@tellescope/sdk 1.256.14 → 1.256.16

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/schema-adminonly-enforcement.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+var __assign = (this && this.__assign) || function () {
+    __assign = Object.assign || function(t) {
+        for (var s, i = 1, n = arguments.length; i < n; i++) {
+            s = arguments[i];
+            for (var p in s) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s, p))
+                t[p] = s[p];
+        }
+        return t;
+    };
+    return __assign.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+require('source-map-support').install();
+import axios from "axios";
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+import { assert, log_header, } from "@tellescope/testing";
+import { PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS } from "@tellescope/constants";
+import { setup_tests } from "../../setup";
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+var RAND = function () { return Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10); };
+var ALL = 'All';
+var FULL_ACCESS = { create: ALL, read: ALL, update: ALL, delete: ALL };
+/**
+ * Regression test: `adminOnly` custom actions must be enforced at runtime, not merely declared.
+ *
+ * `adminOnly: true` on a CUSTOM action in schema.ts was documentation-only. The runtime gate
+ * (routing.ts:944) reads the flag off the options object built by getCustomEndpointFields, and
+ * api.ts:609 set `adminOnly: o.adminOnly` without ever consulting `action.adminOnly`. So every
+ * admin-only custom action had to declare the flag twice, and the copies desynced: 11 of 20
+ * declared custom actions were unenforced at runtime while both public doc artifacts
+ * (openapi.json and the unauthenticated GET /documentation feed, which read the SCHEMA flag)
+ * advertised "**Admin only.**".
+ *
+ * DEFAULT CRUD actions never had this bug — routing.ts:2434 etc. read
+ * model.defaultActions.<op>.adminOnly straight off the schema. The fix
+ * (`adminOnly: o.adminOnly ?? action.adminOnly`) makes custom actions behave the same way.
+ *
+ * Five of the 11 were de-flagged in the schema instead, because the flag itself was wrong and
+ * enforcing it would revert a deliberate decision: users.invite_user carries an explicit
+ * "no longer admin only, but controlled by users.create" and send_invitation_to_existing is its
+ * sibling; organizations.create_and_join is the self-service signup path and would 401 every new
+ * org (a fresh user has no roles — the handler is what grants Admin); sync_note_to_canvas is
+ * designed around `access: 'read'` for non-admin callers; background_errors.mark_read substitutes
+ * its own RBAC check that intentionally admits non-admins holding the verb.
+ *
+ * SAFETY: every probe fails EARLY inside its handler — after the adminOnly gate but before any
+ * vendor call. Pre-fix these requests really do reach the handler, and these handlers talk to
+ * Twilio, Athena and Canvas:
+ *   - trigger_events     : no `action` key + an absent triggerId => the loop `continue`s (inert)
+ *   - athena-subscription: frequency 1 trips the `frequency < 5` guard on the handler's first line
+ *   - sync-athena        : 404s on the missing Athena integration (skipped if one exists)
+ *   - link-twilio        : takes NO parameters and can CREATE A REAL TWILIO SUBACCOUNT, so it is
+ *                          probed only when the org already has a twilioSID (handler short-circuits)
+ *   - twilio-embed       : no phoneNumberSid => 404 no-config or 400, both before any Twilio call
+ *   - handle-autoreply   : absent enduserId => `if (!enduser) return` (communications.ts:42)
+ * Input validation runs BEFORE the adminOnly gate (routing.ts:921 orders access, then validate),
+ * so every probe body must be schema-VALID or the test would prove nothing.
+ *
+ * RED (pre-fix): the six group-B rows fail — each reaches its handler and returns a non-401.
+ * GREEN (post-fix): all six return 401 "Admin access only"; the group-A controls are unchanged.
