@team-agent/installer 0.4.5 → 0.4.7

package/crates/team-agent/src/provider/adapter.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ use std::process::Command;
 use super::helpers::{find_session_id, parse_jsonl_records, patterns};
 use super::types::{
     AuthHintStatus, CaptureVia, CapturedSession, CommandPlan, Confidence, McpConfig,
-    ProviderCaps, ProviderCommandContext, ProviderCommandOverrides, ProviderError, RolloutPath,
+    ProviderCaps, ProviderCommandContext, ProviderError, RolloutPath,
     SessionId, StatusPatterns,
 };
 use super::{AuthMode, Provider};
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ pub fn get_adapter(p: Provider) -> Box<dyn ProviderAdapter> {
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
-struct BasicProviderAdapter {
+pub(crate) struct BasicProviderAdapter {
     provider: Provider,
 }
 
@@ -438,6 +438,23 @@ impl ProviderAdapter for BasicProviderAdapter {
     ) -> Result<CommandPlan, ProviderError> {
         match self.provider {
             Provider::Claude | Provider::ClaudeCode => {
+                // 0.4.7 (B1 verified, restart partial resume): RESTORE
+                // `--session-id <uuid>` on Claude fresh spawn. B1 confirmed
+                // Claude ≥ 2.1.185 honours the framework-supplied --session-id
+                // and creates a transcript at that id. The earlier 0.4.6
+                // P0 removal (commit 9feafc31) is reverted; the actual issue
+                // it tried to fix (leader-marker pollution) is addressed
+                // separately in commit d39b5104 (leader session exclusion
+                // in capture/repair).
+                //
+                // Fresh path: --session-id <expected> → Claude writes
+                // transcript at that id → capture/restart restore use the
+                // SAME id we predicted, so apply-time backing-store check
+                // passes immediately (no cwd+spawned_at attribution race).
+                //
+                // Resume path unchanged — `build_resume_command_plan` uses
+                // `--resume <existing_id>` on a session id that already has
+                // a real transcript.
                 let expected = next_session_token();
                 let managed = ctx.profile_launch.is_some_and(|profile| profile.managed_mcp_config);
                 let projects_root = ctx
@@ -458,9 +475,7 @@ impl ProviderAdapter for BasicProviderAdapter {
                 // Layer 1 self-healing (architect probe 2026-06-22, claude help
                 // `-n, --name <name>`): pass `--name <agent_id>` so the
                 // resume picker and on-disk `~/.claude/sessions/*.json name`
-                // field carry our role label. This is a secondary diagnostic
-                // hint — primary restart key remains `session_id + backing
-                // store revalidation` (see provider/session/resume.rs).
+                // field carry our role label.
                 if let Some(agent_id) = ctx.agent_id_hint {
                     if !agent_id.is_empty() {
                         argv.push("--name".to_string());
@@ -913,26 +928,7 @@ impl ProviderAdapter for BasicProviderAdapter {
     }
 }
 
-fn command_name(provider: Provider) -> &'static str {
-    match provider {
-        Provider::Claude | Provider::ClaudeCode => "claude",
-        Provider::Codex => "codex",
-        Provider::Copilot => "copilot",
-        Provider::GeminiCli => "gemini",
-        Provider::Fake => "team-agent",
-    }
-}
-
-fn provider_wire(provider: Provider) -> &'static str {
-    match provider {
-        Provider::Claude => "claude",
-        Provider::ClaudeCode => "claude_code",
-        Provider::Codex => "codex",
-        Provider::Copilot => "copilot",
-        Provider::GeminiCli => "gemini_cli",
-        Provider::Fake => "fake",
-    }
-}
+use crate::provider::wire::{command_name, provider_wire};
 
 fn auth_mode_wire(auth_mode: AuthMode) -> &'static str {
     match auth_mode {
@@ -1045,6 +1041,18 @@ fn scan_session_candidates_once(
         };
         let positive_agent_id_match = candidate_text_has_team_agent_id(&text, context);
         let agent_path_match = candidate_path_matches_agent_id(&path, context);
+        // P0 (lane-046-capture-gap): Claude leader transcripts must NEVER be
+        // returned as a worker capture candidate. The macmini repro showed a
+        // 590MB leader transcript (sessionId=ea059b82, customTitle="claude
+        // leader") being attributed to a fresh release-engineer worker via the
+        // cwd+spawned_at time window. Filter by leader marker in the head
+        // records — limited to Claude/ClaudeCode (codex/copilot transcripts
+        // don't use customTitle/agentName the same way).
+        if matches!(provider, Provider::Claude | Provider::ClaudeCode)
+            && claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records)
+        {
+            continue;
+        }
         out.push(CapturedSessionCandidate {
             captured: CapturedSession {
                 session_id: session_id.map(SessionId::new),
@@ -1181,13 +1189,36 @@ fn parse_spawned_at(raw: &str) -> Option<std::time::SystemTime> {
 /// `collect_optional_candidate_files` 对不存在目录是 no-op)。
 fn claude_projects_dir_for_cwd(home: &Path, spawn_cwd: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
     let canonical = std::fs::canonicalize(spawn_cwd).unwrap_or_else(|_| spawn_cwd.to_path_buf());
-    let encoded = canonical.to_string_lossy().replace('/', "-");
+    let encoded = encode_claude_projects_dir(&canonical.to_string_lossy());
     if encoded.is_empty() {
         return None;
     }
     Some(home.join(".claude").join("projects").join(encoded))
 }
 
+/// 0.4.6 Stage 4: Claude CLI's project-dir encoding rule. Collapse every
+/// non-ASCII-alphanumeric character (slashes, dots, spaces, punctuation,
+/// non-ASCII codepoints like Chinese) into a single `-`. The pre-fix
+/// implementation only replaced `/` → `-` which silently produced wrong
+/// directory names for any cwd containing Chinese / spaces / dots
+/// (`/Users/alauda/.../agent前沿探索/多agent协作` produced raw UTF-8 while
+/// Claude actually creates `-Users-alauda-...-agent------agent--`).
+///
+/// Note: each non-alnum CHARACTER produces one `-`. A 2-char Chinese word
+/// like "协作" becomes 2 dashes. Adjacent non-alnums each contribute one
+/// dash (Claude does NOT collapse runs).
+fn encode_claude_projects_dir(path: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(path.len());
+    for c in path.chars() {
+        if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() {
+            out.push(c);
+        } else {
+            out.push('-');
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
 /// §C4 cr verdict — copilot session 真相源 sqlite 点查。
 ///
 /// 路径:`<HOME>/.copilot/session-store.db`,sessions 表(id/cwd/created_at/updated_at)
@@ -1509,364 +1540,29 @@ fn path_is_under_team_runtime(path: &Path) -> bool {
         .any(|c| c.as_os_str() == std::ffi::OsStr::new(".team"))
 }
 
-fn fake_worker_command() -> Vec<String> {
-    let exe = std::env::current_exe()
-        .ok()
-        .and_then(|p| p.into_os_string().into_string().ok())
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| "team-agent".to_string());
-    vec![
-        exe,
-        "fake-worker".to_string(),
-        "--workspace".to_string(),
-        "{workspace}".to_string(),
-        "--agent-id".to_string(),
-        "{agent_id}".to_string(),
-    ]
-}
-
-fn claude_launch_command(
-    adapter: &BasicProviderAdapter,
-    auth_mode: AuthMode,
-    mcp_config: Option<&McpConfig>,
-    system_prompt: Option<&str>,
-    model: Option<&str>,
-    tools: &[&str],
-) -> Result<Vec<String>, ProviderError> {
-    let mut argv = claude_base_command(adapter, auth_mode, mcp_config, system_prompt, model, tools, false)?;
-    argv.push("--session-id".to_string());
-    argv.push(next_session_token());
-    Ok(argv)
-}
-
-fn claude_base_command(
-    adapter: &BasicProviderAdapter,
-    auth_mode: AuthMode,
-    mcp_config: Option<&McpConfig>,
-    system_prompt: Option<&str>,
-    model: Option<&str>,
-    tools: &[&str],
-    managed_mcp_config: bool,
-) -> Result<Vec<String>, ProviderError> {
-    let mut argv = vec!["claude".to_string()];
-    if claude_dangerous_auto_approve(tools) {
-        argv.push("--dangerously-skip-permissions".to_string());
-    } else {
-        argv.push("--permission-mode".to_string());
-        argv.push("default".to_string());
-    }
-    if let Some(model) = model {
-        argv.push("--model".to_string());
-        argv.push(model.to_string());
-    }
-    if let Some(prompt) = system_prompt {
-        argv.push("--append-system-prompt".to_string());
-        argv.push(prompt.to_string());
-    }
-    if !managed_mcp_config
-        && (mcp_config.is_some()
-            || auth_mode == AuthMode::CompatibleApi
-            || system_prompt.is_some_and(prompt_needs_native_mcp))
-    {
-        let raw = if let Some(config) = mcp_config {
-            serde_json::json!({"mcpServers": config.raw.clone()})
-        } else {
-            serde_json::json!({"mcpServers": adapter.mcp_config(auth_mode)?.raw})
-        };
-        argv.push("--mcp-config".to_string());
-        argv.push(raw.to_string());
-    }
-    for tool in claude_disallowed_tools(tools) {
-        argv.push("--disallowedTools".to_string());
-        argv.push(tool.to_string());
-    }
-    Ok(argv)
-}
-
-fn prompt_needs_native_mcp(prompt: &str) -> bool {
+pub(crate) fn prompt_needs_native_mcp(prompt: &str) -> bool {
     prompt.contains('\n') || prompt.contains('"')
 }
 
