@telora/daemon 0.21.26 → 0.21.81

package/dist/audit-hooks.d.ts

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Per-worktree git-hook management.
- *
- * Two hooks live in a worktree's `.telora-hooks/` directory (a single
- * `core.hooksPath`):
- *   - a `commit-msg` hook installed on EVERY writable execution worktree that
- *     refuses commits lacking a well-formed `Telora-Delivery: <uuid>` trailer
- *     (`installDeliveryTrailerCommitMsgHook`); and
- *   - a `pre-commit` hook installed only for read-only audit sessions that
- *     blocks all commits (`installAuditPreCommitHook`), alongside the Claude
- *     write-deny + Codex read-only overlays.
- *
- * `installExecutionWorktreeGuards` is the single entry point that applies the
- * right set for a worktree given its read-only flag.
- */
-/**
- * Install a pre-commit hook in a worktree that blocks all commits.
- * Used for read-only audit sessions.
- */
-export declare function installAuditPreCommitHook(worktreePath: string): void;
-/**
- * Write (or merge into) the worktree's `.claude/settings.json` a write-deny
- * overlay so a read-only audit team physically cannot Write/Edit or run
- * write-shaped Bash.
- *
- * The daemon spawns agents with `--dangerously-skip-permissions
- * --setting-sources project,local`, which reads the worktree's
- * `.claude/settings.json` (project source). Two properties make this deny
- * overlay the tool-layer enforcement of read-only mode:
- *   - `--dangerously-skip-permissions` only auto-approves the *ask* tier;
- *     explicit `permissions.deny` entries are still enforced.
- *   - Crucially, `deny` is honored even in an UNTRUSTED worktree -- the case
- *     that actually matters, because a daemon-created worktree is a fresh path
- *     and untrusted by default. In an untrusted worktree `permissions.allow` is
- *     DISCARDED ("this workspace has not been trusted"), so it would be wrong to
- *     assume `deny` shares that fate: `deny` is a restriction, not a grant, so
- *     honoring it from an untrusted project is safe, and Claude Code does.
- *
- * This is not assumed -- it is verified. See
- * `__tests__/read-only-deny-enforcement-evidence.test.ts` for the reproduction
- * (untrusted worktree + deny overlay -> the Write tool is removed from the
- * session and no file is written; the same untrusted worktree WITHOUT deny ->
- * Write is available and succeeds while the allow list is ignored), measured
- * against Claude Code 2.1.221 on 2026-08-04. Re-run that reproduction when
- * bumping the Claude CLI.
- *
- * The pre-commit hook (installAuditPreCommitHook) and the completion-side
- * revert are retained as defense-in-depth ON TOP of this tool-layer guard --
- * not as the only guards.
- *
- * Idempotent: re-running merges the deny list, deduplicated, producing no diff.
- * MUST only be called for read-only focuses -- a writable focus's settings
- * must never carry a `deny` key.
- */
-export declare function writeReadOnlyDenyOverlay(worktreePath: string): void;
-/**
- * Write Codex's read-only audit overlay into the worktree-local project config.
- *
- * Codex project config is a durable record for the worktree; spawn-time `-c`
- * overrides still select `default_permissions="telora_read_only"` so read-only
- * enforcement does not depend on project trust. The profile itself is kept here
- * for parity, inspection, and trusted-project runs.
- */
-export declare function writeCodexReadOnlyOverlay(worktreePath: string): void;
-/**
- * Install all read-only audit enforcement in a worktree: the commit-blocking
- * pre-commit hook, Claude's write-deny settings overlay, and Codex's
- * read-only permission profile. Single entry point so every read-only
- * worktree-setup site gets identical coverage.
- */
-export declare function installReadOnlyAuditGuards(worktreePath: string): void;
-/**
- * Install a `commit-msg` hook in a worktree that REFUSES any commit whose
- * message lacks a well-formed `Telora-Delivery: <uuid>` trailer.
- *
- * The trailer is the one durable per-commit fact every delivery-attribution
- * read rests on (`readDeliveryTrailer` in resolvers/shared/git-diff.ts reads it
- * via `git show -s --format=%(trailers:key=Telora-Delivery,valueonly)`). Prose
- * in the execution prompt + agent CLAUDE.md asks agents to stamp it, but prose
- * has already failed silently once (2026-08-13: the daemon's own recommended
- * `-m` form voided the trailer when `Co-Authored-By` was appended). This hook
- * makes the mandate mechanical at commit time.
