@tellescope/sdk 1.251.0 → 1.252.1

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+"use strict";
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = void 0;
+var utilities_1 = require("@tellescope/utilities");
+// Regression test for F-0013 / F-0014 (pattern 06 — XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML).
+// sanitize_user_html is the canonical render-time sanitizer that replaced remove_script_tags
+// at every dangerouslySetInnerHTML sink. This asserts it neutralizes XSS vectors (incl. encoded /
+// whitespace / mixed-case / iframe-srcdoc bypass variants) while preserving legitimate
+// customization HTML (tables, headings, lists, links, images, inline styles).
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs as part of the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js
+var fail = function (msg) { throw new Error(msg); };
+var has_no_executable_vector = function (out) {
+    var o = out.toLowerCase();
+    // A handler smuggled into an attribute VALUE (e.g. title="&lt;img onerror=...&gt;") is inert
+    // text — strip quoted values before checking for *live* on*= attributes to avoid false positives.
+    var withoutValues = o.replace(/"[^"]*"/g, '""').replace(/'[^']*'/g, "''");
+    return !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(withoutValues) // no live on*= event-handler attribute
+        && !o.includes('javascript:') // dropped schemes never appear in safe output
+        && !o.includes('vbscript:')
+        && !o.includes('<script') // literal dangerous tags (encoded &lt;script is fine)
+        && !o.includes('<iframe')
+        && !o.includes('<svg')
+        && !o.includes('<math')
+        && !o.includes('<object')
+        && !o.includes('<embed')
+        && !o.includes('<form')
+        && !o.includes('<noscript')
+        && !o.includes('<template');
+};
+var sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+    var xssPayloads, _i, xssPayloads_1, _a, name_1, payload, out, clobber, heading, table, list, link, img, dataimg, fmt, mixed;
+    return __generator(this, function (_b) {
+        console.log("Running F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests");
+        xssPayloads = [
+            ['img onerror', "<img src=x onerror=\"alert(document.domain)\">"],
+            ['svg onload', "<svg onload=\"alert(1)\"></svg>"],
+            ['svg animate onbegin', "<svg><animate onbegin=\"alert(1)\" attributeName=\"x\" dur=\"1s\"></svg>"],
+            ['details ontoggle', "<details open ontoggle=\"alert(1)\"></details>"],
+            ['input onfocus autofocus', "<input autofocus onfocus=\"alert(1)\">"],
+            ['body onpageshow', "<body onpageshow=\"alert(1)\">"],
+            ['a javascript scheme', "<a href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</a>"],
+            ['a javascript entity-encoded', "<a href=\"jav&#x09;ascript:alert(1)\">x</a>"],
+            ['iframe javascript src', "<iframe src=\"javascript:alert(1)\"></iframe>"],
+            ['iframe srcdoc nested', "<iframe srcdoc=\"<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\"></iframe>"],
+            ['script tag', "<script>alert(1)</script>"],
+            ['onerror newline before =', "<img src=x onerror\n=\"alert(1)\">"],
+            ['onerror mixed case', "<IMG SRC=x OnErRoR=\"alert(1)\">"],
+            ['marquee onstart', "<marquee onstart=\"alert(1)\">x</marquee>"],
+            // mutation / namespace confusion — svg/math/noscript/template must be stripped
+            ['mathml mglyph style mxss', "<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"],
+            ['svg foreignObject', "<svg><foreignObject><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></foreignObject></svg>"],
+            ['noscript context confusion', "<noscript><p title=\"</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\">"],
+            ['template content', "<template><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></template>"],
+            // comment / CDATA confusion
+            ['comment confusion', "<!--><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>-->"],
+            ['cdata confusion', "<![CDATA[<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>]]>"],
+            // markup smuggled inside an attribute value must stay inert
+            ['markup inside attr value', "<img src=\"x\" alt=\"<script>alert(1)</script>\">"],
+            // protocol obfuscation
+            ['vbscript scheme', "<a href=\"vbscript:msgbox(1)\">x</a>"],
