@tellescope/sdk 1.256.12 → 1.256.14

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tellescope/sdk",
-  "version": "1.256.12",
+  "version": "1.256.14",
   "description": "Code for interacting with the Tellescope API",
   "main": "./lib/cjs/sdk.js",
   "module": "./lib/esm/sdk.js",
@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@
   },
   "homepage": "https://github.com/tellescope-os/tellescope#readme",
   "dependencies": {
-    "@tellescope/constants": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/schema": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/testing": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/types-client": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/types-models": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/types-utilities": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/utilities": "1.256.12",
-    "@tellescope/validation": "1.256.12",
+    "@tellescope/constants": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/schema": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/testing": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/types-client": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/types-models": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/types-utilities": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/utilities": "1.256.14",
+    "@tellescope/validation": "1.256.14",
     "axios": "0.30.3",
     "dotenv": "14.3.2",
     "form-data": "4.0.4",
@@ -55,5 +55,5 @@
   "publishConfig": {
     "access": "public"
   },
-  "gitHead": "137bfca8fc8d2229a8eee245265536e507a3afae"
+  "gitHead": "0b32ba0040e286c4a1013287f9e154e612db11af"
 }

package/src/sdk.ts

@@ -810,6 +810,9 @@ type Queries = { [K in keyof ClientModelForName]: APIQuery<K> } & {
     load_events: (args: extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['load_events']['parameters']>) => (
       Promise<extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['load_events']['returns']>>
     ),
+    out_of_office: (args?: extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['out_of_office']['parameters']>) => (
+      Promise<extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['out_of_office']['returns']>>
+    ),
     generate_zoom_meeting: (args: extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['generate_zoom_meeting']['parameters']>) => (
       Promise<extractFields<CustomActions['calendar_events']['generate_zoom_meeting']['returns']>>
     ),
@@ -1146,6 +1149,7 @@ export class Session extends SessionManager {
     queries.calendar_events.session_for_start_link = a => this._GET(`/v1${schema.calendar_events.publicActions.session_for_start_link.path}`, a)
     queries.calendar_events.get_events_for_user = a => this._GET(`/v1/${schema.calendar_events.customActions.get_events_for_user.path}`, a)
     queries.calendar_events.load_events = a => this._GET(`/v1/${schema.calendar_events.customActions.load_events.path}`, a)
+    queries.calendar_events.out_of_office = a => this._GET(`/v1${schema.calendar_events.customActions.out_of_office.path}`, a)
     queries.calendar_events.generate_meeting_link = a => this._POST(`/v1/${schema.calendar_events.customActions.generate_meeting_link.path}`, a)
     queries.calendar_events.generate_zoom_meeting = a => this._POST(`/v1/${schema.calendar_events.customActions.generate_zoom_meeting.path}`, a)
     queries.calendar_events.change_zoom_host = a => this._POST(`/v1/${schema.calendar_events.customActions.change_zoom_host.path}`, a)

package/src/tests/api_tests/organization_signup.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+require('source-map-support').install();
+
+import axios from "axios"
+
+import { Session } from "../../sdk"
+import { wait } from "@tellescope/testing"
+import {
+  assert_checks,
+  Check,
+  set_email_verification_code,
+  setup_isolated_tenant,
+  test_support_request,
+} from "../setup_isolated"
+
+const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
+
+const RAND = () => Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)
+
+// legacy shared fixture — teardown must refuse it
+const SEEDED_TEST_BUSINESS_ID = '60398b1131a295e64f084ff6'
+
+/**
+ * Covers the self-service organization signup chain, which had ZERO test coverage:
+ * `users.register` -> `users.submit_email_verification` -> `organizations.create_and_join`.
+ *
+ * That gap is why F-0191 nearly shipped a schema `adminOnly` flag on create_and_join that would have
+ * 401'd every new organization — a freshly registered user has no `roles`, because create_and_join is
+ * itself what grants Admin. This test is the regression guard for that.
+ *
+ * It also covers the new test-support provisioning module, including the assertion that matters most:
+ * teardown refuses any organization it did not create.
+ *
+ * Uses a `dontsend...@tellescope.com` address so the verification email is dropped at
+ * forCommunications before it is ever enqueued (locally the worker consumes the same test queue the
+ * API writes to, so an unsuppressed registration really does send mail).
