@teevee98/synapse-hub 4.1.4 → 4.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.agents/rules/git-push-protocol.md +2 -2
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/auth-session-and-cookie-manager/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/bats-testing-patterns/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/clean-pom-crafter/SKILL.md +8 -3
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/e2e-testing-patterns/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/katalon-cli-runner/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/lam-script-generator/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/mobile-appium-som/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/mobile-appium-som/examples/BaseScreen.java +2 -2
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/mobile-appium-som/examples/LoginScreen.java +2 -2
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/mobile-appium-som/examples/TC_MobileLogin.java +2 -2
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/playwright-live-interaction/SKILL.md +7 -2
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/playwright-webapp-testing/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/01-web-automation/web-agent-gym-benchmarking/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/02-test-design/architecture-decision-records/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/02-test-design/gherkin-to-suite/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/02-test-design/rbt-manual-testing/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/02-test-design/review-spec/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/.agents/skills/02-test-design/tot-exploratory-testing/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/03-api-and-contracts/api-network-mocking-interception/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/03-api-and-contracts/api-spec-to-e2e-matrix/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/03-api-and-contracts/consumer-driven-contract-testing/SKILL.md +7 -2
- package/.agents/skills/04-performance-and-load/backend-load-and-stress-patterns/SKILL.md +7 -2
- package/.agents/skills/04-performance-and-load/lean-impact-scoreboard/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/.agents/skills/04-performance-and-load/web-vitals-and-performance-profiler/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/05-security-and-compliance/security-dast-sentinel/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/05-security-and-compliance/skillspector-security-guard/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/05-security-and-compliance/wcag-audit-patterns/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/agentless-qa-repair/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/antigravity-test-sentinel/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/failure-autopsy-and-healing/SKILL.md +7 -2
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/flaky-test-sentinel-and-quarantine/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/self-healing-locator/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/systematic-debugging/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/test-driven-development/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/verification-before-completion/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/06-healing-and-resilience/visual-regression-sentinel/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/07-data-and-state/db-state-verifier-and-seeder/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/07-data-and-state/file-and-report-validator/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/07-data-and-state/synthetic-test-data-generator/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/code-refactoring-refactor-clean/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/graphify-impact-analyzer/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/lean-code-ladder/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/repo-quality-audit/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/senior-code-review/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/surgical-coding-principles/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/08-code-quality/technical-debt-harvester/SKILL.md +4 -1
- package/.agents/skills/09-ci-and-devops/github-actions-templates/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/10-agent-orchestration/actor-qa-swarm/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/10-agent-orchestration/agent-orchestration-multi-agent-optimize/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/10-agent-orchestration/event-stream-qa-orchestrator/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/10-agent-orchestration/persistent-planning-files/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/10-agent-orchestration/qa-memory-os/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/11-ai-and-prompting/meta-prompt-crafter/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/11-ai-and-prompting/mipro-prompt-compiler/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/11-ai-and-prompting/qa-aci-interface/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/.agents/skills/11-ai-and-prompting/token-and-context-optimizer/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/AGENTS.md +7 -1
- package/LICENSE +5 -5
- package/NOTICE +1 -1
- package/README.en.md +4 -4
- package/README.md +4 -4
- package/agentskills.json +1 -1
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.en.md +2 -2
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +11 -2
- package/docs/CLI_REFERENCE.en.md +6 -4
- package/docs/CLI_REFERENCE.md +1 -1
- package/docs/CONTRIBUTING.en.md +1 -1
- package/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md +2 -2
- package/docs/TOOL_CATALOG.md +6 -2
- package/docs/research/agent_skill_training_analysis.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/skills_manifest.json +320 -55
- package/synapse.config.json +1 -1
- package/templates/ui/index.html +2 -2
- package/tools/TOOL_CATALOG.json +63 -3
- package/tools/__init__.py +1 -1
- package/tools/api_fuzzer.py +179 -118
- package/tools/author_integrity.py +121 -11
- package/tools/benchmark_swarm_context.py +119 -18
- package/tools/break_ui_generator.py +233 -0
- package/tools/browser_helpers.js +2 -2
- package/tools/check_version_sync.py +18 -50
- package/tools/cli.py +109 -18
- package/tools/core/bm25_retriever.py +218 -0
- package/tools/core/i18n.py +4 -4
- package/tools/core/provider_usage_adapter.py +317 -0
- package/tools/core/token_estimator.py +42 -14
- package/tools/count_tokens.py +5 -0
- package/tools/coverage_reporter.py +245 -0
- package/tools/dashboard_generator.py +6 -6
- package/tools/db_sandbox.py +146 -4
- package/tools/distill_skill.py +191 -0
- package/tools/git_pre_commit_guard.py +12 -0
- package/tools/humanize_linter.py +3 -0
- package/tools/mcp_docx_server.py +1 -1
- package/tools/mcp_excel_server.py +1 -1
- package/tools/mcp_server.py +75 -15
- package/tools/micro_mutator.py +84 -14
- package/tools/pentest_scope_guard.py +399 -56
- package/tools/perf/benchmark_perf_runner.py +42 -0
- package/tools/rules_router.py +401 -41
