npm - @tellescope/sdk - Versions diffs - 1.255.19 → 1.256.0 - Mend

@tellescope/sdk 1.255.19 → 1.256.0

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package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+import { DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX, replace_form_field_template_values, sanitize_user_html, sanitize_user_html_with_iframes } from "@tellescope/utilities"
+// Companion to F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.ts (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
+//
+// sanitize_user_html_with_iframes is the variant used by the live form's field description, so
+// admins can embed video / scheduling widgets. It permits <iframe> and NOTHING else beyond what
+// sanitize_user_html allows. This asserts:
+//   1. permitting iframe did not reopen any of the F-0013 vectors (the full payload list is re-run)
+//   2. only absolute https iframes survive — relative, protocol-relative, http, javascript:, data:
+//      and srcdoc frames are dropped, along with their fallback content
+//   3. the restrictive sandbox is forced, but an author-supplied sandbox is honored
+//   4. sanitize_user_html itself still strips iframes (the boundary between the two functions)
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs as part of the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html-with-iframes.test.js
+const fail = (msg: string) => { throw new Error(msg) }
+// Same as has_no_executable_vector in the F-0013 test, minus the '<iframe' clause (iframes are
+// expected in this function's output). Everything else must still be neutralized.
+const has_no_executable_vector_allowing_iframe = (out: string) => {
+  const o = out.toLowerCase()
+  const withoutValues = o.replace(/"[^"]*"/g, '""').replace(/'[^']*'/g, "''")
+  return !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(withoutValues)   // no live on*= event-handler attribute
+      && !o.includes('javascript:')
+      && !o.includes('vbscript:')
+      && !o.includes('<script')
+      && !o.includes('<svg')
+      && !o.includes('<math')
+      && !o.includes('<object')
+      && !o.includes('<embed')
+      && !o.includes('<form')
+      && !o.includes('<noscript')
+      && !o.includes('<template')
+      && !o.includes('srcdoc')                   // an inline document is arbitrary markup
+}
+// Tokens that must NEVER appear in the forced default. allow-top-navigation is the important one:
+// it is what stops a hostile embed from redirecting the patient's form page to a phishing site.
+const FORBIDDEN_SANDBOX_TOKENS = [
+  'allow-top-navigation',
+  'allow-downloads',
+  'allow-modals',
+  'allow-pointer-lock',
+  'allow-orientation-lock',
+]
+export const sanitize_user_html_with_iframes_tests = async () => {
+  console.log("Running sanitize_user_html_with_iframes XSS regression tests")
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 1. Re-run the full F-0013 payload set — permitting iframe must not be a general regression
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  const xssPayloads: [string, string][] = [
+    ['img onerror', `<img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">`],
+    ['svg onload', `<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>`],
+    ['svg animate onbegin', `<svg><animate onbegin="alert(1)" attributeName="x" dur="1s"></svg>`],
+    ['details ontoggle', `<details open ontoggle="alert(1)"></details>`],
+    ['input onfocus autofocus', `<input autofocus onfocus="alert(1)">`],
+    ['body onpageshow', `<body onpageshow="alert(1)">`],
+    ['a javascript scheme', `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['a javascript entity-encoded', `<a href="jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['script tag', `<script>alert(1)</script>`],
+    ['onerror newline before =', `<img src=x onerror\n="alert(1)">`],
+    ['onerror mixed case', `<IMG SRC=x OnErRoR="alert(1)">`],
+    ['marquee onstart', `<marquee onstart="alert(1)">x</marquee>`],
+    ['mathml mglyph style mxss', `<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`],
+    ['svg foreignObject', `<svg><foreignObject><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></foreignObject></svg>`],
+    ['noscript context confusion', `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">`],
+    ['template content', `<template><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></template>`],
+    ['comment confusion', `<!--><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>-->`],
+    ['cdata confusion', `<![CDATA[<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>]]>`],
+    ['markup inside attr value', `<img src="x" alt="<script>alert(1)</script>">`],
+    ['vbscript scheme', `<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['data text/html href', `<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">x</a>`],
+    ['javascript decimal entity', `<a href="&#74;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+    ['javascript newline entity', `<a href="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert(1)">x</a>`],
+  ]
+  for (const [name, payload] of xssPayloads) {
+    const out = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(payload)
+    if (!has_no_executable_vector_allowing_iframe(out)) fail(`XSS not neutralized [${name}] -> ${out}`)
+  }
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 2. Only absolute https iframes survive
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  const badSrcs: [string, string][] = [
+    ['javascript scheme', `javascript:alert(1)`],
+    ['data text/html', `data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>`],
+    ['http (not https)', `http://evil.example`],
+    // sanitize-html does NOT reject protocol-relative iframe srcs on its own when
+    // allowProtocolRelative is set — this is the self-origin framing vector and the reason the
+    // sanitizer does its own absolute-https check.
