@tekyzinc/gsd-t 5.1.10 → 5.1.11

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
 
 All notable changes to GSD-T are documented here. Updated with each release.
 
+## [5.1.11] - 2026-07-13
+
+### Fixed — paused M102 work leaked into the v5.1.10 package; removed
+
+`npm publish` tarballs the WORKING TREE, not the committed tree — so v5.1.10 shipped the uncommitted, PAUSED M102 env-registry files (the known-leaky secret guard bins + a `templates/CLAUDE-global.md` "Environment Access" rule pointing at them). `update-all` re-propagated that rule into `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md`. This patch removes the M102 env-access rule from the template and publishes from a clean tree (the paused M102 build files are stashed during publish, so the package matches the committed state). The Simply Stated doctrine (v5.1.10) is unaffected and retained.
+
+- `templates/CLAUDE-global.md`: removed the M102 "Environment Access — read-first" rule (M102 is paused; the rule pointed at an unfinished/leaky mechanism).
+- Publish hygiene: the paused M102 working-tree files no longer ride into the released tarball.
+
 ## [5.1.10] - 2026-07-13
 
 ### Added — Simply Stated Doctrine (clarity as a defect gate, the verbose-virus cure)

package/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # GSD-T: Contract-Driven Development for Claude Code
 
-**v5.1.10** - A methodology for reliable, parallelizable development using Claude Code with optional Agent Teams support.
+**v5.1.11** - A methodology for reliable, parallelizable development using Claude Code with optional Agent Teams support.
 
 **Eliminates context rot** — task-level fresh dispatch (one subagent per task, ~10-20% context each) means compaction never triggers.
 **Compaction-proof debug loops** — `gsd-t headless --debug-loop` runs test-fix-retest cycles as separate `claude -p` sessions. A JSONL debug ledger persists all hypothesis/fix/learning history across fresh sessions. Anti-repetition preamble injection prevents retrying failed hypotheses. Escalation tiers (sonnet → opus → human) and a hard iteration ceiling enforced externally.

package/bin/gsd-t-logging-scaffolder.cjs

@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@
 const fs = require("fs");
 const path = require("path");
 const crypto = require("crypto");
-// M102 — the marker-block idempotent doc-writer was extracted here into the ONE
-// shared module both this scaffolder and bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs call.
-const { upsertMarkedDocBlock } = require("./gsd-t-doc-marker.cjs");
 
 const VALID_BACKENDS = ["db-table", "local-sqlite", "local-jsonl"];
 
@@ -185,9 +182,24 @@ function writeChoiceToProjectDocs(projectDir, envelope) {
   const targetPath = candidates.find((p) => fs.existsSync(p)) || candidates[0];
 
   const block = docBlock(envelope);
-  // M102 — delegate to the ONE shared marker-block writer (byte-identical logic
-  // to the former inline replace/append; extracted so env-registry reuses it).
-  return upsertMarkedDocBlock(targetPath, DOC_MARKER_START, DOC_MARKER_END, block);
+  let content = "";
+  if (fs.existsSync(targetPath)) {
+    content = fs.readFileSync(targetPath, "utf8");
+  } else {
+    const dir = path.dirname(targetPath);
+    if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+  }
+
+  if (content.includes(DOC_MARKER_START) && content.includes(DOC_MARKER_END)) {
+    const startIdx = content.indexOf(DOC_MARKER_START);
+    const endIdx = content.indexOf(DOC_MARKER_END) + DOC_MARKER_END.length;
+    content = content.slice(0, startIdx) + block + content.slice(endIdx);
+  } else {
+    content = content.replace(/\s*$/, "") + "\n\n" + block + "\n";
+  }
+
+  fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, content, "utf8");
+  return targetPath;
 }
 
 // ─── Seam envelope builder ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

package/bin/gsd-t-verify-gate.cjs

@@ -307,8 +307,6 @@ function _detectDefaultTrack2(projectDir, notes) {
 
   plan.push({ id: 'logging-envelope', cmd: 'node', args: [path.join(__dirname, 'gsd-t-logging-envelope-check.cjs'), '--project', projectDir], timeoutMs: 30000 }); // M100 D3: structural trace+audit envelope gate, FAIL-CLOSED
 