+            ['data text/html href', "<a href=\"data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>\">x</a>"],
+            ['javascript decimal entity', "<a href=\"&#74;avascript:alert(1)\">x</a>"],
+            ['javascript newline entity', "<a href=\"jav&#x0A;ascript:alert(1)\">x</a>"],
+        ];
+        for (_i = 0, xssPayloads_1 = xssPayloads; _i < xssPayloads_1.length; _i++) {
+            _a = xssPayloads_1[_i], name_1 = _a[0], payload = _a[1];
+            out = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)(payload);
+            if (!has_no_executable_vector(out))
+                fail("XSS not neutralized [".concat(name_1, "] -> ").concat(out));
+        }
+        clobber = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<a id=\"x\" name=\"getElementById\">link</a><img name=\"y\">");
+        if (/\b(id|name)\s*=/.test(clobber))
+            fail("id/name not stripped (DOM clobbering): ".concat(clobber));
+        heading = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<h1>Welcome</h1><h3 style=\"color:#333\">Sub</h3>");
+        if (!(heading.includes('<h1>') && heading.includes('<h3') && heading.toLowerCase().includes('color')))
+            fail("headings/style stripped: ".concat(heading));
+        table = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<table><thead><tr><th>H</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td style=\"padding:4px\" colspan=\"2\">cell</td></tr></tbody></table>");
+        if (!(table.includes('<table') && table.includes('<td') && table.includes('colspan')))
+            fail("table stripped: ".concat(table));
+        list = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<ul><li>a</li></ul><ol start=\"3\"><li>c</li></ol>");
+        if (!(list.includes('<ul') && list.includes('<li') && list.includes('<ol')))
+            fail("list stripped: ".concat(list));
+        link = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<a href=\"https://example.com\">link</a>");
+        if (!link.includes('href="https://example.com"'))
+            fail("safe link stripped: ".concat(link));
+        if (!link.toLowerCase().includes('noopener'))
+            fail("external link not hardened: ".concat(link));
+        img = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<img src=\"https://cdn.example.com/a.png\" alt=\"pic\" width=\"200\">");
+        if (!(img.includes('src="https://cdn.example.com/a.png"') && img.includes('alt="pic"')))
+            fail("http image stripped: ".concat(img));
+        dataimg = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<img src=\"\">");
+        if (!dataimg.includes('data:image/png'))
+            fail("data: image stripped: ".concat(dataimg));
+        fmt = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<p><strong>b</strong> <em>i</em> <span style=\"font-size:14px\">s</span></p><blockquote>q</blockquote>");
+        if (!(fmt.includes('<strong>') && fmt.includes('<span') && fmt.toLowerCase().includes('font-size')))
+            fail("formatting stripped: ".concat(fmt));
+        mixed = (0, utilities_1.sanitize_user_html)("<p>Hello <b>name</b></p><img src=x onerror=\"steal()\">");
+        if (!(mixed.includes('<b>name</b>') && !/\son[a-z]+\s*=/.test(mixed.toLowerCase())))
+            fail("mixed content not handled: ".concat(mixed));
+        console.log("✅ F-0013/F-0014 sanitize_user_html XSS regression tests passed");
+        return [2 /*return*/];
+    });
+}); };
+exports.sanitize_user_html_xss_tests = sanitize_user_html_xss_tests;
+if (require.main === module) {
+    (0, exports.sanitize_user_html_xss_tests)()
+        .then(function () { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0); })
+        .catch(function (err) { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1); });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0013-sanitize-user-html.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export declare const prototype_pollution_tests: () => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAWA,eAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,qBAgCrC,CAAA"}

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"use strict";
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.prototype_pollution_tests = void 0;
+var utilities_1 = require("@tellescope/utilities");
+// Regression test for F-0016 (pattern 17 — prototype pollution).
+// add_value_for_dotted_key must NOT write through __proto__/constructor/prototype path segments
+// (which would pollute Object.prototype process-wide), while still performing legitimate dotted assignment.
