@terminal3/t3n-sdk 3.17.0 → 4.0.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -725,29 +725,6 @@ declare class UserUpsertError extends T3nError {
      */
     static fromWire(raw: string): UserUpsertError | null;
 }
-/** One contract-scoped grant for an agent. Wire form is snake_case
- *  (`script_name` / `version_req` / `allowed_hosts`); `agentAuthUpdate`
- *  performs the conversion. */
-interface AgentScriptGrant {
-    scriptName: string;
-    /** SemVer requirement (e.g. `"^1.0.0"`). Omit / null = any version. */
-    versionReq?: string | null;
-    /** Allowed function names. Omit / null = all functions. */
-    functions?: string[] | null;
-    /** Allowed outbound HTTP hosts. Omit = none. */
-    allowedHosts?: string[];
-}
-/** Per-agent authorisation grant binding an agent DID to its script grants. */
-interface AgentGrantInput {
-    agentDid: string;
-    scripts: AgentScriptGrant[];
-}
-/** Input to {@link T3nClient.agentAuthUpdate}. The document IS the new state:
- *  an empty `agents` list revokes all agent access. Mirrors the contract
- *  `AgentAuthPolicy`. */
-interface AgentAuthUpdateInput {
-    agents: AgentGrantInput[];
-}
 
 /**
  * Org-data wire types mirroring the org-data contract wire shapes.
@@ -1401,6 +1378,93 @@ declare class ContractResponseError extends T3nError {
  */
 declare function parseContractResponse<T = unknown>(raw: string, schema?: ContractResponseSchema<T>): T;
 
+/**
+ * Agent-auth grants — the standing on-chain authority a user delegates to
+ * an agent (envelope-free authorisation).
+ *
+ * `AGENT_AUTH_MAP` is keyed by the *user* DID — one policy document per
+ * user, global across orgs, with at most one entry per agent DID. Reads
+ * (`agent-auth-get`) and writes (`agent-auth-update`) on
+ * `tee:user/contracts` are **SelfOnly**: only the user, authenticated as
+ * themselves, may read or write their own grants. This is the user-approval
+ * proof the per-call delegation credential's `user_sig` used to carry.
+ *
+ * The write shape gained `scopes` + a validity window: the
+ * agent's delegated org-data scopes, and an optional `[valid_from_secs,
+ * valid_until_secs]` window. The ≤ cap *length* check is enforced contract-
+ * side at write time; the expiry gate is host-side at read time.
+ *
+ * The merge below is a script-level union (R59): writing a grant for one
+ * `(agent_did, script_name)` preserves every other script row on that
+ * agent's entry, and every other agent's entry, unchanged.
+ */
+/** A single script grant in the camelCase write-request shape. */
+interface AgentAuthScriptGrant {
+    /** Contract name, or `"*"`. */
+    scriptName: string;
+    /** Optional semver requirement; `null` to match any version. */
+    versionReq?: string | null;
+    /** Functions the agent may invoke on this contract. */
+    functions: string[];
+    /** Org-data scopes delegated to the agent for the contract functions to
+     *  read on its behalf. */
+    scopes?: string[];
+    /** Direct-read scopes the agent may enumerate itself, via whichever read
+     *  function the contract exposes for direct enumeration. A strict subset of
+     *  `scopes` (enforced contract-side). */
+    readScopes?: string[];
+    /** Optional validity-window start (unix seconds). */
+    validFromSecs?: number | null;
+    /** NEW: optional validity-window end (unix seconds). */
+    validUntilSecs?: number | null;
+    /** Egress hosts the agent may reach for this contract. */
+    allowedHosts: string[];
+}
+/** One agent's entry in the write-request shape. */
+interface AgentAuthEntry {
+    agentDid: string;
+    scripts: AgentAuthScriptGrant[];
+}
+/** Extract the `agents` array from an `agent-auth-get` response. */
+declare function parseAgentAuthGet(response: unknown): AgentAuthEntry[];
+interface AgentAuthMergeResult {
+    /** Full merged `agents` list, ready for `agent-auth-update`. */
+    agents: AgentAuthEntry[];
+    /** `"<agentDid> → <scriptName>"` rows preserved from the existing policy. */
+    preservedRows: string[];
+}
+/** Input to the full-document write {@link T3nClient.agentAuthUpdate}. The
+ *  document IS the new state: an empty `agents` list revokes all agent
+ *  access. Mirrors the contract `AgentAuthPolicy`. */
+interface AgentAuthUpdateInput {
+    agents: AgentAuthEntry[];
+}
+/**
+ * Serialise a camelCase `agents` list to the contract's canonical
+ * snake_case `agent-auth-update` wire (`agent_did` / `script_name` /
+ * `version_req` / `read_scopes` / `valid_from_secs` / `valid_until_secs` /
+ * `allowed_hosts`), so neither write path relies on the contract's
+ * compatibility aliases. Absent optionals are omitted (never sent as
+ * `null`); empty `scopes` / `read_scopes` are omitted (the contract
+ * defaults both to empty). `functions` and `allowed_hosts` are always
+ * emitted — the contract requires explicit functions (`["*"]` = all) and
+ * reads an absent `allowed_hosts` as deny-all egress.