- package/tools/security_scanner.py +80 -0
- package/tools/senior_code_review.py +14 -0
- package/tools/skill_canonical_digest.py +244 -0
- package/tools/skill_profiles.py +77 -7
- package/tools/slide_deck_exporter.py +477 -0
- package/tools/sync_skills_manifest.py +166 -0
- package/tools/task_memory_manager.py +260 -0
- package/tools/ui_server.py +1 -1
- package/tools/update_sentinel.py +3 -3
- package/tools/validate_host_interop.py +485 -0
- package/tools/validate_skills_schema.py +282 -0
- package/tools/verify_all.py +572 -42
- package/tools/welcome_page.py +2 -2
package/synapse.config.json
CHANGED
package/templates/ui/index.html
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@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@
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<!-- Footer -->
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<footer>
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-
<p>Synapse Hub © 2026 <strong>Thế Vị (@
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<p>Synapse Hub © 2026 <strong>Thế Vị (@TeeVee98)</strong> — Distributed under the <a href="https://github.com/TeeVee98/Synapse-Hub/blob/main/LICENSE" target="_blank">MIT License</a>.</p>
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</footer>
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<script>
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"Target Repository: D:\\agent-skills",
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"Operational Mode : HUB\n",
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"[GATE 0] Verifying Author Attribution & MIT License Integrity...",
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-
"[PASS] Author Attribution & MIT License Provenance verified intact: Thế Vị (@
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"[PASS] Author Attribution & MIT License Provenance verified intact: Thế Vị (@TeeVee98)",
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"\n[GATE 1] Scanning UTF-8 No BOM and Encoding Integrity across repository...",
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"[PASS] 100% UTF-8 No BOM & Clean Encoding verified across all source files.",
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"\n[GATE 2] Checking Path Portability (Zero absolute machine paths)...",
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package/tools/TOOL_CATALOG.json
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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{
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"schema_version": "1.0.0",
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"updated_at": "2026-11-
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"total_tools":
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"stable_count":
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"updated_at": "2026-11-15T03:21:02.088778+00:00",
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"total_tools": 125,
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"stable_count": 125,
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"experimental_count": 0,
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"tools": [
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{
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],
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"description": "Cross-Platform Token & Cost Auditor (Synapse-Hub)"
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},
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{
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"file": "tools/coverage_reporter.py",
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"command": "python tools/coverage_reporter.py",
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"category": "Auxiliary Utilities",
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"owner_role": "orchestrator",
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"status": "stable",
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"risk_level": "read_only",
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"inputs": [
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"CLI options"
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],
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"outputs": [
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"Artifacts / Telemetry"
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],
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"description": "tools/coverage_reporter.py — Standardized Coverage Metrics & Roadmap Evaluator"
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},
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"file": "tools/create_mock_docx.py",
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"command": "python tools/create_mock_docx.py",
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],
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"description": "Zero-command automated project bootstrap tailoring AI agent rules to the target stack."
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},
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{
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"file": "tools/skill_canonical_digest.py",
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"command": "python tools/skill_canonical_digest.py",
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"category": "Auxiliary Utilities",
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"owner_role": "orchestrator",
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"status": "stable",
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"risk_level": "read_only",
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],
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"Artifacts / Telemetry"
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],
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"description": "tools/skill_canonical_digest.py — Single Source of Truth for Skill Canonical Digest & Lockfile Integrity"
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},
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"description": "tools/sync_agent_rules.py — Synchronizes AGENTS.md single-source rules to all AI bridges"
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"file": "tools/sync_skills_manifest.py",
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"command": "python tools/sync_skills_manifest.py",
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"category": "Auxiliary Utilities",
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"owner_role": "orchestrator",
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"status": "stable",
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],
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],
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"description": "tools/sync_skills_manifest.py — Synchronize Skill Policies & Frontmatter into Manifest"
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},
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],
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"description": "Pre-check validator for Groovy scripts and POM keywords in enterprise test suites."