+//
+// Pure-function test — no Session needed. Runs in the main suite and standalone:
+//   ./build_cjs.sh && cd packages/public/sdk && node -r dotenv/config lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js
+var fail = function (msg) { throw new Error(msg); };
+var prototype_pollution_tests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+    var leakedA, leakedB, leakedC, obj, flat;
+    return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+        console.log("Running F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests");
+        // 1. __proto__ path must not pollute Object.prototype
+        (0, utilities_1.add_value_for_dotted_key)({ insurance: {} }, 'insurance.__proto__.__pp_a__', 'polluted');
+        leakedA = {}.__pp_a__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_a__; // clean up regardless, so a failure here can't contaminate the rest of the suite
+        if (leakedA !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via __proto__ path');
+        // 2. constructor.prototype path must not pollute
+        (0, utilities_1.add_value_for_dotted_key)({ insurance: {} }, 'insurance.constructor.prototype.__pp_b__', 'polluted');
+        leakedB = {}.__pp_b__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_b__;
+        if (leakedB !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via constructor.prototype path');
+        // 3. a leading __proto__ segment must not pollute either
+        (0, utilities_1.add_value_for_dotted_key)({}, '__proto__.__pp_c__', 'polluted');
+        leakedC = {}.__pp_c__;
+        delete Object.prototype.__pp_c__;
+        if (leakedC !== undefined)
+            fail('Object.prototype polluted via leading __proto__ segment');
+        obj = { a: { b: {} } };
+        (0, utilities_1.add_value_for_dotted_key)(obj, 'a.b.c', 42);
+        if (obj.a.b.c !== 42)
+            fail('legitimate dotted assignment broke');
+        flat = {};
+        (0, utilities_1.add_value_for_dotted_key)(flat, 'name', 'ok');
+        if (flat.name !== 'ok')
+            fail('single-key assignment broke');
+        console.log("✅ F-0016 prototype-pollution regression tests passed");
+        return [2 /*return*/];
+    });
+}); };
+exports.prototype_pollution_tests = prototype_pollution_tests;
+if (require.main === module) {
+    (0, exports.prototype_pollution_tests)()
+        .then(function () { console.log("✅ suite completed"); process.exit(0); })
+        .catch(function (err) { console.error("❌ suite failed:", err); process.exit(1); });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0016-prototype-pollution.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Tenant-boundary guard for cascade_role_rename (relates to security-audit finding F-0053,
+ * which was investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the code trace).
+ *
+ * The `cascade_role_rename` side-effect handler
+ * ([event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts](packages/private/api/api/v1/event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts))
+ * runs when a `role_based_access_permissions` doc's `role` field changes. It finds every user
+ * with the old role name (via `DBUnrestricted.users`) and rewrites their `roles` array, then
+ * deauthenticates them. F-0053 hypothesized this query was globally cross-tenant. It is NOT:
+ * `DBUnrestricted` bypasses per-user/per-role RBAC but is STILL scoped to the acting session's
+ * `businessId` (see `modifyFilterForAccessConstraint` injecting `{ businessId }` at
+ * database.ts:1761-1763, reached via the `unrestricted: true` branch at database.ts:2137-2144).
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of `DBUnrestricted` semantics
+ * can't silently turn the cascade into a cross-tenant write:
+ *   1. Tenant A creates a role `ROLE_OLD` and assigns it to a Tenant A user (positive control).
+ *   2. Tenant B (separate businessId) has a user whose roles include the SAME `ROLE_OLD`.
+ *   3. Tenant A renames the role `ROLE_OLD` -> `ROLE_NEW`.
+ *   4. Assert the Tenant B user's roles are UNCHANGED (still `[ROLE_OLD]`)  <-- guards the tenant boundary.
+ *   5. Assert the Tenant A user's roles ARE renamed to `[ROLE_NEW]`         <-- same-tenant cascade works.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: BOTH assertions pass. A regression that drops the
+ * `businessId` scoping would flip assertion #4 to red (Tenant B user becomes `[ROLE_NEW]`).
+ *
+ * A collision-proof unique role name (timestamped) is used so the test never touches real roles.