+ */
+export const organization_signup_checks = async (): Promise<Check[]> => {
+  const checks: Check[] = []
+  const record = (label: string, pass: boolean, detail: string) => checks.push({ label, pass, detail })
+
+  let bootstrapUserId = ''
+  let createdBusinessId = ''
+  let provisioned: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof setup_isolated_tenant>> | undefined
+
+  try {
+    /* ===== A: provisioning works with no seeded database ===== */
+
+    provisioned = await setup_isolated_tenant()
+    record(
+      'A1: provision-tenant returns a usable admin session',
+      !!provisioned.businessId && provisioned.sdk.userInfo?.businessId === provisioned.businessId,
+      `businessId=${provisioned.businessId} session businessId=${provisioned.sdk.userInfo?.businessId}`,
+    )
+
+    // proves the frozen utf8 api-key hash was reproduced correctly, and that the key's creator
+    // resolves — a key whose creator is missing fails authentication outright
+    let keyDetail = ''
+    let keyPass = false
+    try {
+      const keySession = new Session({ host, apiKey: provisioned.apiKeys[0] })
+      keyDetail = await keySession.test_authenticated()
+      keyPass = keyDetail === 'Authenticated!'
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      keyDetail = `rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('A2: a provisioned API key authenticates', keyPass, `test_authenticated -> ${keyDetail}`)
+
+    // the tenant is genuinely usable, not just addressable
+    const enduser = await provisioned.sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'Provisioned', lname: 'Patient' })
+    record('A3: the provisioned tenant accepts writes', !!enduser.id, `enduserId=${enduser.id}`)
+
+    /* ===== B: teardown refuses anything it did not create — the safety assertion ===== */
+
+    const refusal = await test_support_request('/teardown-tenant', { businessId: SEEDED_TEST_BUSINESS_ID })
+    record(
+      'B1: teardown REFUSES an organization without the provenance marker',
+      refusal.status === 403,
+      `status=${refusal.status} ${JSON.stringify(refusal.body)} (expected 403)`,
+    )
+
+    /* ===== C: the signup chain ===== */
+
+    const email = `dontsend-signup-${RAND()}@tellescope.com`
+    const password = `Signup-${RAND()}-A1!`
+
+    const registerResult = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/users/register`,
+      data: { email, password, termsVersion: '1' },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    record(
+      'C1: register accepts a new org-less user',
+      registerResult.status === 204,
+      `status=${registerResult.status} ${JSON.stringify(registerResult.data ?? '')}`,
+    )
+    await wait(undefined, 1200) // register is IP-limited to ~1/sec
+
+    // login works before verification, which is how a test learns the new user's id
+    const preVerifyLogin = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/users/login`,
+      data: { email, password },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    bootstrapUserId = preVerifyLogin.data?.user?.id ?? ''
+    record(
+      'C2: the unverified user can log in (and is org-less)',
+      preVerifyLogin.status === 200 && !!bootstrapUserId && !preVerifyLogin.data?.user?.businessId,
+      `status=${preVerifyLogin.status} id=${bootstrapUserId} businessId=${preVerifyLogin.data?.user?.businessId ?? '(none)'}`,
+    )
+
+    // an unverified session must be rejected by a gated endpoint
+    const unverifiedAttempt = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/organizations/create-and-join`,
+      data: { name: 'Should Not Work', subdomain: `nope-${RAND()}` },
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${preVerifyLogin.data?.authToken}` },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    record(
+      'C3: create_and_join is rejected before email verification',
+      unverifiedAttempt.status === 400,
+      `status=${unverifiedAttempt.status} ${JSON.stringify(unverifiedAttempt.data ?? '')}`,
+    )
+
+    // set the pending code, then drive the REAL verification endpoint
+    const code = `verify-${RAND()}`
+    await set_email_verification_code(email, code)
+
+    const verified = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/users/submit-email-verification`,
+      data: { email, code },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    record(
+      'C4: submit_email_verification accepts the code and mints a token',
+      verified.status === 200 && !!verified.data?.authToken,
+      `status=${verified.status} authToken=${!!verified.data?.authToken}`,
+    )
+
+    /* ===== D: create_and_join — what F-0191's flag would have broken ===== */
+
+    const subdomain = `signup-${RAND()}`
+    const joined = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/organizations/create-and-join`,
+      data: { name: `Signup Test ${RAND()}`, subdomain },