- *
- * The hook validates SHAPE via git's OWN trailer parse, not a substring match:
- *   - It uses `git interpret-trailers --parse` on the message file, so the value
- *     it reads is exactly what the read side reads. A `Telora-Delivery:` line
- *     sitting in the commit BODY (separated from the trailer block by a blank
- *     line) is VOIDED by git and does not parse -- the read side rejects it, so
- *     the hook must too. A naive `grep 'Telora-Delivery'` on the raw message
- *     would wrongly PASS such a voided commit; this does not.
- *   - A trailing `Co-Authored-By:` (or any other trailer) in the same block
- *     still parses, so the commit PASSES -- the 2026-08-13 failure mode.
- *   - The value must be a well-formed UUID (8-4-4-4-12 hex); a malformed or
- *     truncated id FAILS.
- *
- * The failure message names the missing trailer and prints the exact line +
- * the mandated `git commit --trailer` form, so an agent self-corrects without
- * escalating.
- *
- * The hook lives in the SAME `.telora-hooks/` directory as any audit
- * `pre-commit` hook, because `core.hooksPath` is a single value -- git runs
- * every hook file in that one dir by name. So this coexists with the read-only
- * audit pre-commit block (which runs first and blocks the commit outright)
- * without weakening it.
- */
-export declare function installDeliveryTrailerCommitMsgHook(worktreePath: string): void;
-/**
- * Install the execution-worktree git guards: the delivery-trailer `commit-msg`
- * hook on EVERY writable worktree, plus -- when the focus is read-only -- the
- * full audit guard set (commit-blocking pre-commit hook + Claude/Codex
- * read-only overlays). Single entry point so every worktree create/reuse site
- * gets identical, idempotent coverage.
- *
- * `core.hooksPath` and the hook files are per-worktree config that does NOT
- * survive as tree content, so this must be RE-ASSERTED on every reuse/spawn
- * (it is idempotent -- re-running produces the same files). A read-only
- * worktree still gets the trailer hook, but its pre-commit block runs first and
- * refuses the commit outright, so the two coexist without the trailer hook
- * weakening the read-only guarantee.
- */
-export declare function installExecutionWorktreeGuards(worktreePath: string, readOnly: boolean): void;
-//# sourceMappingURL=audit-hooks.d.ts.map

package/dist/audit-hooks.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"audit-hooks.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hooks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAeH;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAiCpE;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiCG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CA0BnE;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CA8BpE;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,0BAA0B,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAIrE;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiCG;AACH,wBAAgB,mCAAmC,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CA2D9E;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,wBAAgB,8BAA8B,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAK5F"}

package/dist/audit-hooks.js

@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Per-worktree git-hook management.
- *
- * Two hooks live in a worktree's `.telora-hooks/` directory (a single
- * `core.hooksPath`):
- *   - a `commit-msg` hook installed on EVERY writable execution worktree that
- *     refuses commits lacking a well-formed `Telora-Delivery: <uuid>` trailer
- *     (`installDeliveryTrailerCommitMsgHook`); and
- *   - a `pre-commit` hook installed only for read-only audit sessions that
- *     blocks all commits (`installAuditPreCommitHook`), alongside the Claude
- *     write-deny + Codex read-only overlays.
- *
- * `installExecutionWorktreeGuards` is the single entry point that applies the
- * right set for a worktree given its read-only flag.
- */
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { runGitSync } from './git/index.js';
-import { buildClaudeSettings, mergeClaudeSettings } from './templates/claude-settings.js';
-import { ensureCodexConfigIgnoredInWorktree } from './worktree.js';
-import { createLogger } from './log.js';
-const log = createLogger({ module: 'audit-hooks' });
-const CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_START = '# BEGIN TELORA CODEX READ-ONLY';
-const CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_END = '# END TELORA CODEX READ-ONLY';
-/**
- * Install a pre-commit hook in a worktree that blocks all commits.
- * Used for read-only audit sessions.