+ */
+export declare const cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests: ({ sdk }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAetC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAyBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sCAAsC;SAA2B,OAAO;iBAAe,OAAO;mBA+F1G,CAAA"}

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+"use strict";
+var __assign = (this && this.__assign) || function () {
+    __assign = Object.assign || function(t) {
+        for (var s, i = 1, n = arguments.length; i < n; i++) {
+            s = arguments[i];
+            for (var p in s) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(s, p))
+                t[p] = s[p];
+        }
+        return t;
+    };
+    return __assign.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+var __awaiter = (this && this.__awaiter) || function (thisArg, _arguments, P, generator) {
+    function adopt(value) { return value instanceof P ? value : new P(function (resolve) { resolve(value); }); }
+    return new (P || (P = Promise))(function (resolve, reject) {
+        function fulfilled(value) { try { step(generator.next(value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function rejected(value) { try { step(generator["throw"](value)); } catch (e) { reject(e); } }
+        function step(result) { result.done ? resolve(result.value) : adopt(result.value).then(fulfilled, rejected); }
+        step((generator = generator.apply(thisArg, _arguments || [])).next());
+    });
+};
+var __generator = (this && this.__generator) || function (thisArg, body) {
+    var _ = { label: 0, sent: function() { if (t[0] & 1) throw t[1]; return t[1]; }, trys: [], ops: [] }, f, y, t, g;
+    return g = { next: verb(0), "throw": verb(1), "return": verb(2) }, typeof Symbol === "function" && (g[Symbol.iterator] = function() { return this; }), g;
+    function verb(n) { return function (v) { return step([n, v]); }; }
+    function step(op) {
+        if (f) throw new TypeError("Generator is already executing.");
+        while (g && (g = 0, op[0] && (_ = 0)), _) try {
+            if (f = 1, y && (t = op[0] & 2 ? y["return"] : op[0] ? y["throw"] || ((t = y["return"]) && t.call(y), 0) : y.next) && !(t = t.call(y, op[1])).done) return t;
+            if (y = 0, t) op = [op[0] & 2, t.value];
+            switch (op[0]) {
+                case 0: case 1: t = op; break;
+                case 4: _.label++; return { value: op[1], done: false };
+                case 5: _.label++; y = op[1]; op = [0]; continue;
+                case 7: op = _.ops.pop(); _.trys.pop(); continue;
+                default:
+                    if (!(t = _.trys, t = t.length > 0 && t[t.length - 1]) && (op[0] === 6 || op[0] === 2)) { _ = 0; continue; }
+                    if (op[0] === 3 && (!t || (op[1] > t[0] && op[1] < t[3]))) { _.label = op[1]; break; }
+                    if (op[0] === 6 && _.label < t[1]) { _.label = t[1]; t = op; break; }
+                    if (t && _.label < t[2]) { _.label = t[2]; _.ops.push(op); break; }
+                    if (t[2]) _.ops.pop();
+                    _.trys.pop(); continue;
+            }
+            op = body.call(thisArg, _);
+        } catch (e) { op = [6, e]; y = 0; } finally { f = t = 0; }
+        if (op[0] & 5) throw op[1]; return { value: op[0] ? op[1] : void 0, done: true };
+    }
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = void 0;
+require('source-map-support').install();
+var sdk_1 = require("../../../sdk");
+var testing_1 = require("@tellescope/testing");
+var setup_1 = require("../../setup");
+var constants_1 = require("@tellescope/constants");
+var host = process.env.API_URL || 'http://localhost:8080';
+// Separate tenant (different businessId), reusing the same hardcoded apiKey that
+// multi_tenant_tests relies on in tests.ts.
+var OTHER_TENANT_API_KEY = "ba745e25162bb95a795c5fa1af70df188d93c4d3aac9c48b34a5c8c9dd7b80f7";
+/**
+ * Tenant-boundary guard for cascade_role_rename (relates to security-audit finding F-0053,
+ * which was investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the code trace).
+ *
+ * The `cascade_role_rename` side-effect handler
+ * ([event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts](packages/private/api/api/v1/event_handlers_v2/role_based_access_permissions.ts))
+ * runs when a `role_based_access_permissions` doc's `role` field changes. It finds every user
+ * with the old role name (via `DBUnrestricted.users`) and rewrites their `roles` array, then
+ * deauthenticates them. F-0053 hypothesized this query was globally cross-tenant. It is NOT:
+ * `DBUnrestricted` bypasses per-user/per-role RBAC but is STILL scoped to the acting session's
+ * `businessId` (see `modifyFilterForAccessConstraint` injecting `{ businessId }` at
+ * database.ts:1761-1763, reached via the `unrestricted: true` branch at database.ts:2137-2144).
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of `DBUnrestricted` semantics
+ * can't silently turn the cascade into a cross-tenant write:
+ *   1. Tenant A creates a role `ROLE_OLD` and assigns it to a Tenant A user (positive control).
+ *   2. Tenant B (separate businessId) has a user whose roles include the SAME `ROLE_OLD`.
+ *   3. Tenant A renames the role `ROLE_OLD` -> `ROLE_NEW`.
+ *   4. Assert the Tenant B user's roles are UNCHANGED (still `[ROLE_OLD]`)  <-- guards the tenant boundary.
+ *   5. Assert the Tenant A user's roles ARE renamed to `[ROLE_NEW]`         <-- same-tenant cascade works.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: BOTH assertions pass. A regression that drops the
+ * `businessId` scoping would flip assertion #4 to red (Tenant B user becomes `[ROLE_NEW]`).
+ *
+ * A collision-proof unique role name (timestamped) is used so the test never touches real roles.