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${verified.data?.authToken}` },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    createdBusinessId = joined.data?.organization?.id ?? ''
+    record(
+      'D1: a freshly verified, org-less user can create and join an organization',
+      joined.status === 200 && !!createdBusinessId,
+      `status=${joined.status} organizationId=${createdBusinessId} ${joined.status !== 200 ? JSON.stringify(joined.data) : ''}`,
+    )
+    record(
+      'D2: the handler grants Admin and sets businessId (the roles bootstrap)',
+      joined.data?.user?.roles?.includes('Admin') && joined.data?.user?.businessId === createdBusinessId,
+      `roles=${JSON.stringify(joined.data?.user?.roles)} businessId=${joined.data?.user?.businessId}`,
+    )
+    record(
+      'D3: a fresh token is returned',
+      !!joined.data?.authToken && joined.data.authToken !== verified.data?.authToken,
+      `token returned=${!!joined.data?.authToken}, rotated=${joined.data?.authToken !== verified.data?.authToken}`,
+    )
+
+    const second = await axios.request({
+      method: 'post', url: `${host}/v1/organizations/create-and-join`,
+      data: { name: 'Second Org', subdomain: `signup-${RAND()}` },
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${joined.data?.authToken}` },
+      validateStatus: () => true,
+    })
+    record(
+      'D4: a user already in an organization cannot create another',
+      second.status === 400,
+      `status=${second.status} ${JSON.stringify(second.data ?? '')}`,
+    )
+
+    /* ===== E: teardown actually removes the tenant ===== */
+
+    // a second, disposable tenant so the assertions above keep their fixture
+    const disposable = await setup_isolated_tenant({ users: [{ isAdmin: true }], apiKeys: 1 })
+    const disposableKey = disposable.apiKeys[0]
+    await disposable.sdk.api.endusers.createOne({ fname: 'Disposable', lname: 'Patient' })
+    await disposable.teardown()
+
+    const secondTeardown = await test_support_request('/teardown-tenant', { businessId: disposable.businessId })
+    record(
+      'E1: teardown removes the organization record itself',
+      secondTeardown.status === 404,
+      `re-teardown status=${secondTeardown.status} ${JSON.stringify(secondTeardown.body)} (expected 404 — org gone)`,
+    )
+
+    let revokedDetail = ''
+    let revokedPass = false
+    try {
+      revokedDetail = await (new Session({ host, apiKey: disposableKey })).test_authenticated()
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      revokedPass = true
+      revokedDetail = `rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record(
+      'E2: the torn-down tenant\'s API key no longer authenticates',
+      revokedPass,
+      revokedDetail,
+    )
+
+  } finally {
+    if (provisioned) { try { await provisioned.teardown() } catch (e) { console.error('teardown failed', e) } }
+    // The signup-created org is NOT test-seeded, so teardown-tenant correctly refuses it; the org row
+    // is documented residue. The bootstrap user IS removable via test-support (the
+    // /tellescope-admin/delete-user route needs a staff session an isolated test deliberately lacks —
+    // posting to it without an Authorization header silently 401'd, so this used to leak every run).
+    if (bootstrapUserId) {
+      try { await test_support_request('/delete-user', { userId: bootstrapUserId }) } catch {}
+    }
+    if (createdBusinessId) {
+      console.log(`  note: organization ${createdBusinessId} was created by the signup flow and is left behind (nothing can delete an org record)`)
+    }
+  }
+
+  return checks
+}
+
+/** Asserting wrapper, for standalone runs and for sequential use in the suite. */
+export const organization_signup_tests = async () => {
+  assert_checks('Organization signup', await organization_signup_checks())
+}
+
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+  console.log(`🌐 Using API URL: ${host}`)
+  organization_signup_tests()
+    .then(() => {
+      console.log("✅ Organization signup test suite completed successfully")
+      process.exit(0)
+    })
+    .catch((error) => {
+      console.error("❌ Organization signup test suite failed:", error)
+      process.exit(1)
+    })
+}

package/src/tests/api_tests/out_of_office_endpoint.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+require('source-map-support').install();
+
+import { Session } from "../../sdk"
+import {
+  assert,
+  log_header,
+} from "@tellescope/testing"
+import { setup_tests } from "../setup"
+
+const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
+
+const MS_PER_MINUTE = 60 * 1000
+const MS_PER_HOUR = 60 * MS_PER_MINUTE
+
+// Covers the calendar_events.out_of_office endpoint, whose whole reason to exist is that it reads
+// ACROSS users: calendar_events is row-filtered on attendees.id and a non-admin defaults to
+// read: 'Assigned', so the ordinary read path returns only the caller's own blocks. The endpoint
+// therefore queries organization-wide on purpose, and returns no event content to make that safe.