+    ['protocol-relative', `//app.tellescope.com/`],
+    ['root-relative', `/portal/settings`],
+    ['bare relative', `settings`],
+    ['whitespace-obfuscated', `  https:/\\/\\evil`],
+    ['tab-entity javascript', `jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)`],
+    ['scheme-only', `https://`],
+    ['empty', ``],
+  ]
+  for (const [name, src] of badSrcs) {
+    const out = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="${src}"></iframe>`)
+    if (out.toLowerCase().includes('<iframe')) fail(`bad iframe src survived [${name}] -> ${out}`)
+  }
+  // A dropped iframe must take its fallback content with it (exclusiveFilter, not a tagName swap)
+  const fallback = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="/x">FALLBACK-TEXT</iframe>`)
+  if (fallback.includes('FALLBACK-TEXT')) fail(`dropped iframe leaked its fallback text: ${fallback}`)
+  if (fallback.toLowerCase().includes('<iframe')) fail(`dropped iframe survived: ${fallback}`)
+  // srcdoc is not allowlisted, even alongside a valid src
+  const srcdoc = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" srcdoc="<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></iframe>`)
+  if (srcdoc.toLowerCase().includes('srcdoc')) fail(`srcdoc not stripped: ${srcdoc}`)
+  if (!srcdoc.toLowerCase().includes('<iframe')) fail(`valid iframe dropped alongside srcdoc: ${srcdoc}`)
+  // handlers / clobbering attributes stripped, frame itself kept
+  const handlers = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" onload="alert(1)" id="x" name="getElementById"></iframe>`)
+  if (!handlers.toLowerCase().includes('<iframe')) fail(`valid iframe dropped: ${handlers}`)
+  if (/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(handlers.toLowerCase())) fail(`iframe event handler survived: ${handlers}`)
+  if (/\b(id|name)\s*=/.test(handlers)) fail(`iframe id/name not stripped (DOM clobbering): ${handlers}`)
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 3. Legitimate embeds survive, hardened
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // The exact shape draftjs-to-html emits for the WYSIWYG "embedded" button
+  const yt = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc" frameBorder="0"></iframe>`)
+  if (!yt.includes('src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc"')) fail(`youtube embed src stripped: ${yt}`)
+  if (!(yt.includes('width="560"') && yt.includes('height="315"'))) fail(`iframe dimensions stripped: ${yt}`)
+  if (!yt.toLowerCase().includes('frameborder')) fail(`frameborder stripped: ${yt}`)
+  // forced containment
+  if (!yt.includes(`sandbox="${DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX}"`)) fail(`sandbox not forced: ${yt}`)
+  if (!yt.toLowerCase().includes('referrerpolicy=')) fail(`referrerpolicy not set: ${yt}`)
+  for (const token of FORBIDDEN_SANDBOX_TOKENS) {
+    if (DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX.includes(token)) fail(`forced sandbox must not grant ${token}: ${DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX}`)
+  }
+  // allow-same-origin IS granted — required for real embeds (a Loom embed renders blank without it)
+  // and harmless because the src is guaranteed cross-origin by the check asserted above.
+  if (!DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX.includes('allow-same-origin')) fail(`forced sandbox must grant allow-same-origin so real embeds render: ${DEFAULT_IFRAME_SANDBOX}`)
+  // author-supplied sandbox honored verbatim, so a surface can tighten (or loosen) per embed.
+  // Uses a value distinct from the default, so this can't pass by coincidence.