- */
-export function installAuditPreCommitHook(worktreePath) {
-    // Create a custom hooks directory inside the worktree
-    const hooksDir = join(worktreePath, '.telora-hooks');
-    if (!existsSync(hooksDir)) {
-        mkdirSync(hooksDir, { recursive: true });
-    }
-    const hookScript = [
-        '#!/bin/bash',
-        'echo ""',
-        'echo "========================================================"',
-        'echo "  READ-ONLY AUDIT SESSION"',
-        'echo "========================================================"',
-        'echo ""',
-        'echo "  Commits are blocked. This session operates in"',
-        'echo "  read-only audit mode by design."',
-        'echo ""',
-        'echo "  Your job is discovery only:"',
-        'echo "  - Log findings as issues via MCP tools"',
-        'echo "  - Create remediation deliveries for fixes"',
-        'echo "  - Do NOT modify or commit code changes"',
-        'echo ""',
-        'echo "========================================================"',
-        'echo ""',
-        'exit 1',
-        '',
-    ].join('\n');
-    const hookPath = join(hooksDir, 'pre-commit');
-    writeFileSync(hookPath, hookScript, { mode: 0o755 });
-    // Point this worktree's git config at the custom hooks directory
-    runGitSync(['config', 'core.hooksPath', hooksDir], worktreePath);
-}
-/**
- * Write (or merge into) the worktree's `.claude/settings.json` a write-deny
- * overlay so a read-only audit team physically cannot Write/Edit or run
- * write-shaped Bash.
- *
- * The daemon spawns agents with `--dangerously-skip-permissions
- * --setting-sources project,local`, which reads the worktree's
- * `.claude/settings.json` (project source). Two properties make this deny
- * overlay the tool-layer enforcement of read-only mode:
- *   - `--dangerously-skip-permissions` only auto-approves the *ask* tier;
- *     explicit `permissions.deny` entries are still enforced.
- *   - Crucially, `deny` is honored even in an UNTRUSTED worktree -- the case
- *     that actually matters, because a daemon-created worktree is a fresh path
- *     and untrusted by default. In an untrusted worktree `permissions.allow` is
- *     DISCARDED ("this workspace has not been trusted"), so it would be wrong to
- *     assume `deny` shares that fate: `deny` is a restriction, not a grant, so
- *     honoring it from an untrusted project is safe, and Claude Code does.
- *
- * This is not assumed -- it is verified. See
- * `__tests__/read-only-deny-enforcement-evidence.test.ts` for the reproduction
- * (untrusted worktree + deny overlay -> the Write tool is removed from the
- * session and no file is written; the same untrusted worktree WITHOUT deny ->
- * Write is available and succeeds while the allow list is ignored), measured
- * against Claude Code 2.1.221 on 2026-08-04. Re-run that reproduction when
- * bumping the Claude CLI.
- *
- * The pre-commit hook (installAuditPreCommitHook) and the completion-side
- * revert are retained as defense-in-depth ON TOP of this tool-layer guard --
- * not as the only guards.
- *
- * Idempotent: re-running merges the deny list, deduplicated, producing no diff.
- * MUST only be called for read-only focuses -- a writable focus's settings
- * must never carry a `deny` key.
- */
-export function writeReadOnlyDenyOverlay(worktreePath) {
-    const dir = join(worktreePath, '.claude');
-    if (!existsSync(dir)) {
-        mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
-    }
-    const settingsPath = join(dir, 'settings.json');
-    let existing = null;
-    if (existsSync(settingsPath)) {
-        try {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf-8'));
-            if (parsed && typeof parsed === 'object' && !Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-                existing = parsed;
-            }
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            // Corrupt settings file -- log and overwrite with the deny overlay rather
-            // than leave a read-only worktree without enforcement.
-            log.warn(`[audit-hooks] Existing ${settingsPath} is not valid JSON, overwriting with read-only overlay: ` +
-                `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
-        }
-    }
-    const merged = mergeClaudeSettings(existing, buildClaudeSettings({ readOnly: true }));
-    writeFileSync(settingsPath, JSON.stringify(merged, null, 2) + '\n');
-}
-/**
- * Write Codex's read-only audit overlay into the worktree-local project config.
- *
- * Codex project config is a durable record for the worktree; spawn-time `-c`
- * overrides still select `default_permissions="telora_read_only"` so read-only
- * enforcement does not depend on project trust. The profile itself is kept here
- * for parity, inspection, and trusted-project runs.
- */
-export function writeCodexReadOnlyOverlay(worktreePath) {
-    ensureCodexConfigIgnoredInWorktree(worktreePath);
-    const dir = join(worktreePath, '.codex');
-    if (!existsSync(dir)) {
-        mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    }
-    const configPath = join(dir, 'config.toml');
-    const existing = existsSync(configPath) ? readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8') : '';
-    const block = [
-        CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_START,
-        '# Generated by Telora for read-only Codex audit execution.',
-        '# Spawn-time overrides select this permission profile.',
-        '',
-        '[permissions.telora_read_only.filesystem]',
-        '":minimal" = "read"',
-        '":workspace_roots" = { "." = "read" }',
-        '',
-        '[permissions.telora_read_only.network]',
-        'enabled = false',
-        CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_END,
-    ].join('\n');
-    const markerPattern = new RegExp(`${CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_START}[\\s\\S]*?${CODEX_READ_ONLY_BLOCK_END}\\n?`, 'm');
-    const withoutOldBlock = existing.replace(markerPattern, '').trimEnd();
-    const separator = withoutOldBlock ? '\n\n' : '';
-    writeFileSync(configPath, `${withoutOldBlock}${separator}${block}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-}
-/**
- * Install all read-only audit enforcement in a worktree: the commit-blocking
- * pre-commit hook, Claude's write-deny settings overlay, and Codex's
- * read-only permission profile. Single entry point so every read-only
- * worktree-setup site gets identical coverage.
- */
-export function installReadOnlyAuditGuards(worktreePath) {
-    installAuditPreCommitHook(worktreePath);
-    writeReadOnlyDenyOverlay(worktreePath);
-    writeCodexReadOnlyOverlay(worktreePath);
-}
-/**
- * Install a `commit-msg` hook in a worktree that REFUSES any commit whose
- * message lacks a well-formed `Telora-Delivery: <uuid>` trailer.
- *
- * The trailer is the one durable per-commit fact every delivery-attribution
- * read rests on (`readDeliveryTrailer` in resolvers/shared/git-diff.ts reads it
- * via `git show -s --format=%(trailers:key=Telora-Delivery,valueonly)`). Prose
- * in the execution prompt + agent CLAUDE.md asks agents to stamp it, but prose
- * has already failed silently once (2026-08-13: the daemon's own recommended
- * `-m` form voided the trailer when `Co-Authored-By` was appended). This hook
- * makes the mandate mechanical at commit time.
- *
- * The hook validates SHAPE via git's OWN trailer parse, not a substring match:
- *   - It uses `git interpret-trailers --parse` on the message file, so the value
- *     it reads is exactly what the read side reads. A `Telora-Delivery:` line
- *     sitting in the commit BODY (separated from the trailer block by a blank
- *     line) is VOIDED by git and does not parse -- the read side rejects it, so
- *     the hook must too. A naive `grep 'Telora-Delivery'` on the raw message
- *     would wrongly PASS such a voided commit; this does not.
- *   - A trailing `Co-Authored-By:` (or any other trailer) in the same block
- *     still parses, so the commit PASSES -- the 2026-08-13 failure mode.
- *   - The value must be a well-formed UUID (8-4-4-4-12 hex); a malformed or
- *     truncated id FAILS.
- *
- * The failure message names the missing trailer and prints the exact line +
- * the mandated `git commit --trailer` form, so an agent self-corrects without
- * escalating.
- *
- * The hook lives in the SAME `.telora-hooks/` directory as any audit
- * `pre-commit` hook, because `core.hooksPath` is a single value -- git runs
- * every hook file in that one dir by name. So this coexists with the read-only
- * audit pre-commit block (which runs first and blocks the commit outright)
- * without weakening it.
- */
-export function installDeliveryTrailerCommitMsgHook(worktreePath) {
-    const hooksDir = join(worktreePath, '.telora-hooks');
-    if (!existsSync(hooksDir)) {
-        mkdirSync(hooksDir, { recursive: true });
-    }
-    const hookScript = [
-        '#!/bin/bash',
-        '# Telora delivery-attribution guard. Every commit must carry a well-formed',
-        '# `Telora-Delivery: <uuid>` git trailer so the verify gate can recover its',
-        '# changed-work evidence from the commit object itself. See audit-hooks.ts.',
-        '#',
-        '# No `set -e`/`pipefail`: a grep that finds no trailer (the reject case) exits',
-        '# non-zero, and we MUST fall through to print the guidance rather than abort.',
-        'msg_file="$1"',
-        '',
-        '# Read the trailer through git\'s own parser (--parse == --only-trailers',
-        '# --only-input --unfold), so a BODY-paragraph line that git voids does not',
-        '# count and a trailing Co-Authored-By in the same block does not break it.',
-        'value="$(git interpret-trailers --parse "$msg_file" 2>/dev/null \\',
-        '  | grep -i \'^Telora-Delivery:\' | head -n1 | sed \'s/^[^:]*:[[:space:]]*//\' | tr -d \'[:space:]\')"',
-        '',
-        'uuid_re=\'^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$\'',
-        '',
-        'if [[ ! "$value" =~ $uuid_re ]]; then',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "========================================================" >&2',
-        '  echo "  COMMIT REFUSED: missing Telora-Delivery trailer" >&2',
-        '  echo "========================================================" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "  Every commit must carry a well-formed delivery trailer:" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "      Telora-Delivery: <deliveryId>" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "  Add it as a git TRAILER (not a body line) so an appended" >&2',
-        '  echo "  Co-Authored-By cannot void it:" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "      git commit --trailer \\"Telora-Delivery: <deliveryId>\\" -m \\"<subject>\\"" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "  To fix the commit you just attempted:" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "      git commit --amend --no-edit --trailer \\"Telora-Delivery: <deliveryId>\\"" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  echo "========================================================" >&2',
-        '  echo "" >&2',
-        '  exit 1',
-        'fi',
-        '',
-        'exit 0',
-        '',
-    ].join('\n');
-    const hookPath = join(hooksDir, 'commit-msg');
-    writeFileSync(hookPath, hookScript, { mode: 0o755 });
-    // Point this worktree's git config at the custom hooks directory. Same dir as
-    // the audit pre-commit hook -- core.hooksPath is a single value, so both hook
-    // files coexist here.
-    runGitSync(['config', 'core.hooksPath', hooksDir], worktreePath);
-}
-/**
- * Install the execution-worktree git guards: the delivery-trailer `commit-msg`
- * hook on EVERY writable worktree, plus -- when the focus is read-only -- the
- * full audit guard set (commit-blocking pre-commit hook + Claude/Codex
- * read-only overlays). Single entry point so every worktree create/reuse site
- * gets identical, idempotent coverage.
- *
- * `core.hooksPath` and the hook files are per-worktree config that does NOT
- * survive as tree content, so this must be RE-ASSERTED on every reuse/spawn
- * (it is idempotent -- re-running produces the same files). A read-only
- * worktree still gets the trailer hook, but its pre-commit block runs first and
- * refuses the commit outright, so the two coexist without the trailer hook
- * weakening the read-only guarantee.
- */
-export function installExecutionWorktreeGuards(worktreePath, readOnly) {
-    installDeliveryTrailerCommitMsgHook(worktreePath);
-    if (readOnly) {
-        installReadOnlyAuditGuards(worktreePath);
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=audit-hooks.js.map

package/dist/audit-hooks.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"audit-hooks.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hooks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACjC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAC1F,OAAO,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAExC,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAGpD,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACrE,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAEjE;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAoB;IAC5D,sDAAsD;IACtD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IACrD,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1B,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG;QACjB,aAAa;QACb,SAAS;QACT,iEAAiE;QACjE,kCAAkC;QAClC,iEAAiE;QACjE,SAAS;QACT,wDAAwD;QACxD,0CAA0C;QAC1C,SAAS;QACT,sCAAsC;QACtC,iDAAiD;QACjD,oDAAoD;QACpD,iDAAiD;QACjD,SAAS;QACT,iEAAiE;QACjE,SAAS;QACT,QAAQ;QACR,EAAE;KACH,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAErD,iEAAiE;IACjE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;AACnE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiCG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CAAC,YAAoB;IAC3D,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1C,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IAEhD,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAmC,IAAI,CAAC;IACpD,IAAI,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/D,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnE,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAiC,CAAC;YAC/C,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YACb,0EAA0E;YAC1E,uDAAuD;YACvD,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CACN,0BAA0B,YAAY,0DAA0D;gBAC9F,GAAG,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CACxD,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACtF,aAAa,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AACtE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAoB;IAC5D,kCAAkC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACzC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;IACjF,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;QACZ,2BAA2B;QAC3B,4DAA4D;QAC5D,wDAAwD;QACxD,EAAE;QACF,2CAA2C;QAC3C,qBAAqB;QACrB,uCAAuC;QACvC,EAAE;QACF,wCAAwC;QACxC,iBAAiB;QACjB,yBAAyB;KAC1B,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEb,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,CAC9B,GAAG,2BAA2B,aAAa,yBAAyB,MAAM,EAC1E,GAAG,CACJ,CAAC;IACF,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACtE,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;IAChD,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,eAAe,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AACzF,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,0BAA0B,CAAC,YAAoB;IAC7D,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,wBAAwB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1C,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiCG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mCAAmC,CAAC,YAAoB;IACtE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IACrD,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1B,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG;QACjB,aAAa;QACb,4EAA4E;QAC5E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,GAAG;QACH,gFAAgF;QAChF,+EAA+E;QAC/E,eAAe;QACf,EAAE;QACF,0EAA0E;QAC1E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,oEAAoE;QACpE,wGAAwG;QACxG,EAAE;QACF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,EAAE;QACF,uCAAuC;QACvC,eAAe;QACf,uEAAuE;QACvE,gEAAgE;QAChE,uEAAuE;QACvE,eAAe;QACf,wEAAwE;QACxE,eAAe;QACf,kDAAkD;QAClD,eAAe;QACf,yEAAyE;QACzE,+CAA+C;QAC/C,eAAe;QACf,gGAAgG;QAChG,eAAe;QACf,sDAAsD;QACtD,eAAe;QACf,+FAA+F;QAC/F,eAAe;QACf,uEAAuE;QACvE,eAAe;QACf,UAAU;QACV,IAAI;QACJ,EAAE;QACF,QAAQ;QACR,EAAE;KACH,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEb,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAErD,8EAA8E;IAC9E,8EAA8E;IAC9E,sBAAsB;IACtB,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;AACnE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B,CAAC,YAAoB,EAAE,QAAiB;IACpF,mCAAmC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAClD,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACb,0BAA0B,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}

package/dist/audit-phase.d.ts

@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Autonomous reality-tree audit phase.
- *
- * Replaces the runAuditPhase scaffold with a one-shot LLM assessor session
- * that compares the focus's observable state against the CRT/FRT and mutates
- * the graph via reality_tree_* MCP tools. The session's narrated summary
- * is captured to an `audit_runs` row for human review.
- *
- * Failure modes never throw -- each path returns outcome='continue' with
- * an explanatory rationale and metadata.errors entries. This keeps the
- * focus loop running so a transient audit failure does not stall execution.
- */
-import './assembly-resolvers.js';
-import { type FocusPhaseOutcome } from './queries/focus-cycle-evaluations.js';
-import { type AuditRunRow, type AuditRunStatus, type RecentAuditRun } from './queries/audit-runs.js';
-import { type AuditSpawnOptions, type AuditSpawnResult } from './spawner/index.js';
-import type { DaemonConfig } from './types.js';
-/**
- * Ordered assembly recipe for the audit prompt. Each entry resolves to a
- * markdown section that gets composed into the assessor's input. Order
- * matters: the assessor reads top-down so cycle context comes first, then
- * code-level diff, then the live graph it must reconcile.
- */
-export declare const AUDIT_ASSEMBLY_RECIPE: readonly string[];
-/**
- * MCP tool names the assessor session is permitted to call.
- *
- * The audit is READ-ONLY w.r.t. code but AUTHORS intent structure: a CRT
- * (entities + UDEs) plus an FRT of injections, self-validated via
- * telora_reality_tree action=derive_frt (read-only, carried on the
- * telora_reality_tree tool), then anchored to planning deliveries via
- * telora_product_delivery create (injectionNodeId + executionStatus). It must
- * NOT touch workflow state otherwise, and must NOT file remediation issues.
- */
-export declare const AUDIT_MCP_TOOLS: readonly string[];
-/**
- * Default Claude model for the audit assessor. Override via deps.