-  plan.push({ id: 'env-registry', cmd: 'node', args: [path.join(__dirname, 'gsd-t-env-registry-check.cjs'), '--project', projectDir], timeoutMs: 30000 }); // M102 D3: no-secret-in-registry + rule-without-table gate, FAIL-CLOSED
-
   // secrets — gitleaks (PATH detection deferred to runtime)
   if (_hasOnPath('gitleaks')) {
     plan.push({

package/bin/gsd-t.js

@@ -2999,16 +2999,6 @@ const PROJECT_BIN_TOOLS = [
   // ship to every project or the consumers can't classify. Same propagation class as
   // gsd-t-graph-store-resolver.cjs above. [[project_global_bin_propagation_gap]]
   "gsd-t-graph-availability.cjs",
-  // M102 — Environment Registry. The shared marker-block doc-writer + the
-  // registry helper (record/lookup/detect/add-permission/ensure-gitignore).
-  // Sandboxed workflows (init/populate + provisioning execute/quick tasks) call
-  // the registry via project-local Bash, and the registry `require`s the shared
-  // writer at load — BOTH must ship or the registry throws / the writer is a
-  // second copy. Same propagation class as the graph tools above.
-  // [[project_global_bin_propagation_gap]]
-  // Plus the verify-gate lint (gsd-t-verify-gate.cjs invokes it via __dirname,
-  // so it must sit alongside the gate in the project's bin/).
-  "gsd-t-doc-marker.cjs", "gsd-t-env-registry.cjs", "gsd-t-env-registry-check.cjs",
 ];
 
 // Files that older versions of this installer copied into project bin/ but

package/commands/gsd-t-init.md

@@ -296,12 +296,6 @@ docs/
 
 These are the living documents that persist across milestones and keep institutional knowledge alive. The `infrastructure.md` is especially important — it captures the exact commands for provisioning cloud resources, setting up databases, managing secrets, and deploying, so this knowledge doesn't get lost between sessions.
 
-The `infrastructure.md` template ships with a marker-delimited `## Environments` table (`<!-- gsd-t-env-registry:start -->` / `:end`) — the committed, **secret-free** connection registry (M102). It is created empty by init and populated by the two triggers:
-- **Greenfield (record-at-create):** whenever this project later BUILDS/PROVISIONS/CONFIGURES an environment (a local test DB, a remote server, credentials, or hands the user setup instructions), record the map row in the SAME pass:
-  `node bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs record '{"projectDir":".","scope":"local","kind":"postgres","host":"localhost","port":"5432","name":"appdb","authMethod":"password","secretVault":"local (.env)","secretEnvVarName":"DATABASE_URL","fetchCommand":"read $DATABASE_URL from .env","connectCommand":"psql \"$DATABASE_URL\""}'`
-  Records only the MAP + vault pointer + env-var NAME + fetch/connect commands — **never a secret VALUE** (a literal password/token in a command is REJECTED). `scope=prod` defaults `read-only=YES`.
-- Also run `node bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs ensure-gitignore .` so `.env` is gitignored (auto-add + report; secret-leak precheck).
-
 ## Step 8: Ensure README.md Exists
 
 If no `README.md` exists, create one with:

package/commands/gsd-t-populate.md

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ Scan this codebase and populate the GSD-T documentation. Analyze the actual code
 - List Credentials and Secrets from .env.example (local) and any secret manager configs
 - Document Deployment from CI/CD configs, Dockerfiles, cloud configs
 - Document Logging and Monitoring from any logging setup or dashboard configs
-- **Back-fill the `## Environments` registry (M102 — brownfield capture).** For an existing project whose non-local environments are undocumented, back-fill the map-only Environments table WITHOUT ever reading or writing a secret VALUE:
-  1. `node bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs detect .` → proposes the vault + fetch command from `.env.example` var NAMES, connection-string SHAPES, and `vercel.json`/`.vercel` (Vercel) · `cloudbuild.yaml`/`.gcloudignore` (Google Secret Manager) · neon dep (Neon) · plain `.env` (local). Map only — never a value.
-  2. Confirm/fill gaps with the human, then `node bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs record '<json>'` per environment (upsert by `(scope, kind)` — a re-provision replaces the stale row).
-  3. `node bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs ensure-gitignore .` — auto-add `.env` to `.gitignore` if missing + report.
-  - **No-Fallback-Ever:** a genuinely undocumented environment reached for the first time HALTs → detect → ask → record → `add-permission` → proceed. NEVER guess a connection string, NEVER grep transcripts to rediscover.
 