+ */
+declare function toAgentAuthUpdateWire(agents: AgentAuthEntry[]): {
+    agents: Array<{
+        agent_did: string;
+        scripts: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+    }>;
+};
+/**
+ * Merge new agent entries into the existing policy with script-level union
+ * semantics: for an agent DID present on both sides, script rows whose
+ * `scriptName` is not being written are preserved; rows with a matching
+ * `scriptName` are replaced by the new grant. Entries for other agent DIDs
+ * pass through unchanged.
+ */
+declare function mergeAgentAuthEntries(existing: AgentAuthEntry[], newEntries: AgentAuthEntry[]): AgentAuthMergeResult;
+
 /**
  * KYC types for the `tee:user/contracts::kyc-status` short-poll
  * function.
@@ -1747,6 +1811,41 @@ declare class T3nClient {
      *   empty / too long)
      */
     createOrganisation(name: string): Promise<Did>;
+    /**
+     * Read the authenticated user's own agent-auth policy — the standing
+     * grants delegated to agents. Dispatches `agent-auth-get` on
+     * `tee:user/contracts`, which is **SelfOnly**, so this always returns the
+     * caller's own `AGENT_AUTH_MAP[self]` document.
+     *
+     * @returns the `agents` entries (normalised to the camelCase write shape)
+     * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or the contract refuses
+     */
+    getAgentAuth(): Promise<AgentAuthEntry[]>;
+    /**
+     * Authorise an agent for one contract on the caller's own behalf
+     * (envelope-free authorisation). Read-merge-writes the
+     * caller's `AGENT_AUTH_MAP[self]` document via `agent-auth-update`
+     * (**SelfOnly**) with script-level union semantics, so other contracts'
+     * grants for this or any agent survive untouched.
+     *
+     * Carries the new `scopes` + validity fields: the delegated
+     * org-data scopes and an optional `[validFromSecs, validUntilSecs]`
+     * window. The ≤ cap *length* check is enforced contract-side at write
+     * time; the expiry gate is host-side at read time.
+     *
+     * This is the write surface `getDelegationInstructions` produces the
+     * parameters for. The caller MUST be the delegating user, authenticated as
+     * themselves — only they may create their own grant.
+     *
+     * @param agentDid - the agent DID being authorised
+     * @param grant - the single script grant to set (contract, functions,
+     *   scopes, validity, egress hosts)
+     * @returns the script rows preserved from the existing policy (audit aid)
+     * @throws if the session is not authenticated, or the contract refuses
+     */
+    updateAgentAuth(agentDid: string, grant: AgentAuthScriptGrant): Promise<{
+        preservedRows: string[];
+    }>;
     /**
      * Build the canonical `ExecuteActionRequest` shape the server
      * expects (`script_name`, `script_version`, `function_name`, `input`,
@@ -1996,12 +2095,15 @@ declare class T3nClient {
     /**
      * Replace this user's agent-authorisation policy (`tee:user/contracts` →
      * `agent-auth-update`). The supplied document IS the new state: an empty
-     * `agents` array revokes all agent access.
+     * `agents` array revokes all agent access. This is the full-document
+     * write — use {@link T3nClient.updateAgentAuth} for the single-grant
+     * read-merge-write that preserves other contracts' grants.
      *
-     * Typed wrapper over the raw contract call: callers pass
-     * camelCase input; the SDK emits the canonical snake_case wire
-     * (`agent_did` / `script_name` / `version_req` / `allowed_hosts`), so it no
-     * longer relies on the contract's compatibility aliases.
+     * Typed wrapper over the raw contract call: callers pass camelCase input;
+     * the SDK emits the canonical snake_case wire via
+     * {@link toAgentAuthUpdateWire} (carrying `scopes` / `read_scopes` /
+     * validity alongside `functions` / `allowed_hosts`), so it does not rely
+     * on the contract's compatibility aliases.
      *
      * @throws {RpcError} if the contract rejects the policy (validation failure,
      *   too many agents/grants).
@@ -2269,44 +2371,26 @@ declare function createRandomHandler(): GuestToHostHandler;
 declare function createDefaultHandlers(baseUrl: string): GuestToHostHandlers;
 
 /**
- * User-to-Agent Delegation.
- *
- * TypeScript reference implementation of the delegation credential and
- * envelope shapes defined by the delegation wire contract.
- *
- * The wire shape is byte-for-byte identical to the Rust source — pinned
- * by the KAT fixtures under `tests/kat/`. Specifically:
- *
- *   - `not_before_secs` / `not_after_secs` / `batch_cap_cents` are
- *     emitted as **JSON strings** (e.g. `"1700086400"`) so JS Number
- *     precision never enters the canonicalisation surface.
- *   - `nonce` (16 B), `vc_id` (16 B), `request_hash` (32 B),
- *     `agent_pubkey` (33 B compressed secp256k1), `user_sig`,
- *     `agent_sig` are emitted as **base64url-no-pad** strings.
- *   - `org_did` / `user_did` are emitted as `did:t3n:<40-hex>` (the
- *     `CompactDid` `Display` form).
- *
- * Canonicalisation uses the npm `canonicalize` package (RFC 8785 JCS).
- * Cryptography uses `@noble/curves` (secp256k1) and `@noble/hashes`
- * (sha256, keccak_256).
- */
-/** Domain tag carried in `DelegationCredential.v`. */
-declare const DELEGATION_CREDENTIAL_DOMAIN: "ot3.delegation/1";
-/** Domain tag prepended to the agent-side pre-image. */
-declare const DELEGATION_INVOCATION_DOMAIN: "ot3.invocation/1";
-declare const VC_ID_LEN = 16;
-declare const NONCE_LEN = 16;
-declare const REQUEST_HASH_LEN = 32;
-declare const AGENT_PUBKEY_LEN = 33;
-declare const ETH_SIG_LEN = 65;
-declare const MAX_FUNCTIONS_PER_CREDENTIAL = 16;
+ * Payroll request shapes + shared encoding utilities.
+ *
+ * Envelope-free authorisation removed the per-call delegation
+ * credential and envelope entirely: authority is now the standing on-chain
+ * `agent_auth` ∩ `UserGrant` intersection the host re-reads every call, and
+ * every payroll call emits the plain Direct wire variant (`{ request }`).
+ * What remains here is the request body shape, its canonical defaults, and
+ * the base64url / DID helpers callers still need.
+ *
+ * Wire conventions retained from the contract:
+ *   - `batch_cap_cents` is emitted as a **JSON string** so JS Number
+ *     precision never enters the wire surface.
+ *   - binary fields are base64url-no-pad strings.
+ *   - `org_id` is `did:t3n:<40-hex>` (the `CompactDid` `Display` form).
+ */
 /**
  * Canonical sorted run-pipeline function surface for the z-payroll contract
- * (`z:<org-tid>:payroll`). Sorted ascending as required by the credential
- * validator. Mirrors `Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS` in the Trinity harness.
- *
- * Pass this (or a sorted subset) as `functions` to
- * {@link buildDelegationCredential} for z-payroll credentials.
+ * (`z:<org-tid>:payroll`). Sorted ascending. Mirrors `Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS`
+ * in the Trinity harness; used as the `functions` set for agent-auth grants
+ * and `check-delegation` queries.
  */
 declare const Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS: readonly ["compute-payroll", "execute-disbursement", "finalize-audit", "submit-escalations", "validate-credentials"];
 /**
@@ -2315,48 +2399,7 @@ declare const Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS: readonly ["compute-payroll", "execute-dis
  * `get-audit-entry`.
  */
 declare const Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS: readonly ["get-audit-entry", "list-audit-cycles"];
-/** User-to-agent delegation credential body. */
-interface DelegationCredential {
-    /** Domain tag, must equal {@link DELEGATION_CREDENTIAL_DOMAIN}. */
-    v: string;
-    /** `did:t3n:<40-hex>` user DID. */
-    user_did: string;
-    /** 33-byte compressed secp256k1 public key the agent uses per call. */
-    agent_pubkey: Uint8Array;
-    /** `did:t3n:<40-hex>` org DID. */
-    org_did: string;
-    /** Contract id, e.g. `"tee:z-payroll"`. */
-    contract: string;
-    /**
-     * Functions this credential authorises. Sorted ascending, deduped,
-     * each entry non-empty lowercase ASCII, 1..=16 entries.
