@team-agent/installer 0.5.65 → 0.5.68

package/skills/team-agent/command-coverage.json

@@ -1,5 +1,22 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "team-agent-skill-command-coverage-v3",
+  "authority": {
+    "kind": "normative_handbook_plus_live_help",
+    "handbook": {
+      "path": "docs/reference/team-agent-operator.md",
+      "start_marker": "<!-- command-coverage:normative-start -->",
+      "end_marker": "<!-- command-coverage:normative-end -->"
+    },
+    "live_help": {
+      "argv": ["team-agent", "--help"],
+      "source": "exact_test_binary",
+      "root_command_policy": "canonical_handbook_commands_may_use_compatibility_forms"
+    },
+    "compact_skill_smoke": {
+      "path": "skills/team-agent/SKILL.md",
+      "policy": "quick_start_and_send_are_subset_only"
+    }
+  },
   "commands": [
     {
       "command": "team-agent add-agent <agent> --role-file <file>",
@@ -312,6 +329,20 @@
       "owner": "runtime-owner:messaging",
       "plan": "Execute the exact argv in an isolated coder fixture and bind assertions to blocked-before-watch or the same-message result closure."
     },
+    {
+      "command": "team-agent send TO MESSAGE",
+      "bucket": "declared_gap",
+      "covered": false,
+      "owner": "runtime-owner:messaging",
+      "plan": "Execute the compact-skill positional send smoke with representative target and message tokens, then bind delivery truth."
+    },
+    {
+      "command": "team-agent send reviewer \"...\"",
+      "bucket": "declared_gap",
+      "covered": false,
+      "owner": "runtime-owner:messaging",
+      "plan": "Execute the compact-skill reviewer send smoke and bind recipient and delivery fields."
+    },
     {
       "command": "team-agent send reviewer \"Review this change\"",
       "bucket": "declared_gap",

package/crates/team-agent/src/lifecycle/launch/approval.rs

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-use std::path::Path;
-
-use crate::lifecycle::{DangerousApproval, DangerousApprovalSource, LifecycleError};
-
-/// `detect_inherited_dangerous_permissions`(`launch/config.py`):扫进程祖先链找
-/// `--dangerously-*` flag,产出危险审批继承态。launch 在 inherited=false 且无 --yes 时拒。
-pub fn detect_dangerous_approval() -> Result<DangerousApproval, LifecycleError> {
-    if let Ok(raw) = std::env::var("TEAM_AGENT_TEST_PROCESS_ANCESTRY_ARGV_JSON") {
-        let argv_tokens = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<String>>(&raw).map_err(|e| {
-            LifecycleError::StatePersist(format!("invalid test ancestry argv: {e}"))
-        })?;
-        return Ok(detect_dangerous_approval_in_argv(&argv_tokens)
-            .unwrap_or_else(disabled_dangerous_approval));
-    }
-    for argv_tokens in process_ancestry_argv(std::process::id()) {
-        if let Some(detected) = detect_dangerous_approval_in_argv(&argv_tokens) {
-            return Ok(detected);
-        }
-    }
-    Ok(disabled_dangerous_approval())
-}
-
-pub(super) fn disabled_dangerous_approval() -> DangerousApproval {
-    DangerousApproval {
-        enabled: false,
-        source: DangerousApprovalSource::Disabled,
-        inherited: false,
-        provider: None,
-        flag: None,
-        worker_capability_above_leader: false,
-        ancestry_binary_name: None,
-        unexpected_binary: false,
-    }
-}
-
-pub(super) fn detect_dangerous_approval_in_argv(
-    argv_tokens: &[String],
-) -> Option<DangerousApproval> {
-    let argv0 = argv_tokens.first().map(String::as_str).unwrap_or("");
-    let ancestry_binary_name = binary_name(argv0);
-    for token in argv_tokens {
-        for (provider, flag) in dangerous_leader_flags() {
-            if token == flag {
-                let unexpected_binary =
-                    !binary_matches_provider(provider, ancestry_binary_name.as_deref());
-                return Some(DangerousApproval {
-                    enabled: true,
-                    source: DangerousApprovalSource::LeaderProcess,
-                    inherited: true,
-                    provider: Some((*provider).to_string()),
-                    flag: Some((*flag).to_string()),
-                    worker_capability_above_leader: false,
-                    ancestry_binary_name,
-                    unexpected_binary,
-                });
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    None
-}
-
-pub(super) fn dangerous_leader_flags() -> &'static [(&'static str, &'static str)] {
-    // Process argv command grammar, not persisted provider identity parsing.
-    &[
-        ("claude", "--dangerously-skip-permissions"),
-        ("claude", "--dangerously-skip-permission"),
-        ("codex", "--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox"),
-        // 0.3.27 P1 (E54 symptom 2): copilot's full-permission flags. Without
-        // these entries, a copilot leader running with --allow-all / --yolo would
-        // NOT propagate bypass to claude/codex workers because
-        // detect_dangerous_approval scans the coordinator's ancestor argv and
-        // only matches entries in THIS table.
-        ("copilot", "--allow-all"),
-        ("copilot", "--yolo"),
-    ]
-}
-
-pub(super) fn binary_matches_provider(provider: &str, binary: Option<&str>) -> bool {
-    // Binary-name command grammar, not provider identity parsing.
-    match (provider, binary) {
-        ("codex", Some("codex")) => true,
-        ("claude", Some("claude" | "claude-code" | "claude_code")) => true,
-        // 0.3.27 P1 (E54): copilot binary detection for dangerous-approval scan.
-        ("copilot", Some("copilot" | "github-copilot" | "gh-copilot")) => true,
-        _ => false,
-    }
-}
-
-pub(super) fn binary_name(argv0: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    Path::new(argv0)
-        .file_name()
-        .and_then(|v| v.to_str())
-        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
-        .map(str::to_string)
-}
-
-pub(super) fn process_ancestry_argv(pid: u32) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
-    let mut out = Vec::new();
-    let mut current = pid;
-    let mut seen = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
-    for _ in 0..12 {
-        if current == 0 || !seen.insert(current) {
-            break;
-        }
-        if let Some(argv_tokens) = process_argv_tokens(current) {
-            out.push(argv_tokens);
-        }
-        let Some(parent) = process_parent_pid(current) else {
-            break;
-        };
-        if parent <= 1 || parent == current {
-            break;
-        }
-        current = parent;
-    }
-    out
-}
-
-// 0.5.x Windows portability Batch 4: `process_argv_tokens` and
-// `process_parent_pid` route through `crate::platform::argv`. Unix
-// impls are byte-preserving (Linux `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, macOS
-// `sysctl(KERN_PROCARGS2)`, other Unix `ps -p ... -o command=`).
-// Windows returns `None` per design §Batch 4 conservative anchor:
-// unknown argv must never infer elevated approval; callers already
-// treat `None` as "no elevation inherited" via
-// `disabled_dangerous_approval()`.
-
-pub(super) fn process_argv_tokens(pid: u32) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
-    crate::platform::argv::argv_tokens(pid)
-}
-
-pub(super) fn process_parent_pid(pid: u32) -> Option<u32> {
-    crate::platform::argv::parent_pid(pid)
-}