 ## Graph Structural Slice — who-imports + cluster (M94-D10)
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@tekyzinc/gsd-t",
-  "version": "5.1.10",
+  "version": "5.1.11",
   "description": "GSD-T: Contract-Driven Development for Claude Code — 54 slash commands with headless-by-default workflow spawning, unattended supervisor relay with event stream, graph-powered code analysis, real-time agent dashboard, task telemetry, doc-ripple enforcement, backlog management, impact analysis, test sync, milestone archival, and PRD generation",
   "author": "Tekyz, Inc.",
   "license": "MIT",

package/templates/CLAUDE-global.md

@@ -99,25 +99,6 @@ NEED TO UNDERSTAND SOMETHING?
   └── Not documented? → Research, then DOCUMENT IT
 ```
 
-### Environment Access — read-first, HALT-and-document (M102)
-
-**EXTENDS No-Re-Research; obeys No-Fallback-Ever.** Before reaching ANY non-local environment (staging/prod DB, remote server, hosted API, SSH host), the connection MAP is read from the committed `## Environments` table in `docs/infrastructure.md` — NEVER re-discovered.
-
-```
-NEED TO REACH A NON-LOCAL ENVIRONMENT?
-  ├── lookupEnvironment(scope, kind) FIRST  →  bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs lookup
-  ├── Row exists → use its connect command; the secret is pulled at runtime via
-  │                the recorded env-var NAME from its vault (never a value in the doc).
-  │                scope=prod + read-only=YES + a WRITE op → HALT, confirm with human.
-  └── Row MISSING → HALT the connect. Do NOT guess a connection string. Do NOT grep
-                    transcripts to rediscover. The brownfield path:
-                    detectEnvConfig → ask human to confirm/fill → recordEnvironment
-                    → addPermissionEntry → THEN proceed. First need = last rediscovery.
-```
-
-- The registry stores only the MAP + which vault holds the secret + the env-var NAME + the fetch/connect commands — **never a secret VALUE**.
-- **Zero fallback.** A missing row resolves by DOCUMENTING (detect → ask → record → proceed), never by a guessed connstring or a transcript re-grep. That HALT-then-document is NOT a fallback.
-- Greenfield: when GSD-T builds/provisions an env, it records the row in the SAME pass (`recordEnvironment`) — so staleness self-heals (a re-provision upserts by `(scope, kind)` and replaces the stale row).
 
 
 # Versioning

package/templates/infrastructure.md

@@ -68,46 +68,6 @@ cp .env.example .env
 {command}
 ```
 
-<!-- gsd-t-env-registry:start -->
-## Environments
-
-> **Map, not secrets.** This table records only WHERE an environment lives and
-> HOW to reach it — host/port/name/auth-method/which-vault-holds-the-secret/the
-> env-var NAME/the fetch + connect commands. It NEVER stores a secret VALUE.
-> The value lives in the vault (`.env` / Vercel / Neon / Google Secret Manager)
-> and is pulled at runtime via the env-var NAME. A missing row → HALT and
-> document (detect → ask → record → proceed); never guess a connection string,
-> never grep transcripts to rediscover.
-
-| id | scope | kind | host | port | db/name | auth method | secret vault | secret env-var NAME | fetch command | connect command | access gotchas | read-only default | recorded |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-<!-- gsd-t-env-registry:end -->
-
-<!--
-  Column notes:
-    scope             = local | staging | prod
-    kind              = postgres | mysql | redis | http-api | ssh-host | ...
-    secret vault      = local (.env) | Vercel | Neon | Google Secret Manager | ...
-    secret env-var NAME = e.g. DATABASE_URL_PROD  — the NAME only, NEVER the value
-    host              = POSITIVE shape: localhost | IPv4 | dotted DNS hostname |
-                        short lowercase service name (letters+hyphen, no digits, e.g. db, postgres)
-    db/name           = short lowercase snake identifier (<=16, e.g. binvoice_prod, analytics)
-    auth method       = ENUMERATED — password | iam | oauth | oauth2 | service-account |
-                        ssh-key | api-key | none | scram-sha-256 | md5 | trust | token | key | ...
-    fetch command     = how to pull the secret from its vault (e.g. `vercel env pull`)
-                        POSITIVE allowlist: a token is accepted ONLY if it IS a $VAR/${VAR} ref,
-                        a flag, a hostname/IP, a .env dotfile, or a curated CLI/db word.
-                        Any OTHER bare literal is REJECTED (move it to an env var, reference as $VAR).
-    connect command   = references the env-var by name: `psql "$DATABASE_URL_PROD"` (same allowlist)
-    access gotchas    = ENUMERATED — vpn | ip-allowlist | ssh-tunnel | bastion | none,
-                        optionally `via <hostname>` (e.g. `ssh-tunnel via bastion.example.com`).
-                        Free prose is FORBIDDEN (nowhere for a secret to hide).
-    read-only default = YES for scope=prod unless a human explicitly recorded write-ok
-  There is deliberately NO secret-value column — a row is structurally incapable
-  of holding a secret. Populated by `gsd-t-env-registry` (record-at-create +
-  capture-on-first-need).
--->
-
 ## Credentials & Secrets
 
