@tatchi-xyz/sdk 0.21.0 → 0.31.0

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/rpcCalls.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"rpcCalls.js","names":["error: any","ActionType","ActionPhase","DeviceLinkingPhase","DeviceLinkingStatus","signedTransactions: Array<{ signedTransaction: SignedTransaction }>","e: unknown","addKeyTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome","storeDeviceLinkingTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome","DEFAULT_WAIT_STATUS","txError: any","errorMessage","createRandomVRFChallenge","base64UrlEncode","ensureEd25519Prefix","DEFAULT_EMAIL_RECOVERY_CONTRACTS","err: unknown","base: ActionArgs[]","base64UrlDecode"],"sources":["../../../../../src/core/rpcCalls.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Consolidated NEAR Contract Calls\n *\n * This file contains all the NEAR contract calls made to the web3authn contract\n * throughout the passkey SDK. It provides a centralized location for all\n * contract interactions and makes it easier to maintain and update contract\n * call patterns.\n */\n\nimport type { FinalExecutionOutcome } from '@near-js/types';\nimport type { NearClient, SignedTransaction } from './NearClient';\nimport type { ContractStoredAuthenticator } from './TatchiPasskey/syncAccount';\nimport type { PasskeyManagerContext } from './TatchiPasskey';\nimport type { AccountId } from './types/accountIds';\nimport type { DeviceLinkingSSEEvent } from './types/sdkSentEvents';\nimport type {\n  StoredAuthenticator,\n  WebAuthnRegistrationCredential,\n  WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential\n} from './types/webauthn';\n\nimport { ActionPhase, DeviceLinkingPhase, DeviceLinkingStatus } from './types/sdkSentEvents';\nimport { ActionType, type ActionArgs } from './types/actions';\nimport { createRandomVRFChallenge, type VRFChallenge } from './types/vrf-worker';\nimport { DEFAULT_WAIT_STATUS, TransactionContext } from './types/rpc';\nimport type { AuthenticatorOptions } from './types/authenticatorOptions';\nimport type { ConfirmationConfig } from './types/signer-worker';\nimport { base64UrlDecode, base64UrlEncode } from '../utils/encoders';\nimport { errorMessage } from '../utils/errors';\nimport { ensureEd25519Prefix } from '../utils/validation';\nimport type { EmailRecoveryContracts } from './types/tatchi';\nimport { DEFAULT_EMAIL_RECOVERY_CONTRACTS } from './defaultConfigs';\n\n// ===========================\n// CONTRACT CALL RESPONSES\n// ===========================\n\nexport interface DeviceLinkingResult {\n  linkedAccountId: string;\n  deviceNumber: number;\n}\n\nexport interface CredentialIdsResult {\n  credentialIds: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface AuthenticatorsResult {\n  authenticators: Array<[string, ContractStoredAuthenticator]>;\n}\n\nexport type RecoveryAttemptStatus =\n  | \"Started\"\n  | \"VerifyingDkim\"\n  | \"VerifyingZkEmail\"\n  | \"DkimFailed\"\n  | \"ZkEmailFailed\"\n  | \"PolicyFailed\"\n  | \"Recovering\"\n  | \"AwaitingMoreEmails\"\n  | \"Complete\"\n  | \"Failed\";\n\nexport type RecoveryAttempt = {\n  request_id: string;\n  status: RecoveryAttemptStatus | string;\n  created_at_ms: number;\n  updated_at_ms: number;\n  error?: string | null;\n  /**\n   * 32-byte SHA-256 hash of \"<canonical_from>|<account_id_lower>\".\n   * Returned by newer EmailRecoverer contracts (replaces `from_address`).\n   */\n  from_address_hash?: number[] | null;\n  /** Legacy field (string email address). */\n  from_address?: string | null;\n  email_timestamp_ms?: number | null;\n  new_public_key?: string | null;\n};\n\nfunction normalizeByteArray(input: unknown): number[] | null | undefined {\n  if (input == null) return input as null | undefined;\n\n  if (Array.isArray(input)) {\n    return input.map((v) => Number(v)).filter((v) => Number.isFinite(v));\n  }\n\n  if (typeof input === 'string' && input) {\n    try {\n      const bytes =\n        typeof Buffer !== 'undefined'\n          ? Buffer.from(input, 'base64')\n          : Uint8Array.from(atob(input), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));\n      const arr = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? Array.from(bytes) : Array.from(new Uint8Array(bytes));\n      return arr;\n    } catch {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function getEmailRecoveryAttempt(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  accountId: string,\n  requestId: string\n): Promise<RecoveryAttempt | null> {\n  const raw = await nearClient.view<{ request_id: string }, Omit<RecoveryAttempt, 'status'> & { status: any } | null>({\n    account: accountId,\n    method: 'get_recovery_attempt',\n    args: { request_id: requestId },\n  });\n\n  if (!raw) return null;\n\n  // Normalization logic for status (string or object enum)\n  const statusRaw = raw.status;\n  const status = (() => {\n    if (typeof statusRaw === 'string') return statusRaw.trim();\n    if (statusRaw && typeof statusRaw === 'object') {\n      const keys = Object.keys(statusRaw as Record<string, unknown>);\n      if (keys.length === 1) {\n        return String(keys[0] || '').trim();\n      }\n    }\n    return '';\n  })();\n\n  return {\n    ...raw,\n    from_address_hash: normalizeByteArray((raw as any).from_address_hash) ?? (raw as any).from_address_hash,\n    status: status as RecoveryAttemptStatus,\n  };\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// DEVICE LINKING CONTRACT CALLS\n// ===========================\n\n/**\n * Query the contract to get the account linked to a device public key\n * Used in device linking flow to check if a device key has been added\n *\n * NEAR does not provide a way to lookup the AccountID an access key has access to.\n * So we store a temporary mapping in the contract to lookup pubkey -> account ID.\n */\nexport async function getDeviceLinkingAccountContractCall(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  contractId: string,\n  devicePublicKey: string\n): Promise<DeviceLinkingResult | null> {\n  try {\n    const result = await nearClient.callFunction<\n      { device_public_key: string },\n      [string, number | string]\n    >(\n      contractId,\n      'get_device_linking_account',\n      { device_public_key: devicePublicKey }\n    );\n\n    // Handle different result formats\n    if (result && Array.isArray(result) && result.length >= 2) {\n      const [linkedAccountId, deviceNumberRaw] = result;\n      const deviceNumber = Number(deviceNumberRaw);\n      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deviceNumber) || deviceNumber < 0) {\n        console.warn(\n          'Invalid deviceNumber returned from get_device_linking_account:',\n          deviceNumberRaw\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      return {\n        linkedAccountId,\n        deviceNumber\n      };\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    console.warn('Failed to get device linking account:', error.message);\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// DEVICE LINKING TRANSACTION CALLS\n// ===========================\n\n/**\n * Execute device1's linking transactions (AddKey + Contract mapping)\n * This function signs and broadcasts both transactions required for device linking\n */\nexport async function executeDeviceLinkingContractCalls({\n  context,\n  device1AccountId,\n  device2PublicKey,\n  nextNonce,\n  nextNextNonce,\n  nextNextNextNonce,\n  txBlockHash,\n  vrfChallenge,\n  onEvent,\n  confirmationConfigOverride,\n  confirmerText,\n}: {\n  context: PasskeyManagerContext,\n  device1AccountId: AccountId,\n  device2PublicKey: string,\n  nextNonce: string,\n  nextNextNonce: string,\n  nextNextNextNonce: string,\n  txBlockHash: string,\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge,\n  onEvent?: (event: DeviceLinkingSSEEvent) => void;\n  confirmationConfigOverride?: Partial<ConfirmationConfig>;\n  confirmerText?: { title?: string; body?: string };\n}): Promise<{\n  addKeyTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome;\n  storeDeviceLinkingTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome;\n  signedDeleteKeyTransaction: SignedTransaction\n}> {\n\n  const signTransactions = () => context.webAuthnManager.signTransactionsWithActions({\n    rpcCall: {\n      contractId: context.webAuthnManager.tatchiPasskeyConfigs.contractId,\n      nearRpcUrl: context.webAuthnManager.tatchiPasskeyConfigs.nearRpcUrl,\n      nearAccountId: device1AccountId\n    },\n    // Prefer threshold signing when available; fall back to local signing if the account\n    // is not enrolled with threshold key material.\n    signerMode: { mode: 'threshold-signer', behavior: 'fallback' },\n    confirmationConfigOverride,\n    title: confirmerText?.title,\n    body: confirmerText?.body,\n    transactions: [\n      // Transaction 1: AddKey - Add Device2's key to Device1's account\n      {\n        receiverId: device1AccountId,\n        actions: [{\n          action_type: ActionType.AddKey,\n          public_key: device2PublicKey,\n          access_key: JSON.stringify({\n            // NEAR-style AccessKey JSON shape, matching near-api-js:\n            // { nonce: number, permission: { FullAccess: {} } }\n            nonce: 0,\n            permission: { FullAccess: {} },\n          }),\n        }],\n        nonce: nextNonce,\n      },\n      // Transaction 2: Store temporary mapping in contract so Device2 can lookup Device1's accountID.\n      {\n        receiverId: context.webAuthnManager.tatchiPasskeyConfigs.contractId,\n        actions: [{\n          action_type: ActionType.FunctionCall,\n          method_name: 'store_device_linking_mapping',\n          args: JSON.stringify({\n            device_public_key: device2PublicKey,\n            target_account_id: device1AccountId,\n          }),\n          gas: '30000000000000', // 30 TGas for device linking with yield promise automatic cleanup\n          deposit: '0'\n        }],\n        nonce: nextNextNonce,\n      },\n      // Transaction 3: Remove Device2's temporary key if it fails to complete linking after a timeout\n      {\n        receiverId: device1AccountId,\n        actions: [{\n          action_type: ActionType.DeleteKey,\n          public_key: device2PublicKey\n        }],\n        nonce: nextNextNextNonce,\n      }\n    ],\n    onEvent: (progress) => {\n      // Bridge all action progress events to the parent so the wallet iframe overlay\n      // can expand during user confirmation in wallet-iframe mode.\n      try { onEvent?.(progress as any); } catch { }\n      // Keep existing mapping for device linking semantics; surface signing as a loading state\n      if (progress.phase == ActionPhase.STEP_6_TRANSACTION_SIGNING_COMPLETE) {\n        onEvent?.({\n          step: 3,\n          phase: DeviceLinkingPhase.STEP_3_AUTHORIZATION,\n          status: DeviceLinkingStatus.PROGRESS,\n          message: progress.message || 'Transaction signing in progress...'\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  });\n\n  // Sign three transactions with one PRF authentication\n  let signedTransactions: Array<{ signedTransaction: SignedTransaction }> = [];\n  try {\n    signedTransactions = await signTransactions();\n  } catch (e: unknown) {\n    if (!isVrfSessionPasskeyMismatchError(e)) throw e;\n\n    // This happens when:\n    // - the VRF worker is unlocked for a different device's VRF keypair, but\n    // - IndexedDB `lastUser` (and thus allowCredentials) points at another device.\n    // Fix by re-unlocking the VRF keypair for the current deviceNumber, then retry once.\n    onEvent?.({\n      step: 3,\n      phase: DeviceLinkingPhase.STEP_3_AUTHORIZATION,\n      status: DeviceLinkingStatus.PROGRESS,\n      message: 'Session mismatch detected; re-authenticating with TouchID...'