+//
+// The cross-user assertion below is the one that matters: swapping the handler's
+// buildOrganizationWideQueries back to the request-scoped DB would silently break peer visibility in
+// Team Chat without breaking a build or any other test.
+export const out_of_office_endpoint_tests = async ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
+  log_header("Out of Office Endpoint")
+
+  const adminId = sdk.userInfo.id
+  const nonAdminId = sdkNonAdmin.userInfo.id
+  const now = Date.now()
+
+  // active right now, on the ADMIN, so the non-admin is neither an attendee nor the creator
+  const active = await sdk.api.calendar_events.createOne({
+    title: 'Out of Office',
+    outOfOffice: true,
+    startTimeInMS: now - 2 * MS_PER_HOUR,
+    durationInMinutes: 8 * 60,
+    attendees: [{ id: adminId, type: 'user' }],
+  })
+  // ended three hours ago — inside the query's start-time range, so only the handler's computed
+  // end-time check excludes it
+  const ended = await sdk.api.calendar_events.createOne({
+    title: 'Out of Office',
+    outOfOffice: true,
+    startTimeInMS: now - 5 * MS_PER_HOUR,
+    durationInMinutes: 2 * 60,
+    attendees: [{ id: adminId, type: 'user' }],
+  })
+  const cancelled = await sdk.api.calendar_events.createOne({
+    title: 'Out of Office',
+    outOfOffice: true,
+    startTimeInMS: now - MS_PER_HOUR,
+    durationInMinutes: 4 * 60,
+    attendees: [{ id: adminId, type: 'user' }],
+    cancelledAt: new Date(),
+  })
+  // not flagged: a normal event overlapping now must never appear
+  const normal = await sdk.api.calendar_events.createOne({
+    title: 'Regular Appointment',
+    startTimeInMS: now - MS_PER_HOUR,
+    durationInMinutes: 4 * 60,
+    attendees: [{ id: adminId, type: 'user' }],
+  })
+  // on the non-admin, used for the userIds scoping check
+  const nonAdminOwn = await sdk.api.calendar_events.createOne({
+    title: 'Out of Office',
+    outOfOffice: true,
+    startTimeInMS: now - MS_PER_HOUR,
+    durationInMinutes: 4 * 60,
+    attendees: [{ id: nonAdminId, type: 'user' }],
+  })
+
+  try {
+    const { outOfOffice } = await sdkNonAdmin.api.calendar_events.out_of_office()
+
+    // assert(assertion, failureMessage, successTitle)
+    assert(
+      !!outOfOffice.find(o => o.userId === adminId && o.startTimeInMS === active.startTimeInMS),
+      'non-admin does NOT see a peer out of office window — is the handler using the request-scoped DB instead of buildOrganizationWideQueries?',
+      'non-admin sees a peer out of office window',
+    )
+
+    assert(
+      outOfOffice.every(o => (
+        Object.keys(o).sort().join(',') === 'endTimeInMS,startTimeInMS,userId'
+      )),
+      `response leaked event fields: ${JSON.stringify(outOfOffice[0] ?? {})}`,
+      'response carries no event content',
+    )
+
+    const forAdmin = outOfOffice.filter(o => o.userId === adminId)
+    assert(
+      forAdmin.length === 1,
+      `expected exactly the one active window for the admin, got ${forAdmin.length}: ${JSON.stringify(forAdmin)}`,
+      'ended, cancelled and unflagged events are excluded',
+    )
+    assert(
+      forAdmin[0]?.endTimeInMS === active.startTimeInMS + active.durationInMinutes * MS_PER_MINUTE,
+      `endTimeInMS was ${forAdmin[0]?.endTimeInMS}, expected ${active.startTimeInMS + active.durationInMinutes * MS_PER_MINUTE}`,
+      'endTimeInMS is resolved from startTimeInMS + durationInMinutes',
+    )
+
+    // An admin's reads are unrestricted anyway, so this passes even if the handler were reverted to
+    // the request-scoped DB — it's the non-admin assertion above that pins the design. Kept as the
+    // pair, so the two together show the result is role-independent rather than role-dependent.
