@teleporthq/teleport-plugin-next-workflows 0.44.6 → 0.44.8

package/dist/esm/server-runtime-code.js

@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
  * that needs a trustworthy figure (a price, an owner) reads it from the
  * database itself.
  *
+ * A result that is a credential (a password hash, see credential-results.ts)
+ * makes the same trip SEALED: `segmentReply` replies it encrypted with a key
+ * derived from NEXTAUTH_SECRET (AES-256-GCM) and signs the sealed form, and
+ * `claimSegmentContext` opens every sealed value a request hands it (a
+ * relayed result once its signature holds). The browser relays it without
+ * ever reading it, and a later segment's reply hands back the sealed form,
+ * never the opened one.
+ *
  * The facts about the graph each route needs are baked into its
  * SEGMENT_CONFIG at generation time (see segment-trust.ts).
  */
@@ -51,6 +59,59 @@ function mac(text) {
   return crypto.createHmac('sha256', stepKey()).update(text).digest('hex');
 }
 
+var __sealKeyCache = { secret: null, key: null };
+
+function sealKey() {
+  var secret = process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET || '';
+  if (__sealKeyCache.secret !== secret) {
+    __sealKeyCache = {
+      secret: secret,
+      key: crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update('teleport-workflow-seal:v1').digest()
+    };
+  }
+  return __sealKeyCache.key;
+}
+
+var SEAL_IV_BYTES = 12;
+var SEAL_TAG_BYTES = 16;
+
+var SEAL_AAD = Buffer.from('teleport-workflow-sealed-result:v1', 'utf8');
+
+// The sealed form of a credential result; undefined (the result is then not
+// replied at all) without an app secret, whose key anyone could derive.
+function sealResult(value) {
+  if (!process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET) return undefined;
+  var serialized;
+  try { serialized = JSON.stringify(value); } catch (e) { return undefined; }
+  if (serialized === undefined) return undefined;
+  var iv = crypto.randomBytes(SEAL_IV_BYTES);
+  var cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', sealKey(), iv);
+  cipher.setAAD(SEAL_AAD);
+  var data = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(serialized, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  return { __sealed: Buffer.concat([iv, cipher.getAuthTag(), data]).toString('base64') };
+}
+
+function isSealedResult(value) {
+  return !!value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value) &&
+    typeof value.__sealed === 'string' && Object.keys(value).length === 1;
+}
+
+// { value } when the sealed form opens under this app's key, else null.
+function openSealedResult(sealed) {
+  if (!process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET) return null;
+  try {
+    var raw = Buffer.from(sealed.__sealed, 'base64');
+    if (raw.length <= SEAL_IV_BYTES + SEAL_TAG_BYTES) return null;
+    var decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', sealKey(), raw.subarray(0, SEAL_IV_BYTES));
+    decipher.setAAD(SEAL_AAD);
+    decipher.setAuthTag(raw.subarray(SEAL_IV_BYTES, SEAL_IV_BYTES + SEAL_TAG_BYTES));
+    var data = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(raw.subarray(SEAL_IV_BYTES + SEAL_TAG_BYTES)), decipher.final()]);
+    return { value: JSON.parse(data.toString('utf8')) };
+  } catch (e) {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
 // Without an app secret every key here would derive from '' — a value anyone
 // can compute — so nothing verifies: relayed server results are dropped and no
 // request passes as an internal call. (The generator gives every app with
@@ -206,10 +267,48 @@ function resetPreviousResult(segmentConfig, context) {
 // merge will.
 var __incomingOrders = new WeakMap();
 
+// The sealed results this segment opened, so its reply hands the caller back
+// the sealed form it relayed (see resealRelayedResults).
+var __openedResults = new WeakMap();
+
+// Opens every sealed value the request hands this segment, so its nodes read
+// the credential itself: a relayed server result (whose signature
+// dropUnsignedResults checked first), or a value the browser holds from one
+// (a custom node's output, the previous result). Only this app's server
+// seals, so what opens is what it sealed.
+function openSealedResults(context) {
+  var opened = [];
+  Object.keys(context).forEach(function(key) {
+    if (isControlKey(key) && key !== '__previousNodeResult') return;
+    if (!isSealedResult(context[key])) return;
+    var result = openSealedResult(context[key]);
+    if (!result) return;
+    opened.push({ sealed: context[key], value: result.value });
+    context[key] = result.value;
+  });
+  __openedResults.set(context, opened);
+}
+
+// Every reply entry that is an opened value (the value itself, or the previous
+// result taken from it) goes back sealed.
+function resealRelayedResults(context, reply) {
+  var opened = __openedResults.get(context) || [];
+  if (opened.length === 0) return;
+  Object.keys(reply).forEach(function(key) {
+    for (var i = 0; i < opened.length; i++) {
+      if (reply[key] === opened[i].value) {
+        reply[key] = opened[i].sealed;
+        return;
+      }
+    }
+  });
+}
+
 function claimSegmentContext(segmentConfig, context) {
   var orderKeys = readSignedOrder(context);
   if (orderKeys) restoreOrder(context, orderKeys);
   dropUnsignedResults(segmentConfig, context, orderKeys);
+  openSealedResults(context);
   stripForeignControlKeys(segmentConfig, context);
   __incomingOrders.set(context, Object.keys(context).filter(function(k) { return !isControlKey(k); }));
   utils.claimSegmentContext(segmentConfig, context);
@@ -219,6 +318,13 @@ function claimSegmentContext(segmentConfig, context) {
 
 function segmentReply(segmentConfig, context, snapshot) {
   var reply = utils.segmentReply(segmentConfig, context, snapshot);
+  resealRelayedResults(context, reply);
+  var credentialIds = utils.credentialResultNodeIds(segmentConfig);
+  Object.keys(credentialIds).forEach(function(id) {
+    if (context[id] === undefined) return;
+    var sealed = sealResult(context[id]);
+    if (sealed) reply[id] = sealed;
+  });
   var sigs = {};
   var incoming = context.__sig && typeof context.__sig === 'object' && !Array.isArray(context.__sig) ? context.__sig : {};
   Object.keys(incoming).forEach(function(id) {

package/dist/esm/server-runtime-code.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"server-runtime-code.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/server-runtime-code.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAuCG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,GAAW,EAAE,CAAC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CA2WtD,CAAA"}