+  const authorSandbox = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" sandbox="allow-scripts"></iframe>`)
+  if (!authorSandbox.includes('sandbox="allow-scripts"')) fail(`author sandbox not honored: ${authorSandbox}`)
+  // sandbox="" is the MOST restrictive value and must not be replaced by the default
+  const emptySandbox = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" sandbox=""></iframe>`)
+  if (emptySandbox.includes('allow-')) fail(`empty sandbox was replaced with the permissive default: ${emptySandbox}`)
+  if (!/\ssandbox(\s|>)/.test(emptySandbox)) fail(`empty sandbox attribute lost entirely: ${emptySandbox}`)
+  // author referrerpolicy honored
+  const noref = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe>`)
+  if (!noref.includes('referrerpolicy="no-referrer"')) fail(`author referrerpolicy not honored: ${noref}`)
+  // `allow` (Permissions-Policy delegation, e.g. YouTube autoplay) preserved
+  const allowAttr = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<iframe src="https://ok.example" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen></iframe>`)
+  if (!allowAttr.includes('allow="autoplay; encrypted-media"')) fail(`allow attribute stripped: ${allowAttr}`)
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 4. Everything sanitize_user_html preserves must still be preserved
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  const heading = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<h1>Welcome</h1><h3 style="color:#333">Sub</h3>`)
+  if (!(heading.includes('<h1>') && heading.includes('<h3') && heading.toLowerCase().includes('color'))) fail(`headings/style stripped: ${heading}`)
+  const table = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<table><thead><tr><th>H</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td style="padding:4px" colspan="2">cell</td></tr></tbody></table>`)
+  if (!(table.includes('<table') && table.includes('<td') && table.includes('colspan'))) fail(`table stripped: ${table}`)
+  const list = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<ul><li>a</li></ul><ol start="3"><li>c</li></ol>`)
+  if (!(list.includes('<ul') && list.includes('<li') && list.includes('<ol'))) fail(`list stripped: ${list}`)
+  const link = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<a href="https://example.com">link</a>`)
+  if (!link.includes('href="https://example.com"')) fail(`safe link stripped: ${link}`)
+  if (!link.toLowerCase().includes('noopener')) fail(`external link not hardened: ${link}`)
+  const img = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<img src="https://cdn.example.com/a.png" alt="pic" width="200">`)
+  if (!(img.includes('src="https://cdn.example.com/a.png"') && img.includes('alt="pic"'))) fail(`image stripped: ${img}`)
+  const dataimg = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<img src="">`)
+  if (!dataimg.includes('data:image/png')) fail(`data: image stripped: ${dataimg}`)
+  const fmt = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(`<p><strong>b</strong> <em>i</em> <span style="font-size:14px">s</span></p><blockquote>q</blockquote>`)
+  if (!(fmt.includes('<strong>') && fmt.includes('<span') && fmt.toLowerCase().includes('font-size'))) fail(`formatting stripped: ${fmt}`)
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 5. The boundary: sanitize_user_html must NOT have been loosened
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  const shared = sanitize_user_html(`<iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc"></iframe>`)
+  if (shared.toLowerCase().includes('<iframe')) fail(`sanitize_user_html must still strip iframes: ${shared}`)
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // 6. End to end: an admin's iframe survives templating, a patient-injected one does not
+  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  const adminTemplate = `<p>Hi {{enduser.fname}}, watch this:</p><iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc"></iframe>`
+  const templated = replace_form_field_template_values(adminTemplate, {
+    enduser: { fname: `<iframe src="https://evil.example/phish"></iframe>` } as any,
+    responses: [],
+    escapeNewlinesAsHTMLBreaks: true,
+    escapeHTMLValues: true,
+  })
+  const endToEnd = sanitize_user_html_with_iframes(templated)
+  if (!endToEnd.includes('src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/abc"')) fail(`admin's own iframe did not survive: ${endToEnd}`)
+  // The patient's markup must survive only as inert escaped text — so 'evil.example' may still
+  // appear as visible characters, but there must be exactly one LIVE frame (the admin's).