\n    });\n\n    await repairVrfSessionForCurrentDevice({\n      context,\n      nearAccountId: device1AccountId,\n      // Needs to cover 3 txs in a single batch.\n      remainingUses: 3,\n      ttlMs: 2 * 60 * 1000,\n    });\n\n    signedTransactions = await signTransactions();\n  }\n\n  if (!signedTransactions[0].signedTransaction) {\n    throw new Error('AddKey transaction signing failed');\n  }\n  if (!signedTransactions[1].signedTransaction) {\n    throw new Error('Contract mapping transaction signing failed');\n  }\n  if (!signedTransactions[2].signedTransaction) {\n    throw new Error('DeleteKey transaction signing failed');\n  }\n\n  // Broadcast just the first 2 transactions: addKey and store device linking mapping\n  let addKeyTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome;\n  let storeDeviceLinkingTxResult: FinalExecutionOutcome;\n  try {\n    console.debug('LinkDeviceFlow: AddKey transaction details:', {\n      receiverId: signedTransactions[0].signedTransaction.transaction.receiverId,\n      actions: signedTransactions[0].signedTransaction.transaction.actions || [],\n      transactionKeys: Object.keys(signedTransactions[0].signedTransaction.transaction),\n    });\n\n    addKeyTxResult = await context.nearClient.sendTransaction(\n      signedTransactions[0].signedTransaction,\n      DEFAULT_WAIT_STATUS.linkDeviceAddKey\n    );\n    console.log('LinkDeviceFlow: AddKey transaction result:', addKeyTxResult?.transaction?.hash);\n\n    // Send success events immediately after AddKey succeeds\n    onEvent?.({\n      step: 3,\n      phase: DeviceLinkingPhase.STEP_3_AUTHORIZATION,\n      status: DeviceLinkingStatus.SUCCESS,\n      message: `AddKey transaction completed successfully!`\n    });\n\n    // Check if contract mapping transaction is valid before attempting to broadcast\n    const contractTx = signedTransactions[1].signedTransaction;\n    console.log('LinkDeviceFlow: Contract mapping transaction details:', {\n      receiverId: contractTx.transaction.receiverId,\n      actions: (contractTx.transaction.actions || []).length\n    });\n\n    // Standard timeout since nonce conflict should be resolved by the 2s delay\n    storeDeviceLinkingTxResult = await context.nearClient.sendTransaction(\n      contractTx,\n      DEFAULT_WAIT_STATUS.linkDeviceAccountMapping\n    );\n\n  } catch (txError: any) {\n    console.error('LinkDeviceFlow: Transaction broadcasting failed:', txError);\n    throw new Error(`Transaction broadcasting failed: ${txError.message}`);\n  }\n\n  onEvent?.({\n    step: 6,\n    phase: DeviceLinkingPhase.STEP_6_REGISTRATION,\n    status: DeviceLinkingStatus.SUCCESS,\n    message: `Device linking completed successfully!`\n  });\n\n  return {\n    addKeyTxResult,\n    storeDeviceLinkingTxResult,\n    signedDeleteKeyTransaction: signedTransactions[2].signedTransaction\n  };\n}\n\nfunction isVrfSessionPasskeyMismatchError(err: unknown): boolean {\n  const msg = errorMessage(err) || String(err || '');\n  return msg.includes('different passkey/VRF session than the current device');\n}\n\nasync function repairVrfSessionForCurrentDevice(args: {\n  context: PasskeyManagerContext;\n  nearAccountId: AccountId;\n  ttlMs?: number;\n  remainingUses?: number;\n}): Promise<void> {\n  const { context, nearAccountId } = args;\n  const lastUser = await context.webAuthnManager.getLastUser();\n  if (!lastUser || lastUser.nearAccountId !== nearAccountId) {\n    throw new Error('Cannot repair VRF session: no lastUser for this account. Please log in again.');\n  }\n  const deviceNumber = lastUser.deviceNumber;\n  if (!Number.isFinite(deviceNumber) || deviceNumber < 1) {\n    throw new Error('Cannot repair VRF session: invalid lastUser.deviceNumber');\n  }\n\n  const authenticators = await context.webAuthnManager.getAuthenticatorsByUser(nearAccountId);\n  const credentialIdsForDevice = authenticators\n    .filter((a) => a.deviceNumber === deviceNumber)\n    .map((a) => a.credentialId);\n\n  const credentialIds = credentialIdsForDevice.length > 0\n    ? credentialIdsForDevice\n    : authenticators.map((a) => a.credentialId);\n\n  if (credentialIds.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(`Cannot repair VRF session: no authenticators found for ${nearAccountId}`);\n  }\n\n  const challenge = createRandomVRFChallenge();\n  const credential = await context.webAuthnManager.getAuthenticationCredentialsSerializedDualPrf({\n    nearAccountId,\n    challenge: challenge as VRFChallenge,\n    credentialIds,\n  });\n\n  const unlockResult = await context.webAuthnManager.unlockVRFKeypair({\n    nearAccountId,\n    encryptedVrfKeypair: lastUser.encryptedVrfKeypair,\n    credential: credential as WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential,\n  });\n  if (!unlockResult.success) {\n    throw new Error(unlockResult.error || 'Failed to re-unlock VRF keypair for current device');\n  }\n\n  // Restore a minimal warm signing session so the retried batch can run without a second TouchID prompt.\n  await context.webAuthnManager.mintSigningSessionFromCredential({\n    nearAccountId,\n    credential: credential as WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential,\n    ttlMs: args.ttlMs,\n    remainingUses: args.remainingUses,\n  });\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// ACCOUNT RECOVERY CONTRACT CALLS\n// ===========================\n\n/**\n * Get credential IDs associated with an account from the contract\n * Used in account recovery to discover available credentials\n */\nexport async function getCredentialIdsContractCall(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  contractId: string,\n  accountId: AccountId\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  try {\n    const credentialIds = await nearClient.callFunction<{ account_id: AccountId }, string[]>(\n      contractId,\n      'get_credential_ids_by_account',\n      { account_id: accountId }\n    );\n    return credentialIds || [];\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    console.warn('Failed to fetch credential IDs from contract:', error.message);\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Get all authenticators stored for a user from the contract\n * Used in account recovery to sync authenticator data\n */\nexport async function getAuthenticatorsByUser(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  contractId: string,\n  accountId: AccountId\n): Promise<[string, ContractStoredAuthenticator][]> {\n  try {\n    const authenticatorsResult = await nearClient.view<{ user_id: AccountId }, [string, ContractStoredAuthenticator][]>({\n      account: contractId,\n      method: 'get_authenticators_by_user',\n      args: { user_id: accountId }\n    });\n\n    if (authenticatorsResult && Array.isArray(authenticatorsResult)) {\n      return authenticatorsResult;\n    }\n    return [];\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    console.warn('Failed to fetch authenticators from contract:', error.message);\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function syncAuthenticatorsContractCall(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  contractId: string,\n  accountId: AccountId\n): Promise<Array<{ credentialId: string, authenticator: StoredAuthenticator, nearPublicKey?: string }>> {\n  try {\n    const authenticatorsResult = await getAuthenticatorsByUser(nearClient, contractId, accountId);\n    if (authenticatorsResult && Array.isArray(authenticatorsResult)) {\n      return authenticatorsResult.map(([credentialId, contractAuthenticator]) => {\n        console.log(`Contract authenticator device_number for ${credentialId}:`, contractAuthenticator.device_number);\n\n        const transports = Array.isArray(contractAuthenticator.transports)\n          ? contractAuthenticator.transports\n          : [];\n\n        const registered = (() => {\n          const raw = String((contractAuthenticator as any).registered ?? '');\n          if (!raw) return new Date(0);\n          if (/^\\d+$/.test(raw)) {\n            const ts = Number(raw);\n            return Number.isFinite(ts) ? new Date(ts) : new Date(0);\n          }\n          const d = new Date(raw);\n          return Number.isFinite(d.getTime()) ? d : new Date(0);\n        })();\n\n        const vrfPublicKeys = (() => {\n          const raw = (contractAuthenticator as any).vrf_public_keys;\n          if (!raw) return undefined;\n          if (Array.isArray(raw) && raw.length > 0 && typeof raw[0] === 'string') {\n            return raw as string[];\n          }\n          if (Array.isArray(raw)) {\n            return raw\n              .map((entry: unknown) => {\n                if (!entry) return null;\n                if (entry instanceof Uint8Array) return base64UrlEncode(entry);\n                if (Array.isArray(entry)) return base64UrlEncode(new Uint8Array(entry));\n                return null;\n              })\n              .filter((x): x is string => typeof x === 'string' && x.length > 0);\n          }\n          return undefined;\n        })();\n\n        const nearPublicKey = (() => {\n          const raw = (contractAuthenticator as any).near_public_key;\n          if (typeof raw !== 'string') return undefined;\n          const trimmed = raw.trim();\n          return trimmed ? ensureEd25519Prefix(trimmed) : undefined;\n        })();\n\n        return {\n          credentialId,\n          authenticator: {\n            credentialId,\n            credentialPublicKey: new Uint8Array(contractAuthenticator.credential_public_key),\n            transports,\n            userId: accountId,\n            name: `Device ${contractAuthenticator.device_number} Authenticator`,\n            registered,\n            // Store the actual device number from contract (no fallback)\n            deviceNumber: contractAuthenticator.device_number,\n            vrfPublicKeys\n          },\n          ...(nearPublicKey ? { nearPublicKey } : {})\n        };\n      });\n    }\n    return [];\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    console.warn('Failed to fetch authenticators from contract:', error.message);\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// RECOVERY EMAIL CONTRACT CALLS\n// ===========================\n\nconst EMPTY_NEAR_CODE_HASH = '11111111111111111111111111111111';\n\nasync function hasDeployedContractCode(nearClient: NearClient, accountId: AccountId): Promise<boolean> {\n  try {\n    const account = await nearClient.viewAccount(accountId);\n    const codeHash = (account as { code_hash?: unknown } | null)?.code_hash;\n    const globalContractHash = (account as { global_contract_hash?: unknown } | null)?.global_contract_hash;\n    const globalContractAccountId = (account as { global_contract_account_id?: unknown } | null)?.global_contract_account_id;\n\n    const hasLocalCode = typeof codeHash === 'string' && codeHash !== EMPTY_NEAR_CODE_HASH;\n    const hasGlobalCode =\n      (typeof globalContractHash === 'string' && globalContractHash.trim().length > 0) ||\n      (typeof globalContractAccountId === 'string' && globalContractAccountId.trim().length > 0);\n\n    return hasLocalCode || hasGlobalCode;\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch on-chain recovery email hashes from the per-account contract.\n * Returns [] when no contract is deployed or on failure.\n */\nexport async function getRecoveryEmailHashesContractCall(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  accountId: AccountId\n): Promise<number[][]> {\n  try {\n    // Prefer `view_account` over `view_code`:\n    // - `view_code` is expected to fail for non-contract accounts and is noisy.\n    // - `view_account` is lightweight and tells us whether the account uses local contract code\n    //   or a NEAR \"global contract\" (via `global_contract_*` fields).\n    const hasContract = await hasDeployedContractCode(nearClient, accountId);\n    if (!hasContract) return [];\n\n    const hashes = await nearClient.view<Record<string, never>, number[][]>({\n      account: accountId,\n      method: 'get_recovery_emails',\n      args: {} as Record<string, never>,\n    });\n\n    return Array.isArray(hashes) ? (hashes as number[][]) : [];\n  } catch (error) {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build action args to update on-chain recovery emails for an account.\n * If the per-account contract is missing, deploy/attach the global recoverer via `init_email_recovery`.\n */\nexport async function buildSetRecoveryEmailsActions(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  accountId: AccountId,\n  recoveryEmailHashes: number[][],\n  contracts: EmailRecoveryContracts = DEFAULT_EMAIL_RECOVERY_CONTRACTS\n): Promise<ActionArgs[]> {\n  const hasContract = await hasDeployedContractCode(nearClient, accountId);\n\n  const {\n    emailRecovererGlobalContract,\n    zkEmailVerifierContract,\n    emailDkimVerifierContract,\n  } = contracts;\n\n  // If the account already has a contract (local or global), it still might not be a readable\n  // EmailRecoverer instance (e.g. stale state after upgrades). In that case, `set_recovery_emails`\n  // would fail while `init_email_recovery` (#[init(ignore_state)]) can safely re-initialize.\n  //\n  // We keep this as a best-effort probe to avoid wiping state on transient RPC issues.\n  let shouldInit = !hasContract;\n  if (!shouldInit) {\n    try {\n      await nearClient.view<Record<string, never>, unknown>({\n        account: accountId,\n        method: 'get_recovery_emails',\n        args: {} as Record<string, never>,\n      });\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      const msg = errorMessage(err);\n      // Common/expected cases where we should fall back to init:\n      // - account has a global contract pointer but no EmailRecoverer-compatible state yet\n      // - account has stale/incompatible state after a contract upgrade\n      // - account has some other contract (method missing)\n      if (/Cannot deserialize the contract state/i.test(msg)\n        || /CodeDoesNotExist/i.test(msg)\n        || /MethodNotFound/i.test(msg)) {\n        shouldInit = true;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const base: ActionArgs[] = [\n    {\n      type: ActionType.UseGlobalContract,\n      accountId: emailRecovererGlobalContract,\n    },\n  ];\n\n  return shouldInit\n    ? [\n        ...base,\n        {\n          type: ActionType.FunctionCall,\n          methodName: 'init_email_recovery',\n          args: {\n            zk_email_verifier: zkEmailVerifierContract,\n            email_dkim_verifier: emailDkimVerifierContract,\n            policy: null,\n            recovery_emails: recoveryEmailHashes,\n          },\n          gas: '80000000000000',\n          deposit: '0',\n        },\n      ]\n    : [\n        ...base,\n        {\n          type: ActionType.FunctionCall,\n          methodName: 'set_recovery_emails',\n          args: {\n            recovery_emails: recoveryEmailHashes,\n          },\n          gas: '80000000000000',\n          deposit: '0',\n        },\n      ];\n}\n\nexport async function fetchNonceBlockHashAndHeight({ nearClient, nearPublicKeyStr, nearAccountId }: {\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  nearPublicKeyStr: string,\n  nearAccountId: AccountId\n}): Promise<TransactionContext> {\n  // Get access key and transaction block info concurrently\n  const [accessKeyInfo, txBlockInfo] = await Promise.all([\n    nearClient.viewAccessKey(nearAccountId, nearPublicKeyStr)\n      .catch(e => { throw new Error(`Failed to fetch Access Key`) }),\n    nearClient.viewBlock({ finality: 'final' })\n      .catch(e => { throw new Error(`Failed to fetch Block Info`) })\n  ]);\n  if (!accessKeyInfo || accessKeyInfo.nonce === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(`Access key not found or invalid for account ${nearAccountId} with public key ${nearPublicKeyStr}. Response: ${JSON.stringify(accessKeyInfo)}`);\n  }\n  const nextNonce = (BigInt(accessKeyInfo.nonce) + BigInt(1)).toString();\n  const txBlockHeight = String(txBlockInfo.header.height);\n  const txBlockHash = txBlockInfo.header.hash; // Keep original base58 string\n\n  return {\n    nearPublicKeyStr,\n    accessKeyInfo,\n    nextNonce,\n    txBlockHeight,\n    txBlockHash,\n  };\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// ACCESS KEY HELPERS\n// ===========================\n\nexport type AccessKeyWaitOptions = {\n  attempts?: number;\n  delayMs?: number;\n};\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, ms));\n}\n\nfunction isAccessKeyNotFoundError(err: unknown): boolean {\n  const msg = String(errorMessage(err) || '').toLowerCase();\n  if (!msg) return false;\n\n  // Common NEAR node / near-api-js phrasing for missing access keys.\n  if (msg.includes('unknown access key') || msg.includes('unknown_access_key') || msg.includes('unknownaccesskey')) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  if (msg.includes('accesskeydoesnotexist')) return true;\n  if (msg.includes('access key does not exist')) return true;\n  if (msg.includes(\"access key doesn't exist\")) return true;\n  if (msg.includes('access key not found')) return true;\n  if (msg.includes('no such access key')) return true;\n  if (msg.includes('viewing access key') && msg.includes('does not exist') && !msg.includes('account')) return true;\n\n  return false;\n}\n\nexport async function hasAccessKey(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  nearAccountId: string,\n  publicKey: string,\n  opts?: AccessKeyWaitOptions,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const expected = ensureEd25519Prefix(publicKey);\n  if (!expected) return false;\n\n  const attempts = Math.max(1, Math.floor(opts?.attempts ?? 6));\n  const delayMs = Math.max(50, Math.floor(opts?.delayMs ?? 750));\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {\n    try {\n      await nearClient.viewAccessKey(nearAccountId, expected);\n      return true;\n    } catch {\n      // tolerate transient view errors during propagation; retry\n    }\n    if (i < attempts - 1) {\n      await sleep(delayMs);\n    }\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nexport async function waitForAccessKeyAbsent(\n  nearClient: NearClient,\n  nearAccountId: string,\n  publicKey: string,\n  opts?: AccessKeyWaitOptions,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const expected = ensureEd25519Prefix(publicKey);\n  if (!expected) return true;\n\n  const attempts = Math.max(1, Math.floor(opts?.attempts ?? 6));\n  const delayMs = Math.max(50, Math.floor(opts?.delayMs ?? 650));\n\n  for (let i = 0; i < attempts; i++) {\n    try {\n      await nearClient.viewAccessKey(nearAccountId, expected);\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      if (isAccessKeyNotFoundError(err)) return true;\n      // tolerate transient view errors during propagation; retry\n    }\n    if (i < attempts - 1) {\n      await sleep(delayMs);\n    }\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n// ===========================\n// REGISTRATION PRE-CHECK CALL\n// ===========================\n\nexport interface CheckCanRegisterUserResult {\n  success: boolean;\n  verified: boolean;\n  logs: string[];\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * View-only registration pre-check.\n *\n * Calls the contract's `check_can_register_user` view method with VRF data\n * derived from the provided VRF challenge and a serialized WebAuthn\n * registration credential (typically with PRF outputs embedded).\n */\nexport async function checkCanRegisterUserContractCall({\n  nearClient,\n  contractId,\n  vrfChallenge,\n  credential,\n  authenticatorOptions,\n}: {\n  nearClient: NearClient;\n  contractId: string;\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge;\n  credential: WebAuthnRegistrationCredential;\n  authenticatorOptions?: AuthenticatorOptions;\n}): Promise<CheckCanRegisterUserResult> {\n  try {\n    const intent_digest_32 = Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.intentDigest || ''));\n    if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const session_policy_digest_32 = vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32\n      ? Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32))\n      : [];\n    if (session_policy_digest_32.length !== 0 && session_policy_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Invalid vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32 (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const vrfData = {\n      vrf_input_data: Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.vrfInput)),\n      vrf_output: Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.vrfOutput)),\n      vrf_proof: Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.vrfProof)),\n      public_key: Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey)),\n      user_id: vrfChallenge.userId,\n      rp_id: vrfChallenge.rpId,\n      block_height: Number(vrfChallenge.blockHeight),\n      block_hash: Array.from(base64UrlDecode(vrfChallenge.blockHash)),\n      intent_digest_32,\n      ...(session_policy_digest_32.length ? { session_policy_digest_32 } : {}),\n    };\n\n    const args = {\n      vrf_data: vrfData,\n      webauthn_registration: credential,\n      authenticator_options: authenticatorOptions,\n    };\n\n    const response = await nearClient.callFunction<typeof args, any>(\n      contractId,\n      'check_can_register_user',\n      args,\n    );\n\n    const verified = !!response?.verified;\n    return {\n      success: true,\n      verified,\n      logs: [],\n      error: verified ? undefined : 'Contract registration check failed',\n    };\n  } catch (err: unknown) {\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      verified: false,\n      logs: [],\n      error: errorMessage(err) || 'Failed to call check_can_register_user',\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Verify authentication response through relay server\n * Routes the request to relay server which calls the web3authn contract for verification\n * and issues a JWT or session credential\n */\nexport async function verifyAuthenticationResponse(\n  relayServerUrl: string,\n  routePath: string,\n  sessionKind: 'jwt' | 'cookie',\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge,\n  webauthnAuthentication: WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  verified?: boolean;\n  jwt?: string;\n  sessionCredential?: any;\n  error?: string;\n  contractResponse?: any;\n}> {\n  try {\n    // Map VRFChallenge into server ContractVrfData shape (number arrays)\n    const toBytes = (b64u: string | undefined): number[] => {\n      if (!b64u) return [];\n      return Array.from(base64UrlDecode(b64u));\n    };\n    const intent_digest_32 = toBytes(vrfChallenge.intentDigest);\n    if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const session_policy_digest_32 = toBytes(vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32);\n    if (session_policy_digest_32.length !== 0 && session_policy_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Invalid vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32 (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const vrf_data = {\n      vrf_input_data: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfInput),\n      vrf_output: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfOutput),\n      vrf_proof: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfProof),\n      public_key: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey),\n      user_id: vrfChallenge.userId,\n      rp_id: vrfChallenge.rpId,\n      block_height: Number(vrfChallenge.blockHeight || 0),\n      block_hash: toBytes(vrfChallenge.blockHash),\n      intent_digest_32,\n      ...(session_policy_digest_32.length ? { session_policy_digest_32 } : {}),\n    };\n\n    // Normalize authenticatorAttachment and userHandle to null for server schema\n    const webauthn_authentication = {\n      ...webauthnAuthentication,\n      authenticatorAttachment: webauthnAuthentication.authenticatorAttachment ?? null,\n      response: {\n        ...webauthnAuthentication.response,\n        userHandle: webauthnAuthentication.response.userHandle ?? null,\n      }\n    };\n\n    const url = `${relayServerUrl.replace(/\\/$/, '')}${routePath.startsWith('/') ? routePath : `/${routePath}`}`;\n    const response = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n      },\n      credentials: sessionKind === 'cookie' ? 'include' : 'omit',\n      body: JSON.stringify({\n        sessionKind: sessionKind,\n        vrf_data,\n        webauthn_authentication,\n      }),\n    });\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const errorText = await response.text();\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: `HTTP ${response.status}: ${errorText}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const result = await response.json();\n    return {\n      success: true,\n      verified: result.verified,\n      jwt: result.jwt,\n      sessionCredential: result.sessionCredential,\n      contractResponse: result.contractResponse,\n    };\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: error.message || 'Failed to verify authentication response',\n    };\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function authorizeThresholdEd25519(\n  relayServerUrl: string,\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge,\n  webauthnAuthentication: WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential,\n  args: {\n    relayerKeyId: string;\n    clientVerifyingShareB64u: string;\n    purpose: string;\n    /**\n     * Exact 32-byte digest that will be co-signed (tx hash / delegate hash / NEP-413 hash).\n     * The relayer must bind this digest to the VRF-authorized `intent_digest_32`.\n     */\n    signingDigest32: number[];\n    signingPayload?: unknown;\n  },\n): Promise<{\n  ok: boolean;\n  mpcSessionId?: string;\n  expiresAt?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  message?: string;\n  error?: string;\n}> {\n  try {\n    const toBytes = (b64u: string | undefined): number[] => {\n      if (!b64u) return [];\n      return Array.from(base64UrlDecode(b64u));\n    };\n    const intent_digest_32 = toBytes(vrfChallenge.intentDigest);\n    if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const vrf_data = {\n      vrf_input_data: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfInput),\n      vrf_output: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfOutput),\n      vrf_proof: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfProof),\n      public_key: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey),\n      user_id: vrfChallenge.userId,\n      rp_id: vrfChallenge.rpId,\n      block_height: Number(vrfChallenge.blockHeight || 0),\n      block_hash: toBytes(vrfChallenge.blockHash),\n      intent_digest_32,\n    };\n\n    const clientVerifyingShareBytes = toBytes(args.clientVerifyingShareB64u);\n    if (clientVerifyingShareBytes.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Missing or invalid args.clientVerifyingShareB64u (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n\n    // Strip extension results before sending to the relay (never send PRF outputs).\n    const webauthn_authentication = {\n      ...webauthnAuthentication,\n      authenticatorAttachment: webauthnAuthentication.authenticatorAttachment ?? null,\n      response: {\n        ...webauthnAuthentication.response,\n        userHandle: webauthnAuthentication.response.userHandle ?? null,\n      },\n      clientExtensionResults: null,\n    };\n\n    const url = `${relayServerUrl.replace(/\\/$/, '')}/threshold-ed25519/authorize`;\n    const response = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n      },\n      credentials: 'include',\n      body: JSON.stringify({\n        relayerKeyId: args.relayerKeyId,\n        clientVerifyingShareB64u: args.clientVerifyingShareB64u,\n        purpose: args.purpose,\n        signing_digest_32: (() => {\n          const d = args.signingDigest32;\n          if (!Array.isArray(d) || d.length !== 32) {\n            throw new Error('Missing or invalid args.signingDigest32 (expected number[32])');\n          }\n          return d;\n        })(),\n        signingPayload: args.signingPayload,\n        vrf_data,\n        webauthn_authentication,\n      }),\n    });\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const errorText = await response.text();\n      return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${response.status}: ${errorText}` };\n    }\n\n    const json = await response.json();\n    return {\n      ok: !!json?.ok,\n      mpcSessionId: json?.mpcSessionId,\n      expiresAt: json?.expiresAt,\n      code: json?.code,\n      message: json?.message,\n    };\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    return { ok: false, error: error?.message || 'Failed to authorize threshold-ed25519 signing' };\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function thresholdEd25519Keygen(\n  relayServerUrl: string,\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge,\n  webauthnAuthentication: WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential,\n  args: {\n    clientVerifyingShareB64u: string;\n    nearAccountId: string;\n  },\n): Promise<{\n  ok: boolean;\n  clientParticipantId?: number;\n  relayerParticipantId?: number;\n  participantIds?: number[];\n  relayerKeyId?: string;\n  publicKey?: string;\n  relayerVerifyingShareB64u?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  message?: string;\n  error?: string;\n}> {\n  try {\n    const base = String(relayServerUrl || '').trim().replace(/\\/$/, '');\n    if (!base) throw new Error('Missing relayServerUrl');\n\n    const clientVerifyingShareB64u = String(args.clientVerifyingShareB64u || '').trim();\n    if (!clientVerifyingShareB64u) throw new Error('Missing clientVerifyingShareB64u');\n\n    const nearAccountId = String(args.nearAccountId || '').trim();\n    if (!nearAccountId) throw new Error('Missing nearAccountId');\n\n    const toBytes = (b64u: string | undefined): number[] => {\n      if (!b64u) return [];\n      return Array.from(base64UrlDecode(b64u));\n    };\n    const intent_digest_32 = toBytes(vrfChallenge.intentDigest);\n    if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n      throw new Error('Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url-encoded 32 bytes)');\n    }\n    const vrf_data = {\n      vrf_input_data: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfInput),\n      vrf_output: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfOutput),\n      vrf_proof: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfProof),\n      public_key: toBytes(vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey),\n      user_id: vrfChallenge.userId,\n      rp_id: vrfChallenge.rpId,\n      block_height: Number(vrfChallenge.blockHeight || 0),\n      block_hash: toBytes(vrfChallenge.blockHash),\n      intent_digest_32,\n    };\n\n    // Strip extension results before sending to the relay (never send PRF outputs).\n    const webauthn_authentication = {\n      ...webauthnAuthentication,\n      authenticatorAttachment: webauthnAuthentication.authenticatorAttachment ?? null,\n      response: {\n        ...webauthnAuthentication.response,\n        userHandle: webauthnAuthentication.response.userHandle ?? null,\n      },\n      clientExtensionResults: null,\n    };\n\n    const url = `${base}/threshold-ed25519/keygen`;\n    const response = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      credentials: 'include',\n      body: JSON.stringify({\n        clientVerifyingShareB64u,\n        nearAccountId,\n        vrf_data,\n        webauthn_authentication,\n      }),\n    });\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const errorText = await response.text();\n      return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${response.status}: ${errorText}` };\n    }\n\n    const json = await response.json();\n    return {\n      ok: !!json?.ok,\n      clientParticipantId: json?.clientParticipantId,\n      relayerParticipantId: json?.relayerParticipantId,\n      participantIds: json?.participantIds,\n      relayerKeyId: json?.relayerKeyId,\n      publicKey: json?.publicKey,\n      relayerVerifyingShareB64u: json?.relayerVerifyingShareB64u,\n      code: json?.code,\n      message: json?.message,\n    };\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    return { ok: false, error: error?.message || 'Failed to keygen threshold-ed25519' };\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function thresholdEd25519KeygenFromRegistrationTx(\n  relayServerUrl: string,\n  args: {\n    clientVerifyingShareB64u: string;\n    nearAccountId: string;\n    registrationTxHash: string;\n  },\n): Promise<{\n  ok: boolean;\n  clientParticipantId?: number;\n  relayerParticipantId?: number;\n  participantIds?: number[];\n  relayerKeyId?: string;\n  publicKey?: string;\n  relayerVerifyingShareB64u?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  message?: string;\n  error?: string;\n}> {\n  try {\n    const base = String(relayServerUrl || '').trim().replace(/\\/$/, '');\n    if (!base) throw new Error('Missing relayServerUrl');\n\n    const clientVerifyingShareB64u = String(args.clientVerifyingShareB64u || '').trim();\n    if (!clientVerifyingShareB64u) throw new Error('Missing clientVerifyingShareB64u');\n\n    const nearAccountId = String(args.nearAccountId || '').trim();\n    if (!nearAccountId) throw new Error('Missing nearAccountId');\n\n    const registrationTxHash = String(args.registrationTxHash || '').trim();\n    if (!registrationTxHash) throw new Error('Missing registrationTxHash');\n\n    const url = `${base}/threshold-ed25519/keygen`;\n    const response = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      credentials: 'include',\n      body: JSON.stringify({\n        clientVerifyingShareB64u,\n        nearAccountId,\n        registrationTxHash,\n      }),\n    });\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      const errorText = await response.text();\n      return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${response.status}: ${errorText}` };\n    }\n\n    const json = await response.json();\n    return {\n      ok: !!json?.ok,\n      clientParticipantId: json?.clientParticipantId,\n      relayerParticipantId: json?.relayerParticipantId,\n      participantIds: json?.participantIds,\n      relayerKeyId: json?.relayerKeyId,\n      publicKey: json?.publicKey,\n      relayerVerifyingShareB64u: json?.relayerVerifyingShareB64u,\n      code: json?.code,\n      message: json?.message,\n    };\n  } catch (error: any) {\n    return { ok: false, error: error?.message || 'Failed to keygen threshold-ed25519 from registration tx' };\n  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package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/sdkPaths/base.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+
+//#region src/core/sdkPaths/base.ts
+/**
+* SDK Base (wallet origin)
+*
+* The wallet iframe host announces the absolute SDK base URL so that all
+* embedded assets (host script, Lit bundles) and module workers resolve from
+* the wallet origin in production. This keeps sensitive execution isolated
+* under the wallet site while allowing cross‑origin embedding.
