent may use
      * while executing one of the org's contracts (org-admin only).
      *
      * Full replacement for the `(agent, contract)` pair. Other contracts' egress
      * entries are untouched. See {@link SetAgentEgressInput} on why this is
-     * needed alongside {@link setGrants}.
+     * needed alongside {@link setDelegation}.
      */
     setAgentEgress(input: SetAgentEgressInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
@@ -3994,11 +4177,11 @@ declare class OrgDataClient {
     purgeOrg(input: PurgeOrgInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
      * Detach-cascade grant sweep: drop `memberDid` from every
-     * one of the org's per-contract `UserGrant` lists. Authorised for an
+     * one of the org's per-contract `BoundGrant` lists. Authorised for an
      * org-admin of the subject, or the member removing their own grants.
      * `deleted_entries` reports how many contract grant lists were rewritten.
      */
-    removeMemberGrants(input: RemoveMemberGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    removeMemberDelegation(input: OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /** Read the policy metadata for an org (admin-only). */
     policyGet(input: PolicyGetInput): Promise<OrgPolicyMeta>;
     /**
@@ -4025,7 +4208,7 @@ declare class OrgDataClient {
     /** Read the writer list for a scope (admin-only). */
     writersGet(input: WritersGetInput): Promise<OrgWriters>;
     /** Read the grant list for a contract (admin-only). */
-    grantsGet(input: GrantsGetInput): Promise<OrgContractGrants>;
+    getDelegation(input: OrgDelegationGetInput): Promise<OrgContractDelegation>;
     /**
      * List entry IDs for a scope (admin-only), paginated.
      *
@@ -4120,17 +4303,17 @@ declare class SessionOrgDataClient {
     secretList(input: SecretListInput): Promise<SecretView[]>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.secretDelete}. */
     secretDelete(input: SecretNameInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
-    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.setGrants}. */
-    setGrants(input: SetGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
-    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.deleteGrants}. */
-    deleteGrants(input: DeleteGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.setDelegation}. */
+    setDelegation(input: OrgDelegationSetInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.deleteDelegation}. */
+    deleteDelegation(input: OrgDelegationDeleteInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
      * Grant or replace the outbound host allow-list an org-owned agent may use
      * while executing one of the org's contracts (org-admin only).
      *
      * Full replacement for the `(agent, contract)` pair. Other contracts' egress
      * entries are untouched. See {@link SetAgentEgressInput} on why this is
-     * needed alongside {@link setGrants}.
+     * needed alongside {@link setDelegation}.
      */
     setAgentEgress(input: SetAgentEgressInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /**
@@ -4172,8 +4355,8 @@ declare class SessionOrgDataClient {
     deleteScope(input: DeleteScopeInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.purgeOrg}. */
     purgeOrg(input: PurgeOrgInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
-    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.removeMemberGrants}. */
-    removeMemberGrants(input: RemoveMemberGrantsInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
+    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.removeMemberDelegation}. */
+    removeMemberDelegation(input: OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput): Promise<MutationResponse>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.policyGet}. */
     policyGet(input: PolicyGetInput): Promise<OrgPolicyMeta>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.policyView}. */
@@ -4182,8 +4365,8 @@ declare class SessionOrgDataClient {
     amIAdmin(input: PolicyGetInput): Promise<boolean>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.writersGet}. */
     writersGet(input: WritersGetInput): Promise<OrgWriters>;
-    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.grantsGet}. */
-    grantsGet(input: GrantsGetInput): Promise<OrgContractGrants>;
+    /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.getDelegation}. */
+    getDelegation(input: OrgDelegationGetInput): Promise<OrgContractDelegation>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.dataList}. */
     dataList(input: DataListInput): Promise<DataListResponse>;
     /** Mirrors {@link OrgDataClient.dataGet}. */
@@ -4213,7 +4396,7 @@ declare function createOrgDataClientFromSession(t3n: T3nClient, baseUrl: string)
  *
  * Envelope-free authorisation removed the per-call delegation
  * credential and envelope entirely: authority is now the standing on-chain
- * `agent_auth` ∩ `UserGrant` intersection the host re-reads every call, and
+ * `member_delegation` ∩ `org_delegation` intersection the host re-reads every call, and
  * every payroll call emits the plain Direct wire variant (`{ request }`).
  * What remains here is the request body shape, its canonical defaults, and
  * the base64url / DID helpers callers still need.
@@ -4227,7 +4410,7 @@ declare function createOrgDataClientFromSession(t3n: T3nClient, baseUrl: string)
 /**
  * Canonical sorted run-pipeline function surface for the z-payroll contract
  * (`z:<org-tid>:payroll`). Sorted ascending. Mirrors `Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS`
- * in the Trinity harness; used as the `functions` set for agent-auth grants
+ * in the Trinity harness; used as the `functions` set for delegation grants
  * and `check-delegation` queries.
  */
 declare const Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS: readonly ["compute-payroll", "execute-disbursement", "finalize-audit", "submit-escalations", "validate-credentials"];
@@ -4432,7 +4615,7 @@ declare function stringToBytes(str: string): Uint8Array;
  */
 declare function bytesToString(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
 
-declare function getScriptVersion(rpcUrl: string, scriptName: string): Promise<string>;
+declare function getContractVersion(rpcUrl: string, contractId: string): Promise<string>;
 