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"command": "python tools/validate_skills_schema.py",
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],
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],
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"description": "tools/validate_skills_schema.py — Standalone Skill Schema & Policy Validator"
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},
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package/tools/__init__.py
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package/tools/api_fuzzer.py
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from pentest_scope_guard import (
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PentestScopeGuard,
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PentestRateLimiter,
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PentestScopeError,
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mask_secrets,
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)
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# Enforce UTF-8 stdout encoding for Windows/macOS/Linux compatibility
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max_requests: int = 500,
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allow_internal: bool = False,
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consent: Any = False,
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h.strip().lower() for h in os.environ.get("SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_HOSTS", "").split(",") if h.strip()
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}
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is_host_specifically_allowed = host in allowed_hosts
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global_override = os.environ.get("SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_FUZZ") in ("1", "true", "TRUE")
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if host and not is_safe_env and not (is_host_specifically_allowed or global_override):
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raise PermissionError(
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f"[SAFETY FIREWALL - REJECTED] Target host '{host}' is not in the allowed non-production environment allowlist "
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"(localhost, private IP, .local/.internal, or verified dev/staging/qa/test subdomain). "
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f"To authorize this host specifically, set SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_HOSTS='{host}' or SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_FUZZ=1 if authorized."
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)
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if host and not is_safe_env and global_override and not is_host_specifically_allowed:
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print(f" ⚠️ [SECURITY WARNING] SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_FUZZ=1 global override active for host '{host}'. "
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f"Prefer setting SYNAPSE_ALLOW_PROD_HOSTS='{host}' for host-scoped permission.")
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# Wire unified scope guard and rate limiter (narrow loopback opt-in for local test harnesses)
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self.scope_guard = scope_guard or PentestScopeGuard(
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allow_internal=allow_internal,
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+
allow_loopback=allow_loopback
|
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+
)
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+
self.rate_limiter = rate_limiter or self.scope_guard.rate_limiter
|
|
136
139
|
|
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137
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# Prepare SSL context (support self-signed staging certificates via explicit --insecure flag)
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138
141
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self.ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context()
|
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@@ -141,90 +144,28 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
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141
144
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self.ssl_context.check_hostname = False
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142
145
|
self.ssl_context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
|
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146
|
|
|
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+
# Hardened transport opener with SafeRedirectHandler
|
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+
self.opener = self.scope_guard.create_safe_opener(
|
|
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|
+
timeout_sec=self.timeout_sec,
|
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+
ssl_context=self.ssl_context
|
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+
)
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+
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# Validate target base_url before proceeding (Fail-closed)
|
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+
ok, reason = self.scope_guard.validate_target(self.base_url, actor="ApiFuzzer.__init__")
|
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if not ok:
|
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+
raise PermissionError(
|
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157
|
+
f"[SAFETY FIREWALL - REJECTED] Target base URL '{self.base_url}' is not permitted by pentest scope guard: {reason}"
|
|
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|
+
)
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
144
160
|
@staticmethod
|
|
145
161
|
def _is_safe_non_prod_host(host: str) -> bool:
|
|
146
162
|
"""
|
|
147
|
-
|
|
148
|
-
|
|
163
|
+
Deprecated: Replaced by PentestScopeGuard. Enforces strict allowlist validation
|
|
164
|
+
without loose subdomain heuristics.