 ### Local (.env)

package/bin/gsd-t-doc-marker.cjs

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-// bin/gsd-t-doc-marker.cjs
-//
-// M102 — the ONE shared marker-block idempotent doc-writer. Extracted from the
-// M100 logging scaffolder's private `writeChoiceToProjectDocs` (so there is a
-// single writer, not two copies): both bin/gsd-t-logging-scaffolder.cjs and
-// bin/gsd-t-env-registry.cjs call this.
-//
-// upsertMarkedDocBlock(targetPath, startMarker, endMarker, block):
-//   - If targetPath contains BOTH markers, the region between them (inclusive)
-//     is REPLACED with `block` (idempotent re-write).
-//   - Otherwise `block` is appended to the end of the file (creating the file
-//     and any missing parent dirs).
-//   - `block` MUST already begin with startMarker and end with endMarker — the
-//     caller composes the full block (same contract the M100 writer used).
-//
-// Zero external npm runtime deps — fs/path only. Symlink-guarded: refuses to
-// write through a symlinked target (defense-in-depth, matches the installer's
-// settings-writer scaffold).
-
-const fs = require("fs");
-const path = require("path");
-
-function isSymlink(filePath) {
-  try {
-    return fs.lstatSync(filePath).isSymbolicLink();
-  } catch (_) {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-// Replace the [startMarker … endMarker] region with `block`, or append it.
-// Returns the written targetPath. Idempotent: a second call with the same
-// block leaves the file byte-identical.
-function upsertMarkedDocBlock(targetPath, startMarker, endMarker, block) {
-  if (!targetPath) throw new Error("upsertMarkedDocBlock: targetPath is required");
-  if (!startMarker || !endMarker) throw new Error("upsertMarkedDocBlock: start/end markers are required");
-  if (typeof block !== "string") throw new Error("upsertMarkedDocBlock: block must be a string");
-
-  if (isSymlink(targetPath)) {
-    throw new Error(`upsertMarkedDocBlock: refusing to write through symlinked target: ${targetPath}`);
-  }
-
-  let content = "";
-  if (fs.existsSync(targetPath)) {
-    content = fs.readFileSync(targetPath, "utf8");
-  } else {
-    const dir = path.dirname(targetPath);
-    if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
-  }
-
-  if (content.includes(startMarker) && content.includes(endMarker)) {
-    const startIdx = content.indexOf(startMarker);
-    const endIdx = content.indexOf(endMarker) + endMarker.length;
-    content = content.slice(0, startIdx) + block + content.slice(endIdx);
-  } else {
-    content = content.replace(/\s*$/, "") + "\n\n" + block + "\n";
-  }
-
-  fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, content, "utf8");
-  return targetPath;
-}
-
-module.exports = { upsertMarkedDocBlock };