 /**
  * Secret redaction utilities for T3n SDK
@@ -4474,8 +4657,8 @@ declare function redactSecretsFromJson(jsonString: string): string;
  *
  * Predicates are intentionally shallow — they validate the immediate
  * top-level structure (object kind, presence/type of leading fields)
- * but do not deeply validate nested elements (e.g. each `UserGrant`
- * inside `OrgContractGrants.grants`). Deep validation would be brittle
+ * but do not deeply validate nested elements (e.g. each `BoundGrant`
+ * inside `OrgContractDelegation.grants`). Deep validation would be brittle
  * against benign contract additions; shallow guards catch the failure
  * modes that actually surface as runtime crashes (null/string/missing
  * top-level field).
@@ -4761,7 +4944,7 @@ interface TenantBaseClient {
 }
 interface TenantClientConfig {
     environment?: TenantSdkEnvironment;
-    /** Node URL for `getScriptVersion` during business contract execution. Falls back to `baseUrl`. */
+    /** Node URL for `getContractVersion` during business contract execution. Falls back to `baseUrl`. */
     endpoint?: string;
     /**
      * Authenticated base client the TenantClient dispatches RPCs through.
@@ -4778,7 +4961,7 @@ interface TenantClientConfig {
     t3n?: TenantBaseClient;
     baseUrl?: string;
     tenantDid?: string;
-    tenantScriptName?: string;
+    tenantContractId?: string;
 }
 type TenantStatus = "pending" | "active" | "suspended";
 interface TenantMeResponse {
@@ -5228,5 +5411,5 @@ declare function tenantDidHex(tenantDid: string): string;
 declare function validateTail(tail: string): string;
 declare function canonicalTenantName(tenantDid: string, tail: string): string;
 
-export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, InvokeError, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, WireEncodingError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, decodeWasmErrorMessage, deriveAgentCardEntryId, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchTrustedManifest, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, getScriptVersion, invoke, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractGrants, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeAgentAuthEntries, mergeDiscoverDids, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseAgentAuthGet, parseAgentAuthPolicy, parseContractResponse, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestToWire, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toAgentAuthUpdateWire, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifyTdxQuote };
-export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentAuthEntry, AgentAuthMergeResult, AgentAuthPolicy, AgentAuthScriptGrant, AgentAuthUpdateInput, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, BalanceRow, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ConfigValidationResult, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractKind, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, ContractSetDescriptorInput, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DeleteDataInput, DeleteGrantsInput, DeleteScopeInput, DetailedContract, Did, Direction, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, GranteeInput, GrantsGetInput, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedContract, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractGrants, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RemoveMemberGrantsInput, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetGrantsInput, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SignedTrustManifest, StringEncoding, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserGrant, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WireBlock, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };
+export { AGENT_CARDS_SCOPE, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, InvokeError, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, SessionUsageReportClient, T3nClient, T3nConfigError, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, WireEncodingError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildSecretWriteArgs, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, clearManifestVersionFloor, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, createUsageReportClientFromSession, createWorkloadAuthInput, decodeWasmErrorMessage, deriveAgentCardEntryId, discoverCheckDelegation, discoverDescribeContract, discoverDescribeFunction, discoverListContracts, discoverWhoami, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, fetchTrustedManifest, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getContractVersion, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, invoke, isAgentCardResponse, isAgentEgressGetResponse, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isListAgentsResponse, isListHumanMembersResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgAdminStatus, isOrgContractDelegation, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgUsageReport, isOrgWriters, isRoleAssignmentsResponse, isRoleGetResponse, isSecretListResponse, isSecretRecord, isSecretView, isUnsafeTrustServer, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, manifestToTrustAnchor, maskKeyMaterial, mergeDiscoverDids, mergeGrants, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseContractResponse, parseMemberDelegationDoc, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestToWire, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyManifestSignature, verifyTdxQuote };
+export type { ActivityCallerType, ActivityEntry, ActivityOutcome, ActivityReport, AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentCardRefInput, AgentCardResponse, AgentCardSetInput, AgentEgressEntry, AgentEgressGetResponse, AgentEgressRefInput, AgentSummary, AssignRolesInput, AuthInput, BalanceRow, BoundGrant, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ConfigValidationResult, ContractDescriptorDocument, ContractDescriptorFacets, ContractExecuteInput, ContractKind, ContractLifecycleStatus, ContractListDetailedOptions, ContractListDetailedPage, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, ContractSetDescriptorInput, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegationGrantKind, DelegationGrantRef, DeleteDataInput, DeleteScopeInput, DescribeContractParams, DescribeContractResult, DescribeFunctionParams, DescribeFunctionResult, DetailedContract, Did, Direction, DiscoverOptions, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, FetchTrustedManifestOptions, FunctionDescriptorEntry, GetActivityLogOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantCheckParams, GrantCheckResult, GranteeInput, GrantsMergeResult, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, HumanMember, InvokeOptions, InvokeRequest, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, ListAgentsInput, ListAgentsResponse, ListContractsParams, ListContractsResult, ListContractsScope, ListHumanMembersInput, ListHumanMembersResponse, ListedContract, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapLifecycleStatus, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MemberDelegationDoc, MemberRole, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgAdminStatus, OrgContractDelegation, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgDelegationDeleteInput, OrgDelegationGetInput, OrgDelegationSetInput, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgRemoveMemberDelegationInput, OrgUsageReport, OrgUsageReportInput, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, PurgeOrgInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RoleAssignments, RoleAssignmentsResponse, RoleDefinition, RoleGetResponse, RoleGrant, RoleIdInput, SdkConfig, SecretKind, SecretListInput, SecretListResponse, SecretNameInput, SecretRecord, SecretSetValueInput, SecretView, SecretWriteInput, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetAgentEgressInput, SetRoleInput, SetWritersInput, SignedTrustManifest, StringEncoding, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantContractSetDescriptorInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorOrUnsafe, TrustAnchorSource, TrustManifestPayload, UnassignRolesInput, UnsafeTrustServer, UpdateMetaInput, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UsageReportSignature, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, Validity, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WhoamiResult, WireBlock, WorkloadAuthInput, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };