@team-harness/memory-algorithms 0.1.0

package/dist/upstream/utils/sanitize.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * Text sanitization for memory pipeline (capture & recall).
+ * Removes injected tags, gateway metadata, media noise, etc.
+ */
+/**
+ * Clean text for the memory pipeline: remove injected tags, metadata,
+ * timestamps, media markers and base64 image data.
+ *
+ * Used by both capture (L0 recording) and recall (query cleaning) paths.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeText(text: string): string;
+/**
+ * Strip fenced code blocks from assistant replies before L0 capture.
+ *
+ * AI responses often contain large code snippets (```...```) that dilute
+ * the semantic signal for embedding and memory extraction. This function
+ * removes only the code block content while preserving surrounding
+ * natural-language explanations.
+ *
+ * Only applied to `role=assistant` messages in the L0 capture path —
+ * user messages and recall queries are NOT affected.
+ */
+export declare function stripCodeBlocks(text: string): string;
+/**
+ * L0 capture filter — intentionally **permissive**.
+ *
+ * L0 is the raw conversation archive. We want to preserve as much user input
+ * as possible so that downstream stages (L1 extraction, search, analytics)
+ * have the full picture. Only messages that are *structurally* useless are
+ * dropped here:
+ *   - Empty / whitespace-only text
+ *   - Framework-internal noise (bootstrap, session reset, NO_REPLY, …)
+ *   - Slash commands (/new, /reset, …)
+ *
+ * Content-quality filters (length, symbols, prompt injection) are deferred
+ * to {@link shouldExtractL1}.
+ */
+export declare function shouldCaptureL0(text: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * L1 extraction filter — **strict** quality gate.
+ *
+ * Applied when L0 messages are fed into the LLM extraction pipeline.
+ * Filters out content that is too short, too long, purely symbolic,
+ * or looks like a prompt-injection attack — none of which should
+ * become structured memories.
+ *
+ * This function is a superset of {@link shouldCaptureL0}: anything
+ * rejected by L0 is also rejected here, plus additional quality checks.
+ */
+export declare function shouldExtractL1(text: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * @deprecated Use {@link shouldExtractL1} (strict) or {@link shouldCaptureL0} (permissive) instead.
+ *
+ * Kept as an alias of `shouldExtractL1` for backward compatibility.
+ */
+export declare const shouldCapture: typeof shouldExtractL1;
+/**
+ * Detect likely prompt-injection / jailbreak attempts.
+ *
+ * Normalises whitespace before matching to defeat trivial obfuscation
+ * (e.g. extra spaces / newlines between keywords).
+ */
+export declare function looksLikePromptInjection(text: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Pick up to `max` recent unique texts.
+ */
+export declare function pickRecentUnique(texts: string[], max: number): string[];
+/**
+ * Escape XML-like tags in text to prevent tag injection attacks.
+ *
+ * When memory content or persona text is injected into XML-delimited sections
+ * (e.g. `<user-persona>...</user-persona>`), a malicious user could craft content
+ * containing `</user-persona>` to break out of the section boundary.
+ *
+ * This function escapes `<` and `>` in known dangerous patterns (closing tags
+ * that match our injection boundaries) so the content cannot prematurely close
+ * the XML section.
+ */
+export declare function escapeXmlTags(text: string): string;
+/**
+ * Sanitize a raw JSON string from LLM output so that `JSON.parse` won't throw
+ * "Bad control character in string literal".
+ *
+ * Per RFC 8259 §7, U+0000–U+001F MUST be escaped inside JSON string literals.
+ * LLMs sometimes produce unescaped control characters (raw newlines, tabs, etc.)
+ * inside string values.
+ *
+ * Strategy (two-phase):
+ *  1. **Precise pass** — walk through JSON string literals (delimited by `"`)
+ *     and escape any unescaped U+0000–U+001F inside them to `\uXXXX` form,
+ *     while leaving structural whitespace (between values) untouched.
+ *  2. **Fallback** — if the precise pass still fails `JSON.parse`, fall back to
+ *     a simple global strip of rare control chars (\x00–\x08, \x0b, \x0c,
+ *     \x0e–\x1f) which are almost never meaningful in natural-language content.
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeJsonForParse(raw: string): string;

package/dist/upstream/utils/sanitize.js

@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/**
+ * Text sanitization for memory pipeline (capture & recall).
+ * Removes injected tags, gateway metadata, media noise, etc.
+ */
+/**
+ * Clean text for the memory pipeline: remove injected tags, metadata,
+ * timestamps, media markers and base64 image data.
+ *
+ * Used by both capture (L0 recording) and recall (query cleaning) paths.