-fn codex_base_command(
-    subcommand: Option<&str>,
-    _auth_mode: AuthMode,
-    mcp_config: Option<&McpConfig>,
-    system_prompt: Option<&str>,
-    model: Option<&str>,
-    tools: &[&str],
-    overrides: Option<&ProviderCommandOverrides>,
-) -> Vec<String> {
-    let mut argv = vec![
-        "codex".to_string(),
-    ];
-    if let Some(subcommand) = subcommand {
-        argv.push(subcommand.to_string());
-    }
-    argv.extend([
-        "--no-alt-screen".to_string(),
-        "--disable".to_string(),
-        "shell_snapshot".to_string(),
-        "--disable".to_string(),
-        "apps".to_string(),
-    ]);
-    // codex.py:105-107 — profile CODEX_PROFILE before the sandbox/approval flags.
-    if let Some(profile) = overrides.and_then(|o| o.codex_profile.as_deref()) {
-        argv.push("--profile".to_string());
-        argv.push(profile.to_string());
-    }
-    if codex_dangerous_auto_approve(tools) {
-        argv.push("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox".to_string());
-    } else {
-        argv.push("--sandbox".to_string());
-        argv.push(codex_sandbox_mode(tools).to_string());
-        argv.push("--ask-for-approval".to_string());
-        argv.push("on-request".to_string());
-    }
-    if let Some(model) = model {
-        argv.push("--model".to_string());
-        argv.push(model.to_string());
-    }
-    // codex.py:117-118 — profile codex_config `-c` items before developer_instructions.
-    if let Some(overrides) = overrides {
-        for config in &overrides.codex_config {
-            argv.push("-c".to_string());
-            argv.push(config.clone());
-        }
-    }
-    if let Some(prompt) = system_prompt {
-        // codex.py:120 — escape order matters: backslash first, then quote, then newline.
-        let escaped = prompt
-            .replace('\\', "\\\\")
-            .replace('"', "\\\"")
-            .replace('\n', "\\n");
-        argv.push("-c".to_string());
-        argv.push(format!("developer_instructions=\"{escaped}\""));
-    }
-    // Contract C / MUST-8: Codex CLI (2026-06) does NOT take Claude's `--mcp-config <json>` flag;
-    // instead it uses `-c mcp_servers.<name>.<field>=...` overrides, the same pattern used by
-    // the live Team Agent workers in this very session (attach-leader codex panes spawn with
-    // `-c mcp_servers.team_orchestrator.command="..."`, ` ...args=[...]`, `...env.TEAM_AGENT_ID=...`).
-    // Inject the resolved MCP config that way so the Codex worker has a real callable
-    // `team_orchestrator` server (not prompt-only metadata).
-    if let Some(config) = mcp_config {
-        append_codex_mcp_overrides(&mut argv, &config.raw);
-    }
-    argv
-}
-
-/// Render an `McpConfig::raw` ({ name: { type, command, args, env: {...} } }) into Codex
-/// `-c mcp_servers.<name>.<field>=...` overrides. JSON values are stringified with serde
-/// so arrays/objects survive (Codex parses the right-hand side as JSON; this is what the
-/// Python golden + the live attached Codex panes do).
-fn append_codex_mcp_overrides(argv: &mut Vec<String>, raw: &serde_json::Value) {
-    let Some(servers) = raw.as_object() else {
-        return;
-    };
-    for (name, server) in servers {
-        let Some(obj) = server.as_object() else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        for (key, value) in obj {
-            if key == "env" {
-                if let Some(env) = value.as_object() {
-                    for (env_key, env_value) in env {
-                        argv.push("-c".to_string());
-                        argv.push(format!(
-                            "mcp_servers.{name}.env.{env_key}={}",
-                            json_inline(env_value)
-                        ));
-                    }
-                }
-                continue;
-            }
-            argv.push("-c".to_string());
-            argv.push(format!("mcp_servers.{name}.{key}={}", json_inline(value)));
-        }
-        // codex.py:129 — every MCP server gets a 600s tool timeout so long-running
-        // team_orchestrator calls (report_result etc.) survive the codex default.
-        argv.push("-c".to_string());
-        argv.push(format!("mcp_servers.{name}.tool_timeout_sec=600.0"));
-    }
-}
-
-fn json_inline(value: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
+/// Shared JSON renderer used by the codex `-c mcp_servers.*=...` overrides
+/// and any other adapter that wants inline JSON. String values are quoted
+/// (with quote escape); other values use serde's default Display.
+pub(crate) fn json_inline(value: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
     match value {
         serde_json::Value::String(s) => format!("\"{}\"", s.replace('"', "\\\"")),
         other => other.to_string(),
     }
 }
 