+ */
+var cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = function (_a) {
+    var sdk = _a.sdk;
+    return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        var stamp, ROLE_OLD, ROLE_NEW, sdkOther, rbapId, controlUserId, victimUserId, tenantABusinessId, rbap, controlUser, victimUser, victimBefore, controlBefore, victimAfter, controlAfter, _b, _c, _d;
+        return __generator(this, function (_e) {
+            switch (_e.label) {
+                case 0:
+                    (0, testing_1.log_header)("F-0053: cascade role rename cross-tenant regression");
+                    stamp = Date.now();
+                    ROLE_OLD = "XTenantRename_".concat(stamp);
+                    ROLE_NEW = "".concat(ROLE_OLD, "_renamed");
+                    sdkOther = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host, apiKey: OTHER_TENANT_API_KEY });
+                    _e.label = 1;
+                case 1:
+                    _e.trys.push([1, , 13, 26]);
+                    tenantABusinessId = sdk.userInfo.businessId;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.createOne({
+                            role: ROLE_OLD,
+                            permissions: __assign({}, constants_1.PROVIDER_PERMISSIONS),
+                        })];
+                case 2:
+                    rbap = _e.sent();
+                    rbapId = rbap.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0053-control-".concat(stamp, "@example.com"),
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                        })];
+                case 3:
+                    controlUser = _e.sent();
+                    controlUserId = controlUser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.updateOne(controlUserId, { roles: [ROLE_OLD] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })
+                        // 3. Tenant B: create a throwaway victim user holding the SAME ROLE_OLD.
+                    ];
+                case 4:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.createOne({
+                            email: "f0053-victim-".concat(stamp, "@example.com"),
+                            notificationEmailsDisabled: true,
+                        })];
+                case 5:
+                    victimUser = _e.sent();
+                    victimUserId = victimUser.id;
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.updateOne(victimUserId, { roles: [ROLE_OLD] }, { replaceObjectFields: true })
+                        // 4. Setup sanity: tenants are distinct and both users actually hold ROLE_OLD before the rename.
+                        //    (Distinguishes a setup failure from the security assertion below.)
+                    ];
+                case 6:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    // 4. Setup sanity: tenants are distinct and both users actually hold ROLE_OLD before the rename.
+                    //    (Distinguishes a setup failure from the security assertion below.)
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(victimUser.businessId !== tenantABusinessId, "Victim user shares businessId with Tenant A (".concat(victimUser.businessId, ") \u2014 not a cross-tenant scenario"), 'F-0053 setup: tenants are distinct');
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.getOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 7:
+                    victimBefore = _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 8:
+                    controlBefore = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(victimBefore.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD])
+                        && JSON.stringify(controlBefore.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD]), "Setup failed: expected both users to hold [".concat(ROLE_OLD, "] (victim=").concat(JSON.stringify(victimBefore.roles), ", control=").concat(JSON.stringify(controlBefore.roles), ")"), 'F-0053 setup: both users hold ROLE_OLD');
+                    // 5. Tenant A renames the role. This triggers cascade_role_rename.
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.updateOne(rbapId, { role: ROLE_NEW })];
+                case 9:
+                    // 5. Tenant A renames the role. This triggers cascade_role_rename.
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, testing_1.wait)(undefined, 1500)
+                        // 6. SECURITY ASSERTION — the Tenant B victim must be untouched by Tenant A's rename.