|
|
149
165
|
"""
|
|
150
|
-
|
|
151
|
-
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
-
host = host.lower().strip()
|
|
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|
-
|
|
155
|
-
# 0. User-specified explicit host allowlist via SYNAPSE_ALLOWED_HOSTS
|
|
156
|
-
allowed_env = os.environ.get("SYNAPSE_ALLOWED_HOSTS", "").strip()
|
|
157
|
-
if allowed_env:
|
|
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|
-
for item in allowed_env.split(","):
|
|
159
|
-
pattern = item.strip().lower()
|
|
160
|
-
if pattern:
|
|
161
|
-
if pattern.startswith("*.") and (host.endswith(pattern[1:]) or host == pattern[2:]):
|
|
162
|
-
return True
|
|
163
|
-
if host == pattern:
|
|
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|
-
return True
|
|
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|
-
|
|
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|
-
# 1. Exact loopback / special names
|
|
167
|
-
if host in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0"): # nosec B104
|
|
168
|
-
return True
|
|
169
|
-
|
|
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|
-
# 2. Check IP address (loopback or private RFC 1918, disallowing link-local metadata like 169.254.169.254)
|
|
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|
-
try:
|
|
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|
-
import ipaddress
|
|
173
|
-
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
|
|
174
|
-
if ip.is_link_local or ip in ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"):
|
|
175
|
-
return False
|
|
176
|
-
return ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private
|
|
177
|
-
except ValueError:
|
|
178
|
-
ip = None # host is a domain name, not an IP literal
|
|
179
|
-
|
|
180
|
-
# 2b. DNS resolution check (anti-SSRF / DNS rebinding against cloud metadata 169.254.0.0/16)
|
|
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|
-
try:
|
|
182
|
-
import socket
|
|
183
|
-
import ipaddress
|
|
184
|
-
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None, socket.AF_UNSPEC, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
|
|
185
|
-
for _, _, _, _, sockaddr in addr_info:
|
|
186
|
-
resolved_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
|
|
187
|
-
if resolved_ip.is_link_local or resolved_ip in ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"):
|
|
188
|
-
return False
|
|
189
|
-
except (socket.gaierror, OSError) as dns_err:
|
|
190
|
-
# Offline test environment or unresolvable mock domain; fall through to lexical verification
|
|
191
|
-
_dns_unresolved = str(dns_err)
|
|
192
|
-
|
|
193
|
-
# 3. Special-use TLDs (RFC 6761 / RFC 2606)
|
|
194
|
-
if any(host.endswith(tld) for tld in (".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".test")):
|
|
195
|
-
return True
|
|
196
|
-
|
|
197
|
-
labels = host.split('.')
|
|
198
|
-
|
|
199
|
-
# 4. Reject production markers anywhere in hostname (e.g. prod-test.bank.com)
|
|
200
|
-
if any(re.search(r'(?:^|[-_])(prod|production)(?:$|[-_])', lbl) for lbl in labels):
|
|
201
|
-
return False
|
|
202
|
-
|
|
203
|
-
# 5. Prevent domain spoofing (e.g. bank.com.test.evil.io where public TLD appears in subdomains)
|
|
204
|
-
common_public_tlds = {
|
|
205
|
-
'com', 'org', 'net', 'edu', 'gov', 'mil', 'io', 'co', 'vn', 'uk', 'de',
|
|
206
|
-
'fr', 'jp', 'cn', 'ru', 'br', 'in', 'ca', 'au', 'info', 'biz'
|
|
207
|
-
}
|
|
208
|
-
if any(lbl in common_public_tlds for lbl in labels[:-2]):
|
|
209
|
-
return False
|
|
210
|
-
|
|
211
|
-
# 6. Apex domains (e.g. bank-test.com, test.com) cannot be assumed non-prod without explicit config
|
|
212
|
-
if len(labels) < 3:
|
|
213
|
-
return False
|
|
214
|
-
|
|
215
|
-
# 7. Subdomain verification (must be in leading subdomains preceding the root domain)
|
|
216
|
-
subdomain_labels = labels[:-2]
|
|
217
|
-
safe_exact_tokens = {"dev", "development", "staging", "qa", "test", "sandbox", "uat", "local", "internal"}
|
|
218
|
-
safe_sub_regex = re.compile(
|
|
219
|
-
r"^(dev|development|staging|qa|test|sandbox|uat)(?:[-_][a-zA-Z0-9]+)*$|^(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]+[-_])+(dev|development|staging|qa|test|sandbox|uat)(?:[-_][a-zA-Z0-9]+)*$",
|
|
220
|
-
re.IGNORECASE
|
|
221
|
-
)
|
|
222
|
-
|
|
223
|
-
for sub in subdomain_labels:
|
|
224
|
-
if sub in safe_exact_tokens or safe_sub_regex.match(sub):
|
|
225
|
-
return True
|
|
226
|
-
|
|
227
|
-
return False
|
|
166
|
+
guard = PentestScopeGuard(allow_internal=True)
|
|
167
|
+
ok, _ = guard.validate_target(f"http://{host}")
|
|
168
|
+
return ok
|
|
228
169
|
|
|
229
170
|
def load_spec(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
230
171
|
"""Loads OpenAPI or Swagger specification from file or URL."""