-fn codex_dangerous_auto_approve(tools: &[&str]) -> bool {
-    tools.contains(&"dangerous_auto_approve")
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// COPILOT base command(v2 实证 + cr verdict v2 30 约束)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-//
-// 设计 v2 §B argv 形态(每条带 help 出处,逐字落地):
-//   copilot --no-color --no-auto-update --no-remote     # C-1-2 噪音 + 禁远控
-//          --disable-builtin-mcps                       # C-3-1 P0 禁内建 github-mcp-server
-//          --additional-mcp-config @<file>              # C-3-4 用 @file 形,避 wrapper 语义
-//          --allow-tool 'team_orchestrator'             # C-3-5 mcp_team 免审批 (server 级)
-//          --session-id <uuid> -n <agent_id>            # C-7-1 plan/launch 加
-//          -C <workspace>                               # 双保险,launch 加
-//          [--allow-all | <granular deny>]              # C-5-1/C-5-2
-//          [--model <m>]
-//          [--log-dir <dir> --log-level info]           # C-6-2 launch 加
-// env: COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS=<ws>/.../<agent_id>/  # C-2-1 launch 注入
-//      COPILOT_DISABLE_TERMINAL_TITLE=1                       # C-4 P0 N39 红线,launch 注入
-// banner 不入 argv(v1 错的 --banner=never 删除;banner 走 config 文件,非 CLI flag)。
-// `-i`/`-p`/`--share*`/`--no-ask-user` **绝不**入 argv(RC-1/RC-14/RC-16)。
-//
-// system_prompt(B2 灵魂件)**不进 argv**:走 spawn env COPILOT_CUSTOM_INSTRUCTIONS_DIRS
-// + per-worker AGENTS.md(B2 单源,不另拼);本函数 system_prompt 参数静默忽略。
-fn copilot_base_command(
-    auth_mode: AuthMode,
-    mcp_config: Option<&McpConfig>,
-    system_prompt: Option<&str>,
-    model: Option<&str>,
-    tools: &[&str],
-) -> Vec<String> {
-    let _ = (auth_mode, system_prompt);
-    let mut argv = vec![
-        "copilot".to_string(),
-        // C-1-2 v2:噪音控制三件 + 禁远控(防 GitHub web 远控 worker)
-        "--no-color".to_string(),
-        "--no-auto-update".to_string(),
-        "--no-remote".to_string(),
-        // C-3-1 v2 (P0):禁内建 github-mcp-server(main-help:70-71);残留风险
-        // 通过 spawn 前 `copilot mcp list` 扫描 + 按名 `--disable-mcp-server <n>` 补
-        // (那一段在 launch 路径加,因为需要 spawn-time 探测)。
-        "--disable-builtin-mcps".to_string(),
-    ];
-    if copilot_dangerous_auto_approve(tools) {
-        // C-5-1 v2 实证:--allow-all == --yolo == 三件套(tools+paths+urls 等价),
-        // help-permissions Enabling All Permissions 节原文。**禁** --allow-all-tools
-        // (仅 tools 一档,语义不全,RC-13)。
-        argv.push("--allow-all".to_string());
-    } else {
-        // C-5-2 v2:角色缺某 canonical 能力 → 精细 deny(deny 恒优先,即便
-        // --allow-all-tools,help-permissions 原文);**禁** --allow-all/--yolo(RC-14)。
-        for flag in copilot_permission_flags(tools) {
-            argv.push(flag);
-        }
-    }
-    // C-3-5 v2:mcp_team ∈ canonical(team_orchestrator 是我们的 server)→ 免审批
-    // (模式 `<mcp-server-name>(tool-name?)` 省略 tool = 该 server 全工具集)。
-    argv.push("--allow-tool".to_string());
-    argv.push("team_orchestrator".to_string());
-    if let Some(model) = model {
-        argv.push("--model".to_string());
-        argv.push(model.to_string());
-    }
-    if let Some(config) = mcp_config {
-        // §C1 v2 + C-3-4 cr verdict v2(te 真机实证 cmd-mcp-add schema):
-        // copilot 的 mcp 配置 schema 字段名是 `transport`(取值 stdio|http|sse),
-        // 不是 codex/claude 的 `type`。McpConfig.raw 是 canonical(type),写
-        // --additional-mcp-config 时必须翻译 type→transport(仅 copilot 走此分支)。
-        argv.push("--additional-mcp-config".to_string());
-        argv.push(copilot_translate_mcp_config(&config.raw).to_string());
-    }
-    argv
-}
-
-/// C-3-4 cr verdict v2 — 把 McpConfig.raw 的 canonical schema(`type`)翻译成
-/// copilot mcp add/--additional-mcp-config 期望的 `transport` 字段(stdio|http|sse)。
-/// 仅 Copilot 适配走此翻译,claude/codex 路径不动。
-fn copilot_translate_mcp_config(raw: &serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Value {
-    let Some(servers) = raw.as_object() else {