+ */
+export var schema_adminonly_enforcement_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var checks, record, request, isAdminDenial, summarize, roleId, attackerId, enduserId, role, rbap, attacker, attackerToken, adminToken, attackerSDK, enduser, doomed, ABSENT_ID, athenaIntegrationExists, existing, _b, orgHasTwilioSID, org, _c, groupB, _i, groupB_1, probe, attackerResult, baseline, badProbe, groupA, _d, groupA_1, probe, r, _e, checks_1, c, _f, checks_2, c, _g, _h, _j;
+        var _k;
+        return __generator(this, function (_l) {
+            switch (_l.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    log_header("schema-declared adminOnly must be enforced on custom actions");
+                    checks = [];
+                    record = function (label, pass, detail) { return checks.push({ label: label, pass: pass, detail: detail }); };
+                    request = function (authToken, method, path, data) { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                        var r;
+                        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                            switch (_a.label) {
+                                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, axios.request(__assign(__assign({ method: method, url: "".concat(host, "/v1").concat(path) }, method === 'get' ? { params: data } : { data: data }), { headers: { Authorization: "Bearer ".concat(authToken) }, validateStatus: function () { return true; } }))];
+                                case 1:
+                                    r = _a.sent();
+                                    return [2 /*return*/, { status: r.status, body: r.data }];
+                            }
+                        });
+                    }); };
+                    isAdminDenial = function (r) {
+                        var _a;
+                        return (r.status === 401 && ((_a = r.body) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.message) === 'Admin access only');
+                    };
+                    summarize = function (r) {
+                        var _a;
+                        return ("".concat(r.status, " ").concat(((_a = JSON.stringify(r.body)) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : '').slice(0, 120)));
+                    };
+                    roleId = '';
+                    attackerId = '';
+                    enduserId = '';
+                    _l.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _l.trys.push([1, , 27, 40]);
+                    role = "f0191-staff-".concat(RAND());
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+                            role: role,
+                            permissions: __assign(__assign({}, PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS), { 
+                                // grant exactly the verbs the actions under test declare, so a rejection proves the ADMIN
+                                // gate fired rather than ordinary RBAC
+                                automation_triggers: FULL_ACCESS, organizations: FULL_ACCESS, availability_blocks: FULL_ACCESS, background_errors: FULL_ACCESS, users: FULL_ACCESS }),
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    rbap = _l.sent();
+                    roleId = rbap.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0191-attacker-".concat(RAND(), "@tellescope.example"),
+                            fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Staff',
+                            verifiedEmail: true,
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                            roles: [role],
+                        })];
+                case 3:
+                    attacker = _l.sent();
+                    attackerId = attacker.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.generate_auth_token({ id: attackerId })];
+                case 4:
+                    attackerToken = (_l.sent()).authToken;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.generate_auth_token({ id: sdk.userInfo.id })];
+                case 5:
+                    adminToken = (_l.sent()).authToken;
+                    attackerSDK = new Session({ host: host, authToken: attackerToken });
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, attackerSDK.refresh_session()];
+                case 6:
+                    _l.sent();
+                    record('setup: attacker is a non-admin holding every verb under test', attackerSDK.userInfo.id === attackerId && !((_k = attackerSDK.userInfo.roles) !== null && _k !== void 0 ? _k : []).includes('Admin'), "id=".concat(attackerSDK.userInfo.id, " roles=").concat(JSON.stringify(attackerSDK.userInfo.roles)));
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Patient' })];
+                case 7:
+                    enduser = _l.sent();
+                    enduserId = enduser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'F0191', lname: 'Absent' })];
+                case 8:
+                    doomed = _l.sent();
+                    ABSENT_ID = doomed.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(ABSENT_ID)
+                        /* ===== environment guards for the two probes input alone cannot make safe ===== */
+                    ];
+                case 9:
+                    _l.sent();
+                    athenaIntegrationExists = false;
+                    _l.label = 10;
+                case 10:
+                    _l.trys.push([10, 12, , 13]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.integrations.load_redacted({})];
+                case 11:
+                    existing = _l.sent();
+                    athenaIntegrationExists = !!existing.integrations.find(function (i) { var _a; return /athena/i.test((_a = i.title) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : ''); });
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 13];