+    const asAdmin = await sdk.api.calendar_events.out_of_office()
+    assert(
+      !!asAdmin.outOfOffice.find(o => o.userId === adminId && o.startTimeInMS === active.startTimeInMS)
+      && !!asAdmin.outOfOffice.find(o => o.userId === nonAdminId),
+      `admin load missing windows: ${JSON.stringify(asAdmin.outOfOffice)}`,
+      'admin sees both its own and a peer out of office window',
+    )
+    assert(
+      asAdmin.outOfOffice.filter(o => o.userId === adminId).length === forAdmin.length,
+      `admin and non-admin disagree on the admin's windows: ${JSON.stringify(asAdmin.outOfOffice.filter(o => o.userId === adminId))} vs ${JSON.stringify(forAdmin)}`,
+      'admin and non-admin loads return the same windows',
+    )
+
+    const scoped = await sdkNonAdmin.api.calendar_events.out_of_office({ userIds: [nonAdminId] })
+    assert(
+      scoped.outOfOffice.length === 1 && scoped.outOfOffice[0].userId === nonAdminId,
+      `expected only the requested user, got ${JSON.stringify(scoped.outOfOffice)}`,
+      'userIds scopes the result',
+    )
+
+    // a real ObjectId that belongs to no user in this business
+    const foreign = await sdkNonAdmin.api.calendar_events.out_of_office({ userIds: ['5fdb3d4a4e6e2a0016a1a1a1'] })
+    assert(
+      foreign.outOfOffice.length === 0,
+      `expected empty for unknown userIds, got ${JSON.stringify(foreign.outOfOffice)}`,
+      'unknown userIds return nothing',
+    )
+  } finally {
+    await Promise.all([
+      sdk.api.calendar_events.deleteOne(active.id),
+      sdk.api.calendar_events.deleteOne(ended.id),
+      sdk.api.calendar_events.deleteOne(cancelled.id),
+      sdk.api.calendar_events.deleteOne(normal.id),
+      sdk.api.calendar_events.deleteOne(nonAdminOwn.id),
+    ])
+  }
+}
+
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+  console.log(`🌐 Using API URL: ${host}`)
+  const sdk = new Session({ host })
+  const sdkNonAdmin = new Session({ host })
+
+  const runTests = async () => {
+    await setup_tests(sdk, sdkNonAdmin)
+    await out_of_office_endpoint_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+  }
+
+  runTests()
+    .then(() => {
+      console.log("✅ Out of office endpoint test suite completed successfully")
+      process.exit(0)
+    })
+    .catch((error) => {
+      console.error("❌ Out of office endpoint test suite failed:", error)
+      process.exit(1)
+    })
+}

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0179-booking-info-idor-token-mint.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+require('source-map-support').install();
+
+import { Session, EnduserSession } from "../../../sdk"
+import {
+  assert,
+  log_header,
+} from "@tellescope/testing"
+import { authenticate_enduser_via_token, setup_tests } from "../../setup"
+
+const host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080' as const
+const businessId = '60398b1131a295e64f084ff6'
+
+const RAND = () => Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)
+
+const VICTIM_STATE = 'CA'
+const ATTACKER_STATE_WRITE = 'NY'
+
+type Check = {
+  label: string,
+  pass: boolean,
+  detail: string,
+}
+
+/**
+ * Regression test for F-0179
+ * (security-audit/findings/F-0179-booking-info-idor-token-mint.md).