+*
+* Writers:
+*  - Wallet iframe host (service) on boot and after PM_SET_CONFIG
+*  - App provider hook in dev when walletOrigin is configured
+*
+* Readers:
+*  - WebAuthnManager (to set worker base origin for managers)
+*  - Lit wrappers (to resolve embedded script/css URLs)
+*/
+const W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY = "__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__";
+const W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT = "W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_CHANGED";
+/**
+* @param url - Absolute SDK base URL (e.g., `${walletOrigin}/sdk/`).
+* @returns void
+*/
+function setEmbeddedBase(url) {
+	if (typeof window === "undefined") return;
+	const w = window;
+	w[W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY] = url;
+	window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT, { detail: url }));
+}
+/**
+* @param cb - Callback invoked with the new absolute base URL when it changes.
+* @returns Unsubscribe function to remove the listener.
+*/
+function onEmbeddedBaseChange(cb) {
+	if (typeof window === "undefined") return () => {};
+	const handler = (e) => {
+		const d = e.detail;
+		if (typeof d === "string" && d.length > 0) cb(d);
+	};
+	window.addEventListener(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT, handler, { passive: true });
+	return () => window.removeEventListener(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT, handler);
+}
+
+//#endregion
+exports.onEmbeddedBaseChange = onEmbeddedBaseChange;
+exports.setEmbeddedBase = setEmbeddedBase;
+//# sourceMappingURL=base.js.map

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/sdkPaths/base.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"base.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../src/core/sdkPaths/base.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SDK Base (wallet origin)\n *\n * The wallet iframe host announces the absolute SDK base URL so that all\n * embedded assets (host script, Lit bundles) and module workers resolve from\n * the wallet origin in production. This keeps sensitive execution isolated\n * under the wallet site while allowing cross‑origin embedding.\n *\n * Writers:\n *  - Wallet iframe host (service) on boot and after PM_SET_CONFIG\n *  - App provider hook in dev when walletOrigin is configured\n *\n * Readers:\n *  - WebAuthnManager (to set worker base origin for managers)\n *  - Lit wrappers (to resolve embedded script/css URLs)\n */\nexport const W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY = '__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__'\nexport const W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT = 'W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_CHANGED'\n\n/**\n * Typed CustomEvent emitted when the wallet SDK base changes.\n * Detail contains the absolute base URL string (e.g., `${walletOrigin}/sdk/`).\n */\nexport type WalletSdkBaseChangedEvent = CustomEvent<string>\n\nexport interface WalletSDKBase {\n [W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY]?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * @returns Absolute SDK base URL (e.g., `${walletOrigin}/sdk/`) when set, otherwise undefined.\n */\nexport function getEmbeddedBase(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof window === 'undefined') return undefined\n  const w = window as unknown as WalletSDKBase\n  const v = w[W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY]\n  return typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0 ? v : undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * @param url - Absolute SDK base URL (e.g., `${walletOrigin}/sdk/`).\n * @returns void\n */\nexport function setEmbeddedBase(url: string): void {\n  if (typeof window === 'undefined') return\n  const w = window as unknown as WalletSDKBase\n  w[W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_KEY] = url\n  window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT as any, { detail: url }))\n}\n\n/**\n * @param cb - Callback invoked with the new absolute base URL when it changes.\n * @returns Unsubscribe function to remove the listener.\n */\nexport function onEmbeddedBaseChange(cb: (url: string) => void): () => void {\n  if (typeof window === 'undefined') return () => {}\n  const handler = (e: WalletSdkBaseChangedEvent) => {\n    const d = e.detail\n    if (typeof d === 'string' && d.length > 0) cb(d)\n  }\n  window.addEventListener(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT, handler as EventListener, { passive: true })\n  return () => window.removeEventListener(W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE_EVENT, handler as EventListener)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgBA,MAAa,0BAA0B;AACvC,MAAa,4BAA4B;;;;;AA0BzC,SAAgB,gBAAgB,KAAmB;AACjD,KAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAa;CACnC,MAAM,IAAI;AACV,GAAE,2BAA2B;AAC7B,QAAO,cAAc,IAAI,YAAY,2BAAkC,EAAE,QAAQ;;;;;;AAOnF,SAAgB,qBAAqB,IAAuC;AAC1E,KAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAa,cAAa;CAChD,MAAM,WAAW,MAAiC;EAChD,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE;AACZ,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG,IAAG;;AAEhD,QAAO,iBAAiB,2BAA2B,SAA0B,EAAE,SAAS;AACxF,cAAa,OAAO,oBAAoB,2BAA2B"}

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/sdkPaths/workers.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+
+//#region src/core/sdkPaths/workers.ts
+/**
+* Resolve the base origin for worker scripts.
+* Priority:
+* 1) window.__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__ (absolute `${walletOrigin}${sdkBasePath}/`) → take its origin (only if same-origin)
+* 2) window.location.origin (host/app origin)
+*
+* @returns The origin (protocol + host [+ port]) used to resolve worker script URLs.
+*          Prefers the wallet SDK base origin; falls back to the current window origin.
+*/
+function resolveWorkerBaseOrigin() {
+	const currentOrigin = typeof window !== "undefined" && window.location?.origin ? window.location.origin : "";
+	try {
+		const embeddedBase = window?.__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__;
+		if (embeddedBase) {
+			const embeddedOrigin = new URL(embeddedBase, currentOrigin || "https://invalid.local").origin;
+			if (embeddedOrigin === currentOrigin) return embeddedOrigin;
+		}
+	} catch {}
+	return currentOrigin;
+}
+function resolveWorkerUrl(input, opts) {
+	const worker = opts.worker;
+	const baseOrigin = opts.baseOrigin || resolveWorkerBaseOrigin() || (typeof window !== "undefined" ? window.location.origin : "") || "https://invalid.local";
+	try {
+		const ovAny = typeof window !== "undefined" ? window : {};
+		const override = worker === "signer" ? ovAny.__W3A_SIGNER_WORKER_URL__ : ovAny.__W3A_VRF_WORKER_URL__;
+		const candidate = typeof override === "string" && override ? override : input || defaultWorkerPath(worker);
+		if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(candidate)) return new URL(candidate).toString();
+		return new URL(candidate, baseOrigin).toString();
+	} catch {
+		try {
+			return new URL(input || defaultWorkerPath(worker), baseOrigin).toString();
+		} catch {}
+		return input || defaultWorkerPath(worker);
+	}
+}
+function defaultWorkerPath(worker) {
+	return worker === "signer" ? "/sdk/workers/web3authn-signer.worker.js" : "/sdk/workers/web3authn-vrf.worker.js";
+}
+
+//#endregion
+exports.resolveWorkerBaseOrigin = resolveWorkerBaseOrigin;
+exports.resolveWorkerUrl = resolveWorkerUrl;
+//# sourceMappingURL=workers.js.map

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/sdkPaths/workers.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"workers.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../src/core/sdkPaths/workers.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Resolve the base origin for worker scripts.\n * Priority:\n * 1) window.__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__ (absolute `${walletOrigin}${sdkBasePath}/`) → take its origin (only if same-origin)\n * 2) window.location.origin (host/app origin)\n *\n * @returns The origin (protocol + host [+ port]) used to resolve worker script URLs.\n *          Prefers the wallet SDK base origin; falls back to the current window origin.\n */\nexport function resolveWorkerBaseOrigin(): string {\n  const currentOrigin =\n    (typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.location?.origin)\n      ? window.location.origin\n      : '';\n\n  // Only allow worker scripts to resolve from the embedded base when it matches\n  // the current origin. Cross-origin worker scripts are not reliably loadable\n  // across browsers (even for module workers) and will fail with CORS errors.\n  try {\n    const embeddedBase = (window as any)?.__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__ as string | undefined;\n    if (embeddedBase) {\n      const embeddedOrigin = new URL(embeddedBase, currentOrigin || 'https://invalid.local').origin;\n      if (embeddedOrigin === currentOrigin) {\n        return embeddedOrigin;\n      }\n    }\n  } catch {}\n\n  return currentOrigin;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an absolute worker script URL from a path or absolute URL.\n * If `input` is a path (e.g., `/sdk/workers/foo.js`), it will be resolved\n * against the wallet origin (from `__W3A_WALLET_SDK_BASE__`) when available,\n * otherwise against the host origin.\n *\n * @param input - Absolute URL or path (e.g., `/sdk/workers/web3authn-signer.worker.js`).\n * @returns Absolute URL to the worker script, resolved against the wallet origin when available,\n *          otherwise against the current window origin.\n */\nexport function resolveWorkerScriptUrl(input: string): string {\n  return resolveWorkerUrl(input, { worker: detectWorkerFromPath(input) })\n}\n\nexport function resolveWorkerUrl(\n  input: string | undefined,\n  opts: { worker: 'signer' | 'vrf'; baseOrigin?: string }\n): string {\n  const worker = opts.worker\n  const baseOrigin = opts.baseOrigin || resolveWorkerBaseOrigin() || (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.origin : '') || 'https://invalid.local'\n  try {\n    // Prefer explicit per-worker URL override\n    const ovAny = (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? (window as any) : {}) as any\n    const override = worker === 'signer' ? ovAny.__W3A_SIGNER_WORKER_URL__ : ovAny.__W3A_VRF_WORKER_URL__\n    const candidate = (typeof override === 'string' && override) ? override : (input || defaultWorkerPath(worker))\n    if (/^https?:\\/\\//i.test(candidate)) {\n      return new URL(candidate).toString()\n    }\n    return new URL(candidate, baseOrigin).toString()\n  } catch {\n    try { return new URL(input || defaultWorkerPath(worker), baseOrigin).toString() } catch {}\n    return input || defaultWorkerPath(worker)\n  }\n}\n\nfunction detectWorkerFromPath(p: string): 'signer' | 'vrf' {\n  return /web3authn-signer\\.worker\\.js(?:$|\\?)/.test(p) ? 'signer' : 'vrf'\n}\n\nfunction defaultWorkerPath(worker: 'signer' | 'vrf'): string {\n  return worker === 'signer' ? '/sdk/workers/web3authn-signer.worker.js' : '/sdk/workers/web3authn-vrf.worker.js'\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AASA,SAAgB,0BAAkC;CAChD,MAAM,gBACH,OAAO,WAAW,eAAe,OAAO,UAAU,SAC/C,OAAO,SAAS,SAChB;AAKN,KAAI;EACF,MAAM,eAAgB,QAAgB;AACtC,MAAI,cAAc;GAChB,MAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,cAAc,iBAAiB,yBAAyB;AACvF,OAAI,mBAAmB,cACrB,QAAO;;SAGL;AAER,QAAO;;AAiBT,SAAgB,iBACd,OACA,MACQ;CACR,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;CACpB,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,cAAc,8BAA8B,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AACpI,KAAI;EAEF,MAAM,QAAS,OAAO,WAAW,cAAe,SAAiB;EACjE,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,MAAM,4BAA4B,MAAM;EAC/E,MAAM,YAAa,OAAO,aAAa,YAAY,WAAY,WAAY,SAAS,kBAAkB;AACtG,MAAI,gBAAgB,KAAK,WACvB,QAAO,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW;AAE5B,SAAO,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY;SAChC;AACN,MAAI;AAAE,UAAO,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAS,YAAY;UAAmB;AACxF,SAAO,SAAS,kBAAkB;;;AAQtC,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAkC;AAC3D,QAAO,WAAW,WAAW,4CAA4C"}