-     */
-    functions: string[];
-    /** Org-data scopes the contract may read on this user's behalf. */
-    scopes: string[];
-    /** Flat key-value labels checked against the org grant. */
-    metadata: Record<string, string>;
-    /** Inclusive lower bound of the validity window (unix seconds). */
-    not_before_secs: bigint;
-    /** Inclusive upper bound of the validity window (unix seconds). */
-    not_after_secs: bigint;
-    /** Random 16-byte credential id. */
-    vc_id: Uint8Array;
-}
-/** Envelope wrapping a contract-specific request body. */
-interface DelegationEnvelope {
-    /** RFC 8785 JCS bytes of the credential, exactly as signed. */
-    credential_jcs: Uint8Array;
-    /** 65-byte EIP-191 signature over `credential_jcs`. */
-    user_sig: Uint8Array;
-    /** Per-call agent signature over the invocation pre-image. */
-    agent_sig: Uint8Array;
-    /** 16-byte agent-generated per-call nonce. */
-    nonce: Uint8Array;
-    /** SHA-256 of the canonical request body. */
-    request_hash: Uint8Array;
-}
-/** Payroll-specific request body wrapped by a delegation envelope. */
+/** Payroll-specific request body — the Direct wire variant carries `{ request }`. */
 interface PayrollRunRequest {
     /** `did:t3n:<40-hex>` org id. */
     org_id: string;
@@ -2368,55 +2411,18 @@ interface PayrollRunRequest {
     /** `employee_id` → previous-cycle baseline net disbursement, cents (decimal string). */
     historical_baselines: Record<string, string>;
     /**
-     * Per-employee disbursement flag threshold, in cents. Mirrors the
-     * payroll request's individual-disbursement threshold field.
-     * When absent the contract applies its own default (SGD 15,000). When
-     * present, the value is included in the wire shape and participates in
-     * the request hash.
+     * Per-employee disbursement flag threshold, in cents. When absent the
+     * contract applies its own default (SGD 15,000); when present it is included
+     * in the wire shape.
      */
     individual_disbursement_threshold_cents?: bigint;
 }
 /** Default for `individual_disbursement_threshold_cents` — SGD 15,000. */
 declare const DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS = 1500000n;
-/** Delegated invocation: the agent acts on behalf of a user. */
-interface PayrollInvocationDelegated {
-    envelope: DelegationEnvelope;
-    request: PayrollRunRequest;
-}
-/**
- * Direct invocation: the agent acts on its own behalf. No delegation
- * envelope is included. The principal DID is resolved by the service layer
- * from `DynamicContext.authenticated_did`; authorisation falls through to
- * `OrgContractGrants[org || "tee:z-payroll"]` for the agent's own DID.
- *
- * Wire shape is `{ request }` — no `envelope` field and no
- * `authenticated_did` field. The contract's entry-point handler injects
- * `authenticated_did` from `GenericInput.context` before calling `verify`.
- */
-interface PayrollInvocationDirect {
-    request: PayrollRunRequest;
-}
-/**
- * Union of the two invocation variants. The serde-untagged enum on the
- * contract side disambiguates by presence of `envelope` — delegated calls
- * carry `{ envelope, request }`, direct calls carry `{ request }` only.
- */
-type PayrollInvocation = PayrollInvocationDelegated | PayrollInvocationDirect;
-/** Response from `tee:delegation.sign`. */
-interface SignDelegationResponse {
-    credential_jcs: Uint8Array;
-    user_sig: Uint8Array;
-}
 declare function b64uEncode(input: Uint8Array): string;
 /**
- * Encode raw bytes to base64url-no-pad (RFC 4648 §5 with padding
- * dropped). The same encoding the wire-shape uses for binary
- * fields (`agent_pubkey`, `vc_id`, `nonce`, `agent_sig`, `user_sig`,
- * `request_hash`, `credential_jcs`).
- *
- * Public API since v2.2: callers building `PayrollInvocation` JSON
- * for the wire (e.g. the t3n-mcp `runPayroll` handler) need this
- * encoder to match the contract's deserializer.
+ * Encode raw bytes to base64url-no-pad (RFC 4648 §5 with padding dropped).
+ * The encoding the wire uses for binary fields.
  */
 declare function b64uEncodeBytes(input: Uint8Array): string;
 /**
@@ -2429,241 +2435,6 @@ declare function b64uDecodeStrict(input: string): Uint8Array;
 declare const _b64uEncode: typeof b64uEncode;
 /** Build a `did:t3n:<40-hex>` from raw 20 bytes. */
 declare function compactDidFromBytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
-/**
- * Canonicalise a {@link DelegationCredential} to RFC 8785 JCS bytes.
- *
- * Output is byte-identical to the Rust `canonicalise_credential` in
- * `delegation-types` (pinned by `tests/kat/credential.json`).
- */
-declare function canonicaliseCredential(credential: DelegationCredential): Uint8Array;
-/** Canonicalise an arbitrary {@link PayrollRunRequest} to JCS bytes. */
-declare function canonicaliseRequest(request: PayrollRunRequest): Uint8Array;
-/** SHA-256 of the canonicalised request body. */
-declare function requestHash(request: PayrollRunRequest): Uint8Array;
-/**
- * Build the agent-side pre-image bytes:
- * `utf8(DELEGATION_INVOCATION_DOMAIN) || vc_id || nonce || request_hash`.
- *
- * SHA-256 of these bytes is what the agent's secp256k1 signature is
- * verified against.
- */
-declare function buildInvocationPreimage(vcId: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, reqHash: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
-/** Options for {@link buildDelegationCredential}. */
-interface BuildDelegationCredentialOpts {
-    user_did: string;
-    agent_pubkey: Uint8Array;
-    org_did: string;
-    contract: string;
-    /**
-     * Functions this credential authorises. Must be non-empty, sorted
-     * ascending, deduped — the same invariants enforced by
-     * {@link validateCredentialBody}.
-     */
-    functions: string[];
-    scopes?: string[];
-    metadata?: Record<string, string>;
-    not_before_secs: bigint | number;
-    not_after_secs: bigint | number;
-    vc_id: Uint8Array;
-}
-/**
- * Construct a {@link DelegationCredential} and validate body-level
- * invariants (domain, lengths, validity window). Throws on the same
- * conditions the Rust `validate_credential_body` rejects.
- */
-declare function buildDelegationCredential(opts: BuildDelegationCredentialOpts): DelegationCredential;
-/**
- * Body-level validation matching the delegation credential-body validation,
- * minus the `now`/`max_validity_secs` checks (which are caller-supplied).
- * Throws with a message identifying the offending invariant.
- */
-declare function validateCredentialBody(c: DelegationCredential): void;
-/** Compute the EIP-191 "personal_sign" digest of a message. */
-declare function eip191Digest(msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
-/**
- * EIP-191 sign `jcs` under `secret`, returning a 65-byte signature
- * (`r || s || v`, with `v` in 27/28 — Ethereum convention) and the
- * recovered 20-byte ETH address.
- */
-declare function signCredential(jcs: Uint8Array, secret: Uint8Array): {
-    sig: Uint8Array;
-    addr: Uint8Array;
-};
-/**
- * Recover the 20-byte ETH address that signed `msg` under EIP-191.
- * Mirrors the delegation contract's EIP-191 address recovery.
- *
- * **Signature malleability — accepted by design.** This routine does
- * not enforce low-s. EIP-2 mandates low-s for *transaction* signatures,
- * but EIP-191 / `personal_sign` has no such requirement, and ethers.js
- * / MetaMask / web3.js produce both shapes. Two distinct `(r, s)` and
- * `(r, n − s)` pairs verify under the same recovered address — replay
- * protection comes from the envelope's `request_hash` + `nonce`, not
- * from byte-uniqueness of the signature.
- */
-declare function ethRecoverEip191(msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
-/**
- * Sign the agent-side invocation pre-image. The signature is raw
- * compact ECDSA (64 bytes) over `sha256(preimage)` — the 64-byte form
- * the delegation contract accepts.
- */
-declare function signAgentInvocation(preimage: Uint8Array, secret: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
-/**
- * Options for {@link DelegationCustodialClient}.
- */
-interface DelegationCustodialClientOpts {
-    /**
-     * Explicit semver string for the delegation contract (e.g. `"1.0.0"`).
-     * When omitted the client resolves `"latest"` via
-     * `GET /api/contracts/current?name=tee:delegation/contracts` (one
-     * request per client instance, cached in `getScriptVersion`).