+ *
+ * `form_fields.booking_info` resolved its target patient as
+ * `DB.endusers.findById(enduserId || req.session.id)` with no ownership check for enduser
+ * sessions. The enduser DB branch builds the endusers collection with `enduserAccess: true`
+ * (database.ts), so a FOREIGN in-tenant id resolves — and the handler then writes
+ * `enduserFields.state` onto that record and calls `login_enduser` with
+ * `sessionScopes: ['appointment-booking']`, returning a live 24h token for the victim inside
+ * `bookingURL`. booking_info is enduser-callable AND granted to the 'public-form' scope, so a
+ * portal patient or an anonymous form-filler could mint a working session as any co-tenant patient.
+ *
+ * The fix mirrors `prepare_form_response` (api.ts): reject when an enduser session supplies an
+ * `enduserId` other than its own, before the booking-page lookup and before the `state` write.
+ *
+ * RED (pre-fix): A1 and A2 fail — the exploit returns 200 with a bookingURL whose token decodes to
+ * the VICTIM's id, and the victim's `state` is overwritten. B/C (positive controls) pass pre-fix.
+ * GREEN (post-fix): all six checks pass.
+ *
+ * Checks are collected and printed before any assert runs: the testing harness has
+ * EXIT_ON_FIRST_ERROR, so asserting inline would kill the process before the evidence table and
+ * before `finally` cleanup.
+ */
+export const booking_info_idor_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session, sdkNonAdmin: Session }) => {
+  log_header("F-0179: booking_info must not mint an appointment-booking token for another enduser")
+
+  const checks: Check[] = []
+  const record = (label: string, pass: boolean, detail: string) => checks.push({ label, pass, detail })
+
+  // The minted JWT carries `id: enduser._id.toString()` (authentication.ts login_enduser). Decode
+  // it straight out of the returned URL — the whole point of the finding is WHOSE session it is.
+  const token_enduser_id = (bookingURL: string) => {
+    const token = /[?&]token=([^&]+)/.exec(bookingURL || '')?.[1]
+    const payload = token?.split('.')[1]
+    if (!payload) return ''
+    try {
+      return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, 'base64').toString()).id as string
+    } catch {
+      return ''
+    }
+  }
+
+  let templateId = ''
+  let bookingPageId = ''
+  const enduserIds: string[] = []
+
+  try {
+    /* ================= fixtures ================= */
+
+    const template = await sdk.api.calendar_event_templates.createOne({
+      title: `F0179 template ${RAND()}`, durationInMinutes: 30,
+    } as any)
+    templateId = template.id
+
+    const bookingPage = await sdk.api.appointment_booking_pages.createOne({
+      title: `F0179 booking page ${RAND()}`,
+      calendarEventTemplateIds: [templateId],
+      locationIds: [],
+    } as any)
+    bookingPageId = bookingPage.id
+
+    const attacker = await sdk.api.endusers.createOne({
+      email: `f0179-attacker-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`, fname: 'F0179', lname: 'Attacker',
+    })
+    enduserIds.push(attacker.id)
+
+    const victim = await sdk.api.endusers.createOne({
+      email: `f0179-victim-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`, fname: 'F0179', lname: 'Victim',
+      state: VICTIM_STATE,
+    })
+    enduserIds.push(victim.id)
+
+    // Token mint, NOT enduserSDK.authenticate — /login-enduser is IP rate-limited and the suite
+    // shares one IP.
+    const attackerSDK = new EnduserSession({ host, businessId })
+    await authenticate_enduser_via_token(sdk, attackerSDK, { id: attacker.id })
+
+    /* ===== A: the exploit — enduser mints a booking session as another patient ===== */
+
+    let a1Detail = ''
+    let a1Pass = false
+    try {
+      const r = await attackerSDK.api.form_fields.booking_info({ bookingPageId, enduserId: victim.id })
+      const mintedFor = token_enduser_id(r.bookingURL)
+      a1Detail = (
+        `EXPLOITED: 200 with a bookingURL; token subject=${mintedFor} `
+        + `(victim=${victim.id}, attacker=${attacker.id})`
+        + (mintedFor === victim.id ? ' — a live appointment-booking session AS THE VICTIM' : '')
+      )
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      a1Pass = true
+      a1Detail = `rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('A1: enduser cannot mint a booking token for another enduser', a1Pass, a1Detail)
+
+    // A2: the same call also writes enduserFields.state onto the target before minting.