|
|
@@ -256,10 +197,17 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
256
197
|
}
|
|
257
198
|
|
|
258
199
|
if self.spec_path.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
|
|
200
|
+
# Validate spec URL with scope guard before network dispatch
|
|
201
|
+
ok, reason = self.scope_guard.validate_target(self.spec_path, actor="ApiFuzzer.load_spec")
|
|
202
|
+
if not ok:
|
|
203
|
+
raise PermissionError(f"[PENTEST SCOPE GUARD] Disallowed OpenAPI spec URL '{self.spec_path}': {reason}")
|
|
259
204
|
req = urllib.request.Request(self.spec_path, headers={"User-Agent": "AgentQA-Fuzzer/2.0"})
|
|
260
|
-
|
|
261
|
-
|
|
262
|
-
|
|
205
|
+
try:
|
|
206
|
+
with self.opener.open(req, timeout=10.0) as resp:
|
|
207
|
+
raw = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
|
|
208
|
+
return json.loads(raw)
|
|
209
|
+
except PentestScopeError as pse:
|
|
210
|
+
raise PermissionError(f"[PENTEST SCOPE GUARD] Redirect blocked during load_spec: {pse}")
|
|
263
211
|
else:
|
|
264
212
|
if not os.path.exists(self.spec_path):
|
|
265
213
|
raise FileNotFoundError(f"OpenAPI spec not found: {self.spec_path}")
|
|
@@ -432,7 +380,7 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
432
380
|
|
|
433
381
|
return mutations
|
|
434
382
|
|
|
435
|
-
def execute_request(self, mutation: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
383
|
+
def execute_request(self, mutation: Dict[str, Any], dry_run: bool = False, consent: Optional[Any] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
436
384
|
"""Dispatches HTTP mutation and evaluates the three-alarm Oracle."""
|
|
437
385
|
url = f"{self.base_url}{mutation['path']}"
|
|
438
386
|
method = mutation["method"]
|
|
@@ -445,7 +393,7 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
445
393
|
return {
|
|
446
394
|
"name": mutation["name"],
|
|
447
395
|
"type": mutation["type"],
|
|
448
|
-
"url": url,
|
|
396
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
449
397
|
"method": method,
|
|
450
398
|
"status_code": 400 if mutation["type"] != "BASELINE" else 200,
|
|
451
399
|
"duration_ms": 42.5,
|
|
@@ -455,6 +403,83 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
455
403
|
"response_preview": '{"status": "handled_by_dry_run"}'
|
|
456
404
|
}
|
|
457
405
|
|
|
406
|
+
# Consent verification: active live testing requires explicit consent before network dispatch
|
|
407
|
+
effective_consent = self.consent if consent is None else consent
|
|
408
|
+
if not self.scope_guard.verify_consent(effective_consent):
|
|
409
|
+
return {
|
|
410
|
+
"name": mutation.get("name", "unnamed"),
|
|
411
|
+
"type": mutation.get("type", "UNKNOWN"),
|
|
412
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
413
|
+
"method": method,
|
|
414
|
+
"status_code": -5,
|
|
415
|
+
"duration_ms": 0.0,
|
|
416
|
+
"verdict": "FAIL",
|
|
417
|
+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
|
|
418
|
+
"alarms": ["CONSENT_REQUIRED: Active API request rejected. Explicit consent required (--confirm-pentest-scope, consent=True, or scoped consent dict)."],
|
|
419
|
+
"response_preview": "Active request blocked: missing consent."
|
|
420
|
+
}
|
|
421
|
+
|
|
422
|
+
# Scoped consent check: verify target, method, path if specified in consent dict
|
|
423
|
+
if isinstance(effective_consent, dict):
|
|
424
|
+
c_target = effective_consent.get("target") or effective_consent.get("base_url")
|
|
425
|
+
if c_target and not (url.startswith(c_target.rstrip("/")) or self.base_url == c_target.rstrip("/")):
|
|
426
|
+
return {
|
|
427
|
+
"name": mutation.get("name", "unnamed"),
|
|
428
|
+
"type": mutation.get("type", "UNKNOWN"),
|
|
429
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
430
|
+
"method": method,
|
|
431
|
+
"status_code": -5,
|
|
432
|
+
"duration_ms": 0.0,
|
|
433
|
+
"verdict": "FAIL",
|
|
434
|
+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
|
|
435
|
+
"alarms": [f"CONSENT_MISMATCH: Scoped consent target '{c_target}' does not authorize target URL '{mask_secrets(url)}'."],
|
|
436
|
+
"response_preview": "Active request blocked: consent target mismatch."