- * Opus: the audit authors a navigable causal tree + injection plan -- the
- * reasoning depth (root-cause attribution, FRT self-validation) warrants the
- * stronger model. Matched as a substring by the telemetry pricing table (see
- * spawner/lifecycle AUDIT_CAPTURE_MODEL).
- */
-export declare const AUDIT_DEFAULT_MODEL = "opus";
-/** Default timeout for the assessor session (15 minutes). */
-export declare const AUDIT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS: number;
-/**
- * Session lineage key for the audit assessor (INJ-E). The audit loop phase
- * declares continuity 'resume' so the differential receiver accumulates
- * cross-cycle memory of the gap's trajectory (convergence vs oscillation).
- */
-export declare const AUDIT_LINEAGE = "audit";
-/**
- * Audit prompt surface. The prompt text and its posture composition live in
- * audit-prompt.ts (dependency-free string constants); this module owns the
- * phase orchestration around it. Re-exported here so existing importers and
- * tests that reference AUDIT_PROMPT / buildAuditPrompt / AuditPosture through
- * audit-phase keep resolving.
- */
-export { buildAuditPrompt, AUDIT_PROMPT, type AuditPosture, } from './audit-prompt.js';
-import type { AuditPosture } from './audit-prompt.js';
-export interface AuditPhaseResult {
-    outcome: FocusPhaseOutcome;
-    rationale?: string;
-    metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
-}
-/**
- * The delivery fields the audit gates read. A structural subset of
- * `FocusDeliveryInfo` -- the settle gate reads `executionStatus`, the
- * change-detection gate reads `updatedAt`.
- */
-export interface AuditGateDelivery {
-    executionStatus: string | null;
-    updatedAt?: string | null;
-}
-export interface AuditSummary {
-    summaryMd: string | null;
-    nodesTouched: number;
-    edgesTouched: number;
-}
-export type { AuditSpawnOptions, AuditSpawnResult } from './spawner/index.js';
-/**
- * Dependency-injected I/O for runAuditPhase. Tests stub these to avoid
- * spawning processes or hitting Supabase.
- */
-export interface AuditPhaseDeps {
-    assembleContext: (focusId: string, recipe: readonly string[]) => Promise<string>;
-    insertAuditRun: (input: {
-        focusId: string;
-        cycleNumber: number;
-        model: string | null;
-        sessionId: string | null;
-    }) => Promise<AuditRunRow>;
-    updateAuditRun: (input: {
-        auditRunId: string;
-        summaryMd: string | null;
-        nodesTouched: number;
-        edgesTouched: number;
-        status: AuditRunStatus;
-    }) => Promise<AuditRunRow>;
-    getCurrentCycleNumber: (focusId: string) => Promise<number>;
-    /**
-     * Fetch the focus's deliveries so the settle gate can decide whether to spawn
-     * the assessor at all. The execution status drives the settle gate (terminal
-     * vs not) and `updatedAt` drives the change-detection gate below it.
-     * Injected so tests drive the gates without live Supabase/MCP.
-     */
-    getFocusDeliveries: (focusId: string) => Promise<AuditGateDelivery[]>;
-    /**
-     * Fetch the focus's most recent audit run (null = never audited). Feeds the
-     * change-detection gate: a completed prior run whose `startedAt` is at or
-     * after every delivery's `updatedAt` means nothing has changed since the last
-     * audit, so there is nothing for the assessor to find. Rejects on API
-     * failure -- the gate then fails CLOSED for the tick.
-     */
-    getRecentAuditRun: (focusId: string) => Promise<RecentAuditRun | null>;
-    spawnAuditAgent: (opts: AuditSpawnOptions) => Promise<AuditSpawnResult>;
-    parseAuditSummary?: (stdout: string) => AuditSummary;
-    getConfig: () => DaemonConfig;
-    /**
-     * Resolve the prior session id for a focus's lineage (INJ-E). Returns null
-     * when there is no recorded session (first cycle). Optional so existing
-     * callers/tests that omit it simply get a fresh (non-resumed) assessor.