+  if (!endToEnd.includes('&lt;iframe')) fail(`patient markup not escaped to inert text: ${endToEnd}`)
+  if ((endToEnd.toLowerCase().match(/<iframe/g) || []).length !== 1) fail(`patient-injected iframe became a live frame: ${endToEnd}`)
+  console.log("✅ sanitize_user_html_with_iframes XSS regression tests passed")
+}
+if (require.main === module) {
+  sanitize_user_html_with_iframes_tests()
+    .then(() => { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0) })
+    .catch((err) => { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1) })
+}

package/src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0166-allowed-paths-wildcard-bypass.test.ts CHANGED Viewed

@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ export const allowed_paths_confinement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session,
   let joinEnduserId: string | undefined
   let formEnduserEmail: string | undefined
   let hostUserId: string | undefined
+  let templateId: string | undefined
+  let bookingEnduserId: string | undefined
   const eventIds: string[] = []
   try {
@@ -245,6 +247,120 @@ export const allowed_paths_confinement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session,
     // bare '/product' prefix entry did — that used to reach /products/prepare-stripe-checkout too
     await expectDenied(S1, 'exact matching: /products not granted by get:/product', publicFormSession.authToken, baselineEnduserToken, 'get', '/products')
+    /* ---- field confinement on the granted generic update route ----
+     * 'patch:/enduser/:id' is granted for Portal V2's terms gate, so the route check alone no longer
+     * protects this session — SESSION_SCOPE_WRITABLE_FIELDS does. These probes are the live control:
+     * the consent write lands, and every contactable/identity field is refused. Without them the
+     * module test is the only thing standing between a scope-table edit and account takeover.
+     */
+    const formEnduserId = publicFormSession.enduserId
+    // The refresh payload for a fromPublicSession token must carry the session's OWN id — portal V2
+    // seeds its store from it and then addresses itself by id, so without it every write goes to
+    // /enduser/undefined — while still withholding everything else about the patient. Both halves
+    // matter: adding the id must not become a foothold for widening this payload.
+    const publicRefresh = await request(publicFormSession.authToken, 'post', '/refresh-enduser-session', {})
+    const refreshedEnduser = publicRefresh.body?.enduser ?? {}
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S1,
+      label: 'public refresh exposes the session\'s own id',
+      path: '/refresh-enduser-session',
+      expected: 'allowed',
+      status: refreshedEnduser.id === formEnduserId ? 200 : 500,
+      pass: refreshedEnduser.id === formEnduserId,
+      note: `id=${refreshedEnduser.id}`,
+    })
+    const withheld = ['email', 'phone', 'dateOfBirth', 'fname', 'lname', 'note', 'insurance', 'tags']
+      .filter(f => refreshedEnduser[f] !== undefined)
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S1,
+      label: 'public refresh still withholds the patient record',
+      path: '/refresh-enduser-session',
+      expected: 'denied',
+      status: withheld.length ? 200 : 403,
+      pass: withheld.length === 0,
+      note: withheld.length ? `LEAKED [${withheld}]` : `keys=[${Object.keys(refreshedEnduser)}]`,
+    })
+    await expectAllowed(
+      S1, 'field-restricted: may record terms consent', publicFormSession.authToken,
+      'patch', `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      { updates: { termsSigned: new Date().toISOString(), termsVersion: '1' } },
+    )
+    // The write being confined is not enough: the update RESPONSE is not redacted for enduser sessions
+    // (applyRedactions runs only for user sessions on that path), so an unprojected echo would hand
+    // this session the record it can't otherwise read — GET /enduser/:id is not even in this scope.
+    // Assert the response carries ONLY what the session was allowed to write.
+    const consentEcho = await request(
+      publicFormSession.authToken, 'patch', `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      { updates: { termsVersion: '2' } },
+    )
+    const echoedKeys = Object.keys(consentEcho.body ?? {})
+    const leakedKeys = echoedKeys.filter(k => !['id', 'termsSigned', 'termsVersion'].includes(k))
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S1,
+      label: 'field-restricted: update response echoes only the writable fields',
+      path: `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      expected: 'allowed',
+      status: leakedKeys.length === 0 ? consentEcho.status : 500,
+      pass: consentEcho.status === 200 && leakedKeys.length === 0,
+      note: leakedKeys.length ? `LEAKED [${leakedKeys}]` : `echoed [${echoedKeys}]`,
+    })
+    // email/phone are the takeover vector: password reset resolves by findOne({ email }) and OTP codes
+    // deliver to enduser.phone. dateOfBirth/fname are the public-form MATCH keys, so writing them would
+    // let a session redirect which patient a later submission attaches to.