+                case 12:
+                    _b = _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 13];
+                case 13:
+                    orgHasTwilioSID = false;
+                    _l.label = 14;
+                case 14:
+                    _l.trys.push([14, 16, , 17]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.organizations.getOne(sdk.userInfo.businessId)];
+                case 15:
+                    org = _l.sent();
+                    orgHasTwilioSID = !!(org === null || org === void 0 ? void 0 : org.twilioSID);
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 16:
+                    _c = _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 17:
+                    groupB = [
+                        {
+                            label: 'automation_triggers.trigger_events',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/automation-triggers/trigger-events',
+                            // no `action` key: stays off the arbitrary-action-execution branch entirely
+                            data: { triggers: [{ enduserId: enduserId, automationTriggerId: ABSENT_ID }] },
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'organizations.add_athena_subscription',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/organizations/athena-subscription',
+                            data: { type: 'patients', frequency: 1 }, // trips `frequency < 5` on the handler's first line
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'organizations.sync_athena_subscription',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/organizations/sync-athena-subscription',
+                            data: { type: 'patients' },
+                            skip: athenaIntegrationExists
+                                ? 'org HAS an Athena integration — probing would call Athena.process_subscription for real'
+                                : undefined,
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'organizations.link_twilio',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/organizations/link-twilio',
+                            data: {},
+                            skip: orgHasTwilioSID
+                                ? undefined
+                                : 'org has no twilioSID — probing would CREATE A REAL TWILIO SUBACCOUNT',
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'organizations.load_twilio_embed',
+                            method: 'get', path: '/organizations/twilio-embed',
+                            data: { type: 'tfn-verification' }, // no phoneNumberSid => rejected before any Twilio call
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'availability_blocks.handle_autoreply',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/handle-out-of-office-autoreply',
+                            data: { channel: 'Email', enduserId: ABSENT_ID }, // communications.ts:42 `if (!enduser) return`
+                        },
+                    ];
+                    _i = 0, groupB_1 = groupB;
+                    _l.label = 18;
+                case 18:
+                    if (!(_i < groupB_1.length)) return [3 /*break*/, 22];
+                    probe = groupB_1[_i];
+                    if (probe.skip) {
+                        record("B: ".concat(probe.label, " rejects a non-admin"), true, "SKIPPED (safety) \u2014 ".concat(probe.skip));
+                        return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                    }
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, request(attackerToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)
+                        // baseline: an admin must NOT be admin-denied on the same path, so a blanket 401 can't pass
+                    ];
+                case 19:
+                    attackerResult = _l.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, request(adminToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)];
+                case 20:
+                    baseline = _l.sent();
+                    badProbe = isAdminDenial(baseline);
+                    record("B: ".concat(probe.label, " rejects a non-admin"), !badProbe && isAdminDenial(attackerResult), "attacker=".concat(summarize(attackerResult), " | admin baseline=").concat(baseline.status)
+                        + (badProbe ? ' BAD PROBE: admin was also admin-denied' : ''));
+                    _l.label = 21;
+                case 21:
+                    _i++;
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 18];
+                case 22:
+                    groupA = [
+                        {
+                            label: 'organizations.sync_note_to_canvas',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/organizations/sync-note-to-canvas',
+                            data: { enduserId: ABSENT_ID, note: 'control' }, // 404 Enduser not found
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'background_errors.mark_read',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/background-errors/mark-read', data: {},
+                        },
+                        {
+                            label: 'users.send_invitation_to_existing',
+                            method: 'post', path: '/invite-existing-user-to-organization',
+                            // takes userId (not email); an absent id hits RecordNotFoundError, well short of any invite
+                            data: { userId: ABSENT_ID },
+                        },
+                    ];
+                    _d = 0, groupA_1 = groupA;
+                    _l.label = 23;
+                case 23:
+                    if (!(_d < groupA_1.length)) return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                    probe = groupA_1[_d];
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, request(attackerToken, probe.method, probe.path, probe.data)];
+                case 24:
+                    r = _l.sent();
+                    record("A: ".concat(probe.label, " stays reachable by a non-admin (flag intentionally dropped)"), !isAdminDenial(r), "".concat(summarize(r), " (expected a handler response, not 401 Admin access only)"));
+                    _l.label = 25;
+                case 25:
+                    _d++;
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 23];
+                case 26:
+                    /* ===== report: print full table first, then assert (harness exits on first failure) ===== */
+                    console.log('\n  check summary:');
+                    for (_e = 0, checks_1 = checks; _e < checks_1.length; _e++) {
+                        c = checks_1[_e];
+                        console.log("    ".concat(c.pass ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL', "  ").concat(c.label, "  \u2014  ").concat(c.detail));
+                    }
+                    console.log('');
+                    for (_f = 0, checks_2 = checks; _f < checks_2.length; _f++) {
+                        c = checks_2[_f];
+                        assert(c.pass, "".concat(c.label, " \u2014 ").concat(c.detail), c.label);
+                    }
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 40];
+                case 27:
+                    if (!enduserId) return [3 /*break*/, 31];
+                    _l.label = 28;
+                case 28:
+                    _l.trys.push([28, 30, , 31]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(enduserId)];
+                case 29:
+                    _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 31];
+                case 30:
+                    _g = _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 31];
+                case 31:
+                    if (!attackerId) return [3 /*break*/, 35];
+                    _l.label = 32;
+                case 32:
+                    _l.trys.push([32, 34, , 35]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.deleteOne(attackerId)];
+                case 33:
+                    _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 35];
+                case 34:
+                    _h = _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 35];
+                case 35:
+                    if (!roleId) return [3 /*break*/, 39];
+                    _l.label = 36;
+                case 36:
+                    _l.trys.push([36, 38, , 39]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(roleId)];
+                case 37:
+                    _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 39];
+                case 38:
+                    _j = _l.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 39];
+                case 39: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 40: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, setup_tests(sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, schema_adminonly_enforcement_tests({ sdk: sdk_1, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ schema adminOnly enforcement test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ schema adminOnly enforcement test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=schema-adminonly-enforcement.test.js.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/schema-adminonly-enforcement.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Self-role privilege-escalation guard (relates to a prior internal review, which was
+ * investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the full code trace).
+ *
+ * An earlier review hypothesized that a non-admin staff user could `PATCH /v1/users/{their-own-id}` with
+ * `{ roles: ['Admin'] }` and self-promote to Admin, because the FIRST `users` relationship
+ * constraint ("Only admin users can set the admin role",
+ * [schema.ts:3446](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3446)) has a self-exception
+ * (`if (_id === session.id) return`).
+ *
+ * That analysis missed the SECOND constraint, "Only admin users can update user roles"
+ * ([schema.ts:3486](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3486)), which has NO self-exception.
+ * Relationship constraints are AND-evaluated — `validateRelationshipConstraints`
+ * ([routing.ts:1240-1252](packages/private/api/api/modules/routing.ts#L1240)) loops the whole
+ * array and throws 400 on the FIRST evaluator that returns a string. So a non-admin self-update
+ * that includes `roles` passes constraint #1 (self-exception) but is rejected by constraint #2.
+ * The self-promotion is blocked.
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of the role constraints can't
+ * silently reintroduce the escalation. A dedicated throwaway non-admin user is used as the
+ * "attacker" (we never mutate the shared sdkNonAdmin's roles):
+ *   1. Admin creates a throwaway user and assigns it a non-admin role (`['Provider']`).
+ *   2. Authenticate AS that user via a freshly-minted auth token.
+ *   3. As the attacker, attempt four self-role mutations — ['Admin'], ['Provider','Admin'],
+ *      an arbitrary role, and [] — and assert EACH is blocked.       <-- the security assertions
+ *   4. Confirm (as admin) the attacker's roles are still ['Provider'] — nothing slipped through.
+ *   5. Positive control: admin CAN update the throwaway user's roles. <-- guards against an
+ *      over-restrictive regression that would block legitimate admin role management.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: all assertions pass. A regression that made the self-update
+ * path role-writable by non-admins would flip the step-3/step-4 assertions to red.
+ */
+export declare const self_admin_role_assignment_tests: ({ sdk }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/esm/tests/api_tests/security/self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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