@tellescope/sdk 1.252.0 → 1.252.2

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+"use strict";
+var __assign = (this && this.__assign) || function () {
+    __assign = Object.assign || function(t) {
+        for (var s, i = 1, n = arguments.length; i < n; i++) {
+            s = arguments[i];
+            for (var p in s) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s, p))
+                t[p] = s[p];
+        }
+        return t;
+    };
+    return __assign.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = void 0;
+require('source-map-support').install();
+var sdk_1 = require("../../../sdk");
+var testing_1 = require("@tellescope/testing");
+var setup_1 = require("../../setup");
+var constants_1 = require("@tellescope/constants");
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+// Separate tenant (different businessId), reusing the same hardcoded apiKey that
+// multi_tenant_tests relies on in tests.ts.
+var OTHER_TENANT_API_KEY = "ba745e25162bb95a795c5fa1af70df188d93c4d3aac9c48b34a5c8c9dd7b80f7";
+/**
+ * Tenant-boundary guard for cascade_role_rename (relates to security-audit finding F-0053,
+ * which was investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the code trace).
+ *
+ * The `cascade_role_rename` side-effect handler
+ * ([event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts](packages/private/api/api/v1/event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts))
+ * runs when a `role_based_access_permissions` doc's `role` field changes. It finds every user
+ * with the old role name (via `DBUnrestricted.users`) and rewrites their `roles` array, then
+ * deauthenticates them. F-0053 hypothesized this query was globally cross-tenant. It is NOT:
+ * `DBUnrestricted` bypasses per-user/per-role RBAC but is STILL scoped to the acting session's
+ * `businessId` (see `modifyFilterForAccessConstraint` injecting `{ businessId }` at
+ * database.ts:1761-1763, reached via the `unrestricted: true` branch at database.ts:2137-2144).
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of `DBUnrestricted` semantics
+ * can't silently turn the cascade into a cross-tenant write:
+ *   1. Tenant A creates a role `ROLE_OLD` and assigns it to a Tenant A user (positive control).
+ *   2. Tenant B (separate businessId) has a user whose roles include the SAME `ROLE_OLD`.
+ *   3. Tenant A renames the role `ROLE_OLD` -> `ROLE_NEW`.
+ *   4. Assert the Tenant B user's roles are UNCHANGED (still `[ROLE_OLD]`)  <-- guards the tenant boundary.
+ *   5. Assert the Tenant A user's roles ARE renamed to `[ROLE_NEW]`         <-- same-tenant cascade works.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: BOTH assertions pass. A regression that drops the
+ * `businessId` scoping would flip assertion #4 to red (Tenant B user becomes `[ROLE_NEW]`).
+ *
+ * A collision-proof unique role name (timestamped) is used so the test never touches real roles.
+ */
+var cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var stamp, ROLE_OLD, ROLE_NEW, sdkOther, rbapId, controlUserId, victimUserId, tenantABusinessId, rbap, controlUser, victimUser, victimBefore, controlBefore, victimAfter, controlAfter, _b, _c, _d;
+        return __generator(this, function (_e) {
+            switch (_e.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    (0, testing_1.log_header)("F-0053: cascade role rename cross-tenant regression");
+                    stamp = Date.now();
+                    ROLE_OLD = "XTenantRename_".concat(stamp);
+                    ROLE_NEW = "".concat(ROLE_OLD, "_renamed");
+                    sdkOther = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host, apiKey: OTHER_TENANT_API_KEY });
+                    _e.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _e.trys.push([1, , 13, 26]);
+                    tenantABusinessId = sdk.userInfo.businessId;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+                            role: ROLE_OLD,
+                            permissions: __assign({}, constants_1.PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS),
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    rbap = _e.sent();
+                    rbapId = rbap.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0053-control-".concat(stamp, "@example.com"),
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                        })];
+                case 3:
+                    controlUser = _e.sent();
+                    controlUserId = controlUser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(controlUserId, { roles: [ROLE_OLD] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })
+                        // 3. Tenant B: create a throwaway victim user holding the SAME ROLE_OLD.
+                    ];
+                case 4:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0053-victim-".concat(stamp, "@example.com"),
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                        })];
+                case 5:
+                    victimUser = _e.sent();
+                    victimUserId = victimUser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.updateOne(victimUserId, { roles: [ROLE_OLD] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })
+                        // 4. Setup sanity: tenants are distinct and both users actually hold ROLE_OLD before the rename.
+                        //    (Distinguishes a setup failure from the security assertion below.)
+                    ];
+                case 6:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    // 4. Setup sanity: tenants are distinct and both users actually hold ROLE_OLD before the rename.
+                    //    (Distinguishes a setup failure from the security assertion below.)