+ */
+export function sanitizeText(text) {
+    let cleaned = text;
+    // Remove injected memory context tags (prevent feedback loops)
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<relevant-memories>[\s\S]*?<\/relevant-memories>/g, "");
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<user-persona>[\s\S]*?<\/user-persona>/g, "");
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<relevant-scenes>[\s\S]*?<\/relevant-scenes>/g, "");
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<scene-navigation>[\s\S]*?<\/scene-navigation>/g, "");
+    // Remove offload-injected task context blocks (MMD mermaid diagrams)
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<current_task_context>[\s\S]*?<\/current_task_context>/g, "");
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<history_task_context[\s\S]*?<\/history_task_context>/g, "");
+    // Remove framework-injected inbound metadata blocks (from inbound-meta.ts buildInboundUserContextPrefix).
+    // These are "label:\n```json\n...\n```" blocks that the framework prepends to user messages.
+    // Pattern matches all known block labels:
+    //   - Conversation info (untrusted metadata):
+    //   - Sender (untrusted metadata):
+    //   - Thread starter (untrusted, for context):
+    //   - Replied message (untrusted, for context):
+    //   - Forwarded message context (untrusted metadata):
+    //   - Chat history since last reply (untrusted, for context):
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/(?:Conversation info|Sender|Thread starter|Replied message|Forwarded message context|Chat history since last reply)\s*\(untrusted[\s\S]*?\):\s*```json\s*[\s\S]*?```/g, "");
+    // Remove conversation metadata JSON blocks (legacy pattern)
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/```json\s*\{[\s\S]*?"session[\s\S]*?\}\s*```/g, "");
+    // Remove framework reply directive tags: [[reply_to_current]], [[reply_to_xxx]], etc.
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\[\[reply_to[^\]]*\]\]\s*/g, "");
+    // Remove injected skill-selection wrappers, e.g. ¥¥[... ]¥¥
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/¥¥\[[\s\S]*?\]¥¥/g, "");
+    // Remove line-leading timestamps, e.g. "[Tue 2026-03-24 03:48 UTC]"
+    // or "[Tue 2026-03-24 20:21 GMT+8]", "[Thu 2026-03-24 01:51 GMT+5:30]"
+    // Matches brackets containing word chars, digits, hyphens, colons, plus signs,
+    // and spaces — the '+' is needed for timezone offsets like GMT+8, GMT+5:30.
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/^\[[\w\d\-:+ ]+\]\s*/gm, "");
+    // Remove gateway media-attachment markers:
+    //   [media attached: /path/to/file.png (image/png) | /path/to/file.png]
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\[media attached:[^\]]*\]\s*/g, "");
+    // Remove gateway image-reply instructions injected after media attachments.
+    // Starts with "To send an image back" and ends before the next real content.
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/To send an image back,[\s\S]*?(?:Keep caption in the text body\.)\s*/g, "");
+    // Remove "System: [timestamp] Exec completed ..." blocks appended by the framework.
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/^System:\s*\[[\s\S]*?$/gm, "");
+    // Remove inline base64 image data URIs (e.g. ...)
+    // Replace with empty string (not a placeholder) so that pure-image messages
+    // become empty after sanitization and are naturally filtered by length checks.
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/data:image\/[a-z+]+;base64,[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/gi, "");
+    // Remove null chars + compress whitespace
+    cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\0/g, "").replace(/\n{3,}/g, "\n\n").trim();
+    return cleaned;
+}
+/**
+ * Strip fenced code blocks from assistant replies before L0 capture.
+ *
+ * AI responses often contain large code snippets (```...```) that dilute
+ * the semantic signal for embedding and memory extraction. This function
+ * removes only the code block content while preserving surrounding
+ * natural-language explanations.
+ *
+ * Only applied to `role=assistant` messages in the L0 capture path —
+ * user messages and recall queries are NOT affected.
+ */
+export function stripCodeBlocks(text) {
+    return text.replace(/```[^\n]*\n[\s\S]*?```/g, "").replace(/\n{3,}/g, "\n\n").trim();
+}
+// ============================
+// L0 / L1 Capture & Extraction Filters
+// ============================
+/**
+ * L0 capture filter — intentionally **permissive**.
+ *
+ * L0 is the raw conversation archive. We want to preserve as much user input
+ * as possible so that downstream stages (L1 extraction, search, analytics)
+ * have the full picture. Only messages that are *structurally* useless are
+ * dropped here:
+ *   - Empty / whitespace-only text
+ *   - Framework-internal noise (bootstrap, session reset, NO_REPLY, …)
+ *   - Slash commands (/new, /reset, …)
+ *
+ * Content-quality filters (length, symbols, prompt injection) are deferred
+ * to {@link shouldExtractL1}.
+ */
+export function shouldCaptureL0(text) {
+    if (!text || !text.trim())
+        return false;
+    // Filter framework-internal / bootstrap noise messages
+    if (isFrameworkNoise(text))
+        return false;
+    // Slash commands are framework directives, not user content
+    if (text.startsWith("/"))
+        return false;
+    return true;
+}
+/**
+ * L1 extraction filter — **strict** quality gate.
+ *
+ * Applied when L0 messages are fed into the LLM extraction pipeline.
+ * Filters out content that is too short, too long, purely symbolic,
+ * or looks like a prompt-injection attack — none of which should
+ * become structured memories.
+ *
+ * This function is a superset of {@link shouldCaptureL0}: anything
+ * rejected by L0 is also rejected here, plus additional quality checks.
+ */
+export function shouldExtractL1(text) {
+    // First apply the same structural filters as L0
+    if (!shouldCaptureL0(text))
+        return false;
+    // ── Length filters ──
+    // const isCJK = /[\u4e00-\u9fff\u3040-\u30ff\uac00-\ud7af]/.test(text);
+    // if (isCJK && text.length < 2) return false;
+    // if (!isCJK && text.length < 2) return false;
+    // if (text.length > 5000) return false;
+    // ── Content-quality filters ──
+    // Match strings composed entirely of non-word, non-space, non-CJK characters (1–5 chars).
+    if (/^[^\w\s\u4e00-\u9fff\u3040-\u30ff\uac00-\ud7af]{1,5}$/.test(text))
+        return false;
+    if (/^[?？]+$/.test(text))
+        return false;
+    // ── Security filters ──
+    // Reject prompt-injection payloads — prevent malicious content from being
+    // persisted into structured memory and re-injected on future recalls.
+    // if (looksLikePromptInjection(text)) return false;
+    return true;
+}
+/**
+ * @deprecated Use {@link shouldExtractL1} (strict) or {@link shouldCaptureL0} (permissive) instead.
+ *
+ * Kept as an alias of `shouldExtractL1` for backward compatibility.
+ */
+export const shouldCapture = shouldExtractL1;
+// ============================
+// Prompt Injection Detection
+// ============================
+/**
+ * Known prompt-injection / jailbreak patterns.
+ *
+ * Covers:
+ * 1. Instruction override — "ignore all previous instructions", etc.
+ * 2. Role hijack — "you are now DAN", "act as root", etc.
+ * 3. System/developer boundary probing — "system prompt", "developer message"
+ * 4. XML/tag injection — opening tags that match our context boundaries
+ * 5. Tool/command invocation tricks — "run command X", "execute tool Y"
+ * 6. Multi-language variants — Chinese prompt-injection patterns
+ */
+const PROMPT_INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
+    // ── Instruction override ──
+    /ignore\b.{0,30}\b(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i,
+    /disregard\b.{0,30}\b(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i,
+    /forget\b.{0,30}\b(instructions|rules|context)/i,
+    /override\b.{0,30}\b(instructions|rules|guidelines|safety)/i,
+    // ── Role hijack ──
+    /you are now (?!going|about|ready)/i, // "you are now DAN" but not "you are now going to..."
+    /act as (?:if you are |if you were )?(?:a |an )?(?:root|admin|unrestricted|unfiltered|jailbroken)/i,
+    /enter (?:DAN|jailbreak|god|sudo|developer|dev|debug|unrestricted|unfiltered) mode/i,
+    /switch to (?:DAN|jailbreak|god|sudo|developer|dev|debug|unrestricted|unfiltered) mode/i,
+    // ── System boundary probing ──
+    /(?:show|reveal|print|output|display|repeat|leak|dump|give)\b.{0,20}\bsystem prompt/i,
+    /reveal (?:your |the )?(system|hidden|secret|internal) (?:prompt|instructions|rules)/i,
+    /what (?:are|is) your (?:system|hidden|original|initial) (?:prompt|instructions|rules)/i,
+    // ── XML/tag injection (our context boundaries) ──
+    /<\s*(system|assistant|developer|tool|function|relevant-memories)\b/i,
+    // ── Tool/command invocation tricks ──
+    /\b(run|execute|call|invoke)\b.{0,40}\b(tool|command|function|shell)\b/i,
+    // ── Chinese variants ──
+    /忽略(?:所有|之前|以上|先前)?(?:的)?(?:指令|规则|指示|说明)/,
+    /无视(?:所有|之前|以上)?(?:的)?(?:指令|规则|限制)/,
+    /(?:显示|输出|告诉我|给我看)(?:你的)?(?:系统|初始|隐藏)?(?:提示词|指令|规则|prompt)/,
+    /你(?:现在|从现在开始)是/, // "你现在是 DAN"
+];
+/**
+ * Detect likely prompt-injection / jailbreak attempts.
+ *
+ * Normalises whitespace before matching to defeat trivial obfuscation
+ * (e.g. extra spaces / newlines between keywords).
+ */
+export function looksLikePromptInjection(text) {
+    const normalized = text.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+    if (!normalized)
+        return false;
+    return PROMPT_INJECTION_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(normalized));
+}
+/**
+ * Detect framework-injected noise messages that should never be captured.
+ *
+ * These include:
+ * - "(session bootstrap)" — synthetic user turn for Google turn-order compliance
+ * - Session startup instructions from /new or /reset
+ * - "✅ New session started" — AI's ack of session startup (no user-meaningful content)
+ * - Pre-compaction memory flush prompts (system-to-agent instructions, not user content)
+ * - AI's NO_REPLY ack of memory flush (no user-meaningful content)
+ */
+function isFrameworkNoise(text) {
+    const t = text.trim();
+    // Google turn-order bootstrap placeholder
+    if (t === "(session bootstrap)")
+        return true;
+    // Framework session-reset instruction (starts with "A new session was started via /new or /reset")
+    if (t.startsWith("A new session was started via"))
+        return true;
+    // AI's pure ack of session startup: "✅ New session started · model: ..."
+    if (/^✅\s*New session started/.test(t))
+        return true;
+    // Pre-compaction memory flush prompt injected by the framework as a synthetic
+    // user turn. This is an internal system-to-agent instruction, NOT real user
+    // content. Capturing it would pollute L0/L1 memories with framework directives.
+    if (t.startsWith("Pre-compaction memory flush"))
+        return true;
+    // AI's NO_REPLY response to memory flush (or other silent-reply scenarios).
+    // A bare "NO_REPLY" (with optional whitespace) carries no user-meaningful content.
+    if (/^NO_REPLY\s*$/.test(t))
+        return true;
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Pick up to `max` recent unique texts.
+ */
+export function pickRecentUnique(texts, max) {
+    const seen = new Set();
+    const result = [];
+    for (let i = texts.length - 1; i >= 0 && result.length < max; i--) {
+        const t = texts[i];
+        if (!seen.has(t)) {
+            seen.add(t);
+            result.push(t);
+        }
+    }
+    return result.reverse();
+}
+// ============================
+// LLM Safety Utilities
+// ============================
+/**
+ * Escape XML-like tags in text to prevent tag injection attacks.
+ *
+ * When memory content or persona text is injected into XML-delimited sections
+ * (e.g. `<user-persona>...</user-persona>`), a malicious user could craft content
+ * containing `</user-persona>` to break out of the section boundary.
+ *
+ * This function escapes `<` and `>` in known dangerous patterns (closing tags
+ * that match our injection boundaries) so the content cannot prematurely close
+ * the XML section.
+ */
+export function escapeXmlTags(text) {
+    // Escape closing tags that match our injection section boundaries
+    return text.replace(/<\/?(?:user-persona|relevant-memories|scene-navigation|relevant-scenes|memory-tools-guide|system|assistant)>/gi, (match) => match.replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;"));
+}
+// ============================
+// JSON Sanitization for LLM Output
+// ============================
+/**
+ * Sanitize a raw JSON string from LLM output so that `JSON.parse` won't throw
+ * "Bad control character in string literal".
+ *
+ * Per RFC 8259 §7, U+0000–U+001F MUST be escaped inside JSON string literals.
+ * LLMs sometimes produce unescaped control characters (raw newlines, tabs, etc.)
+ * inside string values.
+ *
+ * Strategy (two-phase):
+ *  1. **Precise pass** — walk through JSON string literals (delimited by `"`)
+ *     and escape any unescaped U+0000–U+001F inside them to `\uXXXX` form,
+ *     while leaving structural whitespace (between values) untouched.
+ *  2. **Fallback** — if the precise pass still fails `JSON.parse`, fall back to
+ *     a simple global strip of rare control chars (\x00–\x08, \x0b, \x0c,
+ *     \x0e–\x1f) which are almost never meaningful in natural-language content.
+ */
+export function sanitizeJsonForParse(raw) {
+    // Phase 1: Escape control characters inside JSON string literals.
+    // We walk the string character-by-character to properly handle escape sequences.