-     */
-    getResumeSessionId?: (focusId: string, lineage: string) => Promise<string | null>;
-    /** Persist the assessor's session id under the focus's lineage (INJ-E). */
-    persistSessionId?: (focusId: string, lineage: string, sessionId: string) => Promise<void>;
-    /**
-     * Open a role-less 'audit' agent_sessions row at assessor start and return its
-     * row id. The row id (NOT the Claude session id) becomes audit_runs.session_id
-     * so the FK resolves, and the row's run-time is observable. Best-effort: null
-     * when creation failed (the audit still records, with session_id NULL).
-     */
-    openAuditSession?: (focusId: string) => Promise<string | null>;
-    /** Close the 'audit' agent_sessions row on assessor exit (stamps ended_at). */
-    closeAuditSession?: (sessionId: string | null, success: boolean) => Promise<void>;
-}
-/**
- * Parse the audit-summary tail block from assessor stdout. Returns null
- * fields when the block is missing or malformed; the caller treats those
- * as advisory zeros and writes them to the audit_runs row.
- */
-export declare function parseAuditSummary(stdout: string): AuditSummary;
-/**
- * Decide whether the focus's reality is provably UNCHANGED since the last
- * completed audit run -- i.e. whether the assessor spawn is pure waste.
- *
- * Returns true (skip the spawn) only when every one of these holds:
- *  - a prior audit run exists,
- *  - that run COMPLETED (a run still in flight proves nothing about what it saw),
- *  - every delivery carries an `updatedAt` timestamp, and
- *  - none of those timestamps is later than the prior run's `startedAt`.
- *
- * Every other shape FAILS OPEN (returns false, assessor spawns): a first-ever
- * audit, an incomplete prior run, a missing/unparseable timestamp. The gate
- * exists to remove waste, never to withhold audit signal -- when it cannot
- * PROVE nothing changed, it lets the audit run.
- *
- * `startedAt` (not `completedAt`) is the comparison point deliberately: the
- * assessor observes the world as of the moment it began reading, so any
- * delivery mutation after that instant is unobserved by that run.
- */
-export declare function isUnchangedSinceLastAudit(deliveries: readonly AuditGateDelivery[], lastRun: RecentAuditRun | null): boolean;
-export declare const defaultAuditDeps: AuditPhaseDeps;
-/**
- * Run the audit phase for a focus. Spawns a one-shot assessor, captures
- * the audit-summary tail block, and writes an audit_runs row. Always
- * returns 'continue' so the focus loop advances regardless of audit
- * outcome -- the row + metadata.errors describe what happened.
- */
-export declare function runAuditPhase(focusId: string, deps?: AuditPhaseDeps, posture?: AuditPosture): Promise<AuditPhaseResult>;
-//# sourceMappingURL=audit-phase.d.ts.map

package/dist/audit-phase.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"audit-phase.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-phase.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AAIH,OAAO,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACjC,OAAO,EAEL,KAAK,iBAAiB,EACvB,MAAM,sCAAsC,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAIL,KAAK,WAAW,EAChB,KAAK,cAAc,EACnB,KAAK,cAAc,EACpB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAMjC,OAAO,EAEL,KAAK,iBAAiB,EACtB,KAAK,gBAAgB,EACtB,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAC5B,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAM/C;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAQlD,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAM5C,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,CAAC;AAE1C,6DAA6D;AAC7D,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,QAAiB,CAAC;AAEvD;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,aAAa,UAAU,CAAC;AAErC;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,OAAO,EACL,gBAAgB,EAChB,YAAY,EACZ,KAAK,YAAY,GAClB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAI3B,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAMtD,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC3B,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CACpC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC/B,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CAC3B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY;IAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACzB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACtB;AAMD,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAE9E;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACjF,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;QAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;QAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;KAAE,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1I,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;QAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;QAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,CAAA;KAAE,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IACtK,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D;;;;;OAKG;IACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACtE;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvE,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,iBAAiB,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;IACxE,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC;IACrD,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;IAC9B;;;;OAIG;IACH,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAClF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1F;;;;;OAKG;IACH,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/D,+EAA+E;IAC/E,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;CACnF;AAMD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,CA4C9D;AAMD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CACvC,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,iBAAiB,EAAE,EACxC,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,GAC7B,OAAO,CAaT;AA+BD,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,cA6B9B,CAAC;AAMF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CACjC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,IAAI,GAAE,cAAiC,EACvC,OAAO,GAAE,YAAqB,GAC7B,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAsQ3B"}