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(victimUser.businessId !== tenantABusinessId, "Victim user shares businessId with Tenant A (".concat(victimUser.businessId, ") \u2014 not a cross-tenant scenario"), 'F-0053 setup: tenants are distinct');
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.getOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 7:
+                    victimBefore = _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 8:
+                    controlBefore = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(victimBefore.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD])
+                        && JSON.stringify(controlBefore.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD]), "Setup failed: expected both users to hold [".concat(ROLE_OLD, "] (victim=").concat(JSON.stringify(victimBefore.roles), ", control=").concat(JSON.stringify(controlBefore.roles), ")"), 'F-0053 setup: both users hold ROLE_OLD');
+                    // 5. Tenant A renames the role. This triggers cascade_role_rename.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.updateOne(rbapId, { role: ROLE_NEW })];
+                case 9:
+                    // 5. Tenant A renames the role. This triggers cascade_role_rename.
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)
+                        // 6. SECURITY ASSERTION — the Tenant B victim must be untouched by Tenant A's rename.
+                    ]; // let the side effect run
+                case 10:
+                    _e.sent(); // let the side effect run
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.getOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 11:
+                    victimAfter = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(victimAfter.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD]), "CROSS-TENANT LEAK: Tenant B victim roles changed to ".concat(JSON.stringify(victimAfter.roles), " ")
+                        + "after Tenant A renamed its role. Expected [".concat(ROLE_OLD, "]."), 'F-0053: Tenant B user roles unaffected by other-tenant role rename');
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 12:
+                    controlAfter = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(controlAfter.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_NEW]), "Same-tenant cascade broken: Tenant A control roles are ".concat(JSON.stringify(controlAfter.roles), ", ")
+                        + "expected [".concat(ROLE_NEW, "]."), 'F-0053: Tenant A user roles renamed by same-tenant cascade');
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                case 13:
+                    if (!victimUserId) return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                    _e.label = 14;
+                case 14:
+                    _e.trys.push([14, 16, , 17]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.deleteOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 15:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 16:
+                    _b = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 17:
+                    if (!controlUserId) return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                    _e.label = 18;
+                case 18:
+                    _e.trys.push([18, 20, , 21]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.deleteOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 19:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                case 20:
+                    _c = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                case 21:
+                    if (!rbapId) return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                    _e.label = 22;
+                case 22:
+                    _e.trys.push([22, 24, , 25]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(rbapId)];
+                case 23:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                case 24:
+                    _d = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                case 25: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 26: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests;
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_2 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, (0, setup_1.setup_tests)(sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests)({ sdk: sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ F-0053 cascade role rename cross-tenant test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ F-0053 cascade role rename cross-tenant test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.js.map

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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Self-role privilege-escalation guard (relates to security-audit finding F-0076, which was
+ * investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the full code trace).
+ *
+ * F-0076 hypothesized that a non-admin staff user could `PATCH /v1/users/{their-own-id}` with
+ * `{ roles: ['Admin'] }` and self-promote to Admin, because the FIRST `users` relationship
+ * constraint ("Only admin users can set the admin role",
+ * [schema.ts:3446](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3446)) has a self-exception
+ * (`if (_id === session.id) return`).
+ *
+ * That analysis missed the SECOND constraint, "Only admin users can update user roles"
+ * ([schema.ts:3486](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3486)), which has NO self-exception.
+ * Relationship constraints are AND-evaluated — `validateRelationshipConstraints`
+ * ([routing.ts:1240-1252](packages/private/api/api/modules/routing.ts#L1240)) loops the whole
+ * array and throws 400 on the FIRST evaluator that returns a string. So a non-admin self-update
+ * that includes `roles` passes constraint #1 (self-exception) but is rejected by constraint #2.
+ * The self-promotion is blocked.
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of the role constraints can't
+ * silently reintroduce the escalation. A dedicated throwaway non-admin user is used as the
+ * "attacker" (we never mutate the shared sdkNonAdmin's roles):
+ *   1. Admin creates a throwaway user and assigns it a non-admin role (`['Provider']`).
+ *   2. Authenticate AS that user via a freshly-minted auth token.
+ *   3. As the attacker, attempt four self-role mutations — ['Admin'], ['Provider','Admin'],
+ *      an arbitrary role, and [] — and assert EACH is blocked.       <-- the security assertions
+ *   4. Confirm (as admin) the attacker's roles are still ['Provider'] — nothing slipped through.
+ *   5. Positive control: admin CAN update the throwaway user's roles. <-- guards against an
+ *      over-restrictive regression that would block legitimate admin role management.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: all assertions pass. A regression that made the self-update
+ * path role-writable by non-admins would flip the step-3/step-4 assertions to red.
+ */
+export declare const self_admin_role_assignment_tests: ({ sdk }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAUtC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA+BG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;SAA2B,OAAO;iBAAe,OAAO;mBAkGpG,CAAA"}

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+"use strict";
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.self_admin_role_assignment_tests = void 0;
+require('source-map-support').install();
+var sdk_1 = require("../../../sdk");
+var testing_1 = require("@tellescope/testing");
+var setup_1 = require("../../setup");
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+/**
+ * Self-role privilege-escalation guard (relates to security-audit finding F-0076, which was
+ * investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the full code trace).
+ *
+ * F-0076 hypothesized that a non-admin staff user could `PATCH /v1/users/{their-own-id}` with
+ * `{ roles: ['Admin'] }` and self-promote to Admin, because the FIRST `users` relationship
+ * constraint ("Only admin users can set the admin role",
+ * [schema.ts:3446](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3446)) has a self-exception
+ * (`if (_id === session.id) return`).
+ *
+ * That analysis missed the SECOND constraint, "Only admin users can update user roles"
+ * ([schema.ts:3486](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3486)), which has NO self-exception.
+ * Relationship constraints are AND-evaluated — `validateRelationshipConstraints`
+ * ([routing.ts:1240-1252](packages/private/api/api/modules/routing.ts#L1240)) loops the whole
+ * array and throws 400 on the FIRST evaluator that returns a string. So a non-admin self-update
+ * that includes `roles` passes constraint #1 (self-exception) but is rejected by constraint #2.
+ * The self-promotion is blocked.
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of the role constraints can't
+ * silently reintroduce the escalation. A dedicated throwaway non-admin user is used as the
+ * "attacker" (we never mutate the shared sdkNonAdmin's roles):
+ *   1. Admin creates a throwaway user and assigns it a non-admin role (`['Provider']`).
+ *   2. Authenticate AS that user via a freshly-minted auth token.
+ *   3. As the attacker, attempt four self-role mutations — ['Admin'], ['Provider','Admin'],
+ *      an arbitrary role, and [] — and assert EACH is blocked.       <-- the security assertions
+ *   4. Confirm (as admin) the attacker's roles are still ['Provider'] — nothing slipped through.
+ *   5. Positive control: admin CAN update the throwaway user's roles. <-- guards against an
+ *      over-restrictive regression that would block legitimate admin role management.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: all assertions pass. A regression that made the self-update
+ * path role-writable by non-admins would flip the step-3/step-4 assertions to red.
+ */
+var self_admin_role_assignment_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var stamp, NON_ADMIN_ROLE, expect_blocked, attackerId, attacker, attackerBefore, sdkAttacker_1, _b, attackerAfter, afterAdminUpdate, _c;
+        var _d;
+        var _e;
+        return __generator(this, function (_f) {
+            switch (_f.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    (0, testing_1.log_header)("F-0076: self-admin role assignment privilege-escalation regression");
+                    stamp = Date.now();
+                    NON_ADMIN_ROLE = 'Provider';
+                    expect_blocked = function (fn, description) { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+                        var e_1;
+                        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+                            switch (_a.label) {
+                                case 0:
+                                    _a.trys.push([0, 2, , 3]);
+                                    return [4 /*yield*/, fn()];
+                                case 1:
+                                    _a.sent();
+                                    (0, testing_1.assert)(false, "".concat(description, " - SELF-ROLE ESCALATION SUCCEEDED (expected it to be blocked)"));
+                                    return [3 /*break*/, 3];
+                                case 2:
+                                    e_1 = _a.sent();
+                                    // CRUD relationship-constraint failures surface as 400 { message, info } via SDK parseError.
+                                    (0, testing_1.assert)((e_1 === null || e_1 === void 0 ? void 0 : e_1.code) === 400 || (e_1 === null || e_1 === void 0 ? void 0 : e_1.statusCode) === 400 || typeof (e_1 === null || e_1 === void 0 ? void 0 : e_1.message) === 'string', "".concat(description, " - expected a block error, got: ").concat(JSON.stringify(e_1)), description);
+                                    return [3 /*break*/, 3];
+                                case 3: return [2 /*return*/];
+                            }
+                        });
+                    }); };
+                    _f.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _f.trys.push([1, , 15, 20]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0076-attacker-".concat(stamp, "@example.com"),
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                            verifiedEmail: true,
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    attacker = _f.sent();
+                    attackerId = attacker.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: [NON_ADMIN_ROLE] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 3:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 2000)
+                        // Setup sanity: the attacker holds exactly the non-admin role and is NOT an admin.