-        return raw.clone();
-    };
-    let mut translated = serde_json::Map::new();
-    for (name, server) in servers {
-        let Some(obj) = server.as_object() else {
-            translated.insert(name.clone(), server.clone());
-            continue;
-        };
-        let mut out = serde_json::Map::new();
-        for (key, value) in obj {
-            if key == "type" {
-                out.insert("transport".to_string(), value.clone());
-            } else {
-                out.insert(key.clone(), value.clone());
-            }
-        }
-        translated.insert(name.clone(), serde_json::Value::Object(out));
-    }
-    serde_json::Value::Object(translated)
-}
-
-/// resume 路径同 base + `--resume <sid>`(去 --session-id);单列出
-/// 避免 plan 端误 push --session-id 与 --resume 同帧。
-fn copilot_base_command_resume(
-    auth_mode: AuthMode,
-    mcp_config: Option<&McpConfig>,
-    system_prompt: Option<&str>,
-    model: Option<&str>,
-    tools: &[&str],
-) -> Vec<String> {
-    copilot_base_command(auth_mode, mcp_config, system_prompt, model, tools)
-}
-
-fn copilot_dangerous_auto_approve(tools: &[&str]) -> bool {
-    tools.contains(&"dangerous_auto_approve")
-}
-
-/// C-5-2 v2 verdict — copilot 细粒度 deny 映射(canonical tool → copilot flag,
-/// 全部走 `--deny-tool <kind>`,help-permissions Tool Permissions 节四 kind:
-/// shell/write/mcp/url):
-///   execute_bash ∉ allowed → `--deny-tool 'shell'`
-///   fs_write     ∉ allowed → `--deny-tool 'write'`
-///   network      ∉ allowed → `--deny-tool 'url'`(help-permissions: "url(domain-or-url?)
-///                                                … If omitted, matches all URLs")
-/// fs_read/fs_list 在 copilot 上无对应 deny kind(C-5-3 prompt_only 诚实)。
-fn copilot_permission_flags(tools: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
-    let mut flags = Vec::new();
-    if !tools.contains(&"execute_bash") {
-        flags.push("--deny-tool".to_string());
-        flags.push("shell".to_string());
-    }
-    if !tools.contains(&"fs_write") {
-        flags.push("--deny-tool".to_string());
-        flags.push("write".to_string());
-    }
-    if !tools.contains(&"network") {
-        // v2 修正:`--deny-tool 'url'`(省略 domain 匹配全 URL),不是 `--deny-url '*'`
-        // (RC-19 反向 case 守 — 全 URL 拒绝走 deny-tool kind,不走 deny-url path)。
-        flags.push("--deny-tool".to_string());
-        flags.push("url".to_string());
-    }
-    flags
-}
-
-fn claude_dangerous_auto_approve(tools: &[&str]) -> bool {
-    tools.contains(&"dangerous_auto_approve")
-}
-
-fn claude_disallowed_tools(tools: &[&str]) -> Vec<&'static str> {
-    let mut disallowed = Vec::new();
-    if !tools.contains(&"execute_bash") {
-        disallowed.push("Bash");
-    }
-    if !tools.contains(&"fs_read") {
-        disallowed.push("Read");
-    }
-    if !tools.contains(&"fs_write") {
-        disallowed.extend(["Edit", "Write", "MultiEdit", "NotebookEdit"]);
-    }
-    if !tools.contains(&"fs_list") {
-        disallowed.extend(["Glob", "Grep"]);
-    }
-    disallowed
-}
-
-fn codex_sandbox_mode(tools: &[&str]) -> &'static str {
-    if tools.iter().any(|tool| matches!(*tool, "fs_write" | "execute_bash")) {
-        "workspace-write"
-    } else {
-        "read-only"
-    }
-}
+// 0.4.x decoupling step 2: provider-local command builders moved to provider/adapters/.
+// Only the entry points the trait impl actually calls are re-imported here;
+// the per-provider helper fns (dangerous_auto_approve, permission flags,
+// disallowed_tools, sandbox_mode, mcp_overrides) are called from within the
+// extracted base_command fns, not directly by this file.
+use super::adapters::claude::{claude_base_command, claude_launch_command};
+use super::adapters::codex::codex_base_command;
+use super::adapters::copilot::{copilot_base_command, copilot_base_command_resume};
+use super::adapters::fake::fake_worker_command;
 