package/bin/gsd-t-env-registry-check.cjs

@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-// bin/gsd-t-env-registry-check.cjs
-//
-// M102 D3 — the deterministic verify-gate lint for the Environment Registry.
-// FAIL-CLOSED. Two failure conditions (spec D3):
-//   (a) any Environments row cell is NOT the POSITIVE shape its column is
-//       supposed to hold (a value that is not a real hostname / not the enum /
-//       not a $VAR / not a curated command token = a probable inline secret);
-//   (b) the env-access DOC RULE is present in the project's CLAUDE.md but the
-//       `## Environments` table MARKERS are absent from docs/infrastructure.md
-//       (rule promises a registry the doc doesn't provide).
-//
-// A project that has neither the table nor the rule is a NO-OP PASS (it simply
-// hasn't adopted M102 yet) — distinguishable from a wired-but-broken FAIL.
-//
-// Zero external npm runtime deps — fs/path only.
-//
-// PRIMARY GUARD = POSITIVE PER-COLUMN SHAPE (re-derived here, NOT a call into
-// the writer). The gate RE-IMPLEMENTS the positive shapes so a writer bug can
-// never silently disable it. It maps each cell to its column and requires the
-// cell to BE the shape that column holds:
-//   - host        → localhost / IPv4 / dotted-DNS / short lowercase service label
-//   - db/name     → short lowercase snake identifier (≤16, no digit→letter)
-//   - auth method → enumerated auth-method name
-//   - fetch/connect command → every token is $VAR / flag / hostname / curated word
-//   - access gotchas → enumerated (vpn|ip-allowlist|ssh-tunnel|bastion|none) + via host
-//   - secret vault → enumerated vault name
-//   - secret env-var NAME → UPPER_SNAKE
-// A cell that is NOT its column's positive shape → FAIL.
-//
-// BACKSTOP (extra layer, applied to EVERY cell regardless of column): the
-// imported known-prefix/JWT/base64/hex `looksLikeSecretValue` + the gate's OWN
-// embedded-credential regex. These are NOT the primary guard — the positive
-// per-column shape is. A secret that somehow matched a positive shape (it can't
-// by construction) would still trip these.
-
-const fs = require("fs");
-const path = require("path");
-
-const {
-  ENV_MARKER_START,
-  ENV_MARKER_END,
-  ENV_COLUMNS,
-  looksLikeSecretValue,
-} = require("./gsd-t-env-registry.cjs");
-
-// The gate ALSO carries its own inline embedded-credential detector so it is
-// not solely dependent on the imported symbol — a proto://user:pw@ literal in
-// ANY cell fails independently of the writer's classification.
-const GATE_EMBEDDED_CRED = /[a-z][a-z0-9+.\-]*:\/\/[^\s:/@]+:(?!\$)[^\s:/@]+@/i;
-
-// ─── Gate's OWN re-implemented POSITIVE shapes (independent of the writer) ────
-//
-// Deliberately re-declared here (not imported) so the gate is a genuinely
-// independent implementation — a bug in the writer's shapes cannot disable the
-// gate's.
-
-const GATE_DOTTED_HOSTNAME =
-  /^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?)+$/;
-const GATE_IPV4 = /^\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}$/;
-const GATE_BARE_HOST_LABEL = /^[a-z][a-z-]{0,15}$/;
-const GATE_VAR_REF = /^["']?\$\{?[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\}?["']?$/;
-const GATE_UPPER_SNAKE = /^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*$/;
-// An ISO-8601 timestamp (the `recorded` column) is structural, not a secret.
-const GATE_ISO_TS = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}([T ]\d{2}:\d{2}(:\d{2}(\.\d+)?)?(Z|[+-]\d{2}:?\d{2})?)?$/;
-
-const GATE_AUTH_METHODS = new Set([
-  "password", "iam", "oauth", "oauth2", "service-account", "ssh-key",
-  "api-key", "none", "scram-sha-256", "md5", "trust", "token", "key",
-  "cert", "mtls", "kerberos", "ldap",
-]);
-const GATE_VAULTS = new Set([
-  "local", "local (.env)", ".env", "env",
-  "vercel", "neon", "gcp-secret-manager", "google secret manager",
-  "aws-secrets-manager", "aws secrets manager", "doppler", "1password",
-  "hashicorp-vault", "vault", "azure-key-vault", "infisical",
-]);
-const GATE_GOTCHA_ENUM = new Set(["vpn", "ip-allowlist", "ssh-tunnel", "bastion", "none"]);
-const GATE_CLI_WORDS = new Set([
-  "psql", "mysql", "mysqldump", "mongo", "mongosh", "redis-cli", "sqlite3",
-  "pg_dump", "pg_restore", "pg_dumpall", "cqlsh", "clickhouse-client",