-     */
-    scriptVersion?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Result returned by {@link DelegationCustodialClient.signCustodial}.
- */
-interface SignCustodialResult {
-    /** RFC 8785 JCS bytes of the credential, exactly as signed by the node. */
-    credentialJcs: Uint8Array;
-    /** 65-byte EIP-191 signature over `credentialJcs` produced by the TEE. */
-    userSig: Uint8Array;
-}
-/**
- * Wraps the `tee:delegation/contracts::sign` function for OIDC users
- * (or any user whose private key is held by the TEE rather than the
- * browser).
- *
- * ETH-EOA users who hold their own key should call
- * {@link signCredential} directly — no network round-trip required.
- *
- * The client must be constructed with an authenticated {@link T3nClient}
- * instance and the node's base URL; `signCustodial` sends the credential
- * body to the TEE and returns the signed bytes.
- */
-declare class DelegationCustodialClient {
-    private readonly t3n;
-    private readonly baseUrl;
-    private readonly opts;
-    constructor(t3n: T3nClient, baseUrl: string, opts?: DelegationCustodialClientOpts);
-    /**
-     * Request the TEE to sign a delegation credential on behalf of the
-     * authenticated user.
-     *
-     * The `body` is sent as-is as the `input.body` field of the
-     * `tee:delegation/contracts::sign` action.  Use
-     * {@link buildDelegationCredential} + the wire-shape projection to
-     * produce the correct representation — binary fields (`agent_pubkey`,
-     * `vc_id`) must be base64url-no-pad strings, and `not_before_secs` /
-     * `not_after_secs` must be decimal strings.
-     *
-     * Returns `{ credentialJcs, userSig }` — both as `Uint8Array` — ready
-     * to be passed into {@link buildPayrollInvocation}.
-     */
-    signCustodial(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<SignCustodialResult>;
-}
-/** Options for {@link revokeDelegation}. */
-interface RevokeDelegationOpts {
-    /** Credential body to revoke. Already-encoded base64url-no-pad JCS bytes. */
-    credentialJcsB64u: string;
-    /**
-     * Omit (or pass `undefined`) to revoke the whole credential. Pass an
-     * array of function names to revoke a subset; the array must obey the
-     * same sort + dedupe invariants the credential's `functions` field
-     * enforces, and each entry must already appear in the credential's
-     * `functions` list (a revocation can only narrow the set, never grow
-     * it).
-     *
-     * Ignored when routing to a z-space contract (`revoke-credential` drops
-     * per-function granularity — whole-credential only).
-     */
-    revokedFunctions?: string[];
-    /** Authenticated {@link T3nClient} for the credential's `user_did`. */
-    client: T3nClient;
-    /**
-     * Override the resolved delegation contract version. Defaults to
-     * whatever `GET /api/contracts/current?name=tee:delegation/contracts`
-     * returns at call time.
-     *
-     * For z-space credentials this field is REQUIRED — `GET /api/contracts/current`
-     * 404s for z: names, so there is no dynamic resolution path.
-     */
-    scriptVersion?: string;
-    /** Override the node base URL used for `"latest"` resolution. */
-    baseUrl?: string;
-}
-/** Result of a successful {@link revokeDelegation} call. */
-interface RevokeDelegationResult {
-    /** Credential id (base64url-no-pad, no padding). */
-    vcId: string;
-    /**
-     * Mirrors the persisted revocation state after merging: `null` means
-     * whole-credential, a sorted array means per-function. The contract
-     * may return a larger set than `opts.revokedFunctions` when an
-     * earlier per-function revocation existed for the same credential.
-     *
-     * Always `null` for z-space credentials (whole-credential granularity only).
-     */
-    revokedFunctions: string[] | null;
-}
-/**
- * Revoke a delegation credential, routing automatically to the correct
- * revocation endpoint based on the credential's `contract` field:
- *
- * - **`tee:` credentials** — calls `tee:delegation/contracts::revoke`.
- *   Only the credential's `user_did` may call this; the contract reads the
- *   authenticated DID from session context and rejects other callers with
- *   `NotCredentialHolder`. Per-function granularity via `revokedFunctions`
- *   is supported. Merge semantics are handled server-side.
- *
- * - **`z:` credentials** — routes to `<z-contract>::revoke-credential`.
- *   The tenant owns its own revocation list; the global
- *   `tee:delegation.revoke` rejects z-space credential names with a typed
- *   `TenantScopedCredential` error. `revokedFunctions` is ignored (z-payroll
- *   revokes whole credentials only). `scriptVersion` is REQUIRED for z:
- *   contracts — `GET /api/contracts/current` 404s for them.