+    const fieldsThatMustBeRefused: [string, any][] = [
+      ['email', `f0166-takeover-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`],
+      ['phone', '+15555550123'],
+      ['landline', '+15555550124'],
+      ['dateOfBirth', '1990-01-01'],
+      ['fname', 'F0166Overwritten'],
+    ]
+    for (const [field, value] of fieldsThatMustBeRefused) {
+      const r = await request(
+        publicFormSession.authToken, 'patch', `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`, { updates: { [field]: value } },
+      )
+      probes.push({
+        scenario: S1,
+        label: `field-restricted: cannot write enduser '${field}'`,
+        path: `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+        expected: 'denied',
+        status: r.status,
+        pass: r.status === 403,
+        note: 'route is granted; the field allowlist is what refuses this',
+      })
+    }
+    // the field guard must reject the whole request rather than filtering, or the allowed key would
+    // carry a disallowed one through alongside it
+    const mixed = await request(
+      publicFormSession.authToken, 'patch', `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      { updates: { termsVersion: '2', email: `f0166-mixed-${RAND()}@tellescope.example` } },
+    )
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S1,
+      label: 'field-restricted: a mixed allowed+denied update is refused whole',
+      path: `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      expected: 'denied',
+      status: mixed.status,
+      pass: mixed.status === 403,
+      note: 'no partial application — email must not ride along with termsVersion',
+    })
+    // and the email on record must be untouched by all of the above
+    const afterProbes = await sdk.api.endusers.getOne(formEnduserId)
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S1,
+      label: 'field-restricted: stored email survived every attempt',
+      path: `/enduser/${formEnduserId}`,
+      expected: 'denied',
+      status: afterProbes.email === formEnduserEmail ? 403 : 200,
+      pass: afterProbes.email === formEnduserEmail,
+      note: `stored=${afterProbes.email}`,
+    })
     /* ============ S2: join-link session — RED before the fix ============ */
     const S2 = 'S2 join-link (enduser)'
@@ -264,6 +380,36 @@ export const allowed_paths_confinement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session,
     await expectAllowed(S2, 'widened: calendar events list', joinSession.authToken, 'get', '/calendar-events')
     await expectAllowed(S2, 'widened: join meeting for event', joinSession.authToken, 'post', '/join-meeting-for-event', { calendarEventId: joinEvent.id })
+    // The WaitingRoom marks attendance here. This write is deliberately NOT field-restricted: the
+    // portal reads the event back through useCalendarEvents, whose updateElement REPLACES the local
+    // record with the update response (react state.tsx), so a truncated response would drop event
+    // fields out of local state mid-visit and break a live Twilio call. Assert both halves of that
+    // contract — the write lands, AND the response is still a whole event.
+    const attendanceWrite = await request(
+      joinSession.authToken, 'patch', `/calendar-event/${joinEvent.id}`,
+      { updates: { joinedVideoCall: [{ id: joinEnduserId, at: new Date().toISOString() }] } },
+    )
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S2,
+      label: 'marks joinedVideoCall on its pinned event',
+      path: `/calendar-event/${joinEvent.id}`,
+      expected: 'allowed',
+      status: attendanceWrite.status,
+      pass: attendanceWrite.status === 200,
+    })
+    // title/durationInMinutes were set at fixture creation, so their presence proves the response was
+    // not projected down to the written field
+    const echoedEvent = attendanceWrite.body ?? {}
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S2,
+      label: 'attendance write returns the WHOLE event (client replaces local state from it)',
+      path: `/calendar-event/${joinEvent.id}`,
+      expected: 'allowed',
+      status: (echoedEvent.title && echoedEvent.durationInMinutes) ? 200 : 500,
+      pass: !!echoedEvent.title && !!echoedEvent.durationInMinutes && !!echoedEvent.joinedVideoCall,
+      note: `echoed ${Object.keys(echoedEvent).length} keys`,
+    })
     // confinement must survive a refresh rather than widening
     const refreshedJoin = await request(joinSession.authToken, 'post', '/refresh-enduser-session', {})
     const refreshedJoinToken = refreshedJoin.body?.authToken
@@ -398,6 +544,73 @@ export const allowed_paths_confinement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session,
       await expectAllowed(S6, 'after refresh: my-meetings still allowed', rescopedToken, 'get', '/my-meetings')
     }
+    /* ============ S7: appointment-booking session — the SAME terms gate as S1 ============
+     * Portal V2's terms gate wraps the booking route too, so this scope needs the same enduser write
+     * (and only that write). Without the grant the gate is unpassable and the patient never reaches the
+     * booking page at all. Field restriction and response projection must behave exactly as in S1 —
+     * mirrored here rather than assumed, since the two scopes are separate table entries.