-  "neonctl", "vercel", "gcloud", "aws", "az", "doppler", "supabase",
-  "flyctl", "fly", "heroku", "railway", "wrangler", "turso", "op", "infisical",
-  "kubectl", "helm", "terraform", "vault",
-  "ssh", "scp", "sftp", "curl", "wget", "ldapsearch", "nc", "openssl", "rsync",
-  "env", "pull", "push", "list", "get", "set", "secrets", "versions",
-  "access", "version", "exec", "run", "connect", "login", "logout",
-  "connection-string", "db-url", "database-url", "redis-url",
-  "admin", "default", "latest", "read", "write", "describe", "show",
-  "from", "cat", "source", "printenv", "dotenv",
-]);
-const GATE_DOTFILE_TOKEN = /^\.[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:\.[a-z][a-z0-9-]*)*$/;
-
-function gateIsDbNameShape(s) {
-  if (typeof s !== "string" || s.length === 0 || s.length > 16) return false;
-  if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$/.test(s)) return false;
-  if (/[0-9][a-z]/.test(s)) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-function gateIsHostShape(s) {
-  if (s === "localhost") return true;
-  if (GATE_IPV4.test(s)) return true;
-  if (GATE_DOTTED_HOSTNAME.test(s)) return true;
-  if (GATE_BARE_HOST_LABEL.test(s)) return true;
-  return false;
-}
-function gateIsVarRef(tok) {
-  const bare = tok.replace(/^["']/, "").replace(/["']$/, "");
-  return GATE_VAR_REF.test(tok) || /^\$\{?[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\}?$/.test(bare);
-}
-// A single command token is on the positive allowlist?
-function gateCommandTokenOk(tok) {
-  const bare = tok.replace(/^["']/, "").replace(/["']$/, "");
-  if (bare === "") return true;
-  if (gateIsVarRef(tok)) return true;
-  if (/^--?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9-]*$/.test(bare)) return true; // bare flag
-  if (/^--?[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9-]*=/.test(bare)) {
-    const value = bare.slice(bare.indexOf("=") + 1);
-    if (value === "") return true;
-    return gateCommandTokenOk(value);
-  }
-  if (gateIsHostShape(bare)) return true;
-  if (GATE_DOTFILE_TOKEN.test(bare)) return true;
-  if (GATE_CLI_WORDS.has(bare.toLowerCase())) return true;
-  if (gateIsDbNameShape(bare)) return true;
-  return false;
-}
-function gateTokenizeCommand(s) {
-  const tokens = [];
-  const re = /"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+/g;
-  let m;
-  while ((m = re.exec(s)) !== null) tokens.push(m[0]);
-  return tokens;
-}
-function gateCommandOk(cell) {
-  for (const tok of gateTokenizeCommand(cell)) {
-    if (!gateCommandTokenOk(tok)) return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-function gateGotchasOk(cell) {
-  const tokens = cell.split(/[,\s]+/).filter(Boolean);
-  for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-    const t = tokens[i].toLowerCase();
-    if (GATE_GOTCHA_ENUM.has(t)) continue;
-    if (t === "via") {
-      const next = tokens[i + 1];
-      if (!next || !gateIsHostShape(next)) return false;
-      i++;
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (gateIsHostShape(tokens[i])) continue;
-    return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-// The BACKSTOP leak test — the known-prefix/JWT/base64/hex detector + the
-// embedded-cred regex. Applied to EVERY cell as an extra layer.
-function cellHitsBackstop(cell) {
-  if (typeof cell !== "string" || !cell) return false;
-  if (looksLikeSecretValue(cell)) return true;
-  if (GATE_EMBEDDED_CRED.test(cell)) return true;
-  return false;
-}
-
-// PRIMARY GUARD: is this cell the POSITIVE shape its column is supposed to hold?
-// Returns true if the cell is VALID for its column. An empty cell / placeholder
-// (`—`) is always valid. `col` is the column NAME.
-function cellMatchesColumnShape(col, cell) {
-  if (typeof cell !== "string") return true;
-  const s = cell.trim();
-  if (s === "" || s === "—") return true;
-  switch (col) {
-    case "id":
-      // <scope>-<kind> — lowercase identifier with a hyphen.
-      return /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(s);
-    case "scope":
-      return s === "local" || s === "staging" || s === "prod";
-    case "kind":
-      return /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(s);
-    case "host":
-      return gateIsHostShape(s.replace(/:\d+$/, ""));
-    case "port":