+    const escaped = escapeControlCharsInJsonStrings(raw);
+    try {
+        JSON.parse(escaped);
+        return escaped;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Phase 1 didn't fully fix it — fall through to phase 2
+    }
+    // Phase 2: Brute-force strip of rare control chars that have no textual meaning.
+    // Preserves \t (\x09), \n (\x0a), \r (\x0d) which are common structural whitespace.
+    // NOTE: We strip from `escaped` (Phase 1 result) rather than `raw`, so that any
+    // control-character escaping Phase 1 performed is preserved even when the JSON has
+    // other issues (e.g. trailing commas) that cause the Phase 1 parse to fail.
+    const stripped = escaped.replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f]/g, "");
+    return stripped;
+}
+/**
+ * Walk through a JSON text and escape U+0000–U+001F control characters that
+ * appear *inside* JSON string literals (between unescaped `"` delimiters).
+ *
+ * Characters that already have short escape sequences (\n, \r, \t, \b, \f)
+ * are mapped to those; others become \uXXXX.
+ *
+ * Structural whitespace outside string literals is left untouched.
+ */
+function escapeControlCharsInJsonStrings(text) {
+    const SHORT_ESCAPES = {
+        0x08: "\\b", // backspace
+        0x09: "\\t", // tab
+        0x0a: "\\n", // line feed
+        0x0c: "\\f", // form feed
+        0x0d: "\\r", // carriage return
+    };
+    const out = [];
+    let inString = false;
+    let i = 0;
+    while (i < text.length) {
+        const ch = text[i];
+        const code = ch.charCodeAt(0);
+        if (inString) {
+            if (ch === "\\" && i + 1 < text.length) {
+                // Already-escaped sequence — copy both characters verbatim
+                out.push(ch, text[i + 1]);
+                i += 2;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (ch === '"') {
+                // End of string literal
+                out.push(ch);
+                inString = false;
+                i++;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (code <= 0x1f) {
+                // Unescaped control character inside string — escape it
+                const short = SHORT_ESCAPES[code];
+                if (short) {
+                    out.push(short);
+                }
+                else {
+                    out.push("\\u" + code.toString(16).padStart(4, "0"));
+                }
+                i++;
+                continue;
+            }
+            // Normal character inside string
+            out.push(ch);
+            i++;
+        }
+        else {
+            // Outside string literal
+            if (ch === '"') {
+                out.push(ch);
+                inString = true;
+                i++;
+                continue;
+            }
+            // Structural character (including whitespace) — pass through
+            out.push(ch);
+            i++;
+        }
+    }
+    return out.join("");
+}

package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{
+  "name": "@team-harness/memory-algorithms",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Host-independent L1/L2/L3 and Skill extraction derived from TencentDB-Agent-Memory",
+  "type": "module",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "publishConfig": { "access": "public", "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/" },
+  "repository": { "type": "git", "url": "git+https://github.com/team-harness/memory-algorithms.git" },
+  "engines": { "node": ">=22" },
+  "exports": { ".": { "types": "./dist/index.d.ts", "import": "./dist/index.js" } },
+  "files": ["dist", "LICENSE", "README.md", "upstream/baseline.json", "upstream/changes.md"],
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
+    "test": "npm run build && node --test tests/*.test.mjs",
+    "test:package": "node scripts/verify-package.mjs",
+    "test:evaluation": "npm run build && node --test evaluation/long-chain.test.mjs evaluation/driver.test.mjs evaluation/tape.test.mjs evaluation/loader.test.mjs",
+    "test:differential": "npm run build && node --import ./evaluation/upstream-loader.mjs --test evaluation/differential.test.mjs",
+    "eval:live": "npm run build && node evaluation/live.mjs --live",
+    "eval:paired": "npm run build && MEMORY_PARITY_DETERMINISTIC=1 node --import ./evaluation/upstream-loader.mjs evaluation/paired.mjs --live",
+    "test:paired": "npm run build && MEMORY_PARITY_DETERMINISTIC=1 node --import ./evaluation/upstream-loader.mjs evaluation/paired.mjs",
+    "sync:verify": "npm run upstream:check && npm test && npm run test:evaluation && npm run test:differential && npm run test:paired && npm run test:package",
+    "sync:drill": "npm run build && node scripts/sync-drill.mjs",
+    "upstream:check": "node scripts/upstream-check.mjs",
+    "prepack": "npm run build"
+  },
+  "dependencies": { "ajv": "^8.17.1", "yaml": "^2.8.3" },
+  "devDependencies": { "@types/node": "^22.0.0", "typescript": "^5.9.3" }
+}