+                    ]; // role change triggers a logout; let it propagate before minting a token
+                case 4:
+                    _f.sent(); // role change triggers a logout; let it propagate before minting a token
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(attackerId)];
+                case 5:
+                    attackerBefore = _f.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(attackerBefore.roles) === JSON.stringify([NON_ADMIN_ROLE]), "Setup failed: expected attacker to hold [".concat(NON_ADMIN_ROLE, "], got ").concat(JSON.stringify(attackerBefore.roles)), 'F-0076 setup: attacker holds a non-admin role');
+                    _b = sdk_1.Session.bind;
+                    _d = {
+                        host: host
+                    };
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.generate_auth_token({ id: attackerId })];
+                case 6:
+                    sdkAttacker_1 = new (_b.apply(sdk_1.Session, [void 0, (_d.authToken = (_f.sent()).authToken,
+                            _d)]))();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkAttacker_1.refresh_session()]; // populate userInfo from the freshly-minted token
+                case 7:
+                    _f.sent(); // populate userInfo from the freshly-minted token
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(sdkAttacker_1.userInfo.id === attackerId && !((_e = sdkAttacker_1.userInfo.roles) !== null && _e !== void 0 ? _e : []).includes('Admin'), "Setup failed: attacker session is not the expected non-admin user", 'F-0076 setup: authenticated as the non-admin attacker');
+                    // 3. SECURITY ASSERTIONS — every self-role mutation by the non-admin must be blocked.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, expect_blocked(function () { return sdkAttacker_1.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: ['Admin'] }, { replaceObjectFields: true }); }, 'F-0076: non-admin self-update to [Admin] is blocked')];
+                case 8:
+                    // 3. SECURITY ASSERTIONS — every self-role mutation by the non-admin must be blocked.
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, expect_blocked(function () { return sdkAttacker_1.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: [NON_ADMIN_ROLE, 'Admin'] }, { replaceObjectFields: true }); }, 'F-0076: non-admin self-update to [Provider, Admin] is blocked')];
+                case 9:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, expect_blocked(function () { return sdkAttacker_1.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: ["Arbitrary_".concat(stamp)] }, { replaceObjectFields: true }); }, 'F-0076: non-admin self-update to an arbitrary role is blocked')];
+                case 10:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, expect_blocked(function () { return sdkAttacker_1.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: [] }, { replaceObjectFields: true }); }, 'F-0076: non-admin self-update to [] (would grant defaults) is blocked')
+                        // 4. STATE ASSERTION — nothing slipped through; roles are still the original non-admin role.
+                    ];
+                case 11:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(attackerId)];
+                case 12:
+                    attackerAfter = _f.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(attackerAfter.roles) === JSON.stringify([NON_ADMIN_ROLE]), "ESCALATION LEAK: attacker roles changed to ".concat(JSON.stringify(attackerAfter.roles), " ")
+                        + "after self-update attempts. Expected [".concat(NON_ADMIN_ROLE, "]."), 'F-0076: attacker roles unchanged after all self-escalation attempts');
+                    // 5. POSITIVE CONTROL — an Admin CAN update the user's roles (mechanism is not over-restricted).
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(attackerId, { roles: [NON_ADMIN_ROLE] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })];
+                case 13:
+                    // 5. POSITIVE CONTROL — an Admin CAN update the user's roles (mechanism is not over-restricted).
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(attackerId)];
+                case 14:
+                    afterAdminUpdate = _f.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(afterAdminUpdate.roles) === JSON.stringify([NON_ADMIN_ROLE]), "Admin role update failed: roles are ".concat(JSON.stringify(afterAdminUpdate.roles), ", expected [").concat(NON_ADMIN_ROLE, "]"), 'F-0076: admin can manage user roles (positive control)');
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 20];
+                case 15:
+                    if (!attackerId) return [3 /*break*/, 19];
+                    _f.label = 16;
+                case 16:
+                    _f.trys.push([16, 18, , 19]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.deleteOne(attackerId)];
+                case 17:
+                    _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 19];
+                case 18:
+                    _c = _f.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 19];
+                case 19: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 20: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+exports.self_admin_role_assignment_tests = self_admin_role_assignment_tests;
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_2 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, (0, setup_1.setup_tests)(sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, exports.self_admin_role_assignment_tests)({ sdk: sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ F-0076 self-admin role assignment test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ F-0076 self-admin role assignment test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.js.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/user_portal_settings.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import { Session } from "../../sdk";
+export declare const user_portal_settings_tests: ({ sdk, sdkNonAdmin }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=user_portal_settings.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/user_portal_settings.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"user_portal_settings.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/tests/api_tests/user_portal_settings.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAkB,MAAM,WAAW,CAAA;AAanD,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B;SAAuC,OAAO;iBAAe,OAAO;mBAmL1G,CAAA"}