-      return /^\d+$/.test(s);
-    case "db/name":
-      return gateIsDbNameShape(s);
-    case "auth method":
-      return GATE_AUTH_METHODS.has(s.toLowerCase());
-    case "secret vault":
-      return GATE_VAULTS.has(s.toLowerCase());
-    case "secret env-var NAME":
-      return GATE_UPPER_SNAKE.test(s);
-    case "fetch command":
-    case "connect command":
-      return gateCommandOk(s);
-    case "access gotchas":
-      return gateGotchasOk(s);
-    case "read-only default":
-      return s === "YES" || s === "NO";
-    case "recorded":
-      return GATE_ISO_TS.test(s);
-    default:
-      // Unknown column — fall back to refusing anything the backstop flags.
-      return !cellHitsBackstop(s);
-  }
-}
-
-// The gate's leak test for a cell in a KNOWN column: FAIL if it is NOT the
-// column's positive shape OR (backstop) it hits the known-prefix/embedded-cred
-// detector. The positive shape is the PRIMARY guard.
-function cellLeaks(col, cell) {
-  if (typeof cell !== "string" || !cell) return false;
-  if (!cellMatchesColumnShape(col, cell)) return true; // primary: wrong shape
-  if (cellHitsBackstop(cell)) return true; // backstop: extra layer
-  return false;
-}
-
-function readSafe(p) {
-  try {
-    return fs.readFileSync(p, "utf8");
-  } catch (_) {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-function splitRow(line) {
-  const trimmed = line.trim().replace(/^\|/, "").replace(/\|$/, "");
-  const cells = [];
-  let cur = "";
-  for (let i = 0; i < trimmed.length; i++) {
-    const ch = trimmed[i];
-    if (ch === "\\" && trimmed[i + 1] === "|") {
-      cur += "|";
-      i++;
-    } else if (ch === "|") {
-      cells.push(cur.trim());
-      cur = "";
-    } else {
-      cur += ch;
-    }
-  }
-  cells.push(cur.trim());
-  return cells;
-}
-
-function check(projectDir) {
-  const infraPath = path.join(projectDir, "docs", "infrastructure.md");
-  const claudePath = path.join(projectDir, "CLAUDE.md");
-
-  const infra = readSafe(infraPath) || "";
-  const claude = readSafe(claudePath) || "";
-
-  const hasMarkers = infra.includes(ENV_MARKER_START) && infra.includes(ENV_MARKER_END);
-  // The env-access rule is identified by its stable marker phrase.
-  const hasRule = /Environment Access — read-first, HALT-and-document/.test(claude);
-
-  const failures = [];
-
-  // (b) rule present but table markers absent.
-  if (hasRule && !hasMarkers) {
-    failures.push(
-      "env-access rule is present in CLAUDE.md but the `## Environments` table markers are absent from docs/infrastructure.md"
-    );
-  }
-
-  // (a) secret-shaped value in any row cell.
-  if (hasMarkers) {
-    const start = infra.indexOf(ENV_MARKER_START);
-    const end = infra.indexOf(ENV_MARKER_END);
-    const block = infra.slice(start, end);
-    const lines = block.split("\n");
-    for (const line of lines) {
-      if (!line.trim().startsWith("|")) continue;
-      const cells = splitRow(line);
-      if (cells[0] === "id") continue; // header
-      if (cells.every((c) => /^-{1,}$/.test(c) || c === "")) continue; // separator
-      for (let i = 0; i < cells.length; i++) {
-        const col = ENV_COLUMNS[i] || `col${i}`;
-        if (cellLeaks(col, cells[i])) {
-          failures.push(
-            `Environments row cell (${col}) contains a secret-shaped literal value: "${cells[i]}" — record the env-var NAME and a $VAR reference, never a literal secret`
-          );
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return {
-    ok: failures.length === 0,
-    check: "env-registry",
-    hasMarkers,
-    hasRule,
-    failures,
-    note:
-      !hasMarkers && !hasRule
-        ? "no-op PASS: project has not adopted the M102 Environments registry (no table, no rule)"
-        : undefined,
-  };
-}
-
-function parseArgs(argv) {
-  const out = { projectDir: "." };
-  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
-    if (argv[i] === "--project") out.projectDir = argv[++i] || ".";
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-module.exports = { check };
-
-if (require.main === module) {
-  const { projectDir } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
-  const result = check(projectDir);
-  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2) + "\n");
-  process.exit(result.ok ? 0 : 1);
-}