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519AuthSession.js

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+const require_validation = require('../../utils/validation.js');
+const require_base64 = require('../../utils/base64.js');
+const require_participants = require('../../threshold/participants.js');
+const require_credentialsHelpers = require('../WebAuthnManager/credentialsHelpers.js');
+
+//#region src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519AuthSession.ts
+const authSessionCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function makeThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheKey(args) {
+	const relayerUrl = require_validation.stripTrailingSlashes(require_validation.toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));
+	const participantIds = require_participants.normalizeThresholdEd25519ParticipantIds(args.participantIds);
+	return [
+		String(args.nearAccountId || "").trim(),
+		String(args.rpId || "").trim(),
+		relayerUrl,
+		String(args.relayerKeyId || "").trim(),
+		...participantIds ? [participantIds.join(",")] : []
+	].join("|");
+}
+function getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey) {
+	const entry = authSessionCache.get(cacheKey);
+	if (!entry) return null;
+	if (typeof entry.expiresAtMs === "number" && Number.isFinite(entry.expiresAtMs) && Date.now() >= entry.expiresAtMs) {
+		authSessionCache.delete(cacheKey);
+		return null;
+	}
+	return entry;
+}
+function putCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey, entry) {
+	authSessionCache.set(cacheKey, entry);
+}
+function clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey) {
+	authSessionCache.delete(cacheKey);
+}
+function clearAllCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessions() {
+	authSessionCache.clear();
+}
+function getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessionJwt(cacheKey) {
+	const cached = getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey);
+	const jwt = cached?.jwt;
+	if (typeof jwt === "string") {
+		const trimmed = jwt.trim();
+		if (trimmed) return trimmed;
+	}
+	if (cached) clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey);
+	return void 0;
+}
+async function mintThresholdEd25519AuthSession(args) {
+	const relayerUrl = require_validation.stripTrailingSlashes(require_validation.toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));
+	if (!relayerUrl) return {
+		ok: false,
+		code: "invalid_args",
+		message: "Missing relayerUrl for threshold session mint"
+	};
+	if (typeof fetch !== "function") return {
+		ok: false,
+		code: "unsupported",
+		message: "fetch is not available for threshold session mint"
+	};
+	const toBytes = (b64u) => {
+		if (!b64u) return [];
+		return Array.from(require_base64.base64UrlDecode(b64u));
+	};
+	const intent_digest_32 = toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.intentDigest);
+	if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) return {
+		ok: false,
+		code: "invalid_args",
+		message: "Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url 32 bytes)"
+	};
+	const clientVerifyingShareBytes = toBytes(args.clientVerifyingShareB64u);
+	if (clientVerifyingShareBytes.length !== 32) return {
+		ok: false,
+		code: "invalid_args",
+		message: "Missing or invalid clientVerifyingShareB64u (expected base64url 32 bytes)"
+	};
+	const session_policy_digest_32 = toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32);
+	if (session_policy_digest_32.length !== 32) return {
+		ok: false,
+		code: "invalid_args",
+		message: "Missing vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32 (expected base64url 32 bytes) for threshold session mint"
+	};
+	const vrf_data = {
+		vrf_input_data: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfInput),
+		vrf_output: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfOutput),
+		vrf_proof: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfProof),
+		public_key: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey),
+		user_id: args.vrfChallenge.userId,
+		rp_id: args.vrfChallenge.rpId,
+		block_height: Number(args.vrfChallenge.blockHeight || 0),
+		block_hash: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.blockHash),
+		intent_digest_32,
+		session_policy_digest_32
+	};
+	const webauthn_authentication = require_credentialsHelpers.removePrfOutputGuard(args.webauthnAuthentication);
+	try {
+		const url = `${relayerUrl}/threshold-ed25519/session`;
+		const response = await fetch(url, {
+			method: "POST",
+			headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+			credentials: args.sessionKind === "cookie" ? "include" : "omit",
+			body: JSON.stringify({
+				sessionKind: args.sessionKind,
+				relayerKeyId: args.relayerKeyId,
+				clientVerifyingShareB64u: args.clientVerifyingShareB64u,
+				sessionPolicy: args.sessionPolicy,
+				vrf_data,
+				webauthn_authentication
+			})
+		});
+		const data = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
+		if (!response.ok) return {
+			ok: false,
+			code: data.code || "http_error",
+			message: data.message || `HTTP ${response.status}`
+		};
+		const expiresAtMs = (() => {
+			const raw = data.expiresAt ? Date.parse(data.expiresAt) : NaN;
+			return Number.isFinite(raw) ? raw : void 0;
+		})();
+		return {
+			ok: data.ok === true,
+			sessionId: data.sessionId,
+			expiresAtMs,
+			remainingUses: data.remainingUses,
+			jwt: data.jwt,
+			...data.code ? { code: data.code } : {},
+			...data.message ? { message: data.message } : {}
+		};
+	} catch (e) {
+		const msg = String(e && typeof e === "object" && "message" in e ? e.message : e || "Failed to mint threshold session");
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			code: "network_error",
+			message: msg
+		};
+	}
+}
+
+//#endregion
+exports.clearAllCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessions = clearAllCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessions;
+exports.clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession = clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession;
+exports.getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessionJwt = getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessionJwt;
+exports.makeThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheKey = makeThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheKey;
+exports.mintThresholdEd25519AuthSession = mintThresholdEd25519AuthSession;
+exports.putCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession = putCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession;
+//# sourceMappingURL=thresholdEd25519AuthSession.js.map

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519AuthSession.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"thresholdEd25519AuthSession.js","names":["stripTrailingSlashes","toTrimmedString","normalizeThresholdEd25519ParticipantIds","base64UrlDecode","removePrfOutputGuard","e: unknown"],"sources":["../../../../../../src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519AuthSession.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { base64UrlDecode } from '@/utils/encoders';\nimport { stripTrailingSlashes, toTrimmedString } from '@/utils/validation';\nimport { removePrfOutputGuard } from '../WebAuthnManager/credentialsHelpers';\nimport type { VRFChallenge } from '../types/vrf-worker';\nimport type { ThresholdEd25519SessionPolicy } from './thresholdSessionPolicy';\nimport type { WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential } from '../types/webauthn';\nimport { normalizeThresholdEd25519ParticipantIds } from '../../threshold/participants';\n\nexport type ThresholdEd25519SessionKind = 'jwt' | 'cookie';\n\nexport type ThresholdEd25519AuthSession = {\n  sessionKind: ThresholdEd25519SessionKind;\n  policy: ThresholdEd25519SessionPolicy;\n  policyJson: string;\n  sessionPolicyDigest32: string;\n  jwt?: string;\n  expiresAtMs?: number;\n};\n\ntype ThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheEntry = ThresholdEd25519AuthSession;\n\nconst authSessionCache = new Map<string, ThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheEntry>();\n\nexport function makeThresholdEd25519AuthSessionCacheKey(args: {\n  nearAccountId: string;\n  rpId: string;\n  relayerUrl: string;\n  relayerKeyId: string;\n  participantIds?: number[];\n}): string {\n  const relayerUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));\n  const participantIds = normalizeThresholdEd25519ParticipantIds(args.participantIds);\n  return [\n    String(args.nearAccountId || '').trim(),\n    String(args.rpId || '').trim(),\n    relayerUrl,\n    String(args.relayerKeyId || '').trim(),\n    ...(participantIds ? [participantIds.join(',')] : []),\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\nexport function getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey: string): ThresholdEd25519AuthSession | null {\n  const entry = authSessionCache.get(cacheKey);\n  if (!entry) return null;\n\n  if (typeof entry.expiresAtMs === 'number' && Number.isFinite(entry.expiresAtMs) && Date.now() >= entry.expiresAtMs) {\n    authSessionCache.delete(cacheKey);\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  return entry;\n}\n\nexport function putCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey: string, entry: ThresholdEd25519AuthSession): void {\n  authSessionCache.set(cacheKey, entry);\n}\n\nexport function clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey: string): void {\n  authSessionCache.delete(cacheKey);\n}\n\nexport function clearAllCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessions(): void {\n  authSessionCache.clear();\n}\n\nexport function getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSessionJwt(cacheKey: string): string | undefined {\n  const cached = getCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey);\n  const jwt = cached?.jwt;\n  if (typeof jwt === 'string') {\n    const trimmed = jwt.trim();\n    if (trimmed) return trimmed;\n  }\n  if (cached) clearCachedThresholdEd25519AuthSession(cacheKey);\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function mintThresholdEd25519AuthSession(args: {\n  relayerUrl: string;\n  sessionKind: ThresholdEd25519SessionKind;\n  relayerKeyId: string;\n  clientVerifyingShareB64u: string;\n  sessionPolicy: ThresholdEd25519SessionPolicy;\n  vrfChallenge: VRFChallenge;\n  webauthnAuthentication: WebAuthnAuthenticationCredential;\n}): Promise<{\n  ok: boolean;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  expiresAtMs?: number;\n  remainingUses?: number;\n  jwt?: string;\n  code?: string;\n  message?: string;\n}> {\n  const relayerUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));\n  if (!relayerUrl) {\n    return { ok: false, code: 'invalid_args', message: 'Missing relayerUrl for threshold session mint' };\n  }\n\n  if (typeof fetch !