+    let a2Attempt = ''
+    try {
+      await attackerSDK.api.form_fields.booking_info({
+        bookingPageId, enduserId: victim.id, enduserFields: { state: ATTACKER_STATE_WRITE },
+      })
+      a2Attempt = 'call returned 200'
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      a2Attempt = `call rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    const victimAfter = await sdk.api.endusers.getOne(victim.id)
+    record(
+      'A2: enduser cannot write `state` onto another enduser via enduserFields',
+      victimAfter.state === VICTIM_STATE,
+      `${a2Attempt}; victim.state=${victimAfter.state} (expected ${VICTIM_STATE})`,
+    )
+
+    /* ===== B: positive controls — the patient's own booking flow still works ===== */
+
+    let b1Detail = ''
+    let b1Pass = false
+    try {
+      const r = await attackerSDK.api.form_fields.booking_info({ bookingPageId })
+      const mintedFor = token_enduser_id(r.bookingURL)
+      b1Pass = mintedFor === attacker.id
+      b1Detail = `token subject=${mintedFor} (self=${attacker.id})`
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      b1Detail = `unexpectedly rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('B1: enduser can still load booking info with no enduserId', b1Pass, b1Detail)
+
+    let b2Detail = ''
+    let b2Pass = false
+    try {
+      const r = await attackerSDK.api.form_fields.booking_info({ bookingPageId, enduserId: attacker.id })
+      const mintedFor = token_enduser_id(r.bookingURL)
+      b2Pass = mintedFor === attacker.id
+      b2Detail = `token subject=${mintedFor} (self=${attacker.id})`
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      b2Detail = `unexpectedly rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('B2: enduser can still load booking info for its OWN enduserId', b2Pass, b2Detail)
+
+    /* ===== C: positive controls — the staff branches are untouched ===== */
+
+    let c1Detail = ''
+    let c1Pass = false
+    try {
+      const r = await sdk.api.form_fields.booking_info({ bookingPageId, enduserId: victim.id })
+      const mintedFor = token_enduser_id(r.bookingURL)
+      c1Pass = mintedFor === victim.id
+      c1Detail = `token subject=${mintedFor} (target=${victim.id})`
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      c1Detail = `unexpectedly rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('C1: staff can still load booking info for a specific enduser', c1Pass, c1Detail)
+
+    let c2Detail = ''
+    let c2Pass = false
+    try {
+      const r = await sdk.api.form_fields.booking_info({ bookingPageId })
+      c2Pass = !!r.bookingURL && !!r.warningMessage
+      c2Detail = `warningMessage=${JSON.stringify(r.warningMessage)} bookingURL=${!!r.bookingURL}`
+    } catch (e: any) {
+      c2Detail = `unexpectedly rejected: ${e?.message || e?.toString()}`
+    }
+    record('C2: staff test-contact preview branch still works', c2Pass, c2Detail)
+
+    /* ===== report: print full table first, then assert (harness exits on first failure) ===== */
+    console.log('\n  F-0179 check summary:')
+    for (const c of checks) {
+      console.log(`    ${c.pass ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL'}  ${c.label}  —  ${c.detail}`)
+    }
+    console.log('')
+
+    for (const c of checks) {
+      assert(c.pass, `${c.label} — ${c.detail}`, c.label)
+    }
+  } finally {
+    for (const id of enduserIds) { try { await sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(id) } catch {} }
+    if (bookingPageId) { try { await sdk.api.appointment_booking_pages.deleteOne(bookingPageId) } catch {} }
+    if (templateId) { try { await sdk.api.calendar_event_templates.deleteOne(templateId) } catch {} }
+  }
+}
+
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+  console.log(`🌐 Using API URL: ${host}`)
+  const sdk = new Session({ host })
+  const sdkNonAdmin = new Session({ host })
+
+  const runTests = async () => {
+    await setup_tests(sdk, sdkNonAdmin)
+    await booking_info_idor_tests({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin })
+  }
+
+  runTests()
+    .then(() => {
+      console.log("✅ F-0179 booking_info IDOR test suite completed successfully")
+      process.exit(0)
+    })
+    .catch((error) => {
+      console.error("❌ F-0179 booking_info IDOR test suite failed:", error)
+      process.exit(1)
+    })
+}