|
|
437
|
+
}
|
|
438
|
+
c_method = effective_consent.get("method")
|
|
439
|
+
if c_method and c_method.upper() != method.upper():
|
|
440
|
+
return {
|
|
441
|
+
"name": mutation.get("name", "unnamed"),
|
|
442
|
+
"type": mutation.get("type", "UNKNOWN"),
|
|
443
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
444
|
+
"method": method,
|
|
445
|
+
"status_code": -5,
|
|
446
|
+
"duration_ms": 0.0,
|
|
447
|
+
"verdict": "FAIL",
|
|
448
|
+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
|
|
449
|
+
"alarms": [f"CONSENT_MISMATCH: Scoped consent method '{c_method}' does not authorize mutation method '{method}'."],
|
|
450
|
+
"response_preview": "Active request blocked: consent method mismatch."
|
|
451
|
+
}
|
|
452
|
+
c_path = effective_consent.get("path")
|
|
453
|
+
if c_path and c_path != mutation.get("path"):
|
|
454
|
+
return {
|
|
455
|
+
"name": mutation.get("name", "unnamed"),
|
|
456
|
+
"type": mutation.get("type", "UNKNOWN"),
|
|
457
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
458
|
+
"method": method,
|
|
459
|
+
"status_code": -5,
|
|
460
|
+
"duration_ms": 0.0,
|
|
461
|
+
"verdict": "FAIL",
|
|
462
|
+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
|
|
463
|
+
"alarms": [f"CONSENT_MISMATCH: Scoped consent path '{c_path}' does not authorize mutation path '{mutation.get('path')}'."],
|
|
464
|
+
"response_preview": "Active request blocked: consent path mismatch."
|
|
465
|
+
}
|
|
466
|
+
|
|
467
|
+
# Check target URL with PentestScopeGuard before network dispatch (Consent NEVER bypasses host scope guard)
|
|
468
|
+
ok, scope_reason = self.scope_guard.validate_target(url, actor="ApiFuzzer.execute_request")
|
|
469
|
+
if not ok:
|
|
470
|
+
return {
|
|
471
|
+
"name": mutation["name"],
|
|
472
|
+
"type": mutation["type"],
|
|
473
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
474
|
+
"method": method,
|
|
475
|
+
"status_code": -3,
|
|
476
|
+
"duration_ms": 0.0,
|
|
477
|
+
"verdict": "FAIL",
|
|
478
|
+
"severity": "CRITICAL",
|
|
479
|
+
"alarms": [f"SCOPE_BLOCKED: Request target blocked by pentest scope guard: {scope_reason}"],
|
|
480
|
+
"response_preview": mask_secrets(scope_reason)
|
|
481
|
+
}
|
|
482
|
+
|
|
458
483
|
req = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
459
484
|
url=url,
|
|
460
485
|
data=body_data,
|
|
@@ -466,11 +491,16 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
466
491
|
status_code = 0
|
|
467
492
|
response_body = ""
|
|
468
493
|
duration_ms = 0.0
|
|
494
|
+
redirect_blocked = False
|
|
469
495
|
|
|
470
496
|
try:
|
|
471
|
-
with
|
|
497
|
+
with self.opener.open(req, timeout=self.timeout_sec) as resp:
|
|
472
498
|
status_code = resp.getcode()
|
|
473
499
|
response_body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
|
500
|
+
except PentestScopeError as pse:
|
|
501
|
+
status_code = -4
|
|
502
|
+
response_body = str(pse)
|
|
503
|
+
redirect_blocked = True
|
|
474
504
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as he:
|
|
475
505
|
status_code = he.code
|
|
476
506
|
try:
|
|
@@ -491,6 +521,9 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
491
521
|
# ----------------------------------------------------
|
|
492
522
|
alarms = []
|
|
493
523
|
|
|
524
|
+
if redirect_blocked:
|
|
525
|
+
alarms.append(f"DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_BLOCKED: {response_body}")
|
|
526
|
+
|
|
494
527
|
# Alarm 1: HTTP 500 / 502 / 503 Internal Server Error
|
|
495
528
|
if status_code in (500, 502, 503):
|
|
496
529
|
alarms.append(f"HTTP_{status_code}_SERVER_CRASH: Unhandled backend exception / server panic")