+                    ]; // let the side effect run
+                case 10:
+                    _e.sent(); // let the side effect run
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.getOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 11:
+                    victimAfter = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(victimAfter.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_OLD]), "CROSS-TENANT LEAK: Tenant B victim roles changed to ".concat(JSON.stringify(victimAfter.roles), " ")
+                        + "after Tenant A renamed its role. Expected [".concat(ROLE_OLD, "]."), 'F-0053: Tenant B user roles unaffected by other-tenant role rename');
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.getOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 12:
+                    controlAfter = _e.sent();
+                    (0, testing_1.assert)(JSON.stringify(controlAfter.roles) === JSON.stringify([ROLE_NEW]), "Same-tenant cascade broken: Tenant A control roles are ".concat(JSON.stringify(controlAfter.roles), ", ")
+                        + "expected [".concat(ROLE_NEW, "]."), 'F-0053: Tenant A user roles renamed by same-tenant cascade');
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 26];
+                case 13:
+                    if (!victimUserId) return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                    _e.label = 14;
+                case 14:
+                    _e.trys.push([14, 16, , 17]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdkOther.api.users.deleteOne(victimUserId)];
+                case 15:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 16:
+                    _b = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 17];
+                case 17:
+                    if (!controlUserId) return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                    _e.label = 18;
+                case 18:
+                    _e.trys.push([18, 20, , 21]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.users.deleteOne(controlUserId)];
+                case 19:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                case 20:
+                    _c = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 21];
+                case 21:
+                    if (!rbapId) return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                    _e.label = 22;
+                case 22:
+                    _e.trys.push([22, 24, , 25]);
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, sdk.api.role_based_access_permissions.deleteOne(rbapId)];
+                case 23:
+                    _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                case 24:
+                    _d = _e.sent();
+                    return [3 /*break*/, 25];
+                case 25: return [7 /*endfinally*/];
+                case 26: return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    });
+};
+exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests = cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests;
+// Allow running this test file independently
+if (require.main === module) {
+    console.log("\uD83C\uDF10 Using API URL: ".concat(host));
+    var sdk_2 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var sdkNonAdmin_1 = new sdk_1.Session({ host: host });
+    var runTests = function () { return __awaiter(void 0, void 0, void 0, function () {
+        return __generator(this, function (_a) {
+            switch (_a.label) {
+                case 0: return [4 /*yield*/, (0, setup_1.setup_tests)(sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin_1)];
+                case 1:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [4 /*yield*/, (0, exports.cascade_role_rename_cross_tenant_tests)({ sdk: sdk_2, sdkNonAdmin: sdkNonAdmin_1 })];
+                case 2:
+                    _a.sent();
+                    return [2 /*return*/];
+            }
+        });
+    }); };
+    runTests()
+        .then(function () {
+        console.log("✅ F-0053 cascade role rename cross-tenant test suite completed successfully");
+        process.exit(0);
+    })
+        .catch(function (error) {
+        console.error("❌ F-0053 cascade role rename cross-tenant test suite failed:", error);
+        process.exit(1);
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.js.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0053-cascade-role-rename-cross-tenant.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { Session } from "../../../sdk";
+/**
+ * Self-role privilege-escalation guard (relates to security-audit finding F-0076, which was
+ * investigated and closed as a FALSE POSITIVE — see that file for the full code trace).
+ *
+ * F-0076 hypothesized that a non-admin staff user could `PATCH /v1/users/{their-own-id}` with
+ * `{ roles: ['Admin'] }` and self-promote to Admin, because the FIRST `users` relationship
+ * constraint ("Only admin users can set the admin role",
+ * [schema.ts:3446](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3446)) has a self-exception
+ * (`if (_id === session.id) return`).
+ *
+ * That analysis missed the SECOND constraint, "Only admin users can update user roles"
+ * ([schema.ts:3486](packages/public/schema/src/schema.ts#L3486)), which has NO self-exception.
+ * Relationship constraints are AND-evaluated — `validateRelationshipConstraints`
+ * ([routing.ts:1240-1252](packages/private/api/api/modules/routing.ts#L1240)) loops the whole
+ * array and throws 400 on the FIRST evaluator that returns a string. So a non-admin self-update
+ * that includes `roles` passes constraint #1 (self-exception) but is rejected by constraint #2.
+ * The self-promotion is blocked.
+ *
+ * This test locks that boundary in place so a future refactor of the role constraints can't
+ * silently reintroduce the escalation. A dedicated throwaway non-admin user is used as the
+ * "attacker" (we never mutate the shared sdkNonAdmin's roles):
+ *   1. Admin creates a throwaway user and assigns it a non-admin role (`['Provider']`).
+ *   2. Authenticate AS that user via a freshly-minted auth token.
+ *   3. As the attacker, attempt four self-role mutations — ['Admin'], ['Provider','Admin'],
+ *      an arbitrary role, and [] — and assert EACH is blocked.       <-- the security assertions
+ *   4. Confirm (as admin) the attacker's roles are still ['Provider'] — nothing slipped through.
+ *   5. Positive control: admin CAN update the throwaway user's roles. <-- guards against an
+ *      over-restrictive regression that would block legitimate admin role management.
+ *
+ * Expected on current (correct) code: all assertions pass. A regression that made the self-update
+ * path role-writable by non-admins would flip the step-3/step-4 assertions to red.
+ */
+export declare const self_admin_role_assignment_tests: ({ sdk }: {
+    sdk: Session;
+    sdkNonAdmin: Session;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

package/lib/cjs/tests/api_tests/security/F-0076-self-admin-role-assignment.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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