package/crates/team-agent/src/lifecycle/launch/fork_agent/completion.rs

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-//!
-use super::super::*;
-
-pub(super) struct CompleteForkInput<'a> {
-    pub workspace: &'a Path,
-    pub team_key: &'a str,
-    pub agent_id: &'a AgentId,
-    pub spawn: &'a crate::transport::SpawnResult,
-    pub window: &'a WindowName,
-    pub transport: &'a dyn Transport,
-    pub session_name: &'a SessionName,
-    pub mcp_config_path: &'a Path,
-    pub profile_launch: &'a crate::provider::ProviderProfileLaunch,
-    pub materialized_role: &'a mut MaterializedRole,
-    pub claude_fork:
-        &'a mut Option<crate::provider::adapters::claude_fork::ClaudeForkMaterialization>,
-    pub copilot_fork:
-        &'a mut Option<crate::provider::adapters::copilot_fork::CopilotForkMaterialization>,
-}
-
-pub(super) fn complete_fork(input: CompleteForkInput<'_>) -> Result<bool, LifecycleError> {
-    if let Err(error) = verify_fork_registration(
-        input.workspace,
-        input.team_key,
-        input.agent_id,
-        input.spawn,
-        input.window,
-    ) {
-        rollback_fork_after_spawn(
-            input.workspace,
-            input.transport,
-            input.session_name,
-            input.window,
-            input.mcp_config_path,
-            input.agent_id,
-            input.profile_launch,
-            input.team_key,
-        );
-        return Err(error);
-    }
-    let coordinator_started = start_fork_coordinator(ForkCoordinatorInput {
-        workspace: input.workspace,
-        team_key: input.team_key,
-        agent_id: input.agent_id,
-        transport: input.transport,
-        session_name: input.session_name,
-        window: input.window,
-        mcp_config_path: input.mcp_config_path,
-        profile_launch: input.profile_launch,
-    })?;
-    input.materialized_role.keep();
-    if let Some(materialized) = input.claude_fork.as_mut() {
-        materialized.keep();
-    }
-    if let Some(materialized) = input.copilot_fork.as_mut() {
-        materialized.keep();
-    }
-    Ok(coordinator_started)
-}