|
|
@@ -512,7 +545,7 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
512
545
|
|
|
513
546
|
# Alarm 5: Target unreachable - an endpoint that could not be tested
|
|
514
547
|
# must NEVER be reported as PASS (Truth Anchor discipline).
|
|
515
|
-
if status_code < 0:
|
|
548
|
+
if status_code < 0 and not redirect_blocked:
|
|
516
549
|
alarms.append("CONNECTION_ERROR: Target unreachable or transport failure - endpoint could not be verified")
|
|
517
550
|
|
|
518
551
|
verdict = "FAIL" if alarms else "PASS"
|
|
@@ -526,18 +559,27 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
526
559
|
return {
|
|
527
560
|
"name": mutation["name"],
|
|
528
561
|
"type": mutation["type"],
|
|
529
|
-
"url": url,
|
|
562
|
+
"url": mask_secrets(url),
|
|
530
563
|
"method": method,
|
|
531
564
|
"status_code": status_code,
|
|
532
565
|
"duration_ms": duration_ms,
|
|
533
566
|
"verdict": verdict,
|
|
534
567
|
"severity": severity,
|
|
535
568
|
"alarms": alarms,
|
|
536
|
-
"response_preview": response_body[:300]
|
|
569
|
+
"response_preview": mask_secrets(response_body[:300])
|
|
537
570
|
}
|
|
538
571
|
|
|
539
|
-
def run_fuzz_suite(self, dry_run: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
572
|
+
def run_fuzz_suite(self, dry_run: bool = False, consent: Any = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
540
573
|
"""Runs the complete fuzzing suite against all extracted targets."""
|
|
574
|
+
# Consent validation: active live testing requires explicit consent
|
|
575
|
+
if not dry_run:
|
|
576
|
+
has_consent = self.scope_guard.verify_consent(consent)
|
|
577
|
+
if not has_consent:
|
|
578
|
+
raise PermissionError(
|
|
579
|
+
"Active API fuzzing requires explicit consent. Set PENTEST_CONSENT_ACKNOWLEDGED=1, "
|
|
580
|
+
"pass --confirm-pentest-scope, or set dry_run=True to preview safely."
|
|
581
|
+
)
|
|
582
|
+
|
|
541
583
|
spec = self.load_spec()
|
|
542
584
|
targets = self.extract_fuzz_targets(spec)
|
|
543
585
|
|
|
@@ -545,23 +587,36 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
545
587
|
for t in targets:
|
|
546
588
|
all_mutations.extend(self.generate_mutations(t))
|
|
547
589
|
|
|
590
|
+
total_generated = len(all_mutations)
|
|
591
|
+
volume_capped = False
|
|
592
|
+
if len(all_mutations) > self.max_requests:
|
|
593
|
+
all_mutations = all_mutations[:self.max_requests]
|
|
594
|
+
volume_capped = True
|
|
595
|
+
|
|
548
596
|
results = []
|
|
549
597
|
total_failures = 0
|
|
550
598
|
|
|
551
599
|
print(f"\n{BOLD}{CYAN}======================================================================{RESET}")
|
|
552
600
|
print(f"{BOLD}{CYAN} ENTERPRISE AUTONOMOUS API FUZZING & CHAOS BREAKER {RESET}")
|
|
553
601
|
print(f"{BOLD}{CYAN}======================================================================{RESET}")
|
|
554
|
-
print(f" Target Base URL : {self.base_url}")
|
|
555
|
-
print(f" Spec Source : {self.spec_path or 'Default Archetype'}")
|
|
602
|
+
print(f" Target Base URL : {mask_secrets(self.base_url)}")
|
|
603
|
+
print(f" Spec Source : {mask_secrets(self.spec_path or 'Default Archetype')}")
|
|
556
604
|
print(f" Total Endpoints : {len(targets)}")
|
|
557
|
-
print(f" Total Mutations : {len(all_mutations)}")
|
|
605
|
+
print(f" Total Mutations : {len(all_mutations)} (capped from {total_generated})" if volume_capped else f" Total Mutations : {len(all_mutations)}")