 /// Contract C / MUST-8: the per-worker Team Agent MCP server config used by Claude
 /// (`--mcp-config`) and Codex (`-c mcp_servers.*` injection). Placeholders
@@ -1909,11 +1605,58 @@ fn current_team_agent_command() -> String {
     "/usr/local/bin/team-agent".to_string()
 }
 
+/// P0 (lane-046-capture-gap): detect Claude leader transcripts by their head
+/// marker records. A leader transcript head contains records of the form
+/// `{"type":"custom-title","customTitle":"claude leader",...}` or
+/// `{"type":"agent-name","agentName":"claude leader",...}` written when the
+/// leader pane starts. Workers must never be attributed to such transcripts.
+/// E57 (lane-046-capture-gap postflight): expose the Claude leader-marker
+/// scanner for the event-log repair path. `recover_resume_session_from_events`
+/// must apply the SAME marker filter the capture allocator applies, otherwise
+/// a stale `session.captured` event from a pre-fix run still pulls the leader
+/// transcript onto a worker on the next restart.
+///
+/// Returns `true` ONLY for Claude/ClaudeCode providers when the rollout file's
+/// head records carry `customTitle == "claude leader"` or `agentName ==
+/// "claude leader"` (case-insensitive). Other providers always return `false`
+/// — codex/copilot transcripts don't use those fields the same way.
+pub(crate) fn rollout_path_has_claude_leader_marker(
+    provider: crate::provider::Provider,
+    rollout_path: &Path,
+) -> bool {
+    if !matches!(
+        provider,
+        crate::provider::Provider::Claude | crate::provider::Provider::ClaudeCode
+    ) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let Ok(text) = read_head_text(rollout_path, CAPTURE_HEAD_BYTES) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let records = parse_session_records(&text);
+    claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records)
+}
+
+fn claude_records_have_leader_marker(records: &[serde_json::Value]) -> bool {
+    records.iter().any(|record| {
+        let custom_title = record
+            .get("customTitle")
+            .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
+            .map(str::to_ascii_lowercase);
+        let agent_name = record
+            .get("agentName")
+            .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
+            .map(str::to_ascii_lowercase);
+        matches!(custom_title.as_deref(), Some("claude leader"))
+            || matches!(agent_name.as_deref(), Some("claude leader"))
+    })
+}
+
 fn has_cwd_field(record: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {
     record_cwd(record).is_some()
 }
 