+     */
+    const S7 = 'S7 appointment-booking'
+    const bookingTemplate = await sdk.api.calendar_event_templates.createOne({
+      title: `F-0166 booking ${RAND()}`, durationInMinutes: 30,
+    })
+    templateId = bookingTemplate.id
+    const bookingEnduserEmail = `f0166-booking-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`
+    const bookingEnduser = await sdk.api.endusers.createOne({
+      email: bookingEnduserEmail, fname: 'Booking', lname: 'Confinement',
+    })
+    bookingEnduserId = bookingEnduser.id
+    const bookingSession = await new EnduserSession({ host, businessId })
+      .api.calendar_events.session_for_public_appointment_booking({
+        businessId,
+        calendarEventTemplateId: bookingTemplate.id,
+        email: bookingEnduserEmail,
+        fname: 'Booking',
+        lname: 'Confinement',
+      })
+    await expectAllowed(
+      S7, 'field-restricted: may record terms consent', bookingSession.authToken,
+      'patch', `/enduser/${bookingEnduser.id}`,
+      { updates: { termsSigned: new Date().toISOString(), termsVersion: '1' } },
+    )
+    const bookingEcho = await request(
+      bookingSession.authToken, 'patch', `/enduser/${bookingEnduser.id}`, { updates: { termsVersion: '2' } },
+    )
+    const bookingLeaked = Object.keys(bookingEcho.body ?? {})
+      .filter(k => !['id', 'termsSigned', 'termsVersion'].includes(k))
+    probes.push({
+      scenario: S7,
+      label: 'field-restricted: update response echoes only the writable fields',
+      path: `/enduser/${bookingEnduser.id}`,
+      expected: 'allowed',
+      status: bookingLeaked.length === 0 ? bookingEcho.status : 500,
+      pass: bookingEcho.status === 200 && bookingLeaked.length === 0,
+      note: bookingLeaked.length ? `LEAKED [${bookingLeaked}]` : undefined,
+    })
+    for (const [field, value] of [['email', `f0166-bt-${RAND()}@tellescope.example`], ['phone', '+15555550188']] as [string, any][]) {
+      const r = await request(bookingSession.authToken, 'patch', `/enduser/${bookingEnduser.id}`, { updates: { [field]: value } })
+      probes.push({
+        scenario: S7,
+        label: `field-restricted: cannot write enduser '${field}'`,
+        path: `/enduser/${bookingEnduser.id}`,
+        expected: 'denied',
+        status: r.status,
+        pass: r.status === 403,
+        note: 'route is granted; the field allowlist is what refuses this',
+      })
+    }
+    // the booking scope must not have gained anything else along with the enduser write
+    await expectDenied(S7, 'unlisted: form responses', bookingSession.authToken, baselineEnduserToken, 'get', '/form-responses')
+    await expectDenied(S7, 'unlisted: calendar events', bookingSession.authToken, baselineEnduserToken, 'get', '/calendar-events')
+    await expectAllowed(S7, 'listed: refresh enduser session', bookingSession.authToken, 'post', '/refresh-enduser-session')
     /* ============ S5: ordinary sessions with no allowedPaths claim ============ */
     const S5 = 'S5 unconfined sessions'
@@ -479,6 +692,8 @@ export const allowed_paths_confinement_tests = async ({ sdk } : { sdk: Session,
       } catch {}
     }
     if (hostUserId) { try { await sdk.api.users.deleteOne(hostUserId) } catch {} }
+    if (bookingEnduserId) { try { await sdk.api.endusers.deleteOne(bookingEnduserId) } catch {} }
+    if (templateId) { try { await sdk.api.calendar_event_templates.deleteOne(templateId) } catch {} }
     if (productId) { try { await sdk.api.products.deleteOne(productId) } catch {} }
     if (formId) { try { await sdk.api.forms.deleteOne(formId) } catch {} }
   }