|
|
558
606
|
print(f" SLA Threshold : {self.sla_ms} ms")
|
|
607
|
+
print(f" Rate Limit Max : {self.rate_limiter.max_req_per_sec} req/s")
|
|
559
608
|
print(f" Mode : {'DRY-RUN (Air-Gapped / Deterministic)' if dry_run else 'LIVE STAGING ATTACK'}\n")
|
|
560
609
|
|
|
561
610
|
for idx, m in enumerate(all_mutations, start=1):
|
|
562
|
-
|
|
611
|
+
if not dry_run:
|
|
612
|
+
self.rate_limiter.acquire()
|
|
613
|
+
|
|
614
|
+
res = self.execute_request(m, dry_run=dry_run, consent=consent if not dry_run else None)
|
|
563
615
|
results.append(res)
|
|
564
616
|
|
|
617
|
+
if not dry_run and res["status_code"] > 0:
|
|
618
|
+
self.rate_limiter.record_response(res["status_code"])
|
|
619
|
+
|
|
565
620
|
status_str = f"{GREEN}PASS{RESET}" if res["verdict"] == "PASS" else f"{RED}ALARM{RESET}"
|
|
566
621
|
sys.stdout.write(f" [{idx:03d}/{len(all_mutations):03d}] {status_str} | HTTP {res['status_code']} ({res['duration_ms']}ms) | {m['name']}\n")
|
|
567
622
|
if res["alarms"]:
|
|
@@ -570,10 +625,13 @@ class ApiFuzzer:
|
|
|
570
625
|
print(f" 👉 {RED}{BOLD}[DEFECT]{RESET} {alarm}")
|
|
571
626
|
|
|
572
627
|
scorecard = {
|
|
573
|
-
"base_url": self.base_url,
|
|
628
|
+
"base_url": mask_secrets(self.base_url),
|
|
574
629
|
"timestamp": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"),
|
|
575
630
|
"mode": "ACTIVE",
|
|
576
631
|
"total_mutations": len(all_mutations),
|
|
632
|
+
"total_generated": total_generated,
|
|
633
|
+
"volume_capped": volume_capped,
|
|
634
|
+
"max_requests": self.max_requests,
|
|
577
635
|
"passed": len(all_mutations) - total_failures,
|
|
578
636
|
"failed": total_failures,
|
|
579
637
|
"sla_ms": self.sla_ms,
|
|
@@ -727,6 +785,8 @@ def main():
|
|
|
727
785
|
help="active = live fuzzing (default); passive = offline spec audit, zero traffic")
|
|
728
786
|
parser.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true", help="Explicitly bypass TLS certificate verification (for staging/self-signed certs)")
|
|
729
787
|
parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true", help="Simulate mutation generation without live requests")
|
|
788
|
+
parser.add_argument("--max-requests", type=int, default=500, help="Max requests volume ceiling (default: 500)")
|
|
789
|
+
parser.add_argument("--confirm-pentest-scope", action="store_true", help="Explicit human consent acknowledgement for live fuzzing")
|
|
730
790
|
parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="Output summary in JSON format")
|
|
731
791
|
|
|
732
792
|
args = parser.parse_args()
|
|
@@ -740,7 +800,8 @@ def main():
|
|
|
740
800
|
spec_path_or_url=args.spec,
|
|
741
801
|
headers=headers,
|
|
742
802
|
sla_ms=args.sla_ms,
|
|
743
|
-
insecure=args.insecure
|
|
803
|
+
insecure=args.insecure,
|
|
804
|
+
max_requests=args.max_requests
|
|
744
805
|
)
|
|
745
806
|
|
|
746
807
|
if args.mode == "passive":
|
|
@@ -751,7 +812,7 @@ def main():
|
|
|
751
812
|
blocking = int(severity_dict.get("HIGH", 0)) + int(severity_dict.get("CRITICAL", 0))
|
|
752
813
|
return 1 if blocking > 0 else 0
|
|
753
814
|
|
|
754
|
-
scorecard = fuzzer.run_fuzz_suite(dry_run=args.dry_run)
|
|
815
|
+
scorecard = fuzzer.run_fuzz_suite(dry_run=args.dry_run, consent=args.confirm_pentest_scope)
|
|
755
816
|
if args.json:
|
|
756
817
|
print(json.dumps(scorecard, indent=2))
|
|
757
818
|
|