== 'function') {\n    return { ok: false, code: 'unsupported', message: 'fetch is not available for threshold session mint' };\n  }\n\n  const toBytes = (b64u: string | undefined): number[] => {\n    if (!b64u) return [];\n    return Array.from(base64UrlDecode(b64u));\n  };\n\n  const intent_digest_32 = toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.intentDigest);\n  if (intent_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n    return { ok: false, code: 'invalid_args', message: 'Missing or invalid vrfChallenge.intentDigest (expected base64url 32 bytes)' };\n  }\n\n  const clientVerifyingShareBytes = toBytes(args.clientVerifyingShareB64u);\n  if (clientVerifyingShareBytes.length !== 32) {\n    return { ok: false, code: 'invalid_args', message: 'Missing or invalid clientVerifyingShareB64u (expected base64url 32 bytes)' };\n  }\n\n  const session_policy_digest_32 = toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32);\n  if (session_policy_digest_32.length !== 32) {\n    return { ok: false, code: 'invalid_args', message: 'Missing vrfChallenge.sessionPolicyDigest32 (expected base64url 32 bytes) for threshold session mint' };\n  }\n\n  const vrf_data = {\n    vrf_input_data: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfInput),\n    vrf_output: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfOutput),\n    vrf_proof: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfProof),\n    public_key: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.vrfPublicKey),\n    user_id: args.vrfChallenge.userId,\n    rp_id: args.vrfChallenge.rpId,\n    block_height: Number(args.vrfChallenge.blockHeight || 0),\n    block_hash: toBytes(args.vrfChallenge.blockHash),\n    intent_digest_32,\n    session_policy_digest_32,\n  };\n\n  // Never send PRF outputs to the relay.\n  const webauthn_authentication = removePrfOutputGuard(args.webauthnAuthentication);\n\n  type ThresholdEd25519SessionMintResponseBody = Partial<{\n    ok: boolean;\n    sessionId: string;\n    expiresAt: string;\n    remainingUses: number;\n    jwt: string;\n    code: string;\n    message: string;\n  }>;\n\n  try {\n    const url = `${relayerUrl}/threshold-ed25519/session`;\n    const response = await fetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      credentials: args.sessionKind === 'cookie' ? 'include' : 'omit',\n      body: JSON.stringify({\n        sessionKind: args.sessionKind,\n        relayerKeyId: args.relayerKeyId,\n        clientVerifyingShareB64u: args.clientVerifyingShareB64u,\n        sessionPolicy: args.sessionPolicy,\n        vrf_data,\n        webauthn_authentication,\n      }),\n    });\n\n    const data = (await response.json().catch(() => ({}))) as ThresholdEd25519SessionMintResponseBody;\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        code: data.code || 'http_error',\n        message: data.message || `HTTP ${response.status}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const expiresAtMs = (() => {\n      const raw = data.expiresAt ? 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package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.js

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+const require_validation = require('../../utils/validation.js');
+const require_signer_worker = require('../types/signer-worker.js');
+
+//#region src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.ts
+const DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS = 6e4;
+const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+const inFlight = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+const DEFAULT_WARN_TTL_MS = 10 * 6e4;
+const MAX_WARN_KEYS = 1e3;
+const warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+async function isRelayerThresholdEd25519ConfiguredBase(base, opts) {
+	if (!base) return false;
+	if (typeof fetch !== "function") return false;
+	const ttlMs = Math.max(0, Number(opts?.cacheTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS));
+	const now = Date.now();
+	const cached = cache.get(base);
+	if (cached && cached.expiresAtMs > now) return cached.configured;
+	const existing = inFlight.get(base);
+	if (existing) return existing;
+	const req = (async () => {
+		try {
+			const res = await fetch(`${base}/threshold-ed25519/healthz`, { method: "GET" });
+			if (!res.ok) {
+				cache.set(base, {
+					configured: false,
+					expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs
+				});
+				return false;
+			}
+			const data = await res.json().catch(() => null);
+			const configured = data?.configured === true;
+			cache.set(base, {
+				configured,
+				expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs
+			});
+			return configured;
+		} catch {
+			cache.set(base, {
+				configured: false,
+				expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs
+			});
+			return false;
+		} finally {
+			inFlight.delete(base);
+		}
+	})();
+	inFlight.set(base, req);
+	return req;
+}
+function coerceThresholdBehavior(input) {
+	return input === "fallback" || input === "strict" ? input : require_signer_worker.DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_BEHAVIOR;
+}
+function pruneWarned(nowMs) {
+	if (warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.size <= MAX_WARN_KEYS) return;
+	for (const [key, expiresAtMs] of warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.entries()) if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.delete(key);
+	while (warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.size > MAX_WARN_KEYS) {
+		const first = warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.keys().next().value;
+		if (!first) break;
+		warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.delete(first);
+	}
+}
+function warnOnce(key, message, opts) {
+	const nowMs = Date.now();
+	const ttlMs = Math.max(0, Math.floor(opts?.warnTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_WARN_TTL_MS));
+	if (ttlMs === 0) return;
+	pruneWarned(nowMs);
+	const existing = warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.get(key);
+	if (existing && existing > nowMs) return;
+	warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.set(key, nowMs + ttlMs);
+	console.warn(message);
+	opts?.warnings?.push(message);
+}
+async function fallbackToLocalSignerIfRelayerUnsupported(args) {
+	const requested = args.signerMode.mode;
+	if (requested !== "threshold-signer") return requested;
+	const base = require_validation.stripTrailingSlashes(require_validation.toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));
+	const behavior = coerceThresholdBehavior(require_signer_worker.getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode(args.signerMode));
+	const configured = await isRelayerThresholdEd25519ConfiguredBase(base, { cacheTtlMs: args.cacheTtlMs });
+	if (configured) return requested;
+	const msg = "[WebAuthnManager] signerMode=threshold-signer requested but the relayer does not support threshold signing";
+	if (behavior === "fallback") {
+		warnOnce(`${args.nearAccountId}|${base}`, `${msg}; falling back to local-signer`, {
+			warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs,
+			warnings: args.warnings
+		});
+		return "local-signer";
+	}
+	throw new Error(`${msg}; set signerMode={ mode: 'threshold-signer', behavior: 'fallback' } to allow local-signer fallback`);
+}
+async function resolveSignerModeForThresholdSigning(args) {
+	const requested = args.signerMode.mode;
+	if (requested !== "threshold-signer") return requested;
+	const behavior = coerceThresholdBehavior(require_signer_worker.getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode(args.signerMode));
+	if (!args.hasThresholdKeyMaterial) {
+		const msg = "[WebAuthnManager] signerMode=threshold-signer requested but threshold key material is unavailable";
+		if (behavior === "fallback") {
+			warnOnce(`${args.nearAccountId}|threshold-key-material-missing`, `${msg}; falling back to local-signer`, {
+				warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs,
+				warnings: args.warnings
+			});
+			return "local-signer";
+		}
+		throw new Error(`${msg}; set signerMode={ mode: 'threshold-signer', behavior: 'fallback' } to allow local-signer fallback`);
+	}
+	return fallbackToLocalSignerIfRelayerUnsupported({
+		nearAccountId: args.nearAccountId,
+		signerMode: args.signerMode,
+		relayerUrl: args.relayerUrl,
+		warnings: args.warnings,
+		cacheTtlMs: args.cacheTtlMs,
+		warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs
+	});
+}
+
+//#endregion
+exports.resolveSignerModeForThresholdSigning = resolveSignerModeForThresholdSigning;
+//# sourceMappingURL=thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.js.map

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.js","names":["DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_BEHAVIOR","stripTrailingSlashes","toTrimmedString","getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode"],"sources":["../../../../../../src/core/threshold/thresholdEd25519RelayerHealth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { SignerMode, ThresholdBehavior } from '../types/signer-worker';\nimport { DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_BEHAVIOR, getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode } from '../types/signer-worker';\nimport { stripTrailingSlashes, toTrimmedString } from '../../utils/validation';\n\nexport type ThresholdEd25519HealthzResponse =\n  | { ok: true; configured: true }\n  | { ok: false; configured: false; code?: string; message?: string };\n\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS = 60_000;\nconst cache = new Map<string, { configured: boolean; expiresAtMs: number }>();\nconst inFlight = new Map<string, Promise<boolean>>();\nconst DEFAULT_WARN_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000;\nconst MAX_WARN_KEYS = 1_000;\nconst warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey = new Map<string, number>();\n\nexport async function isRelayerThresholdEd25519Configured(\n  relayerUrl: string,\n  opts?: { cacheTtlMs?: number },\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const base = stripTrailingSlashes(toTrimmedString(relayerUrl));\n  return isRelayerThresholdEd25519ConfiguredBase(base, opts);\n}\n\nasync function isRelayerThresholdEd25519ConfiguredBase(\n  base: string,\n  opts?: { cacheTtlMs?: number },\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (!base) return false;\n  if (typeof fetch !