-fn next_session_token() -> String {
+pub(crate) fn next_session_token() -> String {
     use sha2::Digest;
 
     static COUNTER: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(0);
@@ -1952,6 +1695,70 @@ fn next_session_token() -> String {
     )
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod lane_046_leader_marker_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claude_leader_marker_in_custom_title_is_detected() {
+        let records = vec![serde_json::json!({
+            "type": "custom-title",
+            "customTitle": "claude leader",
+            "sessionId": "ea059b82",
+        })];
+        assert!(
+            claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records),
+            "customTitle=='claude leader' must be detected as leader marker"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claude_leader_marker_in_agent_name_is_detected() {
+        let records = vec![serde_json::json!({
+            "type": "agent-name",
+            "agentName": "claude leader",
+            "sessionId": "ea059b82",
+        })];
+        assert!(
+            claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records),
+            "agentName=='claude leader' must be detected as leader marker"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claude_worker_records_have_no_leader_marker() {
+        let records = vec![
+            serde_json::json!({
+                "type": "custom-title",
+                "customTitle": "claude release-engineer",
+                "sessionId": "abc12345",
+            }),
+            serde_json::json!({
+                "type": "user",
+                "content": "Team Agent message from leader: do X",
+                "sessionId": "abc12345",
+            }),
+        ];
+        assert!(
+            !claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records),
+            "worker transcripts must NOT be flagged as leader marker (the \
+             literal 'claude leader' in user content does not count — only \
+             customTitle/agentName fields)"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claude_leader_marker_is_case_insensitive() {
+        let records = vec![serde_json::json!({
+            "customTitle": "Claude Leader",
+        })];
+        assert!(
+            claude_records_have_leader_marker(&records),
+            "leader marker detection must be case-insensitive"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod e6_session_attribution_tests {
     #![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
@@ -1988,11 +1795,44 @@ mod e6_session_attribution_tests {
         let cwd = tmp_root("encode");
         let got = claude_projects_dir_for_cwd(home, &cwd).unwrap();
         let canon = std::fs::canonicalize(&cwd).unwrap();
-        let expected_leaf = canon.to_string_lossy().replace('/', "-");
+        let expected_leaf = encode_claude_projects_dir(&canon.to_string_lossy());
         assert_eq!(got, home.join(".claude").join("projects").join(expected_leaf));
         let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&cwd);
     }
 
+    /// **0.4.6 Stage 4 RED**: encode every non-[A-Za-z0-9] character to `-`,
+    /// matching Claude CLI's actual project-dir naming rule. Pre-fix code
+    /// only replaced `/` → `-` and silently produced wrong directories for
+    /// non-ASCII / dotted / spaced cwds — invisible to the scanner.
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_claude_projects_dir_parity_with_real_claude_naming() {
+        // Pure-ASCII parity (the pre-fix happy path).
+        assert_eq!(
+            encode_claude_projects_dir("/Users/alauda/code"),
+            "-Users-alauda-code"
+        );
+        // The user's actual project root (Chinese):
+        //   /Users/alauda/Documents/code/agent前沿探索/多agent协作
+        // Each Chinese character → one `-`. "前沿探索"=4 chars → 4 dashes,
+        // "多agent协作" = "多"+"agent"+"协作" = 1 + (alphanumeric kept) + 2.
+        assert_eq!(
+            encode_claude_projects_dir(
+                "/Users/alauda/Documents/code/agent前沿探索/多agent协作"
+            ),
+            "-Users-alauda-Documents-code-agent------agent--"
+        );
+        // Dots and spaces also collapse.
+        assert_eq!(
+            encode_claude_projects_dir("/Users/foo bar.baz/v1.2"),
+            "-Users-foo-bar-baz-v1-2"
+        );
+        // Hidden directory ".team" → "-team".
+        assert_eq!(
+            encode_claude_projects_dir("/proj/.team/runtime"),
+            "-proj--team-runtime"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn parse_spawned_at_rfc3339_roundtrips_and_rejects_junk() {
         assert!(parse_spawned_at("2026-06-10T21:40:00+00:00").is_some());