- */
-declare function revokeDelegation(opts: RevokeDelegationOpts): Promise<RevokeDelegationResult>;
-/** Options for {@link buildPayrollInvocation}. */
-interface BuildPayrollInvocationOpts {
-    credentialJcs: Uint8Array;
-    userSig: Uint8Array;
-    /** Credential's `vc_id` — needed for the agent pre-image. */
-    vcId: Uint8Array;
-    nonce: Uint8Array;
-    request: PayrollRunRequest;
-    agentSecret: Uint8Array;
-}
-/**
- * Assemble a delegated {@link PayrollInvocationDelegated} (envelope +
- * request) given a user-signed credential and a per-call agent secret.
- * Computes `request_hash` from the canonical request bytes and produces an
- * `agent_sig` over `sha256(invocation_preimage)`.
- *
- * When `request.individual_disbursement_threshold_cents` is undefined this
- * function fills in {@link DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS} before
- * hashing so the SDK's hash matches the Rust contract's hash (the contract
- * applies the same default via `#[serde(default)]`).
- */
-declare function buildPayrollInvocation(opts: BuildPayrollInvocationOpts): PayrollInvocationDelegated;
-/** Options for {@link buildPayrollDirectInvocation}. */
-interface BuildPayrollDirectInvocationOpts {
-    request: PayrollRunRequest;
-}
-/**
- * Assemble a direct {@link PayrollInvocationDirect} — no delegation
- * envelope. The caller supplies only the request body; the contract
- * entry-point resolves the principal DID from
- * `DynamicContext.authenticated_did` at runtime.
- *
- * Callers in direct mode must hold a grant in
- * `OrgContractGrants[org || "tee:z-payroll"]` under their own DID.
- *
- * When `request.individual_disbursement_threshold_cents` is undefined this
- * function fills in {@link DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS} so the wire
- * shape matches the Rust contract's `#[serde(default)]` canonicalisation.
- */
-declare function buildPayrollDirectInvocation(opts: BuildPayrollDirectInvocationOpts): PayrollInvocationDirect;
 
 /**
  * OrgDataClient — typed wrapper over the existing authenticated
@@ -3609,5 +3380,5 @@ declare function tenantDidHex(tenantDid: string): string;
 declare function validateTail(tail: string): string;
 declare function canonicalTenantName(tenantDid: string, tail: string): string;
 
-export { AGENT_PUBKEY_LEN, AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, DELEGATION_CREDENTIAL_DOMAIN, DELEGATION_INVOCATION_DOMAIN, DelegationCustodialClient, ETH_SIG_LEN, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MAX_FUNCTIONS_PER_CREDENTIAL, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, NONCE_LEN, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, REQUEST_HASH_LEN, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, T3nClient, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, VC_ID_LEN, WasmError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, buildDelegationCredential, buildInvocationPreimage, buildPayrollDirectInvocation, buildPayrollInvocation, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, canonicaliseCredential, canonicaliseRequest, clearKeyCache, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, decodeWasmErrorMessage, eip191Digest, ethRecoverEip191, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, getScriptVersion, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgContractGrants, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgWriters, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, maskKeyMaterial, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseContractResponse, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, requestHash, revokeDelegation, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, signAgentInvocation, signCredential, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateCredentialBody, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyTdxQuote };
-export type { AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentAuthUpdateInput, AgentGrantInput, AgentScriptGrant, AuthInput, BalanceRow, BuildDelegationCredentialOpts, BuildPayrollDirectInvocationOpts, BuildPayrollInvocationOpts, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ConfigValidationResult, ContractExecuteInput, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DelegationCredential, DelegationCustodialClientOpts, DelegationEnvelope, DeleteDataInput, DeleteGrantsInput, DeleteScopeInput, Did, Direction, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantsGetInput, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgContractGrants, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollInvocation, PayrollInvocationDelegated, PayrollInvocationDirect, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, RevokeDelegationOpts, RevokeDelegationResult, SdkConfig, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetGrantsInput, SetWritersInput, SignCustodialResult, SignDelegationResponse, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, UpdateMetaInput, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UserGrant, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };
+export { AuthMethod, AuthenticationError, BASE_UNITS_PER_TOKEN, ContractResponseError, DEFAULT_ENVIRONMENT, DEFAULT_INDIVIDUAL_THRESHOLD_CENTS, DEFAULT_KYC_POLL_CADENCE, HandshakeError, HttpTransport, KycStatusTimeoutError, LogLevel, MockTransport, NODE_URLS, OrgDataClient, OtpRateLimitedError, RpcError, SessionExpiredError, SessionOrgDataClient, SessionStateError, SessionStatus, T3nClient, T3nError, TERMINAL_KYC_STATUSES, TOKEN_DECIMALS, TenantClient, TenantContractsNamespace, TenantMapsNamespace, TenantNamespace, TenantSdkValidationError, TenantTokenNamespace, UnsupportedTenantSdkOperationError, UserUpsertError, WasmError, Z_PAYROLL_AUDIT_READ_FUNCTIONS, Z_PAYROLL_RUN_FUNCTIONS, _b64uEncode, assertShape, b64uDecodeStrict, b64uEncodeBytes, bytesToString, canonicalTenantName, clearKeyCache, compactDidFromBytes, createDefaultHandlers, createEmailOtpAuthInput, createEthAuthInput, createLogger, createMlKemPublicKeyHandler, createOidcAuthInput, createOrgDataClientFromSession, createRandomHandler, decodeWasmErrorMessage, eth_get_address, extractWasmError, fetchDkgAttestation, fetchMlKemPublicKey, formatTokens, generateRandomString, generateUUID, getEnvironment, getEnvironmentName, getGlobalLogLevel, getLogger, getNodeUrl, getScriptVersion, isDataGetResponse, isDataListResponse, isMutationResponse, isObject, isOrgContractGrants, isOrgPolicyMeta, isOrgPolicyView, isOrgWriters, loadConfig, loadWasmComponent, maskKeyMaterial, mergeAgentAuthEntries, metamask_get_address, metamask_sign, parseAgentAuthGet, parseContractResponse, redactSecrets, redactSecretsFromJson, setEnvironment, setGlobalLogLevel, setNodeUrl, stringToBytes, tenantDidHex, toAgentAuthUpdateWire, toBaseUnits, validateConfig, validateTail, verifyDkgAttestation, verifyTdxQuote };
+export type { AdmitForOrgOptions, AgentAuthEntry, AgentAuthMergeResult, AgentAuthScriptGrant, AgentAuthUpdateInput, AuthInput, BalanceRow, ChargeReason, ClientAuth, ClientHandshake, ConfigValidationResult, ContractExecuteInput, ContractPublishInput, ContractRegisterResult, ContractResponseSchema, CreatePolicyInput, DataGetInput, DataGetResponse, DataListInput, DataListResponse, DeleteDataInput, DeleteGrantsInput, DeleteScopeInput, Did, Direction, DkgAttestation, DkgVerifyResult, EmailOtpAuthInput, EmailOtpCredentials, Environment, EthAuthInput, ExecuteBusinessContractOptions, ExecuteOrgDataActionOptions, GetUsageOptions, GrantsGetInput, GuestToHostHandler, GuestToHostHandlers, HandshakeResult, JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, KycPollCadence, KycPollOptions, KycStatus, KycStatusKind, Logger, MapCreateInput, MapResponse, MapUpdateInput, MapVisibility, MutationResponse, OidcAuthInput, OidcCredentials, OrgContractGrants, OrgDataActionWire, OrgDataClientOptions, OrgPolicyMeta, OrgPolicyView, OrgWriters, OtpChannel, OtpMergeSuggestion, OtpRequestInput, OtpRequestResult, OtpVerifyInput, OtpVerifyResult, PayrollRunRequest, PeerQuoteResult, PolicyGetInput, QuoteVerifyResult, ReaderSet, SdkConfig, SessionCrypto, SessionId, SetGrantsInput, SetWritersInput, SubmitUserInputArgs, SubmitUserInputResult, T3nClientConfig, TenantAdmitProjection, TenantAdmitStatus, TenantBaseClient, TenantClientConfig, TenantContractExecuteInput, TenantContractPublishInput, TenantExecutionSession, TenantMapCreateInput, TenantMapUpdatePatch, TenantMeResponse, TenantSdkEnvironment, TenantSelfAdmitResult, TenantStatus, TenantTargetOptions, TokenTxKind, Transport, UpdateMetaInput, UsageEntry, UsagePage, UserGrant, UserInputProfile, UserUpsertErrorKind, WasmComponent, WasmNextResult, WriteDataInput, WriterSet, WritersGetInput };