== 'function') return false;\n\n  const ttlMs = Math.max(0, Number(opts?.cacheTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_MS));\n  const now = Date.now();\n  const cached = cache.get(base);\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAtMs > now) return cached.configured;\n\n  const existing = inFlight.get(base);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const req = (async (): Promise<boolean> => {\n    try {\n      const res = await fetch(`${base}/threshold-ed25519/healthz`, { method: 'GET' });\n      if (!res.ok) {\n        cache.set(base, { configured: false, expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs });\n        return false;\n      }\n      const data = (await res.json().catch(() => null)) as ThresholdEd25519HealthzResponse | null;\n      const configured = data?.configured === true;\n      cache.set(base, { configured, expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs });\n      return configured;\n    } catch {\n      cache.set(base, { configured: false, expiresAtMs: now + ttlMs });\n      return false;\n    } finally {\n      inFlight.delete(base);\n    }\n  })();\n\n  inFlight.set(base, req);\n  return req;\n}\n\nfunction coerceThresholdBehavior(input?: ThresholdBehavior): ThresholdBehavior {\n  return input === 'fallback' || input === 'strict' ? input : DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_BEHAVIOR;\n}\n\nfunction pruneWarned(nowMs: number): void {\n  if (warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.size <= MAX_WARN_KEYS) return;\n  for (const [key, expiresAtMs] of warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.entries()) {\n    if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.delete(key);\n  }\n  while (warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.size > MAX_WARN_KEYS) {\n    const first = warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.keys().next().value as string | undefined;\n    if (!first) break;\n    warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.delete(first);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction warnOnce(key: string, message: string, opts?: { warnTtlMs?: number; warnings?: string[] }): void {\n  const nowMs = Date.now();\n  const ttlMs = Math.max(0, Math.floor(opts?.warnTtlMs ?? DEFAULT_WARN_TTL_MS));\n  if (ttlMs === 0) return;\n  pruneWarned(nowMs);\n  const existing = warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.get(key);\n  if (existing && existing > nowMs) return;\n  warnedUnsupportedRelayerByKey.set(key, nowMs + ttlMs);\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n  console.warn(message);\n  opts?.warnings?.push(message);\n}\n\nexport async function fallbackToLocalSignerIfRelayerUnsupported(args: {\n  nearAccountId: string;\n  signerMode: SignerMode;\n  relayerUrl: string;\n  warnings?: string[];\n  cacheTtlMs?: number;\n  warnTtlMs?: number;\n}): Promise<SignerMode['mode']> {\n  const requested = args.signerMode.mode;\n  if (requested !== 'threshold-signer') return requested;\n\n  const base = stripTrailingSlashes(toTrimmedString(args.relayerUrl));\n  const behavior = coerceThresholdBehavior(getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode(args.signerMode));\n  const configured = await isRelayerThresholdEd25519ConfiguredBase(base, { cacheTtlMs: args.cacheTtlMs });\n  if (configured) return requested;\n\n  const msg = '[WebAuthnManager] signerMode=threshold-signer requested but the relayer does not support threshold signing';\n  if (behavior === 'fallback') {\n    warnOnce(`${args.nearAccountId}|${base}`, `${msg}; falling back to local-signer`, {\n      warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs,\n      warnings: args.warnings,\n    });\n    return 'local-signer';\n  }\n  throw new Error(`${msg}; set signerMode={ mode: 'threshold-signer', behavior: 'fallback' } to allow local-signer fallback`);\n}\n\nexport async function resolveSignerModeForThresholdSigning(args: {\n  nearAccountId: string;\n  signerMode: SignerMode;\n  relayerUrl: string;\n  hasThresholdKeyMaterial: boolean;\n  warnings?: string[];\n  cacheTtlMs?: number;\n  warnTtlMs?: number;\n}): Promise<SignerMode['mode']> {\n  const requested = args.signerMode.mode;\n  if (requested !== 'threshold-signer') return requested;\n\n  const behavior = coerceThresholdBehavior(getThresholdBehaviorFromSignerMode(args.signerMode));\n\n  if (!args.hasThresholdKeyMaterial) {\n    const msg = '[WebAuthnManager] signerMode=threshold-signer requested but threshold key material is unavailable';\n    if (behavior === 'fallback') {\n      warnOnce(`${args.nearAccountId}|threshold-key-material-missing`, `${msg}; falling back to local-signer`, {\n        warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs,\n        warnings: args.warnings,\n      });\n      return 'local-signer';\n    }\n    throw new Error(`${msg}; set signerMode={ mode: 'threshold-signer', behavior: 'fallback' } to allow local-signer fallback`);\n  }\n\n  return fallbackToLocalSignerIfRelayerUnsupported({\n    nearAccountId: args.nearAccountId,\n    signerMode: args.signerMode,\n    relayerUrl: args.relayerUrl,\n    warnings: args.warnings,\n    cacheTtlMs: args.cacheTtlMs,\n    warnTtlMs: args.warnTtlMs,\n  });\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAQA,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,MAAM,wBAAQ,IAAI;AAClB,MAAM,2BAAW,IAAI;AACrB,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK;AACjC,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,MAAM,gDAAgC,IAAI;AAU1C,eAAe,wCACb,MACA,MACkB;AAClB,KAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO;AAClB,KAAI,OAAO,UAAU,WAAY,QAAO;CAExC,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc;CACrD,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK;CACjB,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI;AACzB,KAAI,UAAU,OAAO,cAAc,IAAK,QAAO,OAAO;CAEtD,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,IAAI;AAC9B,KAAI,SAAU,QAAO;CAErB,MAAM,OAAO,YAA8B;AACzC,MAAI;GACF,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,6BAA6B,EAAE,QAAQ;AACvE,OAAI,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI;AACX,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM;KAAE,YAAY;KAAO,aAAa,MAAM;;AACxD,WAAO;;GAET,MAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY;GAC3C,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,eAAe;AACxC,SAAM,IAAI,MAAM;IAAE;IAAY,aAAa,MAAM;;AACjD,UAAO;UACD;AACN,SAAM,IAAI,MAAM;IAAE,YAAY;IAAO,aAAa,MAAM;;AACxD,UAAO;YACC;AACR,YAAS,OAAO;;;AAIpB,UAAS,IAAI,MAAM;AACnB,QAAO;;AAGT,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAA8C;AAC7E,QAAO,UAAU,cAAc,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQA;;AAG9D,SAAS,YAAY,OAAqB;AACxC,KAAI,8BAA8B,QAAQ,cAAe;AACzD,MAAK,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,gBAAgB,8BAA8B,UAC7D,KAAI,eAAe,MAAO,+BAA8B,OAAO;AAEjE,QAAO,8BAA8B,OAAO,eAAe;EACzD,MAAM,QAAQ,8BAA8B,OAAO,OAAO;AAC1D,MAAI,CAAC,MAAO;AACZ,gCAA8B,OAAO;;;AAIzC,SAAS,SAAS,KAAa,SAAiB,MAA0D;CACxG,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;CACnB,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa;AACxD,KAAI,UAAU,EAAG;AACjB,aAAY;CACZ,MAAM,WAAW,8BAA8B,IAAI;AACnD,KAAI,YAAY,WAAW,MAAO;AAClC,+BAA8B,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ;AAE/C,SAAQ,KAAK;AACb,OAAM,UAAU,KAAK;;AAGvB,eAAsB,0CAA0C,MAOhC;CAC9B,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW;AAClC,KAAI,cAAc,mBAAoB,QAAO;CAE7C,MAAM,OAAOC,wCAAqBC,mCAAgB,KAAK;CACvD,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAwBC,yDAAmC,KAAK;CACjF,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,wCAAwC,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK;AAC1F,KAAI,WAAY,QAAO;CAEvB,MAAM,MAAM;AACZ,KAAI,aAAa,YAAY;AAC3B,WAAS,GAAG,KAAK,cAAc,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,iCAAiC;GAChF,WAAW,KAAK;GAChB,UAAU,KAAK;;AAEjB,SAAO;;AAET,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI;;AAGzB,eAAsB,qCAAqC,MAQ3B;CAC9B,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW;AAClC,KAAI,cAAc,mBAAoB,QAAO;CAE7C,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAwBA,yDAAmC,KAAK;AAEjF,KAAI,CAAC,KAAK,yBAAyB;EACjC,MAAM,MAAM;AACZ,MAAI,aAAa,YAAY;AAC3B,YAAS,GAAG,KAAK,cAAc,kCAAkC,GAAG,IAAI,iCAAiC;IACvG,WAAW,KAAK;IAChB,UAAU,KAAK;;AAEjB,UAAO;;AAET,QAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI;;AAGzB,QAAO,0CAA0C;EAC/C,eAAe,KAAK;EACpB,YAAY,KAAK;EACjB,YAAY,KAAK;EACjB,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,YAAY,KAAK;EACjB,WAAW,KAAK"}

package/dist/cjs/react/src/core/threshold/thresholdSessionPolicy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+const require_base64 = require('../../utils/base64.js');
+const require_digests = require('../../utils/digests.js');
+const require_participants = require('../../threshold/participants.js');
+
+//#region src/core/threshold/thresholdSessionPolicy.ts
+const THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_VERSION = "threshold_session_v1";
+const THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_MAX_TTL_MS = 10 * 6e4;
+const THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_MAX_USES = 20;
+const DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY = {
+	ttlMs: 5 * 6e4,
+	remainingUses: 5
+};
+function clampThresholdSessionPolicy(input) {
+	const ttlMs = Math.max(0, Math.floor(Number(input.ttlMs) || 0));
+	const remainingUses = Math.max(0, Math.floor(Number(input.remainingUses) || 0));
+	return {
+		ttlMs: Math.min(ttlMs, THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_MAX_TTL_MS),
+		remainingUses: Math.min(remainingUses, THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_MAX_USES)
+	};
+}
+function generateThresholdSessionId() {
+	const id = typeof crypto !== "undefined" && typeof crypto.randomUUID === "function" ? crypto.randomUUID() : `tsess-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;
+	return `tsess-${id}`;
+}
+async function computeThresholdSessionPolicyDigest32(policy) {
+	const json = require_digests.alphabetizeStringify(policy);
+	const bytes = await require_digests.sha256BytesUtf8(json);
+	return require_base64.base64UrlEncode(bytes);
+}
+async function buildThresholdSessionPolicy(params) {
+	const sessionId = params.sessionId || generateThresholdSessionId();
+	const { ttlMs, remainingUses } = clampThresholdSessionPolicy({
+		ttlMs: params.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY.ttlMs,
+		remainingUses: params.remainingUses ?? DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY.remainingUses
+	});
+	const participantIds = require_participants.normalizeThresholdEd25519ParticipantIds(params.participantIds);
+	const policy = {
+		version: THRESHOLD_SESSION_POLICY_VERSION,
+		nearAccountId: params.nearAccountId,
+		rpId: params.rpId,
+		relayerKeyId: params.relayerKeyId,
+		sessionId,
+		...participantIds ? { participantIds } : {},
+		ttlMs,
+		remainingUses
+	};
+	const sessionPolicyDigest32 = await computeThresholdSessionPolicyDigest32(policy);
+	return {
+		policy,
+		policyJson: JSON.stringify(policy),
+		sessionPolicyDigest32
+	};
+}
+function isThresholdSessionAuthUnavailableError(err) {
+	const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+	return msg.includes("no cached threshold session token") || msg.includes("relayer threshold session expired") || msg.includes("threshold session exhausted") || msg.includes("threshold session expired") || msg.includes("Missing or invalid threshold session token") || msg.includes("Invalid session token kind") || msg.includes("/authorize HTTP 401") || msg.includes("/authorize HTTP 403");
+}
+function isThresholdSignerMissingKeyError(err) {
+	const msg = (err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)).toLowerCase();
+	return msg.includes("\"code\":\"missing_key\"") || msg.includes("missing_key") || msg.includes("unknown relayerkeyid") || msg.includes("call /threshold-ed25519/keygen");
+}
+
+//#endregion
+exports.buildThresholdSessionPolicy = buildThresholdSessionPolicy;
+exports.isThresholdSessionAuthUnavailableError = isThresholdSessionAuthUnavailableError;
+exports.isThresholdSignerMissingKeyError = isThresholdSignerMissingKeyError;
+//# sourceMappingURL=thresholdSessionPolicy.js.map